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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis seeks to explain the meaning and function of conscience in 
commercial law doctrine.  It argues that the idea of conscience in law bears its 
ordinary meaning.  When the courts use the language of conscience, they are 
simply expressing a moral judgement about whether, e.g. the defendant’s 
behaviour or a particular state of affairs conforms to the commonly held 
standards of right and wrong to which we all have access and of which we are 
all expected to be aware.  The thesis argues further that the language of 
conscience has a discernible but very limited function in commercial law 
doctrine.  It helps us to understand that in recognising and enforcing 
obligations, equity is giving effect to moral obligations, and that it will not do 
so unless the individual on whom the obligation is to be imposed has 
knowledge of the relevant facts.  However, beyond this, the language of 
conscience has little, if any, explanatory force.  For example, it tells us nothing 
about the moral principles underpinning particular doctrines, nor does it tell us 
what or how much an individual must know before it will be reasonable to 
treat her as subject to an obligation.  In fact, the courts’ tendency to invoke the 
language of conscience and unconscionability without regard to the limits of 
its explanatory power means that a number of important doctrinal questions 
remain perpetually unanswered and sometimes obscured.  Therefore, the thesis 
concludes that the courts should not continue to use the language of conscience 
without paying much greater attention to what it can and cannot explain. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
CONSCIENCE – THE CONUNDRUM  
 
This thesis seeks to explain the meaning and function of conscience in 
commercial law doctrine.  Conscience is an evocative word, which brings to 
mind ideas of religious morality and strongly held personal convictions. It 
conjures up hazy visions of the confessional and the ghosts of conscientious 
objectors.  More prosaically, it speaks to us of our internal moral barometer: 
our instinct for choosing good over bad, right over wrong and, when we are 
unsure or fail to make the right choice, of the inner promptings of guilt that 
nag us repeatedly.  It also alludes to intuitively understood moral precepts, 
which help us judge what is right or wrong and by which most of us try to live.  
Its dimensions are simultaneously internal and external, subjective and 
objective.  Thus, it is ‘the little inner voice which warns us that someone may 
be looking’1 and at the same time ‘a window through which one can see 
outward to the common truth which founds and sustains us all.’2   
 
The idea of conscience is largely impressionistic. If asked to identify behaviour 
described as ‘conscientious’ or ‘in accordance with good conscience’, we 
could probably do it easily enough: giving alms to charity and returning a 
dropped wallet to a stranger in the street are obvious examples.  In all 
likelihood, we would also recognize ‘unconscientious’ or ‘unconscionable’ 
behaviour without too much difficulty: lying, cheating in an exam, consciously 
taking advantage of another’s weakness to gain an advantage or deliberately 
taking something that does not belong to us.  Nevertheless, we might find it 
difficult to define terms such as ‘conscientious’, ‘in good conscience’, 
‘unconscientious’ and ‘unconscionable’ more precisely than to equate them 
with moral goodness or immoral behaviour, as appropriate. 
 
                                                
1 H.L. Mencken, A Little Book in C Major (John Lane Co 1916) 42, [12]. 
2 J. Ratzinger, ‘Conscience and Truth’ (10th Workshop for Bishops, Dallas, Texas, February 
1991) 2. 
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The blurred contours, intuitive content and distinctive moral overtones of the 
idea of conscience might well lead us to think that commercial law doctrine is 
not its obvious habitat.  Great store is set by the goals of certainty and 
predictability in law,3 particularly in relation to commercial matters.4  
Commercial certainty depends to a great extent on the meaning and function of 
legal concepts being clear, stable and easily understood by commercial actors.  
As Kitchin J recently commented, ‘Business needs to know where it stands.’5 
Yet judges regularly invoke the idea of conscience  - or variants such as 
unconscientiousness and unconscionability - in a wide range of private law 
doctrines which affect commercial life, such as trusts law,6 the liability of third 
parties for receipt of trust property,7 mistake,8 economic duress,9 undue 
influence10 and unconscionable bargains.11  
 
Views tend to polarise as to whether the idea of conscience can provide a 
useful organising legal principle or whether in fact it encourages judges to 
engage in unacceptably intuitive evaluations and confuses more than it 
elucidates.  Thus, on the one hand it has been argued that the idea of 
unconscionability can operate as a principle for the unification of doctrines 
                                                
3 O. Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harv L Rev 457, 461. 
4 Compania de Naviera Nedelka SA v Tradax Internacional SA (The Tres Flores) [1974] QB 
264 (CA), 278 (Roskill LJ); Tekdata Interconnections Ltd v Amphenol Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 
1209, [2009] 2 CLC 866 [25] (Dyson LJ); Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade 
Corporation Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB) [123] (Leggatt LJ); Virulite LLC v Virulite 
Distribution Ltd [2014] EWHC 366 (QB) [142] (Stuart-Smith J). 
5 Arrow Generics Ltd v Merck & Co Inc [2007] EWHC 1900 (Pat), [2008] Bus LR 487 [58] (a 
patents case). 
6 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 
(HL), 705 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
7 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [1991] 1 Ch 437 
(CA), 456 (Nourse LJ); Arthur v Attorney General of Turks and Caicos [2012] UKPC 30 [33] 
(Sir Terence Etherton). 
8 Thomas Bates & Son Ltd v Wyndham's (Lingerie) Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 505 (CA), 515 (Buckley 
LJ); Commission for the New Towns v Cooper (Great Britain) Ltd [1995] Ch 259 (CA), 277 
(Stuart Smith LJ). 
9 Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep 620; [1999] CLC 230 (QB), 
251 (Mance J) (obiter); Alf Vaughan & Co Ltd (In Receivership) v Royscot Trust Plc [1999] 1 
All ER (Comm) 856 (Ch), 863 (Judge Rich QC). 
10 Dickinson v Lowery Unreported, Auld J, 23 March 1990 (QB), p. 20 of transcript (Auld LJ); 
also Allcard v Skinner (1887) 35 Ch D 145 (CA), 190 (Bowen LJ); Credit Lyonnais Bank 
Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All ER 144 (CA), 153-4 (Millett LJ) (presumed undue 
influence); Bank of Credit and Commerce International v Aboody [1990] 1 QB 923 (CA), 970 
(Slade LJ) (actual undue influence). 
11 Hart v O'Connor [1985] AC 1000 (PC), 1027-28 (Lord Brightman); Boustany v Pigott 
(1993) 69 P & CR 298, 303 (Lord Templeman). 
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such as undue influence, economic duress and unconscionable bargains.12  On 
the other hand the use of the idea of conscience in commercial cases has been 
subject to criticism on the grounds of vagueness, subjectivity and uncertainty.13  
As early as 1532 reference was made to ‘a law called “conscience”, which is 
always uncertain and depends for the greater part on the “arbytrement” of the 
judge in conscience’.14  As Birks put it more recently, ‘there are hundreds of 
kinds of equitable fraud and there are hundreds of kinds of unconscionable 
behaviour.’15  It is therefore said that conscience is ‘a category of meaningless 
reference likely both to mislead judges and to threaten the position of, in 
particular, commercial actors.’16  It is also argued that different judges may 
take a different view as to what is right or wrong in a particular context, and 
this makes it possible for them to use the idea of conscience as a thin cloak for 
the implementation of their own subjectively held moral beliefs.17   
 
Moreover, there is concern that the use of the idea of conscience in law may 
impede ‘careful categorisation’ of cases and undermine the idea that like cases 
ought to be treated alike,18 thus affecting the correct classification of matters 
involving conscience within the taxonomy of the law.  There are questions 
about how to distinguish between matters of conscience that are justiciable and 
those that are not in order to avoid the courts having to respond to every injury 
                                                
12 M. Halliwell, Equity and Good Conscience (2nd edn, Old Bailey Press 2004); A. Phang, 
‘Undue Influence - Methodology, Sources and Linkages’ [1995] JBL 552, 568-9, 570 (all three 
doctrines); D. Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ (1998) 114 
LQR 479, 482; J. Devenney and A. Chandler, ‘Unconscionability and the Taxonomy of Undue 
Influence’ [2007] JBL 541, 542 (unconscionable bargains and undue influence). 
13 P. Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26 UWAL Rev 1, 
16-17; P. Birks, ‘Equity, Conscience and Unjust Enrichment’ (1999) 23 MULR 1, 14-15; C. 
Rickett, ‘Unconscionability and Commercial Law’ (2005) 24 UQLJ 73, 74. 
14 J. Guy, Christopher St German on Chancery and Statute (Selden Society 1985) 79, quoting 
the words of Thomas Audley in a lecture given by him in 1532 and contained in The Reports 
of Sir John Spelman, Vol II, 198-200; F. Pollock, ‘The Transformation of Equity’ in P. 
Vinogradoff (ed), Essays in Legal History (Clarendon Press 1913) 293. 
15 Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (n 13) 16. 
16 Rickett (n 13) 74.  In a similar vein: A. Leff, ‘Unconscionability and the Code - the 
Emperor's New Clause’ (1967) 115 U Phil L Rev 485, 557; P. Finn, ‘Unconscionable 
Conduct’ (1994) 8 JCL 37, 37; J. Wilson, ‘The Institutional and Doctrinal Roles of 
'Conscience' in the Law of Contract’ (2005) 11 Auckland U L Rev 1, 4; E. Voyiakis, 
‘Unconscionability and the Value of Choice’ in M. Kenny, J. Devenney and L. Fox O'Mahony 
(eds), Unconscionability in European Private Financial Transactions (2010) 80; K. Low, 
‘Nonfeasance in Equity’ (2012) 128 LQR 63, 67. 
17 Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (n 13) 16-17; Birks, ‘Equity, 
Conscience and Unjust Enrichment’ (n 13) 14. 
18 Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (n 13) 17. 
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or injustice, however small.19  All these criticisms reflect broader concerns 
about the relationship between the law and morality and tensions within the 
law between certainty and flexibility, rules and other standards, the common 
law and equity and distributive and corrective justice.  How arguments about 
the utility of the idea of conscience in law are resolved therefore has 
implications for the coherence of the law in general.   
 
In light of the above, this thesis seeks to provide a systematic, pan-doctrinal 
analysis of the meaning and function of conscience in commercial law.  The 
quest for meaning has largely been overlooked but it is important in order that 
we may consider properly ‘the philosophical foundations and principled 
interpretation of conscience’ in private law.20   It is also important to assess 
whether the idea of conscience performs a necessary function in adjudication 
or adds little to legal analysis other than to reassure us that the resolution of the 
practical problem in question is in some sense fair.  This requires us to pay 
close attention to how the idea of conscience functions within and across 
doctrines,21 as each doctrine provides a separate framework within which the 
idea of conscience works.  It is hoped that this will aid a more principled 
analysis in future cases. 
ARGUMENT AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The thesis draws on the etymology and ordinary meaning of the word 
‘conscience’ as the starting point for what conscience and its variants might 
mean in law.  The thesis goes on to analyse the way in which the courts use the 
language of conscience in justifying or explaining the basis of their 
interventions and the nature of the relief in a range of commercial law 
doctrines relating to: (i) the creation of express and non-express trusts and 
claims against third parties for interference with equitable relationships (trusts, 
                                                
19 Ibid 17. 
20 G. Virgo, ‘Whose Conscience? Unconscionability in the Common Law of Obligations’ 
(Obligations VII, Hong Kong, 15-18 July 2014) 5 (cited with the author’s permission). 
21 R. Bigwood, ‘Conscience and the Liberal Conception of Contract: Observing Basic 
Distinctions, Part 1’ (2000) 16 JCL 1, 8; Wilson (n 16) 3; I. Samet, ‘What Conscience Can Do 
For Equity’ (2012) 3 Jurisprudence 13, 16. 
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the equitable proprietary claim, knowing receipt and dishonest assistance); and 
(ii) the formation of contracts (mistake, misrepresentation, economic duress, 
undue influence and unconscionable bargains).   
 
In light of this analysis, the thesis makes a number of arguments.  First, it 
argues that the idea of conscience as it appears in law is not a term of art or a 
principle.  When the courts use the language of conscience and 
unconscionability, they are simply expressing a moral judgment about 
whether, e.g. the defendant’s behaviour or a particular state of affairs conforms 
to the commonly held standards of right and wrong to which we all have 
access and of which we are all expected to be aware.  Secondly, it argues that 
the language of conscience and unconscionability has a discernible but very 
limited explanatory function in the context of trusts and contract law.  It helps 
us to understand that all obligations are rooted in morality and that equity does 
not expect us to comply with an obligation unless we have knowledge of the 
relevant facts.  Only then is our capacity for moral reasoning invoked, so that 
we can - through the application of our innate moral understanding to the facts 
as we know them to be - determine what we ought to do in the circumstances.  
At this point (and not before) equity will underwrite the moral obligation with 
the force of law.  Thirdly, it argues that beyond this, the language of 
conscience has little, if any, explanatory force.   The courts’ tendency to 
invoke the language of conscience and unconscionability without regard to the 
limits of its explanatory power means that a number of important questions 
remain perpetually unanswered and sometimes obscured.  Thus, the language 
of conscience cannot help us to identify what moral principles underpin 
doctrines, what or how much an individual must know in order to come under 
an obligation, the nature and scope of obligations or the necessary 
preconditions for rescission or relief for wrongdoing.  Sometimes the language 
of conscience also obscures necessary distinctions between liabilities and 
obligations and between a concern to protect autonomy and a concern to 
prevent wrongdoing.  For all these reasons, the thesis concludes that if judges 
continue to use the language of conscience, not only must they ‘articulate what 
it is that leads [them] to the conclusion that the conduct in question should 
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wear this label’,22 but they must also be mindful of what the concept of 
conscience can and cannot explain. 
 
Inevitably, because of the constraints of space it has not been possible to 
consider every area of law in which the language of conscience occurs.  For 
this reason, some boundaries have had to be drawn as follows.  First, the thesis 
is concerned with commercial, private law doctrine.  For this reason, a detailed 
consideration of the idea of conscience as it appears in legislation23 is beyond 
the scope of this work.  Secondly, doctrines in which the language of 
conscience may appear but which do not quite fit within either of the two 
broad groups of doctrines referred to above, such as, e.g. abuse of confidence, 
contractual exclusion clauses, relief against penalties and forfeiture and 
estoppel are not discussed here (although further work on the latter two 
doctrines is in progress).  Thirdly, doctrines primarily concerned with personal 
rather than commercial relationships, such as family home constructive trusts, 
secret trusts and mutual wills, do not feature in this work.  Finally, the purpose 
of this thesis is to explain the role of conscience in English law; it is not a 
comparative study.  That said, the laws of other jurisdictions, particularly 
Australia and New Zealand, offer many insights concerning the role of 
conscience in a commercial law context.  Consequently, the thesis makes 
reference to the laws of such jurisdictions where relevant.  
 
This chapter continues by outlining the difficulties associated with analysing 
conscience in law by reference to the approach of the courts and the academic 
literature.  It then takes as its own starting point for the analysis of the concept 
of conscience its etymology and dictionary definitions, in order to establish its 
non-legal meaning and distinguish it from other, related concepts.   It considers 
how various aspects of the non-legal idea of conscience were visible in the 
idea of conscience as it developed in equity, and finishes by outlining briefly 
the content of the chapters that follow. 
                                                
22 K. Hayne, ‘Letting Justice be Done Without the Heavens Falling’ (2002) 27 Mon LR 12, 16. 
23 Such as s.2-302, Uniform Commercial Code (USA); s.51AA, Trade Practices Act 1974 
(Aus).   
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THE DIFFICULTIES OF ANALYSING CONSCIENCE 
 
The idea of conscience has not proved susceptible to easy explanation or clear 
categorisation.  Judges themselves sometimes find the idea of conscience 
difficult to define.24  Thus, Lord Scarman held that ‘[D]efinition is a poor 
instrument when used to determine whether a transaction is or is not 
unconscionable: this is a question which depends upon the particular facts of 
the case.’25  What is more, judges do not consistently refer to a single subject 
whose conscience may be in issue:26 they often talk about the court’s 
conscience27 and/or the defendant’s conscience.28  The judicial idea of 
conscience also appears to extend to different objects of evaluation.  These 
include not only the defendant’s state of mind29 and conduct,30 but also 
transactions31 and outcomes.32  The courts are not always consistent in their use 
of analytical criteria by which they describe the modus operandi of the idea of 
conscience in law.33  In some doctrines, such as trusts,34 knowing receipt35 and 
unilateral mistake,36 factual knowledge is said to affect the defendant’s 
conscience and the concept appears to involve an inquiry into the defendant’s 
                                                
24 D. Klinck, ‘The Nebulous Equitable Duty of Conscience’ (2005) 31 QLJ 206, 209. 
25 National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] AC 686 (HL), 709 (Lord Scarman); also 
Ministry of Health v Simpson [1951] 1 AC 251 (HL), 276 (Lord Simonds); Royal Brunei 
Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v Tan [1994] UKPC 4, [1995] 2 AC 378 (PC), 392 (Lord Nicholls). 
26 D. Klinck, ‘The Unexamined 'Conscience' of Contemporary Canadian Equity’ (2001) 46 
McGill LJ 571, 602, 610; Virgo (n 20) 9. 
27 Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 932 (HL), 952 (Viscount Haldane LC); Jennings v Rice 
[2002] EWCA Civ 159, [2002] 1 P & CR 8, [21] (Aldous LJ). 
28 Pitt v Holt [2013] UKSC 26; [2013] 2 AC 108, 157, [124] (Lord Walker), citing Millett J in 
Gibbon v Mitchell [1990] 1 WLR 1304 (Ch), 1310. 
29 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele (n 7); Westdeutsche 
Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (n 6), 705 (Lord Browne-
Wilkinson). 
30 Thomas Bates & Son Ltd v Wyndham's (Lingerie) Ltd (n 8) 515 (Buckley LJ); Borrelli v 
Ting [2010] UKPC 21, [2010] Bus LR 1718. 
31 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch (n 10) 152 (Millett LJ); Coldunell Ltd v 
Gallon [1986] QB 1184 (CA), 1194 (Oliver LJ); Boustany v Pigott  (n 11 ) 303 (Lord 
Templeman).   
32 Mair v Rio Grande Rubber Estates Ltd [1913] AC 853, 873 (Lord Moulton); Boustany v 
Pigott (n 11) 303 (Lord Templeman). 
33 Klinck, ‘The Unexamined 'Conscience' of Contemporary Canadian Equity’ (n 26) 602-608; 
Virgo (n 20). 
34 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (n 6) 705 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
35 Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts [1987] 1 Ch 264 (Ch), 285 (Megarry VC). 
36 Thomas Bates & Son Ltd v Wyndham's (Lingerie) Ltd (n 8). 
16 
 
internal, subjective state of mind.  In others, such as e.g. economic duress,37 
actual undue influence38 and unconscionable bargains,39 the focus is on whether 
the defendant’s behaviour was unconscionable.  However, the use of the term, 
‘unconscionable’ to describe a state of mind has been criticised40 and judges 
have insisted that the evaluation of what is unconscionable is or should be 
exclusively an objective inquiry.41 
 
In addition, when using the idea of conscience, the courts often engage in 
different temporal evaluations.  Sometimes they use the idea of conscience 
prospectively, in order to help frame the cause of action, e.g. in cases of 
knowing receipt,42 unconscionable bargains or economic duress.43  This is 
sometimes referred to as ‘unconscientiousness in acquisition’.44  Sometimes 
they use the idea of conscience retrospectively, to pass judgment on the 
defendant’s behaviour once the cause of action has been established, e.g. 
where a defendant is unjustly enriched by a mistaken payment.45  This is 
sometimes referred to as ‘unconscientiousness ex post’.46  The retrospective use 
of the idea of conscience has been criticised on the basis that the language of 
conscience may confuse insofar as it suggests that bad behaviour is necessary 
to ground relief, when that is not the case.47  Finally, judges do not always 
clearly delineate the boundaries between the idea of conscience and other 
concepts, such as honesty,48 good faith49 or reasonableness.50  This does not 
                                                
37 Borrelli v Ting (n 30). 
38 Bank of Credit and Commerce International v Aboody (n 7). 
39 Boustany v Pigott (n 11).  
40 P. Birks, ‘Receipt’ in P. Birks and A. Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart 2002) 226; Pitt v 
Holt (n ) 157, [125] (Lord Walker). 
41 Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 WLR 1752, 1788, [92] 
(Lord Walker) (proprietary estoppel); Pitt v Holt (n 28) 157, [125] (Lord Walker) (mistaken 
voluntary dispositions). 
42 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele (n 7); Arthur v 
Attorney General of Turks and Caicos (n 7). 
43 N. Chin, ‘Relieving against Forfeiture: Windfalls and Conscience’ (1995) 25 WALR 110, 
111. 
44 Ibid 111. 
45 Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M & W 54; 152 ER 24, [58]/26 (Parke B).   
46 P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 2005) 5-6; P. Birks and N. Chin, ‘On 
the Nature of Undue Influence’ in J. Beatson and D. Friedmann (eds), Good Faith and Fault in 
Contract Law (Oxford University Press 1995) 60; Chin (n 44) 112. 
47 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 46) 5-6; Birks and Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ (n 
46) 61; Chin (n 46) 112. 
48 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v Tan (n 25) 392 (Lord Nicholls). 
49 Arthur v Attorney General of Turks and Caicos (n 7) [40] (Etherton LJ). 
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help to advance our understanding of conscience or the other ideas with which 
it may be compared. 
 
Furthermore, the term, ‘unconscionability’ is often used as shorthand51 to 
describe two types of contractual unfairness:52 (i) procedural unfairness, e.g. 
where a factor such as undue influence, misrepresentation or duress distorts the 
bargaining process; and (ii) substantive unfairness, e.g. where a contract term 
disproportionately favours one party. The use of the language of 
unconscionability in this way can be confusing for two reasons.  First, views 
differ as to whether procedural unconscionability is better explained by 
reference to a problem with the claimant’s consent53 or to the defendant’s 
fault.54  Secondly, the distinction between procedural and substantive 
unfairness is not always clear-cut,55 not least because contractual imbalance 
                                                
50 George Wimpey UK Ltd v VI Construction Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 77, [60] (Sedley LJ). 
51 Leff (n 16) 489; J. Murray, ‘Unconscionability: Unconscionability’ (1969) 31 U Pitt L Rev 
1, 2; S. Waddams, ‘Unconscionability in Contracts’ (1976) 39 MLR 369, 390; M. Eisenberg, 
‘The Bargain Principle and its Limits’ (1981-1982) 95 Harv L Rev 741, 752; S. Waddams, 
‘Unconscionable Contracts: Competing Perspectives’ [1999] Saskatchewan L Rev 1, 3. D. 
Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford University Press 1999), 
251, 252-254, 255-256; Principles of Equity (P. Parkinson ed, 2nd edn, Lawbook Co. 2003), 
34, [204]. 
52 Hart v O'Connor (n 11) 1017-8 (Lord Brightman). 
53 M. Ellinghaus, ‘In Defense of Unconscionability’ (1969) 78 Yale LJ 757, 762; and P. 
Bridwell, ‘The Philosophical Dimensions of the Doctrine of Unconscionability’ (2003) 70 U 
Chi L Rev 1513, 1514 make this argument by reference to freedom of consent generally, in 
Bridwell’s case by reference to the idea of negative freedom.  Murray (n 51) 26 and J. Fort, 
‘Understanding Unconscionability: Defining the Principle’ (1978) 9 Loyola University of 
Chicago Law Journal 765, 798 focus on freedom of consent to the risks allocated by the 
contract.  Birks originally argued that liability for unjust enrichment was strict, so that all 
unjust factors were based on the vitiation or qualification of consent: P. Birks, An Introduction 
to the Law of Restitution (revised edn, 1989).  Later, he argued for a new composite unjust 
factor of ‘absence of basis’: Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 46) 101-127.  A. Burrows, The Law 
of Restitution (Oxford University Press 2010) 95-117 has rejected absence of basis in favour of 
the original classification of unjust factors. 
54 M. Eisenberg, ‘The Bargain Principle and its Limits’ (1982) 95 Harv L Rev 741, 799; 
Waddams, ‘Unconscionable Contracts: Competing Perspectives’ (n 51) 1; Bigwood (n 21); R. 
Bigwood, ‘Conscience and the Liberal Conception of Contract: Observing Basic Distinctions, 
Part II’ (2000) 16 JCL 191; M. Eisenberg, ‘The Role of Fault in Contract Law: 
Unconscionability, Unexpected Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake and Nonperformance’ 
(2009) 107 MichLRev 1412, 1416; R. Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (Oxford University 
Press 2003); R. Bigwood, ‘Contracts by Unfair Advantage: from Exploitation to Transactional 
Neglect’ (2005) 25 OJLS 65; D. Capper, ‘Protection of the Vulnerable in Financial 
Transactions - What the Common Law Vitiating Factors can do for You’ in M. Kenny, J. 
Devenney and L. Fox O'Mahony (eds), Unconscionability in European Private Financial 
Transactions (Cambridge University Press 2010) 167. 
55 A. Phang, ‘The Uses of Unconscionability’ (1995) 111 LQR 559, 560-561; A. Phang, 
‘Vitiating Factors in Contract Law - The Interaction of Theory and Practice’ (2009) 10 SAcLJ 
1, 56; A. Phang, ‘Doctrine and Fairness in the Law of Contract’ (2009) 29 LS 534, 537, n10; 
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often provides powerful evidence of bargaining abuse.56  In addition, the 
English courts have ostensibly set their faces against relief for contractual 
imbalance or ‘inequality of bargaining power’,57 on the grounds that the 
restriction of freedom of contract is a legislative task58 and that, historically, 
equity did not grant relief for unfairness ‘unless the conscience of the plaintiff 
was in some way affected’.59  
 
Although there are some theoretical and doctrinal accounts of conscience in 
English law, the questions of its meaning and function within and across a 
wide range of commercial law doctrines have yet to be adequately addressed. 
Theoretical accounts of conscience60 tend to reflect a particular philosophical 
approach and are valuable in their own right, but they do not take us any closer 
to a doctrinal understanding of what judges actually mean when they use the 
idea of conscience and what role, if any, it plays in commercial adjudication.  
Doctrinal attempts to ascribe meaning to unconscionability tend to be either 
vague, insofar as they rely on equally broad synonyms such as ‘unfair’ and 
‘unjust’,61 or tautologous insofar as they define it by reference to synonyms 
                                                
Eisenberg, ‘The Role of Fault in Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected 
Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake and Nonperformance’ (n 54) 1416. 
56 E. Posner, ‘Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defence of the Unconscionability 
Doctrine, Usury Laws and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract’ (1994) 24 JLS 
283, 304; Hart v O'Connor (n 11) 1017-1018 (Lord Brightman); A. Mason, ‘The Impact of 
Equitable Doctrine on the Law of Contract’ (1998) 27 Anglo-AmLR 1, 10-11. 
57 Lord Denning MR suggested the doctrine of undue influence could be subsumed into a 
general principle of inequality of bargaining power in Lloyd's Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] QB 
326, 339; Waddams, ‘Unconscionability in Contracts’ (n 51) 385-386, 387.  The House of 
Lords rejected Lord Denning MR’s suggestion in National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan (n 
25) 707-8 (Lord Scarman).  Lord Radcliffe expressed similar sentiments in Bridge v Campbell 
Discount Company Ltd [1962] AC 600 (HL), 622. For differing academic views on whether 
relief should be granted for substantive unfairness, compare Eisenberg, ‘The Bargain Principle 
and its Limits’ (n 54); S. Smith, ‘In Defence of Substantive Fairness’ (1996) 112 LQR 138; 
and R. Epstein, ‘Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal’ (1975) 18 J L Econ & Org 293. 
58 National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan (n 25) 708 (Lord Scarman). 
59 Hart v O'Connor (n 11) 1024 (Lord Brightman).   
60  E.g. Bigwood, ‘Conscience and the Liberal Conception of Contract: Observing Basic 
Distinctions, Part 1’ (n 21); Bigwood, ‘Conscience and the Liberal Conception of Contract: 
Observing Basic Distinctions, Part II’ (n 54); Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (n 54);  Samet 
(n 21); Voyiakis (n 16); J. Wightman, ‘From Individual Thought to Transactional Risk: Some 
Relational Thoughts about Unconscionability and Regulation’ in M. Kenny, J. Devenney and 
L. Fox O'Mahony (eds), Unconscionability in European Private Financial Transactions 
(Cambridge University Press 2010). 
61 E.g. Finn (n 16) 38; P. Parkinson, ‘The Conscience of Equity’ in P. Parkinson (ed), The 
Principles of Equity (2nd edn, Lawbook Co. 2003); Capper, ‘Protection of the Vulnerable in 
Financial Transactions - What the Common Law Vitiating Factors can do for You’ (n 54)166. 
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such as ‘unconscientious’.62  Some doctrinal accounts identify various themes 
or concepts that appear within doctrines in which the language of conscience is 
used.  The themes identified are diverse and include: lack of consent, 
avoidance of unjust enrichment and deterrence of wrongdoing;63 mutuality, 
leverage, confidence, candour and awareness;64 and the protection of 
reasonable expectations of parties engaged in common endeavours falling 
short of contracts and the protection of parties within relationships of 
proximity from harm.65  These themes are not necessarily exclusive to 
doctrines in which the ideas of conscience and unconscionability appear, so 
they do not help us to define these ideas more clearly.  There is also a tendency 
to use thematic commonality as a basis for arguing that the idea of 
unconscionability can work as an umbrella doctrine or principle under which 
individual doctrines sharing similar features, e.g., the exertion of undue 
pressure,66 the absence of real consent or real consideration67 or relational 
inequality, transactional imbalance and unconscionable conduct,68 can be 
merged or consolidated. The number and diversity of themes makes it very 
difficult to arrive at a stable definition that is neither so over-inclusive as to be 
almost meaningless nor arbitrarily narrow. 
 
Two recent accounts of the idea of conscience in law are more enlightening. 
Klinck69 considers the meaning of conscience in Canadian equity.  Where 
appropriate this chapter refers to and builds upon his insights as to the meaning 
of conscience.  Virgo70 undertakes a similar exercise for English equity.  His 
starting point is that at ‘the heart of the debate about the use and abuse of 
                                                
62 Halliwell (n 12) v; Wilson (n 16) 4. 
63 S. Waddams, ‘Protection of Weaker Parties in English Law’ in M. Kenny, J. Devenney and 
L. Fox O'Mahony (eds), Unconscionability in European Private Financial Transactions 
(Cambridge University Press 2010). 
64 Klinck, ‘The Nebulous Equitable Duty of Conscience’ (n 24) (this account is avowedly 
descriptive: 258). 
65 Finn (n 16) 39. 
66 Halliwell (n 12) 59; Phang, ‘Undue Influence - Methodology, Sources and Linkages’ (n 12) 
568-9, 570 (undue influence, unconscionable bargains and economic duress). 
67 J. McConvill and M. Bagaric, ‘The Yoking of Unconscionability and Unjust Enrichment in 
Australia’ (2002) 7 Deakin Law Review 225, 227 (unjust enrichment). 
68 Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ (n 12) 482 (undue 
influence and unconscionable bargains); cf. Devenney and Chandler (n 12) 542. 
69 Klinck, ‘The Unexamined 'Conscience' of Contemporary Canadian Equity’ (n 26). 
70 Virgo (n 20). 
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“unconscionability” is confusion about whose conscience is relevant to 
determine what is against conscience’.71  He then puts forward a taxonomy of 
conscience that rests on a distinction between the conscience of the defendant 
and that of the court.72   However, it is really only possible to answer the 
question, ‘whose conscience?’ once we have established what conscience is or 
what it means.  This thesis seeks to address this anterior issue.  It considers 
what conscience means and then examines whether the idea of conscience 
performs a useful function within English commercial law, a matter which 
neither Virgo nor Klinck treat in detail. 
CONSCIENCE – ETYMOLOGY AND ORDINARY MEANING 
 
In light of the difficulties associated with analysing conscience outlined above, 
a different approach is taken here.  Before we can consider what conscience 
might mean in law, it makes sense to consider its non-legal meaning, i.e. how 
we usually or ordinarily understand the idea of conscience.  This section 
considers the etymology and dictionary definitions of conscience and argues 
that the idea of conscience refers to the way in which we make moral 
judgements.  In particular, the language of conscience enables us to describe 
the process of reaching such judgements and the standards to which they refer. 
Etymology 
 
The roots of the word ‘conscience’ are to be found in the Greek word 
suneidesis and the Latin word conscientia, which were understood as ‘the state 
(or act) of sharing knowledge or else simply knowledge, awareness, 
apprehension’.73   The dictionary defines conscientia as ‘privity of knowledge, 
consciousness, from conscire be privy to, formed as CON- + scire know’.74  
Our contemporary understanding of conscience derives from these roots and 
                                                
71 Ibid 1. 
72 Ibid 26. 
73 C.S. Lewis, Studies in Words (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 1967) 181; R. Trumble 
and A. Stevenson (eds), Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, vol 1 (5th edn, OUP 2002)  490. 
74 Trumble and Stevenson (n 73) 490. 
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has been heavily influenced by Christian theology along the way,75 particularly 
by the work of St Thomas Aquinas.   
 
The idea of conscience refers to two types of consciousness.  The first is 
simply an awareness of one’s own acts.  It is the recognition ‘that we have 
done or not done something … and according to this, conscience is said to 
witness’.76  It has therefore been described as  ‘knowledge within oneself’77 or 
conscience as ‘inner witness’.78   We do not often use the idea of conscience to 
describe this factual consciousness alone. Instead, we typically use it to refer to 
moral consciousness.  Thus, we have a ‘clear’ conscience when we are 
conscious that what we have done is right and conversely, we have a ‘guilty’ 
conscience when we are conscious that we have done something that is 
(morally) wrong.79  How do we reach or obtain this moral consciousness?   It 
depends on an inbuilt human faculty to discern right from wrong.  Aquinas 
referred to this faculty as ‘synderesis’,80 which he described as a ‘special 
natural habit … bestowed on us by nature’, which inclines us to good and 
away from evil.81  Thus conceived, synderesis described our innate capacity for 
understanding ‘the external, objective moral law’.82  In other words, the 
Thomist idea of conscience presupposed an external set of universal, objective 
moral truths to which everyone had access through synderesis and which were 
applicable to any given set of facts.   
 
It is this combination of our awareness of our own acts and our ability to 
discern what morality requires of us that enables us to make moral judgments.  
Thus, for Aquinas, the idea of conscience described an act of applied 
                                                
75 D. Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early Modern England 
(Ashgate 2010); T. Endicott, ‘The Conscience of the King: Christopher St German and 
Thomas More and the Development of English Equity’ (1989) 47 UTFacLRev 549. 
76 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Fathers of the English Dominican Province tr, 
Benziger Bros. edn, 1947) Pt I (I), 79, art. 13. 
77 M. Drakopoulou, ‘Equity, Conscience and the Art of Judgment as Ius Aequi et Boni’ (2000-
2001) 5 Law Text Culture 345, 349. 
78 Lewis  (n 73) 190. 
79 Trumble and Stevenson (n 73) 491. 
80 Seemingly, a derivative of the Greek suneidesis. 
81 Aquinas (n 76) Pt I (I), 79, art. 12; P. Vinogradoff, ‘Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth-
Century Jurisprudence’ (1908) 96 LQR 373, 378. 
82 Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early Modern England (n 75) 32. 
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knowledge, an internal process by which synderesis combined with factual 
knowledge of a relevant situation83 so as to enable the individual to reach a 
conclusion as to the moral quality of her actions.  Conscience could therefore 
guide us as to what we ought or ought not to do (in the present or future).  As 
Aquinas put it, ‘so far as through the conscience we judge that something 
should be done or not done; and in this sense, conscience is said to incite or to 
bind’.84 When performing this function, conscience could be described as 
‘inner lawgiver’.85  Conscience could also help us evaluate the moral quality of 
our past acts: ‘[I]n the third way, so far as by conscience we judge that 
something done is well done or ill done, and in this sense conscience is said to 
excuse, accuse, or torment.’86   When performing this function, conscience 
could be described as ‘inner judge’.87  As we shall see in the next section, the 
Thomist ideas of conscience as inner witness, lawgiver and judge have 
survived over time.88  
Dictionary Definitions 
 
Our contemporary understanding of conscience closely resembles the Thomist 
idea of conscience in that the language of conscience refers to the making of 
moral judgements.  We can use the language of conscience to describe the 
internal process by which we make moral judgements, e.g. we might say that 
our conscience tells or prompts us to do something.  We can also use it to 
describe the standards by reference to which we make such judgements, e.g. 
we might say that ‘as a matter of conscience’ we ought or ought not to do 
something, i.e. because morality requires it.   Finally, we can use it to describe 
the outcomes of such judgements, e.g. we might conclude that particular 
behaviour or an outcome was or was not ‘in accordance with conscience’, i.e. 
it was moral or immoral. 
 
                                                
83 Ibid 34. 
84 Aquinas (n 76) Pt I(I), 79, art 13. 
85 Lewis (n 73)194. 
86 Aquinas (n 76). 
87 Lewis (n 73) 194; the Kantian idea of conscience seems to be very similar.  According to 
Samet (n 21) 20, it involves ‘the judge as inner voice that applies public objective standard’. 
88 Lewis (n 73) 195. 
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It is convenient to take the dictionary definition of conscience in three parts.  
The first part is largely peripheral to our ordinary understanding of conscience.  
It reads: 
 
I 1 One’s inmost thought, one’s mind or heart. 
… 
3 Reasonableness, understanding. rare (Shakes).89 
 
We do not tend to use either definition in everyday speech, perhaps because we 
have other words that adequately explain the ideas behind the definition, such 
as ‘knowledge’ or ‘reasonableness’.  On their own, these definitions have no 
moral connotations and therefore do not really get to the heart of what is 
distinctive about the idea of conscience.  For this reason, they are not 
considered further.   
 
The second part of the dictionary definition of conscience is central to our 
understanding of conscience in that it describes the factual and moral 
consciousness that enables us to make moral judgements:  
 
2 (An) inward knowledge or consciousness; (an) internal conviction; 
mental recognition or acknowledgement (of) 
…. 
II 4 A moral sense of right or wrong; a sense of responsibility felt for 
private or public actions, motives, etc; the faculty or principle that leads 
to the approval of right thought or action and condemnation of wrong 
…. 
7 Sense of guilt with regard to a thought or action; scruple, 
compunction, remorse.90 
 
We can use these three definitions of conscience to describe the internal 
process by which we make moral judgements.  Definition 2 refers to internal 
knowledge and echoes the Thomist idea of conscience as inner witness.  
Definition 4 clearly posits a moral sensibility that enables us to tell right from 
wrong and choose the right course of action.  This echoes the Thomist idea of 
synderesis: it suggests an innate capacity to identify moral truth, a sort of 
                                                
89 Trumble and Stevenson (n 73) 490. 
90 Ibid 490. 
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moral barometer.  Definition 7 points to the sense of guilt we feel if we know 
we have acted wrongly.  
 
An example illustrates the way in which these three definitions help us to 
describe the process by which we reach moral judgements.  Assume I take my 
neighbour’s car without permission.  I know the facts, i.e. that I have taken the 
car.  I understand morally that the taking of another’s property without 
permission is regarded as theft and therefore wrong.  The application of my 
internal moral barometer to my internal knowledge of the facts should lead me 
to the conclusion that it was wrong of me to take the car.  If my conscience is 
working properly, I will feel guilty, which ought to prompt me to return the 
car.  Here, we would typically use the language of conscience to connote the 
fact that my judgement is a moral one, i.e. ‘my conscience told me that taking 
the car was wrong’ or ‘my conscience tells me that I ought to give the car 
back’.  What is more, my innate moral understanding enables me to judge the 
moral quality of other people’s behaviour as well as my own, and the language 
of conscience is also apt to describe this.  It follows that if you have taken the 
car without permission, I might say that ‘as a matter of conscience, you ought 
not to have taken the car and should give it back’.  However, it is not possible 
for me to make a moral judgement about my conduct or yours unless I have 
knowledge of the material facts, i.e. that at the time the car was taken, it 
belonged to someone else. 
 
Our ability to make judgements of conscience presupposes that there are 
objective moral standards by which such judgements may be made.  The third 
part of the dictionary definition of conscience refers to the act of compliance or 
the state of conformity with such standards.  It reads as follows: 
 
5 Conscientious observance of, regard to. 
6 Practice of or conformity with what is considered right; 
conscientiousness. arch.91 
 
                                                
91 Ibid 490. 
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Thus, we might say that someone’s behaviour or a situation is ‘in accordance 
with’ or ‘against conscience’.  In this way, we use the language of conscience 
in two ways: to indicate that the standard we are using is a moral one and to 
describe the outcome of behaviour or a situation in moral terms. 
 
The phrase ‘what is considered right’ in definition 6 is capable of describing 
the fact that moral judgements may be made by reference to what is generally 
considered right, as well as what I consider to be right.  In other words, it 
presupposes the idea of moral truth. This is important because if the standards 
by which we make moral judgements were entirely personal, the idea of 
conscience would be reduced to a synonym for sincerity. Then we would end 
up with a multiplicity of inconsistent answers to the same question produced 
by different individuals.92  The better view is that ‘what is considered right’ 
also refers to external, objectively ascertainable moral standards, which we are 
able to discern through our innate faculty of moral understanding.  A definition 
of conscience that did not admit of objective moral standards would be 
inconsistent not only with the Thomist idea of conscience, but also with the 
way in which we usually think about morality. As Samet suggests, conscience 
must ‘relate to objective values that can be quoted to other members of the 
community as reasons for action over and above the special significance they 
hold for the individual.’93  Thus, when we say genocide is wrong, we mean it is 
immoral not just for us but generally.94  Therefore, what I consider right is best 
understood as my interpretation of what the objective standard of morality 
(‘the objective standard’) requires.  Of course, I may sometimes get this 
wrong, so although I may have acted in accordance with what my conscience 
tells me is right, I have nevertheless breached the objective standard and so I 
may also be said to have behaved unconscionably.    
 
The fact that the language of conscience is apt to describe my adherence to the 
objective standard and my practice of what I believe to be right means that we 
                                                
92 Ratzinger (n 2) 1. 
93 Samet (n 21) 20. 
94 R. Dworkin, ‘Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It’ (1996) 25 Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 87, 92. 
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need to be clear about what we mean when we use it to describe the standards 
by which we make moral judgements or their outcomes.  Again, the car 
example illustrates.  Assume I take my neighbour’s car without permission.  
Assume further that society regards the taking of another’s property without 
permission as theft and therefore immoral but I do not believe in private 
property as a moral good.  Because of my personal understanding of what the 
objective standard requires, I am able to say that even though I took the car, I 
have acted in accordance with what my conscience tells me is right.   Of 
course, I am mistaken in my understanding of what the objective standard of 
morality requires and I have breached it.  Thus, I may be said to have acted 
against or failed to comply with the requirements of conscience.   Klinck 
therefore suggests a distinction between doing what I believe to be right, in 
which case we may say I act ‘according to conscience’,95 and doing what is 
right (by reference to the objective standard), in which case we may say I act 
‘according to good conscience’.96 On the same basis, he would distinguish 
between a ‘clear’ conscience and a ‘sound’ conscience.  My conscience may 
be clear because I believe I acted morally in taking the car.  However, my 
conscience is not sound because it failed in fact to distinguish between right 
and wrong,97 and led me to breach the objective standard by taking the car 
without permission.    
 
Ultimately, therefore, our ordinary understanding of conscience comprehends a 
synergy between the internal process by which we make moral judgements and 
the objective moral standards by reference to which we make them.  These 
moral standards are ‘independent of the mind who thinks them’, so that our 
inner debate is not about whether a particular moral obligation or duty exists 
but ‘rather the application of the duty to the specific case at hand.’98 If our 
conscience is working properly, our innate capacity for moral understanding 
allows us to perceive what the objective standard requires of us in a particular 
case.  In turn, by applying our moral understanding to a given set of facts as 
                                                
95 Klinck, ‘The Unexamined 'Conscience' of Contemporary Canadian Equity’ (n 26) 600. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Samet (n 21) 25. 
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they are known to us, we can ensure that our behaviour meets with what is 
right and thus, we may be said to act in accordance with good conscience.  
This interpretation of conscience is reflected in our contemporary, non-legal 
understanding of unconscionability and how the idea of conscience developed 
in equity. 
UNCONSCIONABILITY AND UNCONSCIENTIOUSNESS - ORDINARY 
MEANING 
 
The ideas of unconscionability and unconscientiousness are very similar in that 
they both denote a negative moral judgement, 99 i.e. a finding that particular 
behaviour or an outcome is not in accordance with good conscience in that it 
fails to comply with the objective standard of morality.  The only real 
difference between the concepts lies in the fact that the idea of 
unconscientiousness admits of the possibility that an individual’s behaviour 
may be excused on the basis of her personal understanding of what the 
objective standard requires. 
Unconscionability 
 
The word ‘unconscionable’ is frequently used in law and therefore it is 
appropriate to consider its non-legal meaning here.  ‘Unconscionable’ suggests 
a negative moral judgement; it is best understood as describing behaviour, 
situations or outcomes that do not comply with the objective standard of 
morality.  This failure to comply may but need not be conscious or deliberate: 
the term ‘unconscionable’ also captures innocent or inadvertent breaches.  This 
becomes clear when we scrutinise the dictionary definition of 
‘unconscionable’, which reads as follows:   
 
A adjective. 1 Showing no regard for conscience; not in accordance 
with what is right or reasonable. 
b Unreasonably excessive.  c As an intensive: egregious, blatant. 
                                                
99 P. Finn, ‘Equity and Contract’ in P. Finn (ed), Essays in Contract (Law Book Co 1987) 106 
describes unconscionability as one of equity’s ‘pejorative adjectives’. 
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2 Having no conscience; not controlled by conscience; unscrupulous.100 
 
Part 1 of the definition of ‘unconscionable’ refers to a breach of the objective 
standard, pure and simple.  The phrase ‘showing no regard for conscience’ is 
ambiguous: it can be read as indicating a failure to comply with one’s personal 
understanding of what the objective standard requires or a failure to comply 
with the objective standard per se.  However, the fact that this phrase is 
followed directly by the phrase ‘not in accordance with what is right or 
reasonable’ suggests that ‘unconscionable’ indicates the latter.  It follows that 
‘showing no regard for conscience’ means showing no regard for ‘what is right 
and reasonable’, i.e. for what the objective standard of morality requires.  I 
may show no regard for conscience because I do not understand (morally) 
what it requires or I may know what it requires but I may consciously and 
deliberately ignore or override it.  The definition includes both possibilities.  
Therefore, if I take my neighbour’s car without permission, my behaviour is, 
without more, unconscionable, irrespective of whether I understood morally 
that I was acting wrongly when I took it.  
 
Part 1b of the definition defines ‘unconscionable’ as ‘unreasonably excessive’.  
Arguably, this definition is qualitative, although it contains a quantitative 
element.  For example, if I am sharing a cake with friends and I take an 
unconscionably large slice as opposed to an extremely large slice, the 
implication is that I took more than I was (morally) entitled to.  There is 
nothing to suggest that for my behaviour to be unconscionable, I must have 
deliberately or consciously taken more than I was entitled to, although of 
course this may be the case.  Part 1c tells us that unconscionable may be used 
as an intensive to mean ‘egregious’, i.e. remarkably bad,101 or ‘blatant’, i.e. 
conspicuous or unashamed.102  It is therefore capable of describing conduct that 
is just plain bad, i.e. objectively bad, as well as conduct that is unashamedly, 
i.e. deliberately or consciously bad. 
 
                                                
100 W. Trumble and A. Stevenson (eds), Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, vol 2 (5th edn, 
OUP 2002) 3421. 
101 Trumble and Stevenson, Shorter Oxford English Dictionary vol 1 (n 73) 796. 
102 Ibid 245. 
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Part 2 of the definition of ‘unconscionable’ describes the circumstances where 
an individual breaches the objective standard either without any sense of the 
moral quality of her actions at all or deliberately, i.e. conscious that she is 
doing wrong.  Here ‘unconscionable’ is defined as having no conscience or not 
controlled by conscience or unscrupulous, i.e. without scruples as to the 
morality of a course of action.103  If we say I have no conscience, this suggests 
I lack the faculty of moral understanding, which would enable me to discern 
what the objective standard requires of me in a particular situation.  For 
example, I may not understand morally that the taking of a car without 
permission is theft and therefore wrong.  I take the car without any sense of the 
moral quality of my actions and thus my behaviour is unconscionable.  If we 
say I am not controlled by conscience or I am unscrupulous, this admits of the 
possibility that I may understand morally what the objective standard requires 
of me, but I have ignored or overridden it.  For example, I understand that it is 
wrong to take my neighbour’s car.  However, I deliberately ignore or override 
this message from my conscience and take it anyway.  Again, my behaviour is 
unconscionable but this time I understand morally that I am doing wrong.  
Unconscientiousness 
 
The idea of unconscionability may be usefully compared to the idea of 
unconscientiousness.  The dictionary definition of ‘unconscientious’ is ‘not 
conscientious; not scrupulous or careful’.104  ‘Conscientious’ means ‘obedient 
to conscience, (habitually) governed by a sense of duty; done according to 
conscience; scrupulous, painstaking; of or pertaining to conscience.’105 Clearly 
there is an overlap between unconscionability and unconscientiousness: I 
behave unconscientiously or unconscionably if I fail to obey or act in 
accordance with what conscience requires, i.e. I fail to act morally.  We have 
seen that a failure to act in accordance with what the objective standard of 
morality requires, irrespective of whether that failure is deliberate or not, is 
                                                
103 Trumble and Stevenson, Shorter Oxford English Dictionary vol 2 (n 100) 3464, 2718. 
104 Ibid 3421. 
105 Trumble and Stevenson, Shorter Oxford English Dictionary vol 1 (n 73) 491. 
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sufficient to attract the label of unconscionability.  However, the word 
‘unconscientious’ is capable of bearing a slightly different meaning.   
 
Very occasionally, society is prepared to make exceptions for a departure from 
the objective standard on the basis of an individual’s sincerity of belief in the 
rightness of her actions, i.e. because she behaves in accordance with her own 
sincere interpretation of what the objective standard requires.  Take someone 
who for reasons dictated by her own moral convictions refuses to conform to a 
rule or regulation, such as one that requires her to fight in a foreign war.  We 
would often refer to this person as a ‘conscientious objector’ and depending on 
the circumstances, she might be excused from fighting.106  Taking a more banal 
example, we can explore what this exception tells us about the relationship 
between unconscientiousness and unconscionability.  Assume I do not believe 
in private property as a moral good and I take my neighbour’s car without 
permission, sincerely believing that I am morally entitled to take it.  We would 
be entitled to conclude that my behaviour is unconscionable because a finding 
of unconscionability does not depend on why I breach the objective standard; 
the term is wide enough to encompass inadvertent and innocent breaches.  
However, if this were a situation where society was prepared to excuse my 
behaviour because I have acted in accordance with what I believe to be 
morally true, we might also say that my behaviour is nevertheless 
conscientious (and therefore not unconscientious).  Therefore, whilst the idea 
of unconscionability refers to my failure to comply with the objective standard 
of morality, the idea of conscientiousness admits of the possibility that such a 
breach may be excused because although I have failed to comply with the 
objective standard, I did so in the sincere belief that I was acting morally.  The 
idea of unconscientiousness may therefore be understood in two senses.  In its 
wide sense it refers to a failure to comply with the objective standard, i.e. a 
failure to act morally or in accordance with good conscience.  In its narrow 
sense it refers to a failure to comply with the objective standard, which cannot 
be excused on the basis that I thought what I was doing was right.   
                                                
106 Ibid 491; R. Vischer, Conscience and the Common Good, Reclaiming the Space between 
Person and State (Cambridge University Press 2010) 16 gives the example of the draft 
exemptions under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
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RELATED CONCEPTS 
 
Because the ideas of unconscionability and unconscientiousness are used so 
much in law, it is important to distinguish them from related concepts such as 
bad faith, dishonesty and unreasonableness.  The differences in ordinary 
meaning are discussed below.  They will become important in later chapters, as 
the courts sometimes fail to distinguish adequately between unconscionability 
or unconscientiousness and these related concepts.  
Bad Faith 
 
Bad faith is defined as ‘treachery; intent to deceive’.107  Its definition suggests 
that bad faith is limited to consciously culpable conduct.  Although it suggests 
a negative moral judgement, this is specific to a narrower range of behaviour 
than that encompassed by the labels of unconscionability or 
unconscientiousness.  For example, if I take my neighbour’s car, knowing that 
what I am doing constitutes theft and is wrong, my behaviour is 
unconscionable or unconscientious and I may also be said to be acting in bad 
faith.  However, if my conscience sends me no message at all about the moral 
quality of my actions, I may lack the intent to deceive necessary to constitute 
bad faith but my behaviour is still unconscionable because I have failed to 
comply with the objective standard.  It is also unconscientious in both senses, 
as society will not make an exception for me simply because I thought I was 
acting morally. 
Dishonesty 
 
Like bad faith, the idea of dishonesty also involves a moral judgement, but it 
also relates to a narrower range of behaviour than unconscionability or 
unconscientiousness.  ‘Dishonest’ means (of a conduct or statement), ‘not 
straightforward or honourable; (now chiefly) fraudulent, of the nature of or 
involving theft, lying or cheating’; and (of a person), ‘lacking in probity or 
integrity, untrustworthy; (now chiefly) apt to steal, cheat, lie, or act 
                                                
107 Trumble and Stevenson, Shorter Oxford English Dictionary vol 1 (n 73) 917. 
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fraudulently’.108  This emphasis on lying, stealing and cheating reflects our 
ordinary understanding of the term ‘dishonest’.  If asked what ‘dishonest’ 
means or to give an example of dishonest conduct, the specific examples of 
lying, stealing or cheating spring to mind.  Usually, when we say someone is 
‘honest’, we mean that they do not lie, cheat or steal.  If this is right, then again 
my behaviour may be unconscionable or unconscientious but not dishonest.  
For example, if I deliberately take my neighbour’s car without permission, we 
would say my behaviour is both unconscionable or unconscientious and 
dishonest.  However, if I practice eugenics, my conduct is not necessarily 
dishonest as we would ordinarily understand it, i.e. in the sense of being 
deceptive or fraudulent, but it is likely to be unconscionable as it runs counter 
to what the objective standard requires.  It is also unconscientious in both 
senses, as society is unlikely to excuse my behaviour because I think I am 
acting morally. 
Unreasonableness 
 
Finally, unconscionability and unconscientiousness must be distinguished from 
the idea of unreasonableness.  Unreasonable means: 
 
1 Not endowed with reason; irrational. Rare. 
2 Not based on or acting in accordance with reason or good sense. 
3 Going beyond what is reasonable or equitable; excessive.109 
 
The first two definitions of unreasonable refer to matters of rational rather than 
moral judgement.  Thus, it may be entirely rational for me to take my 
neighbour’s car without permission because I have crashed my own car and 
cannot afford to fix it or buy a new one.  However, because society requires 
me not to take my neighbour’s car without permission, by taking it, I fail to 
meet the objective standard of right and wrong and so I have acted 
unconscionably or unconscientiously.  The third definition of unreasonable 
appears to overlap with unconscionable as meaning unreasonably excessive.  It 
also refers to what is ‘equitable’, i.e. what is ‘characterised by equity or 
                                                
108 Ibid 700. 
109 Trumble and Stevenson, Shorter Oxford English Dictionary vol 2 (n 100) 3460. 
33 
 
fairness; fair, just’.110  This could be read as meaning that a judgement that 
something is unreasonable involves a moral judgement.  However, arguably, 
this is not the case and unreasonable is better read as referring to the rationality 
or the fairness of behaviour or a situation or outcome.  For example, I may 
choose to give a gift of £5,000 to one of my two children and £20 to the other.  
There is nothing to suggest that my decision would be unconscionable or 
unconscientious, i.e. immoral.  Nevertheless, the child who received £20 might 
well complain that my gift to the first child was unreasonable because it was 
excessive by comparison with what she received.  She might also complain 
that my decision was unfair in the sense of not being unbiased or impartial. 
THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIENCE IN EQUITY 
 
This section outlines the development of the idea of conscience in equity.  It 
argues that the idea of conscience in equity closely resembled our ordinary 
understanding of conscience.  When the courts were making judgments of 
conscience they were making moral judgments, which presupposed the 
existence of objective moral truth.  There were three main stages of 
development of the idea of conscience in equity.  In the medieval period when 
equity was administered by the ecclesiastical chancellors, the Thomist idea of 
conscience was influential.111 Its influence was also visible in the work of St 
German in the sixteenth century.  In the seventeenth century Lord Nottingham 
shaped the idea of conscience in law further by distinguishing between 
justiciable and non-justiciable conscience.  The biggest change over time 
related to the content of the objective standard by reference to which 
judgments of conscience were made.  Initially, the courts appealed to what 
they considered to be the universal moral truths laid down by divine law in 
order to explain decisions, which were not mandated by the common law at the 
time.  By the end of the seventeenth century, the relevant objective standards 
                                                
110 Trumble and Stevenson, Shorter Oxford English Dictionary vol 1 (n 73) 850. 
111 Drakopoulou (n 77) 351; Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early 
Modern England (n 75) 34. On the ecclesiastical origins of the equitable jurisdiction relating to 
uses and certain aspects of contract law: O. Holmes Jr, ‘Early English Equity’ (1885) 1 LQR 
162. 
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had largely been incorporated into the case law.  This meant that the objective 
standard was eventually informed by what equity (rather than God) required.  
 
During the medieval period, the idea of conscience developed and was used in 
two ways.  At this time, the common law did not allow for proof of the court’s 
or the defendant’s private knowledge of facts.  However, Chancery procedure 
permitted the defendant’s private knowledge of facts to be admitted by 
subpoena.  The idea of conscience was important insofar as the requirement of 
an oath operated directly on the defendant’s conscience.112  Thus, if her 
conscience was operating properly, she would speak the truth.   From this the 
court could direct its own conscience as to the correct result.113   During this 
period the idea of conscience was also used to ensure that justice was achieved 
in individual cases.  Initially the common law and equity were largely 
undifferentiated,114 but by the fourteenth century the common law had become 
increasingly rigid and a distinct equitable jurisdiction developed so as to 
enable the king through his Council to dispense justice outside the confines of 
the common law.115  In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, as the 
ecclesiastical Chancellors gradually took over the King’s Council’s work in 
dealing with matters of equity,116 the ideas of reason and conscience became 
prominent justifications for equitable intervention.117 
 
The medieval idea of conscience in equity drew heavily on the ecclesiastical 
idea of conscience. Klinck tells us that during the medieval period the 
ecclesiastical idea of conscience was largely objective118 in the sense that 
divine law provided a single external truth or standard for conscience, which 
                                                
112 M. Macnair, ‘Equity and Conscience’ (2007) 27 OJLS 659. 
113 Ibid. 
114 G. Adams, ‘The Origin of English Equity’ (1916) 16 Colum L Rev 87, 89, 91-92; L. Owen 
Pike, ‘Common Law and Conscience in the Ancient Court of Chancery’ (1885) 1 LQR 443. 
115 L. Knafla, ‘Conscience in the English Common Law Tradition’ (1976) 26 UTLJ 1, 3, 4; 
Endicott (n 75) 552; Adams (n 114) 96-98. 
116 G. Adams, ‘The Continuity of English Equity’ (1916-1917) 26 Yale LJ 550 554.   
117 Ecclesiastical ideas of conscience also found their way into English common law: Knafla (n 
115).   Doe gives examples, including the concern for a juror’s soul if a false verdict was 
returned: N. Doe, Fundamental Authority in Late Medieval English Law (CUP 1990) 137, 130-
40, 144, 147-8. 
118 Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early Modern England (n 75) 31. 
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was ‘something outside’ conscience ‘but accessible to it’.119  In other words, 
the ecclesiastical idea of conscience involved adherence to an objective 
standard, which was informed by the divine.  Daily use of the canon law 
procedure known as the denunciatio evangelica as a supplement to the 
common law meant that ‘[T]he duties of conscience, as determined by 
Christian ethics’ provided the standard for decision making in many cases.120  
The ecclesiastical Chancellors believed that it was appropriate to interfere in 
individual cases in order that justice in accordance with natural law121 or the 
law of God, should be achieved,122 ‘even at the cost of dispensing (if necessary) 
with the law of the state.’123  Conscience provided the bridge or vehicle by 
which the Chancellors could apply the law of God and the law of reason to 
individual cases.124  
 
The Chancellors interpreted their own role as being twofold.  First, their job 
was inform the King’s conscience,125 i.e. to interpret (and apply) the divine law 
on behalf of the King, which formed the objective standard by which litigants’ 
behaviour was judged.  Secondly, they were concerned to protect the souls of 
wrongdoing defendants and help them avoid mortal sin, thus giving rise to the 
idea that equity acts in personam126 and on the conscience.  Thus, the idea of 
conscience used by the Chancellors in performing this role ‘connoted what we 
now call the moral law as it applied to particular individuals for the avoidance 
of peril to the soul through mortal sin’.127 
 
                                                
119 Ibid 31, 32. 
120 H. Coing, ‘English Equity and the Denunciatio Evangelica of the Canon Law’ (1955) 71 
LQR 223, 230-1; Endicott (n 83) 554.  Coing explains that if the plaintiff could establish her 
claim and the defendant had acted in bad faith, the penalty was excommunication, which was a 
serious matter. 
121 S. Dobbins, ‘Equity: The Court of Conscience or the King's Command, the Dialogues of St. 
German and Hobbes Compared’ (1991) 9 JL& Relig 113 118-119. 
122 H. Potter, An Introduction to the History of Equity and its Courts (Sweet & Maxwell 1931) 
38. 
123 W. Holdsworth, ‘The Early History of Equity’ (1914-1915) 13 MichLRev 293, 295. 
124 Ibid 294-295. 
125 Endicott (n 75) 556. 
126 A. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of 
Assumpsit (Clarendon 1975) 398-399.  On how this might be thought to give equity an extra 
ethical character, see J. Ames, ‘The Origin of Uses and Trusts’ (1907-1908) 21 Harv L Rev 
261, 261-2. 
127 Simpson (n 126) 398. 
36 
 
During the Reformation in the sixteenth century, the idea of sincerity of belief 
came to be highly valued and the practice of conscientious religious objection 
took hold.’128  According to Klinck, this is likely to have resulted in the erosion 
of a single, universal concept of morality and the corresponding growth of a 
diversity of moral views.  The Protestant idea of conscience emphasised 
‘personal introspection and individual moral accountability’ and therefore 
contained ‘within itself a tendency towards subjectivism and relativism’.129  
However, this move towards relativism did not really change the idea of 
conscience in law, which continued to be referable to compliance with an 
objective standard of morality.   
 
St. German’s work130 diminished the idea of conscience in equity as a purely 
separate, external and divine force and secularised it.131  Although some 
suggest that during this period equity still exhibited concern for the soul of the 
defendant,132 it seems clear that St. German’s work marked a shift towards the 
idea of equity as an integral part of the law133 by virtue of which it corrected134 
and supplemented itself.135 In St. German’s view, conscience ‘must always be 
groundyd vpon some law’136 – the law of God, the law of reason or the law of 
man (insofar as this was not ‘contrary to the lawe of reason nor the law of 
                                                
128 Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early Modern England (n 75) 77. 
129 Klinck, ‘The Unexamined 'Conscience' of Contemporary Canadian Equity’ (n 26) 586. 
130 T. Plucknett and J. Barton (eds), St. German's Doctor and Student (Selden Society 1974). 
131 Klinck, ‘The Unexamined 'Conscience' of Contemporary Canadian Equity’ (n 26) 581. 
132  W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law (7th edn, Methuen & Co. Ltd, Sweet & Maxwell 
1966) vol V, 337, 338; W. Jones, The Elizabethan Court of Chancery (Clarendon Press 1967) 
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of the common law) remained separate.  See also Eyston v Studd (1573) 2 Plow 459; 75 ER 
688, [466]/698 where Plowden distinguishes between equity as ‘a moral virtue which corrects 
the law’ and equity as epieikeia.  
133 Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early Modern England (n 75) 47; 
Dobbins (n 130) 114, 124; Endicott (n 75) 563, 564; Holdsworth, A History of English Law vol 
IV (n 132) 279-280; Drakopoulou (n 77) 361; Guy (n 14) 19-20; Pollock (n 14) 286-287. 
134 This was not a new idea.  It was rooted in the ancient idea of epieikeia: Aristotle, The 
Nichomachean Ethics (J. Thomson tr, Penguin 1953) 198-199; C. Allen, Law in the Making 
(7th edn, Clarendon Press 1964) 391-392, 394-396; Endicott (n 75) 563; Dobbins (n 121) 124.  
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the use of God’s law and the law of reason as a corrective: see also Plucknett and Barton (n 
130) xlviii. 
135 For examples of the use of the idea of equity as epieikeia in statutory interpretation, see C. 
Hare, ‘Inequitable Mistake’ (2003) 62 CLJ 29; D. Friedmann, ‘The Objective Principle and 
Involuntariness in Contract and Restitution’ (2003) 119 LQR 68; Eyston v Studd and 
Plowden’s notes to same (n 132). 
136 Plucknett and Barton (n 130) 167. 
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god’).137  Where the law of man did not conform to the law of God, the law of 
God would prevail and in the absence of a remedy at common law, equity 
could supplement it to provide a remedy or conclusion in accordance with the 
dictates of conscience and hence, divine law.138  Here, again, divine law 
provided the objective standard, which came to be incorporated into the 
doctrines of equity. 
 
St German’s idea of conscience focused extensively on moral understanding139 
and it broadly echoed the Thomist idea of conscience, with its emphasis on the 
combination of synderesis and conscientia.140 St. German differentiated 
between synderesis, as the faculty which allows us to understand ‘objective 
certain truth’,141 and conscience, which he interpreted as meaning ‘knowledge 
with something else’ or with ‘some particular act’, i.e. the process of applied 
knowledge.  This process took the form of synthesis of precepts derived from 
synderesis with factual knowledge so as to reason towards a moral 
conclusion.142  For St German conscience ‘was not simply an act of subjective 
moral judgment whose “sincerity” vindicated the individual actor’.143  It was ‘a 
collective and objective form of applied knowledge and must always be 
founded upon some law.’144   In other words, St. German’s idea of conscience 
incorporated the idea of synergy between the process by which individuals 
made moral judgements and the objective standard, which was, ultimately, 
informed by the law of God.  
 
                                                
137 Ibid 111. 
138 Ibid xxvi, xlviii, 95, 97, 103, 111, 113; Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of 
Chancery in Early Modern England (n 75) 57; Vinogradoff (n 81) 379. 
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141 Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early Modern England (n 75) 54; 
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do a particular act’. 
143 Klinck, ‘The Unexamined 'Conscience' of Contemporary Canadian Equity’ (n 26) 580. 
144 Dobbins (n 121) 127. 
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Klinck tells us that during the seventeenth century the process of 
individualization of conscience continued at a philosophical and religious 
level, such that by the end of the century the decision where to find the 
universal moral truths on which conscience depended had become a very 
personal activity.145  At the same time, however, the idea of conscience in law 
retained its objective flavour and the courts were starting to delineate more 
clearly the boundaries between justiciable and non-justiciable conscience.  The 
key figure in this process was Lord Nottingham, who emphasized the 
importance of the idea of conscience,146 but distinguished between ‘such a 
conscience as is only naturalis et interna’, which was non-justiciable, and 
conscience ‘civilis et politica, and tied to certain measures’,147 which was 
justiciable.   
 
Klinck argues that broadly speaking, conscience civilis et politica could be 
seen as a justiciable sub-set of conscience naturalis et interna,148 and he 
identifies four distinctions between Lord Nottingham’s ideas of justiciable and 
non-justiciable conscience.  They are the distinction between internal and 
external acts, private actions and public order, charity and justice and the 
difference between a private and a regulated conscience.  These distinctions 
are important.  Arguably, they did not affect the meaning of conscience.  
Rather, they can be understood as having set the parameters of the objective 
standard to which equity would give effect.    In other words, equity would not 
punish or grant relief for all forms of unconscionable behaviour.  This reflects 
the view that whilst we may expect all laws to be moral, we do not expect all 
issues of morality to be governed or reinforced by law. 
 
                                                
145 Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early Modern England (n 75) 
135, 193, 197, 217. 
146 Burges v Skinner (1673) Rep t Finch 91; 23 ER 49; Lawrence v Berney (1678) Rep Ch 127; 
21 ER 636. 
147 Cook v Fountain (1733) 3 Swanst 585; 36 ER 984, [600]/990 (Lord Nottingham). 
148 D. Klinck, ‘Lord Nottingham and the Conscience of Equity’ (2006) 67 Journal of the 
History of Ideas 123,127; Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early 
Modern England (n 75) 229-230. 
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The first distinction is between what Klinck calls ‘internal dispositions and 
external acts’.149   Lord Nottingham’s conscience civilis et politica was more 
concerned with a person’s external acts150 than her state of mind.  Thus, equity 
could not intervene in respect of a matter that was internal to the defendant and 
therefore unknowable to the court unless the defendant revealed it.  So, for 
example, in the case of Cook v Fountain,151 a secret trust was alleged but there 
was no evidence of it and the defendant had denied its existence.  Lord 
Nottingham held that whether or not the trust existed was a matter ‘between a 
man and his confessor’ (i.e. God) and continued by saying that ‘with such a 
conscience that is only naturalis et interna the Court has nothing to do’.152  As 
Klinck points out, this example is to do with lack of proof, but the idea of 
(non-justiciable) conscience naturalis et interna would also extend to matters 
that are ‘intrinsically internal’, such as the making of a mental resolution to 
hold property on trust153 without any external indication to that effect.  
Arguably, it would also extend to the converse, i.e. the making of a mental 
reservation not to hold property on trust, whilst externally executing a written 
declaration of trust.154  Finally, it is clear that the idea of conscience civilis et 
politica, i.e. justiciable conscience did extend to cases where there was clear 
evidence of the defendant’s state of mind, such as where a defendant relied on 
the bona fide purchase defence.155  
 
The second distinction was between private actions and public order.  Klinck 
suggests that this meant that conscience in equity involved a focus on 
behaviour that had a social rather than merely a private impact.156  He goes on 
to argue that ‘a plausible concomitant’ of this focus was ‘the fiction that the 
judging conscience is not the chancellor’s own conscience but a disembodied 
                                                
149 Klinck, ‘Lord Nottingham and the Conscience of Equity’ (n 148) 127. 
150 Ibid 127-132; Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early Modern 
England (n 75) 234-240. 
151 Cook v Fountain (n 147) [600]/990 (Lord Nottingham).  
152 Ibid. 
153 Klinck, ‘Lord Nottingham and the Conscience of Equity’ (n 148) 129. 
154 As happened in Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Queensland) v Jolliffe (1920) 28 CLR 178. 
155 Klinck, ‘Lord Nottingham and the Conscience of Equity’ (n 148) 131-2; Klinck, 
Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early Modern England (n 75) 237-238.  
156 Klinck, ‘Lord Nottingham and the Conscience of Equity’ (n 148) 137. 
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personal conscience that is per se public.’157  He adds that Lord Nottingham 
saw himself as administering not his own personal conscience, but ‘the more 
abstract and impersonal “conscience of the court”’158 and conscience ‘is spoken 
of as if it had independent existence, apart from any person’s particular 
conscience.’159   However, given that by Lord Nottingham’s time equity was 
becoming much more rule-based,160 the idea that the ‘conscience of the court’ 
was abstract and impersonal was perhaps less fictional than it might have been 
before.  Lord Nottingham was concerned that matters of justiciable conscience 
should be rule-based and those rules were to be consistently applied.161  
Therefore, it is arguable that by his time, the idea of the conscience of the court 
was in fact a more disembodied conscience.  The standards by reference to 
which decisions in Chancery were now made increasingly involved the 
interpretation and application of settled case law, rather than a direct 
channelling of the divine through the Chancellor’s personal conscience.  Put 
another way, the objective standard was now informed by the corpus of equity 
rather than the spirit of the divine.   
 
The third distinction was between spiritual and civil matters.  Justiciable 
conscience was concerned with ‘the conscience dictated by natural reason’162 
but not with matters that were predominantly spiritual or religious, although 
clearly the development of conscience in equity up to that point had been 
heavily influenced by and was rooted in religious doctrine.163  Finally, Lord 
Nottingham’s idea of justiciable conscience did not extend to enforcing 
‘beneficence, benevolence, and forgiveness’: thus, there was a distinction 
between charity and justice.164   This tells us something important about the 
                                                
157 Ibid 138. 
158 Ibid 139. 
159 Ibid 140. 
160 By the end of the seventeenth century equity had been largely systematised: W. Winder, 
‘Precedent in Equity’ (1941) 57 LQR 245. 
161 Cook v Fountain (n 147) [600]/990 (Lord Nottingham); Klinck, ‘Lord Nottingham and the 
Conscience of Equity’ (n 148) 142-146, esp 143; Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of 
Chancery in Early Modern England (n 75) 252-261. 
162 Klinck, ‘Lord Nottingham and the Conscience of Equity’ (n 148) 134. 
163 Ibid 132-136; Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early Modern 
England (n 75) 240-246. 
164 Klinck, ‘Lord Nottingham and the Conscience of Equity’ (n 148) 141; Klinck, Conscience, 
Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early Modern England (n 75) 247-252. 
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parameters of justiciable conscience: equity was unlikely to interfere in the 
absence of a requirement of a quid pro quo.165  Outside limited exceptions, 
such as fiduciary relationships, parties were entitled to behave selfishly166 and 
could take advantage of each other’s folly as long as the bargaining process 
itself was fair.  Thus, even if a bargain was a harsh one, as long as a person 
entered into it with his eyes open, ‘equity will not relieve him on this footing 
only, unless he can show fraud in the party contracting with him, or some 
undue means made use of to draw him into such an agreement …’167  
Therefore, the objective standard allowed parties to engage in self-interested 
bargaining.   
 
By the end of the seventeenth century, the idea of conscience as a juridical 
principle in its own right had diminished.  This was because equity itself had 
evolved in a syllogistic way through the formation of normative conclusions 
derived from application of higher precepts drawn from synderesis.  Those 
normative conclusions were then applied to individual cases and became rules.  
As more rules were generated, the need to resort to higher-level principles 
diminished,168 and the objective standard increasingly took its content from 
general equitable principles laid down in the case law.169   
 
The doctrinal analysis that follows demonstrates that the idea of conscience 
closely resembles its ordinary meaning.  When the English courts make 
judgments of conscience they are making moral judgments by reference to the 
objective standard.  They are not usually interested in whether the defendant 
thought she was acting morally or not.  When they determine that something is 
unconscionable or unconscientious, they mean simply that it does not comply 
with the objective standard of morality.  Such a finding does not necessarily 
depend on whether the failure to comply was conscious or deliberate.  As 
                                                
165 Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early Modern England (n 75) 
250; The Earl of Oxford's Case in Chancery (1615) 1 Ch Rep 1; 21 ER 485, [5]/486. 
166 Klinck, Conscience, Equity and the Court of Chancery in Early Modern England (n 75) 51. 
167 Willis v Jernegan (1741) 2 Atk 251; 26 ER 555 (Lord Hardwicke). 
168 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (n 132) vol VI, 668-669; Klinck, Conscience, Equity 
and the Court of Chancery in Early Modern England (n 75) 257, 273.  
169 For a very recent account of the development of conscience in equity, see R. Havelock, 
‘The Evolution of Equitable 'Conscience'’ (2014) 9 Journal of Equity 128. 
42 
 
Klinck puts it, ‘[A]t most it might be said that the court orders the person to act 
in the way that it thinks a sound or properly instructed conscience would 
act.’170    
 
The objective standard of equity is informed by the detailed principles of legal 
and equitable doctrine and in particular, often explicitly, by reference to what 
constitutes commercially acceptable conduct.171  The conscience of equity 
therefore reflects ‘a norm of common people’,172 i.e. community values.173  For 
it to work in law, it must ‘relate to objective values that can be quoted to other 
members of the community as reasons for action over and above the special 
significance they hold for the individual.’174  It is ‘a repository of values and 
standards whereby the conduct of suitors is tested’175 and litigants are taken to 
know what the objective standard of equity requires.176  It remains narrower 
than the objective standard of moral conscience.  
OUTLINE 
 
The remainder of this thesis considers the meaning and function of conscience 
in a number of legal doctrines, which have an impact on commercial life. 
Chapters 2-4 analyse the idea of conscience in the context of trusts.   Chapter 2 
examines Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s statement of the relationship between 
trusts and conscience in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington 
LBC,177 particularly as it relates to express and resulting trusts.  Chapter 3 
considers a number of non-express trusts that arise in a commercial context 
                                                
170 Klinck, ‘The Unexamined 'Conscience' of Contemporary Canadian Equity’ (n 26) 604; also 
Jones v Morgan [2001] EWCA Civ 995, p.9 of transcript (Chadwick LJ); J. Chan, ‘Dishonesty 
and Knowledge’ (2001) 31 HKLJ 283, 297. 
171 A view supported by Klinck, ‘The Unexamined 'Conscience' of Contemporary Canadian 
Equity’ (n 26) 606-7. 
172 Jones (n 132) 419.  
173 F. Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics (Macmillan & Co. 1882) 310; Allen (n 134) 
421-22; P. Finn, ‘Commerce, The Common Law and Morality’ (1989) 17 MULR 87; E. 
Thomas, ‘The Harkness Henry Lecture: The Conscience of the Law’ (2000) 8 Waikato LRev 
1, 3, 4; Halliwell (n 12) 153. 
174 Samet (n 21) 20. 
175 P. Keane, ‘The 2009 Wa Lee Lecture in Equity: The Conscience of Equity’ (2010) 10 
QUTLJ 106, 114.  
176 Nocton v Lord Ashburton (n 27) 954 (Viscount Haldane). 
177 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (n 6). 
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and are currently referred to as resulting trusts, i.e. the trusts that arise in 
response to mistaken payments, other defective transfers and theft, the Pallant 
v Morgan178 equity and trusts of fiduciary profits.  Chapter 4 focuses on the 
position of third parties under the equitable proprietary claim and through the 
doctrines of knowing receipt and dishonest assistance.   
 
From the analysis in Chapters 2-4, a number of points emerge.  First, when the 
courts use the language of conscience in relation to trusts, they use it 
consistently with its etymology and ordinary meaning, i.e. to refer to the 
internal process by which we make moral judgements, the standards by 
reference to which we make them and the moral quality of behaviour and 
outcomes.  Secondly, Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s idea of conscience does have 
some explanatory force in relation to trusts.  It reminds us that in recognising 
and enforcing trust obligations, equity is underwriting moral obligations.  It 
tells us further that equity will not give effect to such obligations unless the 
legal owner of the property is in a position to comply with them.  This will 
only be the case where she has knowledge of the relevant facts, i.e. that 
someone else is entitled to the property, because only then can she identify - 
through the operation of her conscience – what she ought to do with the 
property, i.e. deliver it to that other person or hold it for her benefit.  At this 
stage (and not before) equity will underwrite her moral obligations with the 
force of law.  In this way, all trust obligations have their root in conscience.  
Thirdly, however, beyond this the language of conscience tells us nothing and 
leaves a number of important questions unanswered.  Of itself, it cannot tell us 
why or when the beneficiary gets equitable title to the property (despite Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson’s assertion to the contrary in Westdeutsche).  Similarly, it 
does not help us to identify the content of the obligations to which the legal 
owner is subject or what or how much she must know before they will arise.  
To answer these questions, we need direct argument as to the principles the 
law does and/or should embody in this area of law.  The invocation of 
conscience without reference to its explanatory limits can be dangerous, as it 
often obscures the fact that these questions need answering at all. 
                                                
178 Pallant v Morgan [1953] Ch 43 (Ch). 
44 
 
Chapters 5-7 consider the meaning and function of conscience as it appears in 
a number of doctrines relating to the formation of contracts, e.g. mistake and 
misrepresentation (Chapter 5), unconscionable bargains (Chapter 6) and lawful 
act duress and undue influence (Chapter 7).   As in the case of trusts, here the 
language of conscience bears its ordinary meaning, but its function is even 
more limited. Where the only question is whether rescission is justified, 
arguably the language of conscience plays no explanatory role at all beyond 
reminding us that moral principles ground relief.  In principle, rescission can 
and should follow if the claimant’s consent to the relevant transaction has been 
impaired or distorted and the defendant either caused the problem with her 
consent (misrepresentation, undue influence, duress) or knew about it 
(unilateral mistake, unconscionable bargains).  Where the defendant’s 
knowledge is relevant, it is relevant only to whether it is fair to displace the 
defendant’s interest in security of receipt; there is no sense in which equity is 
requiring the defendant to comply with moral standards.  For this reason, the 
language of conscience adds little if anything to our understanding of why 
relief is granted.   It therefore seems wrong to say, as some have argued,179 that 
conscience plays a ‘corrective justice’ function in contract,180 on the basis that 
the defendant must have sufficient knowledge of the problem with the 
claimant’s consent before the contract will be set aside.   
 
The language of conscience may have slightly greater explanatory force where 
the claimant seeks to rectify a contract for unilateral mistake or compensation 
or disgorgement for the commission of a wrong.  In the case of rectification, 
the question is not whether the defendant is entitled to enforce the contract on 
the terms as she understands them to be but whether she is obliged to perform 
it in accordance with the claimant’s terms.   Therefore, the language of 
conscience is not out of place: as in the case of trusts, the defendant’s 
knowledge is highly relevant as a precondition of the imposition of the relevant 
obligation.  Again, however, the explanatory force of conscience is limited, as 
                                                
179 Bigwood, ‘Conscience and the Liberal Conception of Contract: Observing Basic 
Distinctions, Part 1’ (n 21); Bigwood, ‘Conscience and the Liberal Conception of Contract: 
Observing Basic Distinctions, Part II’ (n 60). 
180 Bigwood, ‘Conscience and the Liberal Conception of Contract: Observing Basic 
Distinctions, Part 1’ (n 21) 17. 
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it cannot tell us what or how much the defendant must know, nor does it 
identify the moral principles with which the defendant is expected to comply.  
Moreover, if and to the extent that undue influence and unconscionable 
bargains may be said to involve the commission of a wrong by the defendant, 
again the language of conscience is of limited relevance.  It reminds us that the 
defendant has behaved in a morally unacceptable way by breaching a pre-
existing obligation to the claimant (of which she had reason to know) but it 
tells us little more than that.  In particular, it cannot help us to identify the 
principles that govern the grant of relief nor what constitutes morally 
unacceptable conduct for these purposes.  Chapter 8 concludes by considering 
the implications of these findings for the coherence of commercial law in 
general. 
46 
 
CHAPTER 2: WESTDEUTSCHE AND THE CONSCIENCE-
BASED EXPLANATION OF TRUSTS 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The trust is ubiquitous in commercial life and probably ranks as equity’s 
greatest invention;1 it also has clear historical links to the idea of conscience.  
The law of trusts therefore provides a good starting point for the investigation 
of the meaning and function of conscience in commercial law doctrine.  The 
modern express trust is a powerful, hybrid creature, which offers the 
beneficiary a range of advantages.  She has the ability to recall the property 
from the trustee on demand.2  She is also entitled to trace it into and claim 
substitute property in the trustee’s hands.3  She gets priority in the trustee’s 
insolvency4 and may follow and claim the property itself or any traceable 
substitutes back from third parties who have received the trust property as 
volunteers or for value without notice of her interest.5  These are usually 
referred to as the proprietary aspects of a trust.  The trust also gives rise to 
personal obligations: the trustee is obliged as an express fiduciary to account to 
the beneficiary for the trust property, which requires her, amongst other things, 
to restore the property if she misapplies it6 and disgorge any unauthorised gains 
she has made as a result of her position as trustee,7 including any gains made 
directly from the property or its substitutes.8    
 
                                                
1 J. Brunyate, F. Maitland, Equity, a Course of Lectures, (A. Chaytor and W. Whittaker eds, 
Cambridge University Press 1936) 23. 
2 In accordance with the rule in Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115; 49 ER 282. 
3 Foskett v McKeown [2000] UKHL 29, [2001] 1 AC 102, 110 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 115 
(Lord Hoffmann), 129, 131 (Lord Millett).   
4 Finch v Earl of Winchelsea (1715) 1 P Wms 277; 24 ER 387, [282]/389 (obiter as on the 
facts the trust was not established); Hunter v Moss [1994] WLR 452 (CA); Foskett v McKeown 
(n 3), 130 (Lord Millett). 
5 Foskett v McKeown (n 3) 130 (Lord Millett).   
6 Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns [1996] AC 421 (HL), 434 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); AIB 
Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2014] UKSC 58, [2014] 3 WLR 1367. 
7 Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1995) 182 CLR 544, 557-559 (judgment of the court); 
FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45, [2015] AC 
250. 
8 Foskett v McKeown (n 3) 110  (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 115 (Lord Hoffmann), 130-131 
(Lord Millett).  
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The decision of the House of Lords in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 
v Islington London Borough Council9 is the most important modern statement 
of the relationship between trusts and conscience.  Lords Browne-Wilkinson 
and Goff held that no trust can arise to give the party claiming to benefit from 
it an equitable proprietary interest in the property or subject the alleged trustee 
to fiduciary obligations unless the claimant can point to: (i) identifiable trust 
property in the hands of the alleged trustee; and, at the same time, (ii) that the 
alleged trustee’s conscience is affected by knowledge that she was intended to 
hold the property for the benefit of another (express and implied trusts) or by 
knowledge of whatever other facts are alleged to affect her conscience 
(constructive trusts).   Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s judgment offers the most 
important modern explanation of the relationship between trusts law and the 
idea of conscience. 
 
This chapter starts by reviewing the briefly the historical relationship between 
trusts and conscience.  It then considers Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s idea of 
conscience and argues that it is entirely consistent with our ordinary 
understanding of conscience, as described in Chapter 1.  The chapter goes on 
to consider the function of conscience in trusts law doctrine, with particular 
reference to express and resulting trusts.  It argues that, although perhaps 
historically accurate, it is no longer right to say that the legal owner’s 
conscience must always be affected by knowledge before the proprietary 
aspects of a trust can arise.    In fact, the language of conscience tells us 
nothing about why the beneficiary gets equitable title under an express or 
resulting trust.   By contrast, the language of conscience plays some role in 
explaining the personal aspects of trusteeship.  It reminds us that trust 
obligations are moral obligations and the trustee cannot be expected to comply 
with them unless she knows she has reason to do so.   To know this, she needs 
to know both the relevant moral principles and the relevant facts, so as to be 
able to identify (through the process of moral reasoning) what she ought to do 
in the circumstances.  However, beyond this the language of conscience tells 
                                                
9 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 
(HL). 
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us little, if anything.  In particular, it cannot help us to identify what moral 
principles underpin trusts; nor can it tell us what or how much the individual 
must know before she will be subject to the relevant obligation, or even what 
the content of that obligation is.  To answer these questions, we need to engage 
in direct argument about what principles the law does and/or should embody.  
THE HISTORICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN TRUSTS AND 
CONSCIENCE 
 
The original justification for the basic trust obligation, i.e. to hold property for 
the benefit of someone else, was a moral one, rooted in the idea of conscience.  
‘The modern trust developed from the ancient use’10 and both were said to 
have ‘the same parents, fraud and fear; and the same nurse, a court of 
conscience.’11  The use was a device by which one person (the feoffor) could 
transfer legal title to property to another (the feoffee) to hold for the specific 
purpose of benefiting either the transferor herself or a third party (the cestui 
que use).  The central idea common to uses and trusts was that the recipient of 
the property then came under a duty to apply it in accordance with the 
stipulated purpose.12  Initially, that duty was enforceable only as a matter of 
honour and conscience,13 i.e. it was a personal moral duty, which arose out of 
the trust and confidence placed by the feoffor in the feoffee to administer the 
property for the cestui que use.  No use could arise at all ‘unless at the time of 
its creation there was someone in whom the creator of the use had reposed his 
confidence.  There could be no use which attached simply to the land and not 
to some person.’14  If the feoffee failed to perform the use, the cestui que use 
had no remedy at law because the common law treated the recipient as 
                                                
10 Brunyate (n 1) 23. 
11 This argument was made in Attorney General v Sands (1679) Hardres 488; 145 ER 561, 
[491]/563. A notable example of the use of the language of conscience in a trusts context is 
Lord Nottingham’s judgment in Cook v Fountain (1733) 3 Swanst 585; 36 ER 984, [601]/990. 
12 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law (7th edn, Methuen & Co. Ltd, Sweet & Maxwell 
1966) vol IV 410; O. Holmes Jr, ‘Early English Equity’ (1885) 1 LQR 162, 163; A. Simpson, 
A History of the Land Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1986) 173. 
13 Simpson (n 12) 176.   
14 Ibid 181. 
49 
 
absolute owner in law15 and ‘left no place for the separation of beneficial 
enjoyment from legal title’.16   
 
Over time, the ecclesiastical courts17 and subsequently the courts of Chancery 
underwrote the feoffee’s moral obligation with the force of equity and allowed 
the cestui que use to enforce the use against the feoffee personally ‘in the name 
of good conscience’.18  The Chancellor’s role in relation to uses ‘was to see 
that persons acted honestly according to the precepts of good morality, and, in 
accordance with the principle that equity acts in personam, he did not hesitate 
to proceed against feoffees who disregarded the moral rights of the cestui que 
use.’19  Whilst a legal property interest is enforceable against the world,20 
initially the right of a cestui que use was a personal right21 enforceable against 
the feoffee alone.22  Because the common law gave no remedy to the cestui que 
use, the only remedy equity could provide was to compel the feoffee to convey 
title to the property to her or hold it for her benefit.23  
 
Gradually, the use began to take on proprietary characteristics, as equity 
extended the personal liability of the feoffee to other recipients of the 
property,24 and initially these proprietary characteristics were also referable to 
conscience.  The key to the extension of liability beyond the trustee was 
whether the third party had been affected by the personal confidence originally 
reposed by the feoffor in the feoffee to hold the property for the benefit of the 
cestui que use;25 if not, the Chancellor would not enforce the use against the 
                                                
15 J. Ames, ‘The Origin of Uses and Trusts’ (1907-1908) 21 Harv L Rev 261, 265. 
16 Simpson (n 12) 175. 
17 R. Helmholz, ‘The Early Enforcement of Uses’ (1979) 79 Colum L Rev 1503; R. Helmholz, 
The Oxford History of the Laws of England, vol I (J. Baker ed, Oxford University Press 2004) 
422-3. 
18 Simpson (n 12) 176. 
19 E. Burn and J. Cartwright, Cheshire and Burn's Modern Law of Real Property (18th edn, 
Oxford University Press 2011) 67. 
20 Ibid 80. 
21 Sir Francis Bacon, Reading on the Statute of Uses (Garland Publishing Inc. 1979) 401. 
22 Stephen, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 1 (L. Warrington ed, 21st edn, 
Butterworth & Co. 1950) 119. 
23 Burn and Cartwright (n 19) 67, citing Ames, Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal 
History, vol ii, 741. 
24 Gilbert on Uses and Trusts (3rd edn, W. Reed 1811) 51; J. Penner, ‘The "Bundle of Rights" 
Picture of Property’ [1995] UCLA LRev 711, 813, n 242. 
25 W. Hayes, An Introduction to Conveyancing, vol 1 (5th edn, S. Sweet 1840) 42. 
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third party.26  Thus, the underlying question was whether the circumstances in 
which the third party acquired the trust property were such that she ‘ought in 
conscience to be held responsible.’27   At first, anyone who purchased the 
property from the feoffee with notice of the use was bound in conscience to 
respect it,28 as she knew or had the means of knowing about the use, e.g. 
through a proper investigation of title or reasonable inquiries.29  Because she 
knew or had the ability to know about the existence of the use, she was party to 
the feoffee’s fraud on the cestui que use.30  Someone who purchased the 
property from the feoffee without notice of the cestui que use’s interest in it 
‘was considered as coming to the possession with a clear conscience, and by a 
new right, founded on contract, which entitled him to hold the land for his own 
benefit, discharged of the [trust]’.31  The use in favour of the cestui que use was 
extinguished and the purchaser obtained legal title.32   
 
Eventually, uses became trusts33 and subsequently, those who inherited the 
property from the trustee34 and those who received it from her by way of gift35 
were also bound to carry out the trust, even though they may have had no 
actual or constructive notice of it.  The strict liability of volunteers seems to 
have derived from the practice of landowners transferring legal title to their 
land to feoffees, and only subsequently declaring the use on which the land was 
to be held.  This gave rise to a presumption that the feoffees held the land for 
the grantor’s benefit under a resulting use (the doctrine of presumed uses).  
Where the feoffee transferred land subject to a use to a volunteer, the general 
rule of resulting uses was altered so that the volunteer recipient held directly to 
                                                
26 Burn and Cartwright (n 19) 81. 
27 Ibid. 
28 YB 5 Ed IV, pl 16, fo 7; L. Warmington, Stephen's Commentaries on the Laws of England 
(21st edn, Butterworth & Co. 1950) 120. 
29 Burn and Cartwright (n 19) 85. 
30 Simpson (n 12) 180. 
31 Hayes (n 25) 42, 43; Burn and Cartwright (n 19) 82. 
32 Simpson (n 12) 180. 
33 Burn and Cartwright (n 19) 81. 
34 YB 14 Hen VIII, pl 5. 
35 Stephen (n 22) 119-120; Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol 2 (M. Kerr 
ed, 4th edn, J. Murray 1876) 282; Burn and Cartwright (n 19) 81, citing Chudleigh’s Case 1 
Co Rep 113b, 122b. 
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the use of the cestui que use.36   It is said that equity treated the trustee’s 
gratuitous transfer of the property to a volunteer as insufficient to interrupt the 
obligations of trust and confidence that went with it,37 so that those obligations 
were taken to affect the volunteer’s conscience as a matter of course.  The 
transaction was regarded as ‘a change of the person of the legal owner, without 
any alteration of the legal title.  That confidence which had been expressly 
reposed in [the trustee], was tacitly communicated to [the third party].’38  In 
other words, where the third party received the trust property by way of gift or 
inheritance, it was presumed that she had notice of the trust39 and her 
conscience was thereby affected. The relevant moral precept seems to have 
been that ‘it was against conscience for one man to retain what was clearly 
intended for another’.40 
 
As the beneficiary’s rights under a trust became enforceable not only against 
the trustee but against almost everyone41 in whose hands the trust property 
could be found (except a bona fide purchaser for value without notice), the 
explanation of trusts changed.  It is now the case that some third party 
recipients are bound to recognise the beneficiary’s entitlement to enjoy the 
beneficial interest in the trust property, irrespective of whether they gave any 
undertaking to hold it for her and/or their conscience is affected.  Therefore, 
although the original explanation of the effect of trusts on third parties was 
rooted in the idea that they were affected by the moral obligations owed by the 
trustee, now we would simply say that the beneficiary’s right follows the thing 
itself, i.e. it is an enforceable proprietary interest just like any other. 
 
 
                                                
36 Simpson (n 12) 177, 180; W. Swadling, ‘A New Role for Resulting Trusts?’ (1996) 16 LS 
110, 114. 
37 Hayes (n 25) 43. 
38 Ibid. 
39 C. Harpum, ‘The Stranger as Constructive Trustee’ (1986) 102 LQR 112 , 140, n75, citing 
DEC Yale (ed), The Prolegomena of Chancery and Equity, Chap XV, s.1, 253. 
40 Burn and Cartwright (n 19) 76. 
41 By the late seventeenth century, trusts had also become enforceable against the trustee’s 
creditors: ibid 81. 
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THE WESTDEUTSCHE CASE  
 
In the Westdeutsche case, a bank and a local authority had entered into an 
interest rate swap agreement whereby the bank made large payments to the 
local authority.  Subsequently, it was held elsewhere that interest rate swaps 
were ultra vires local authorities and such contracts were therefore void. The 
local authority had no knowledge at the time it received the payments from the 
bank that the swaps contract was void.  By the time it had gained such 
knowledge it had disposed of the money and no traceable proceeds remained.  
The bank wanted to recover from the local authority not only the money it had 
paid under the void contract but also compound interest.  To recover 
compound interest it had to establish that the local authority was ‘a trustee or 
otherwise in a fiduciary position’.42  The bank argued that the payment was 
made as a result of a mistake and/or pursuant to a void contract (and therefore 
in respect of a consideration which had failed), and that a presumed resulting 
trust arose in order to reverse the local authority’s unjust enrichment. 
 
The claim for compound interest failed because the House of Lords held that 
neither authority43 nor principle supported the recognition of a resulting trust in 
the circumstances.  In particular, they held that a trust could only arise if, at a 
time when the local authority still had the money or its traceable proceeds, its 
conscience was affected by knowledge of the factors alleged to give rise to the 
trust, i.e. the contract was void.44  In fact, the money became untraceable 
before the parties became aware that the contract was void.45  Their Lordships 
could see no moral or legal reason why the bank should be given the additional 
benefits which flowed from an equitable proprietary claim, such as priority in 
the local authority’s insolvency, nor why the local authority should be treated 
as personally liable to account as a fiduciary at a time when nobody knew the 
contract was void.46   
                                                
42 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (n 9) 702 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
43 Ibid 689-90 (Lord Goff), 708, 713-5 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
44 Ibid 690 (Lord Goff), 705, 706, 709 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
45 Ibid 689-90 (Lord Goff), 706 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
46 Ibid 684 (Lord Goff), 704-5 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
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Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that the idea of conscience underpins trusts law 
as follows: 
 
(i) Equity operates on the conscience of the owner of the legal interest.   In 
the case of a trust, the conscience of the legal owner requires him to carry 
out the purposes for which the property was vested in him  (express or 
implied trust) or which the law imposes on him by reason of his 
unconscionable conduct (constructive trust).  (ii) Since the equitable 
jurisdiction to enforce trusts depends upon the conscience of the holder of 
the legal interest being affected, he cannot be a trustee of the property if 
and so long as he is ignorant of the facts alleged to affect his conscience, 
i.e. until he is aware that he is intended to hold the property for the benefit 
of others in the case of an express or implied trust, or, in the case of a 
constructive trust, of the factors which are alleged to affect his 
conscience.47   
 
In Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s view (with which Lord Goff agreed48), it 
followed that a trust could only arise if while the legal owner held identifiable 
trust property or its traceable substitutes, her conscience was affected by 
knowledge either that she was intended to hold the property for the benefit of 
another (express or implied trusts) or of the factors alleged to affect her 
conscience (constructive trusts).49  If both those conditions were satisfied, a 
trust was established.  By this their Lordships meant that from that date, the 
beneficiary had an equitable proprietary interest in the trust property 
enforceable against third parties50 and the legal owner was personally 
accountable as a trustee.  Conversely, if one or other of those conditions was 
not satisfied, the beneficiary had neither an equitable proprietary interest in the 
property nor a personal claim in equity against the legal owner.51  In other 
words, in the view of the House of Lords the personal and proprietary aspects 
of the trust stood or fell together; it was not possible for the beneficiary to 
acquire equitable title to the trust property unless the trustee’s conscience was 
affected by knowledge.    
                                                
47 Ibid 705. 
48 Ibid (n 9) 690 (Lord Goff). 
49 Ibid 705, 706, 709 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
50 Ibid 705. 
51 Ibid 690 (Lord Goff), 714 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
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CONSCIENCE - MEANING 
 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s use of the language of conscience is entirely 
consistent with its ordinary meaning as described in Chapter 1.  His 
proposition that the equitable jurisdiction to enforce trusts depends upon the 
conscience of the legal owner being affected reminds us that in recognising 
and enforcing trusts, equity is underwriting obligations of good conscience,52 
i.e. moral obligations.53  This is consistent with the idea that legal duties 
presuppose and give effect to underlying moral duties.54  The legal owner’s 
conscience will not be affected unless the owner has knowledge of ‘the facts 
alleged to affect his conscience’, i.e. knowledge that ‘he is intended to hold the 
property for the benefit of others in the case of an express or implied trust, or, 
in the case of a constructive trust, of the factors which are alleged to affect his 
conscience.’55  This tells us that even if there are good moral reasons for 
requiring the legal owner to hold the property for the beneficiary, we cannot 
reasonably expect her to do this – and so she should not be viewed as in breach 
of any moral obligation if she fails to do it – unless she knows of the facts 
which support this requirement.  Without knowledge of the material facts, the 
legal owner is not in a position to work out what she ought (morally) to do 
with the property.  Conversely, if she has knowledge of the material facts, she 
is able – through the process of moral reasoning – to identify what the 
objective standard of morality requires of her.  If the legal owner acquires the 
relevant factual knowledge while she still has the property, she is subject to a 
moral obligation to hold the property for the beneficiary, which equity 
underwrites with the force of law.  It follows that if the legal owner breaches 
the obligation, she may be said to have acted unconscionably and equity will 
grant relief.  
                                                
52 T Watkin, ‘Changing Concepts of Ownership in English Law During the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries’ in G. Griffiths and M. Dixon (eds), Contemporary Perspectives on 
Equity, Property and Trusts Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 143-4. 
53 Sekhon v Alissa [1989] 2 FLR 94 (Ch), 99 (Hoffmann J). 
54 S. Smith, ‘A Duty to Make Restitution’ (2013) 26 Canadian Law and Jurisprudence 157, 
163. 
55 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (n 9) 705 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
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CONSCIENCE - FUNCTION 
 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that unless and until the legal owner’s 
conscience is affected by knowledge of the relevant facts, a beneficiary cannot 
acquire equitable title to property under a trust and the legal owner does not 
come under any obligations in respect of the property.  These claims are 
considered below, with particular reference to express and resulting trusts.  As 
critics have argued,56 the case law suggests that Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s first 
claim is incorrect.  The idea that the legal owner’s conscience had to be 
affected before the beneficiary acquired equitable title is consistent with the 
historical development of trusts described earlier in this chapter, but it is no 
longer accurate.  It follows that the language of conscience is unnecessary to 
explain the proprietary aspects of express and resulting trusts.  By contrast, the 
language of conscience does have some explanatory force in relation to the 
personal aspects of trusts.  It reminds us that trust obligations are moral 
obligations and it is not reasonable to treat the legal owner of the property as 
subject to them unless her capacity for moral reasoning has been invoked.  
However, even then the explanatory force of conscience is limited.  In 
particular, it identifies neither the moral principles that inform the obligations 
to which the trustee is subject nor the content of the obligations themselves.  
Moreover, it cannot tell us what or how much the legal owner must know 
before she will be subject to the personal obligations of trusteeship. 
Conscience and the Proprietary Aspects of Trusts 
 
In Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s view the separation of legal and equitable title 
cannot occur so as to give rise to a trust unless and until the legal owner’s 
conscience is affected by knowledge of the relevant facts so as to trigger her 
personal obligations.57  In reaching this conclusion (with which Lord Goff 
                                                
56 R. Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Clarendon Press 1997) 204-6; P. Birks, ‘Trusts Raised to 
Reverse Unjust Enrichment: The Westdeutsche Case’ (1996) 4 RLR 3, 22-3; W. Swadling, 
‘The Law of Property’ in P. Birks and F. Rose (eds), Lessons of the Swaps Litigation 
(Mansfield Press 2000) 260-1 (although he refers to some of the cases as examples of express 
trusts). 
57 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (n 9) 706-7, 
714 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
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agreed58) he was clearly influenced by concerns that it would be inappropriate 
for the bank to enjoy the proprietary advantages associated with equitable title 
from the date of payment, such as the ability to avail of equity’s tracing rules, 
claim the property from third parties and enjoy priority in the trustee’s 
insolvency.  He could see ‘no moral or legal justification for giving such 
priority’ to the bank in circumstances where if the swaps contract had been 
valid, it would have had purely personal rights against the local authority.59  In 
his view, this could give rise to problems in a commercial context, such that ‘a 
businessman who has entered into transactions relating to or depending upon 
property rights could find that assets which apparently belong to one person in 
fact belong to another’.60 
 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s explanation is consistent with the historical 
approach to trusts as described earlier in this chapter.  However, it clearly 
conflicts with the current, generally accepted view that legal and equitable title 
may separate irrespective of the legal owner’s knowledge so as to give rise to a 
trust in the proprietary sense.61  The incidence of the trustee’s personal 
obligations is treated as a separate question, which is referable to knowledge.62  
The different approaches to what constitutes ‘a trust’ may appear semantic but 
they point to a more serious debate about ‘the relationship between the 
personal liabilities of trustees and the division of title’.63  In fact, the law on 
                                                
58 Ibid 690 (Lord Goff). 
59 Ibid 704 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
60 Ibid 705. 
61 Hardoon v Belilios [1901] AC 118 (HL), 123 (Lord Lindley); Birks (n 56) 12; Allan v Rea 
Brothers Trustees Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 85, 4 ITELR 627, [45]-[46] (Walker LJ); Peter 
Millett, ‘Restitution and Constructive Trusts’ (1998) 114 LQR 399, 403-405; S. Worthington, 
‘The Proprietary Consequences of Rescission’ (2002) 10 RLR 28, 50; D. Hayton, P. Matthews 
and C. Mitchell, Underhill & Hayton, Law of Trusts and Trustees (17th edn, LexisNexis 
Butterworths 2006) 422-3. 
62 Lonrho v Fayed (No. 2) [1992] 1 WLR 1, 12 (Millett LJ); R v Chester and North Wales 
Legal Aid Area Office (No. 12), Ex p. Floods of Queensferry Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 1496, 1500 
(Millett LJ); L. Smith, ‘Constructive Fiduciaries?’ in P. Birks (ed), Privacy and Loyalty 
(Oxford University Press 1997) 265-6; Chambers (n 56) 209, 210. 
63 Birks (n 56) 11. Some argue that a contract/obligations analysis best explains trusts: see, e.g. 
J. Langbein, ‘The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts’ (1995-1996) 105 Yale LJ 625; P. 
Parkinson, ‘Reconceptualising the Express Trust’ (2002) 61 CLJ 657.  Others argue that trusts 
are better justified by reference to their proprietary aspects: H. Hansmann and U. Mattei, ‘The 
Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis’ (1998) 73 New York 
University Law Review 434, especially 438, 454 et seq.   See also R. Nolan, ‘Equitable 
Property’ (2006) 122 LQR 232 (beneficiary’s right under a trust described as primarily a right 
to exclude non-beneficiaries from enjoyment of the benefit of trust assets); and B. McFarlane, 
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express and resulting trusts demonstrates that in principle, the separation of 
legal and equitable title can occur before the trustee’s conscience is affected by 
knowledge.   Moreover, tying the recognition of equitable title to the date the 
legal owner acquires knowledge of the relevant facts makes it difficult to say 
when the proprietary aspects of a trust arise, so in practice Lord Browne-
Wilkinson’s approach may increase commercial uncertainty rather than reduce 
it. 64    
Express Trusts 
 
In the case of express trusts, the beneficiary (B) may acquire equitable title to 
the property even where the trustee (T) is entirely unaware that the settlor (S) 
wishes her to hold the property for someone else.  To understand why the 
beneficiary’s equitable title arises, we need to ask what moral principle or 
event65 generates it.   In the case of express trusts, the positive intention of S to 
create a trust is sufficient to result in the separation of legal and equitable title.  
Arguably, this reflects the moral concern that we ought to respect the wishes of 
property owners because they and they alone are entitled ‘to determine the 
disposition of the asset and hence who may receive, use and benefit from it’.66  
 
Assume S wishes to create an express trust over the sum of £100 in favour of 
B, with T as trustee.   We saw earlier in this chapter that historically, the key 
question was whether a relationship of trust and confidence had arisen between 
S and T, so as to subject T to moral obligations, which B could enforce.    
However, since the re-characterisation of trust interests as proprietary interests, 
                                                
‘The Centrality of Constructive and Resulting Trusts’ in C. Mitchell (ed), Constructive and 
Resulting Trusts (Hart Publishing 2010) 203; B. McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law 
(Hart Publishing 2008) 214-215 (trusts described as depending on duty-burdened rights).   On 
the appropriate classification of trusts: N. McBride and A. Hughes, ‘Hedley Byrne in the 
House of Lords: An Interpretation’ (1995) 15 LS 376; and Parkinson (n 63). 
64 Chambers (n 56) 206; Birks (n 56) 20; Swadling, ‘The Law of Property’ (n 56) 263. 
65 P. Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26 UWAL Rev 1, 
42; P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 2005) 21-22. 
66 C. Webb, ‘Intention, Mistakes and Resulting Trusts’ in C. Mitchell (ed), Constructive and 
Resulting Trusts (Hart Publishing 2010) 330; also C. Webb, ‘Property, Unjust Enrichment and 
Defective Transfers’ in R. Chambers, C. Mitchell and R. Penner (eds), The Philosophical 
Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford University Press 2009) 368. 
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there has been a change in emphasis.67  Now, two factors are relevant to 
whether B gets equitable title to the property.  First, equity requires evidence 
that clearly shows S intended to create a trust68 of that particular £10069 in 
favour of that particular person, B.70  Secondly, S must take the formal steps 
necessary to constitute the trust by clothing the legal title to the property with 
the vestments of trusteeship.  She may do this by appointing T trustee of the 
£100 for B and transferring the legal title to the £100 to T on that basis.71  The 
completion of these steps by S is sufficient to separate the title to the property, 
so that the legal title vests in T pending her acceptance of the office of trustee72 
and B acquires the equitable title.   If S has done everything within her power 
to transfer the property to T, equity will not allow the trust to fail for want of 
formality; S will hold the property on constructive trust for T pending 
completion of the relevant formalities.73   In any case, evidence of intention 
and completion of the formalities (subject to the caveat above) is all that is 
required to constitute the trust.   
 
Once S appoints T as trustee of the £100, T must choose whether to accept the 
office of trustee or disclaim it.74  Acceptance may be express75 or it may result 
from conduct on T’s part.76  If T accepts the office, she is subject to the 
personal obligations of trusteeship.  If she disclaims it, she disclaims both the 
obligations of trustee and the legal title to the property.77   However, there is 
                                                
67 Simpson (n 12) 181, 206. 
68 J. Martin, Hanbury and Martin, Modern Equity (19th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 71; Re 
Schebsman [1944] Ch 85 (CA), 89 (Lord Greene MR).  
69 C. Mitchell, Hayton and Mitchell; Commentary and Cases on the Law of Trusts and 
Equitable Remedies (13th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2010)60. 
70 Knight v Knight (1840) 3 Beav 148; 49 ER 58, [173]/68.  Certain statutory formalities must 
also be complied with if the property in question is land. 
71 Milroy v Lord (1862) 4 De G F & J 264; 45 ER 1185, [274]-[275]/1189-90 (Turner LJ).  The 
requisite formalities depend on the type of property involved. 
72 Smith v Wheeler (1671) 1 Lew 279; 86 ER 88; Siggers v Evans (1855) 5 E & B 367; 119 ER 
518; Re Arbib & Class's Contract [1891] 1 Ch 601 (CA). 
73 Re Rose [1952] Ch 499 (CA), 510-1 (Evershed MR); Pennington v Waine [2002] EWCA 
Civ 227, [2002] 1 WLR 2075, 2088, [59] (Arden LJ); J. McGhee QC (ed) Snell's Equity (33rd 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014) 610, [22-047]. 
74 Robinson v Pett (1734) P Wms 249; 24 ER 1049; Fortex Group v Macintosh [1998] 3 NZLR 
171, 174 (Tipping J); Brunyate, F. Maitland, Equity, A Course of Lectures (n 1) 55; P. Pettit, 
Equity and the Law of Trusts (12th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 68. 
75 Doe, d. Chidgey v Harris 16 M & W 517; 153 ER 1294. 
76 Jones v Higgins (1866) LR 2 Eq 538. 
77 Re Birchall (1889) 40 Ch D 439. 
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authority to the effect that even if T disclaims, this does not necessarily destroy 
B’s equitable interest in the trust property and the court will treat the 
settlement as fully constituted.78  These cases support the view that B’s 
equitable proprietary interest in the property arises independently of T’s 
knowledge and acceptance of the office of trusteeship.79  Similarly, if a testator 
fails to appoint a trustee of her will80 or the trustees of a will trust all 
predecease the testator,81 equity will not permit the trust to fail for want of a 
trustee but will appoint a new trustee if necessary to give effect to it.  Here, B’s 
equitable proprietary interest arises even before the new trustee has been 
identified, let alone acquired knowledge of S’s intentions.  In both the 
disclaimer and the will trust cases, B is treated as having an equitable interest 
in the property from the date the trust was constituted.  Therefore, they directly 
undermine Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s suggestion that T’s conscience must be 
affected by knowledge before an express trust can arise.  Instead, they 
demonstrate that the key to the creation of B’s equitable proprietary interest in 
express trusts is S’s positive intention that B should benefit from the property. 
There is no need for T to know of S’s decision or intentions regarding the 
property in order for B’s equitable interest to arise.   
Presumed Resulting Trusts 
 
Similarly, the state of T’s conscience has nothing to do with the creation of B’s 
equitable proprietary interest under a presumed resulting trust.  Here again the 
relevant moral principle seems to be that we should respect the wishes of 
property owners as to how their property is to be dealt with.  However, there 
has been extensive debate as to whether the resulting trust arises because it is 
presumed B positively intended to create a trust in her own favour or it is 
presumed that she did not intend T to benefit from the property.  If the latter, 
then B cannot be said to have consented properly to the transfer of the property 
to T and the trust arises to reverse T’s unjust enrichment at her expense.  
                                                
78 Mallott v Wilson [1903] 2 Ch 494, 502-503 (Byrne J). P. Matthews, ‘The Constitution of 
Disclaimed Trusts Inter Vivos’ [1981] Conv 141 suggests that by analogy with gifts, in the 
case of a voluntary settlement the legal estate should be treated as never having vested in T. 
79 Chambers (n 56) 204-5. 
80 Dodkin v Brunt (1868) LR 6 Eq 580 (Ch). 
81 Re Smirthwaite's Trusts (1870-71) LR 11 Eq 251 (Ch). 
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On Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s analysis, presumed resulting trusts come into 
existence only when the trustee’s conscience is touched by knowledge that the 
beneficiary is intended to benefit from the property.  However, as Chambers 
has suggested,82 this conclusion is clearly inconsistent with four cases83 (‘the 
no-knowledge cases’), which were cited in support of the proposition that a 
presumed resulting trust could arise even where the trustee had no idea that the 
property had been transferred to her with an intention that someone else should 
benefit from it.  In each case, B had transferred property to a relative (T) 
without telling her, and the evidence showed that B’s intention at the time of 
transfer was to enjoy the benefit of the property herself and that she 
subsequently did so.  After B and T had both died, the question was whether 
B’s heirs could assert an equitable interest in the property as against T’s heirs, 
who had inherited legal title to the property from T.  In all four cases the court 
held that B’s heirs were entitled to an equitable interest in the property.   
 
The no-knowledge cases demonstrate that the key factor that gives rise to B’s 
proprietary interest under a presumed resulting trust has nothing to do with T’s 
conscience, but is referable to B’s intention.  The reason behind B’s heirs’ 
entitlement was expressed slightly differently in each of the no-knowledge 
cases: e.g. it was because B had not intended to part with the equitable interest 
in the property;84 or because the intention had been that T would hold the 
property as trustee;85 or because T held the property on resulting trust for B.86 
However, in all four cases B’s equitable interest arose in circumstances where 
T never knew the property had been transferred to her, let alone that in making 
the transfer B intended to enjoy the benefit of the property herself.  Therefore, 
they arose before T’s conscience was affected by knowledge of the facts that 
would require her to hold the property for B’s benefit.   
 
                                                
82 Chambers (n 56) 204-6. 
83 Birch v Blagrave (1755) Amb 264; 27 ER 176; Childers v Childers (1857) 1 De G & J 482; 
44 ER 810; Re Vinogradoff [1935] WN 58; Re Muller [1953] NZLR 879. 
84 Birch v Blagrave (n 83) 265 (Hardwicke LC). 
85 Childers v Childers (n 83) [492]/814 (Knight Bruce LJ). 
86 Re Vinogradoff (n 83); Re Muller (n 83) 882 (Northcroft J). 
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Lord Browne-Wilkinson purported to rationalise the no-knowledge cases as 
being consistent with his conscience-based explanation of trusts.  In his view 
they were explicable on the basis that ‘by the time [the] action was brought, 
[T] or his successors in title have become aware of the facts which gave rise to 
a resulting trust; his conscience was affected as from the time of such 
discovery and thereafter he held on a resulting trust under which the property 
was recovered from him.’87  However, this attempt to square the circle has 
been rightly criticised as inconsistent with the reasoning in the cases, which 
clearly suggests the trust arose irrespective of T’s knowledge and before the 
legal title to the property passed by succession to T’s heirs.88   In fact, the no-
knowledge cases clearly suggest that B’s equitable proprietary interest in the 
property arose immediately because she positively intended to keep the 
beneficial enjoyment of the property and/or immediately started to take the 
fruits of the property for herself.   
 
If B’s entitlement to the property under a presumed resulting trust is referable 
to intention, the question then is whether it arises because of a positive 
intention on B’s part to take the benefit of the property herself (as in the case 
of express trusts) or because of an absence of any intention on her part to 
benefit T.  Before Westdeutsche there were two main explanations of the basis 
on which B’s equitable proprietary interest under a resulting trust arose.89   On 
one view, the trust arises because it is presumed that this was what B had 
positively intended.  It would follow that any evidence inconsistent with an 
intention to create a trust would defeat B’s claim to equitable title.90  This 
would restrict the scope of the proprietary effects of resulting trusts.  On 
another view, the trust arises because it was presumed that B did not intend to 
benefit T and therefore to reverse T’s unjust enrichment.  If so, then only 
                                                
87 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (n 9) 705 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
88 Chambers (n 56) 205-6; Birks, ‘Trusts Raised to Reverse Unjust Enrichment: The 
Westdeutsche Case’ (n 56) 22-3; Swadling, ‘The Law of Property’ (n 56) 260-1 (although he 
refers to some of the cases as examples of express trusts). 
89 Others suggested that the resulting trust operated simply as part of the default rules of 
property to locate the beneficial interest in the property where that was unclear: C. Rickett, 
‘The Classification of Trusts’ (1999) 18 NZULR 305, 317. 
90 Swadling, ‘A New Role for Resulting Trusts?’ (n 36) 113-4, 116, 117; W. Swadling, 
‘Explaining Resulting Trusts’ (2008) 124 LQR 72, 76.   
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evidence inconsistent with the absence of an intention to benefit T would 
suffice to deprive B of equitable title.91  This would widen the circumstances in 
which B could acquire equitable title under a resulting trust.   
 
The bank in Westdeutsche relied on the unjust enrichment analysis in support 
of its claim that the local authority held the money for it on a resulting trust.    
However, Lord Browne-Wilkinson rejected this argument and concluded that 
the presumption in resulting trust cases was that the transferor of property 
positively intended to create a trust in her own favour, such that any evidence 
inconsistent with an intention to create a trust could rebut the presumption.  In 
his view, there was such evidence on the facts: although the parties mistakenly 
believed the contract was valid, the mistake did not affect their intention that 
the money should become the absolute property of the local authority upon 
payment and this was sufficient to rebut the presumption that the bank 
intended the local authority to hold the money for its benefit.92   Both he and 
Lord Goff saw the unjust enrichment argument as an attempt to extend the law 
on resulting trusts and neither was prepared to accept it.93   Subsequently, in 
Air Jamaica v Charlton, Lord Millett held that resulting trusts arise in response 
to an absence of intention to benefit T and therefore to effect her unjust 
enrichment at B’s expense.94  However, he also appeared to accept the House 
of Lords’ conclusion in Westdeutsche that the bank’s intention to transfer the 
money to the local authority under the contract was sufficient to rebut the 
                                                
91 P. Birks, ‘Restitution and Resulting Trusts’ in S. Goldstein (ed), Equity and Contemporary 
Legal Developments, vol 1 - Resulting Trusts and Equitable Compensation (Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem 1992), reproduced in P. Birks and F. Rose (eds), Restitution and 
Equity, Volume 1: Resulting Trusts and Equitable Compensation 265, 273; Birks, Unjust 
Enrichment (n 65) 304-307; Chambers (n 56) 19-35; R. Chambers and J. Penner, ‘Ignorance’ 
in S. Degeling and J. Edelman (eds), Unjust Enrichment in Commercial Law (Thomson 2008) 
253.  Cf. a new and slightly different argument from Chambers: R. Chambers, ‘Is There a 
Presumption of Resulting Trust?’ in C. Mitchell (ed), Constructive and Resulting Trusts (Hart 
Publishing 2010) 284, which suggests that the presumption of a trust arises in response to the 
absence of consideration and to counter the presumption of advancement, which will be 
rebutted by evidence that B did not intend to give the property to T.  
92 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (n 9) 708 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 690 (Lord Goff); Millett (n 61) 412.  
93 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (n 9) 689-90 
(Lord Goff), 708-9 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
94 Air Jamaica Ltd v Charlton [1999] 1 WLR 1399 (CA), 1412 (Millett LJ). 
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presumption that B did not intend to benefit T.95  Therefore, the difference 
between his approach and Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s would appear to be 
marginal.    
 
Turning back to the no-knowledge cases, if we apply Lord Browne-
Wilkinson’s analysis of presumed resulting trusts, we can say the resulting 
trusts arose because the presumption was that B intended to create a trust of the 
property in her own favour and this presumption was not rebutted. 
Alternatively, applying the unjust enrichment analysis, we can say the trusts 
arose because the presumption was that B did not intend T to benefit from the 
property and this presumption was not rebutted.  The Westdeutsche analysis 
represents current law and has attracted recent academic support on the basis 
that it is consistent with the doctrine of resulting uses, as described earlier in 
this chapter.96  The important point for these purposes is that on neither 
analysis is T’s conscience relevant to the creation of B’s equitable proprietary 
interest.   In both cases, the key factor is B’s intention.  This tells us that, as in 
the case of express trusts, the relevant moral concern is to ensure that the 
wishes of property owners as to how their property is disposed of are respected 
and consequently, if we know that someone does not intend us to benefit from 
their property in any way, we ought to give it back. 
Failed Trust Resulting Trusts 
 
Similarly, B may acquire equitable title to property under a failed trust 
resulting trust irrespective of whether T’s conscience is first affected by 
knowledge.   As in the case of presumed resulting trusts, the critical factor in 
deciding whether B gets equitable title is B’s intention.  Again, there is a 
difference in opinion as to whether the trust responds to a positive intention to 
create a trust or the absence of any intention on B’s part to benefit T.  
However, as before, on neither view is the state of T’s conscience relevant. 
                                                
95 Millett (n 61) 401; P. Millett, ‘Proprietary Restitution’ in S. Degeling and J. Edelman (eds), 
Equity in Commercial Law (Thomson 2005) 320. 
96 J. Mee, ‘Presumed Resulting Trusts, Intention and Declaration’ (2014) 73 CLJ 85.  Also: F. 
Maitland, Equity (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 1936) 33; D. Ibbetson, A Historical 
Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford University Press 1999) 274.  
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A failed trust resulting trust arises where an express trust settled by B fails 
from the outset, e.g. because its objects are uncertain.97  It may also arise where 
an express trust fails to exhaust the full beneficial interest in the intended trust 
property, e.g. because it offends the rule against perpetuities but the trust fund 
contains a surplus, which requires to be reallocated.98  In such cases there is no 
doubt that B set up the original express trust with the intention of benefiting 
someone other than herself and T, and T has agreed to act as a trustee of the 
whole property in accordance with the terms of the original trust.  The only 
question for the court is who gets the beneficial interest in the trust property or 
the surplus: usually it reverts to B under a resulting trust.    In other cases, it 
may be uncertain whether T is to hold all of the property as trustee or take 
some of it beneficially.  The court answers this question by reference to B’s 
intentions, which are to be construed by reference to the trust instrument.99  
 
Different explanations are proffered for B’s equitable proprietary right to the 
property under failed trust resulting trusts.  Traditionally, it was held that the 
resulting trust arose automatically because B had failed effectively to alienate 
the beneficial interest in the property and therefore could be said to have 
retained it.100  On this analysis, B originally transferred the property to T with 
the intention of making her a trustee, so T remains a trustee and the resulting 
trust arises simply to re-allocate the beneficial interest in the property to B in 
circumstances in which she never fully parted with it.101 In Westdeutsche Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson held that a failed trust resulting trust may be regarded as 
                                                
97 Vandervell v IRC [1967] 2 AC 291; McGhee QC, Snell’s Equity (n 73) 685, [25-123]. 
98 Air Jamaica Ltd v Charlton (n 94). 
99 Re West, George v Grose [1900] 1 Ch 84 (Ch); Re Foord [1922] 2 Ch 519 (Ch). 
100 Vandervell v IRC (n 97) 329 (Lord Wilberforce).  Subsequently Megarry J described the 
trust as having arisen automatically as a result of Mr. Vandervell’s failure to dispose of the 
option: Re Vandervell (No. 2) [1974] Ch 269 (Ch), 294 (Megarry J). 
101 J. Mee, ‘'Automatic' Resulting Trusts: Retention, Restitution or Reposing Trust?’ in C. 
Mitchell (ed), Constructive and Resulting Trusts (Hart Publishing 2010), 208-9; C. Rickett and 
R. Grantham, ‘Resulting Trusts - A Rather Limited Doctrine’ in P. Birks and F. Rose (eds), 
Restitution and Equity, vol 1 - Resulting Trusts and Equitable Compensation (Mansfield Press 
2000); J. Penner, ‘Resulting Trusts and Unjust Enrichment: Three Controversies’ in C. 
Mitchell (ed), Constructive and Resulting Trusts (Hart Publishing 2010) 257-266; Hayton, 
Matthews and Mitchell (n 61) 431. McFarlane, ‘The Centrality of Constructive and Resulting 
Trusts’ (n 63) agrees that the retention theory has, at the least, some metaphorical utility in 
explaining resulting trusts. 
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‘giving effect to the common intention of the parties’.102   By this he might 
simply have been referring to the fact that the resulting trust arises so as not to 
frustrate the original intentions of B to set up a trust and T to act as trustee.  
However, if he actually meant that the resulting trust depends on a common 
intention that the beneficial interest should revert to B, this is incorrect.  There 
are in fact cases in which a failed trust resulting trust has arisen despite the 
absence of any intention on B’s part to take the beneficial interest, let alone a 
common intention that she should do so.103   This suggests that B’s equitable 
title does not depend on a positive intention to create a trust in her own favour.  
Rather, the resulting trust responds ‘to the absence of any intention’ on the B’s 
part to pass a beneficial interest to T as recipient of the money104 and arises so 
as to prevent T’s unjust enrichment at B’s expense.105  Webb and Akkouh 
suggest that the unjust enrichment and retention explanations are mutually 
supportive.  The unjust enrichment explanation emphasises that is only when B 
does not consent to T receiving the property or her consent is defective that she 
‘does or should retain an interest in that property’, while the retention 
argument tells us that consent is important because B was originally the owner 
of the property ‘and so it was for him, and him alone, to determine who should 
receive and benefit from that property.’ 106  In any event, neither explanation of 
B’s equitable title depends on the state of T’s conscience.  Although as a 
matter of practice in failed trust resulting trust cases T will usually know that 
she is not intended to keep the property and therefore we may say that her 
conscience is affected by such knowledge, this is not what generates B’s 
equitable proprietary interest in the first place.   
 
In light of the above, we can conclude that B can acquire equitable title under a 
trust even when T’s conscience is unaffected by knowledge.  This is 
                                                
102 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (n 9) 708 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
103 C. Webb and T. Akkouh, Trusts Law (3rd edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2013)185, citing 
Vandervell v IRC (n 97) as an example of such a case. 
104 Air Jamaica Ltd v Charlton (n 94) 1412 (Lord Millett). 
105 Birks, ‘Restitution and Resulting Trusts’ (n 91) 277; Chambers, Resulting Trusts (n 56) 41-
54; Webb and Akkouh, Trusts Law (n 103) 186-7.  Cf. Swadling, ‘Explaining Resulting 
Trusts’ (n 90), who suggests that failed trust resulting trusts defy principled analysis 
altogether. 
106 Webb and Akkouh, Trusts Law (n 103) 187. 
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unsurprising, as B’s title tells us nothing about what (if any) obligations T 
owes her.   It seems that B’s equitable title under an express trust derives from 
the moral principle that we ought to respect the intentions of an owner as to 
how she wishes to dispose of her property.   Where the trust is a resulting trust, 
it seems to derive from either the same principle and/or the related principle 
that we ought not to keep that which we were not intended to receive.  These 
principles support the recognition of B’s equitable title notwithstanding that T 
is wholly ignorant of the relevant facts.  
Conscience and the Personal Aspects of Trusts 
 
If we also wish to know whether, in addition to B having equitable title to the 
trust property, T owes her any obligations, this does depend on whether T’s 
conscience is affected by knowledge.  Arguably, the language of conscience 
has a positive, albeit limited, role to play in helping us to understand how trust 
obligations arise.  It reminds us that for T to come under any of the personal 
obligations of trusteeship, she must first know the relevant facts.   In 
accordance with our ordinary understanding of conscience, her factual 
knowledge is relevant not merely for its own sake but because it is only when 
she has this knowledge that her capacity for moral reasoning is invoked.  This 
enables her to work out what she ought to do with the property in order to 
comply with the requirements of the objective standard of morality.  At this 
point – and not before - it becomes reasonable to treat her as being subject to 
the obligation and so equity underwrites it with the force of law.  The 
requirement that T’s conscience be affected tells us more than just that she 
must know the relevant facts.   Rather, it indicates that before equity will 
recognise and underwrite any obligations in respect of the property, T must be 
in a position to identify, through the operation of her conscience, what she 
ought (morally) to do with it in the circumstances.   
 
Critics argue that Lord Browne-Wilkinson takes it for granted that the 
conscience of equity ‘is an artificially ordered conscience and always will 
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be’,107 while the use of the language of conscience may in fact encourage the 
belief ‘that equity can be a licence to commune directly’ with our own, 
personal, moral convictions.108  However, Chapter 1 showed that properly 
understood, the idea of conscience is predicated on the existence of objective 
moral truth.  It also demonstrated that somebody’s behaviour may be described 
as unconscionable because it breached the objective standard of morality, 
irrespective of her own personal interpretation of the relevant moral principles 
and how they governed her situation.  There is nothing artificial about this 
idea, nor does it suggest that equity deals in the application of individualised 
moral convictions.  Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s point is simply that equity 
embodies objective moral standards and assumes that our consciences, 
‘properly informed and instructed’,109 will lead us to comply with them.  If we 
fail to comply, we may be held morally and legally responsible regardless of 
whether we interpreted the standards correctly or not.   Nevertheless, the 
explanatory force of the language of conscience in relation to the personal 
obligations of a trustee is limited for the reasons given below.  
 
Of itself, the language of conscience does not help us to identify the moral 
principles underpinning T’s obligations.  For this we need direct argument as 
to the moral principles underpinning trusts.  In the previous section, it was 
argued that the principle at stake in express trusts is that S’s intentions as to the 
use and disposal of her property should be respected.  As a result of the 
decision in Westdeutsche, the same principle seems to inform presumed 
resulting trusts: the key is B’s presumed intention to enjoy the beneficial 
interest herself.  However, arguably there are good reasons for saying that what 
is (or ought to be) presumed is the absence of a positive intention to benefit T.  
On this analysis, we would simply say that owners of property should not be 
bound by dispositions of their property to which they did not truly consent.110  
It seems likely that this latter concern also informs failed trust resulting trusts.   
                                                
107 Birks, ‘Trusts Raised to Reverse Unjust Enrichment: The Westdeutsche Case’ (n 56) 20. 
108 Ibid. 
109 ACCC v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 51 (HCA), [72] (Gummow & 
Lehane JJ). 
110 Webb, ‘Property, Unjust Enrichment and Defective Transfers’ (n 66); Webb, ‘Intention, 
Mistakes and Resulting Trusts’ (n 66). 
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Moreover, the language of conscience does not help us to identify the nature of 
T’s obligations in any particular case.  Starting from first principles, we know 
that if T is wholly unaware of the facts that make B entitled to the property, 
she is unable to reason morally that it is not hers to keep for her own benefit.  
It follows that at this stage, it would be wholly unreasonable to treat her as 
being under any moral obligation in respect of the property.  At best, we can 
expect her respond appropriately if B asserts her entitlement to it or she learns 
in some other way that B is entitled to it.   Once T becomes aware of B’s 
(moral) entitlement to the property, she is able to work out that she ought not 
to keep the property for her own benefit.  Therefore, at this point, we would 
expect her to do one of two things: return it to B or hold it and preserve it for 
B, pending its return to her.    
 
Equity adopts the approach referred to above.  B may have equitable title to the 
property but if T is ignorant of this fact and honestly and reasonably believes it 
is hers, she cannot be under a legal or equitable duty in respect of it.111   
Nevertheless, B’s equitable title gives her the right to call on T to deliver the 
property up to her or apply it in accordance with her directions under the rule 
in Saunders v Vautier.112   At this stage, T may come under a liability to B in 
respect of the property, even though she has no knowledge of B’s entitlement 
to the property because liabilities do not presuppose the existence of an 
underlying moral obligation or duty.113   Arguably, this liability crystallises into 
a live obligation once T acquires knowledge of the relevant facts.  She may 
acquire this knowledge in one of two ways.  B may exercise her power114 or 
ability115 under the rule in Saunders v Vautier to recall the property from T or 
direct T to apply it in a particular way.  Alternatively, T may acquire 
knowledge from another source.  Once T has this knowledge, she is obliged 
not to hold the property for her own benefit.  This has been referred to as the 
                                                
111 McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law (n 63) 306. 
112 Saunders v Vautier (n 2). 
113 Smith, ‘A Duty to Make Restitution’ (n 54)163. 
114 McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law (n 63) 306-7, 309-310. 
115 Birke Hacker, ‘Proprietary Restitution After Impaired Consent Transfers: a Generalised 
Power Model’ (2009) 68 CLJ 324. 
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‘core trust duty’.116   Logically, it requires her to return the property to B or 
hold it for her benefit, as required, and equity will underwrite these obligations 
with the force of law if T fails to comply with them.     
 
Ultimately, however, to say that T is obliged to hold the property for B’s 
benefit merely begs the question as to what this entails.  The language of 
conscience cannot answer this question, nor can it help us to identify what or 
how much T must know before she will be subject to any such duties.  These 
questions are considered briefly in the context of express and resulting trusts 
below. 
Express Trusts 
 
According to Lord Browne-Wilkinson, in the case of an express trust, the 
trustee must know that she is intended to hold the property for the benefit of 
another.  Then she comes under an obligation ‘to carry out the purposes for 
which the property was vested in [her]’.117  This statement is not particularly 
informative.  In fact, as an express trustee, T is potentially subject to three 
different types of obligation.  First, T comes under a ‘custodial stewardship 
duty, that is, a duty to preserve the assets of the trust except in so far as the 
terms of the trust permit it’.118  This requires T to ‘account for and deliver trust 
property in specie’119 to B.   To do this, she must obtain possession of or ‘get 
in’ the trust property and preserve it for B’s benefit.120  For these purposes, the 
term ‘the trust property’ extends to the fruits inherent in the property itself 
(because B’s claim extends to the whole property121) and the property’s 
traceable substitutes.122  As the law currently stands, if T disposes of the trust 
                                                
116 McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law (n 63) 216, 551; McFarlane, ‘The Centrality of 
Constructive and Resulting Trusts’ (n 63) 184, 197. 
117 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (n 9) 705 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
118 AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors (n 6) 1381, [51] (Lord Toulson JSC). 
119 C. Mitchell and S. Watterson, ‘Remedies for Knowing Receipt’ in C. Mitchell (ed), 
Constructive and Resulting Trusts (Hart Publishing 2010) 122. 
120 Re Brogden (1888) 38 ChD 546 (CA), 571 (Fry J); Robb Evans of Robb Evans & 
Associates v European Bank Ltd (2004) 61 NSWLR 75; McGhee QC, Snell’s Equity (n 73) 
739, [29-004]. 
121 Worthington (n 61) 61. 
122 Foskett v McKeown (n 3) 128 (Lord Millett). 
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property in an unauthorised fashion, she must reconstitute the trust fund in 
specie or if she cannot, compensate the trust for any loss caused by T’s breach 
of trust.123  Secondly, T must also ‘manage the trust property with proper 
care’124 in accordance with the trust instrument (if there is one), and this may 
involve specific investment125 and administrative duties.   Similarly, if this duty 
is breached, T must personally compensate the trust fund for any loss caused 
by it.126  Thirdly, T may be subject to the fiduciary duty of loyalty, ‘which 
prohibits the trustee from taking any advantage from his position without the 
fully informed consent of the beneficiary or beneficiaries.’127  If T is a fiduciary 
she must disgorge any unauthorised profits she makes from the breach, ‘which 
ought therefore properly to be held on behalf of [B]’.128   She is also liable to 
pay compound interest.129   The custodial, management and fiduciary duties of 
a trustee have different purposes and should not be elided.   On the one hand, 
T’s custodial duties are directed at ensuring that she does not ‘exceed the terms 
of her authority when dealing with the property’.130   Her management duties 
are imposed to ensure she exercises proper care when administering the 
property in accordance with the terms of her authority.   By contrast, her 
fiduciary duties require her to act loyally in the furtherance of B’s interests and 
put B’s interests before her own, should they conflict.    
 
Usually, the terms of an express trust are contained in a trust instrument.  
Therefore, once T has accepted the transfer on the basis of what she thinks is a 
genuine trust instrument, she will be ‘conscience-bound to hold … her legal 
title to the property for the benefit of the beneficiaries in accordance with that 
                                                
123 AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors (n 6) 1384, [64] (Lord Toulson JSC).  
Cf. C. Mitchell, ‘Stewardship of Property and Liability to Account’ [2014] Conv 215, 223-4 
who argues that in fact T is liable not simply to compensate for loss caused by the breach but 
to restore the value of the trust fund (by reference to current market value).   
124 AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors (n 6) 1381, [51] (Lord Toulson JSC). 
125 These duties are governed by Part II of the Trustee Act 2000: McGhee QC, Snell’s Equity 
(n 73) 741-2, [29-007]. 
126 AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors (n 6) 1384, [64] (Lord Toulson JSC). 
127 Ibid 1381, [51] (Lord Toulson JSC); also Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL), 123 
(Lord Upjohn). 
128 AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors (n 6) 1384, [64] (Lord Toulson JSC).  
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position as a trustee: Foskett v McKeown (n 3) 110, 130 (Lord Millett); 115 (Lord Hoffmann), 
130-131 (Lord Millett); FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC (n 7). 
129 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (n 9). 
130 Mitchell, ‘Stewardship of Property and Liability to Account’ (n 123) 217. 
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trust instrument’131 and abide by its terms.  However, sometimes it may be 
unclear whether T has accepted or disclaimed the office of trustee.  In these 
circumstances, it seems that what will suffice to constitute acceptance may 
depend on the nature of the obligations in issue.   For example, authority 
suggests that if S conveys the legal estate to T in accordance with the terms of 
an express settlement and T does nothing to disclaim the office of trustee, she 
is presumed to have accepted the trust.132  On the other hand, there is also 
authority that suggests that T’s inaction for a long period gives rise to a 
presumption that T has disclaimed the trust.133  The apparent inconsistency in 
approach may be explicable on the basis that where T was presumed to have 
accepted the trust, her duties were primarily custodial,134 but where she was 
presumed to have disclaimed, the trust involved immediate, active 
management and investment duties and T had done nothing for thirty years.135  
If this is right, then it may be the case that some positive act of acceptance is 
necessary before it is reasonable to treat T as bound by active managerial 
obligations.   Intuitively, this seems correct.   
 
Where T, with notice of the trust but without expressly accepting it, receives 
the trust property, she must then account for it to B.  In Conyngham v 
Conyngham136 T was named in a will as trustee of the rents, profits and 
produce of a West Indian plantation for the legatees.  He received the trust 
property under the will but instead of accounting for the rents and profits to the 
legatees under the will, allowed them to be remitted to the testator’s son and 
heir at law, Daniel, who lived in a different country.   The legatees sought an 
                                                
131 Re Reynolds: Official Assignee v Wilson [2008] NZCA 122; (2007-2008) 10 ITELR 1064, 
[118] (Robertson J), citing Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s judgment in Westdeutsche (n 9). 
132 Re Birchall (n 77) 439 (Lindley MR); Mallott v Wilson (n 78) 502. 
133 In Re Clout & Frewer's Contract [1924] 2 Ch 230 (HL). 
134 Re Birchall (n 78) (duty to hold land on certain trusts for the benefit of the plaintiffs during 
their lives and after the death of the survivor upon trust to sell and apply the proceeds as 
therein mentioned); Mallott v Wilson (n 78) (duty to hold certain hereditaments, furniture, 
railway stock and effects on trust for the settlor’s wife, and after her death, for the settlor’s 
children, their heirs, administrators, executors and assigns, and to do such acts as to enable 
them to obtain possession of the furniture). 
135 In Re Clout & Frewer's Contract (n 133) 232 (duty to convert and invest testator’s personal 
estate in securities and pay the income to his wife, to hold his real estate on trust for her and 
pay her the income from it after outgoings and repairs, and after her death to stand possessed 
of the residuary estate upon trust for sale and conversion). 
136 Conyngham v Conyngham (1750) 1 Ves Sen 522; 27 ER 1181. 
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account of the rents and profits and the defendant alleged that he was merely 
acting as Daniel’s agent.  The Lord Chancellor held that ‘the court ought to 
take [the defendant] to have acted with notice of this trust, on the foot of it, and 
to account for it.’137  Otherwise ‘the trustee might materially act and dispose of 
all the profits of the estate, and yet not be accountable, but the cestui que trust 
would be turned against the heir or tenant for life though in another country.’138  
It was incumbent on the defendant to have refused to act as trustee if he did not 
want to.  Instead, however, he went on receiving the rents and profits.  The 
Lord Chancellor concluded that, ‘Having notice of the will and the plaintiff’s 
demand, and substantially the directions of the will as far as could be, in 
receiving from the hands of Daniel, without telling that he renounced the trust, 
it would be very dangerous to discharge him, and leave the plaintiff to pursue a 
remedy I know not where.’139  This case suggests that if T has notice of a trust 
and receives the trust property, this is sufficient to subject her to custodial 
duties and render her personally liable to account for it to B, even if she never 
formally accepted the terms of the trust.  The incidence of fiduciary obligations 
is discussed in the context of resulting trusts below. 
Resulting Trusts 
 
According to Lord Browne-Wilkinson, resulting trusts work in the same way 
as express trusts.  If T knows she is intended to hold the property for another, 
she comes under an obligation to carry out the purposes for which it was 
vested in her.140  However, this does not necessarily mean that she will be 
subject to all the obligations of an express trustee.     Where the trust is a failed 
trust resulting trust, T’s conscience is already affected by knowledge because 
she accepted the terms of the original express trust.  Therefore, she has already 
accepted an obligation to hold the trust property for someone else in 
                                                
137 Ibid [523]/1182. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid [524]/1182. 
140 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (n 9) 705 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
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accordance with those terms, even if the objects of the trust were uncertain.141  
For this reason, it seems right to say that the obligations to which T is subject 
under a failed trust resulting trust probably do correspond to those to which she 
would have been subject under the original express trust.142 
 
Where the trust is a presumed resulting trust, the nature and extent of T’s 
obligations are less certain.  It has been argued that presumed resulting trusts 
are bare trusts,143 ‘meaning that the trustee’s primary duty is to convey the trust 
property to (or at the direction of) the beneficiary’144 in accordance with the 
rule in Saunders v Vautier.145  On this analysis, once B recalls the property 
from T, T acquires knowledge, ‘which moves the trust up the scale of fiduciary 
obligations to include a duty to preserve the trust property and possibly other 
duties, depending on the circumstances’.146  However, to say that T is under an 
obligation in respect of the trust property in the absence of knowledge is 
inaccurate; at best she is under a liability.  Moreover, it is wrong to equate a 
bare trust with the absence of fiduciary obligations.  Although it is right to say 
that the key to a bare trust is the absence of management duties,147 this does not 
mean T is necessarily free of the core fiduciary obligation of loyalty to B,148 at 
least where she has accepted the terms of the trust. 
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National Star Petroleum v Tor Drilling [2002] SLT 1339 (Court of Session); Persey v Bazley 
(1984) 47 P & CR 37 (CA), 44 (May LJ); Protheroe v Protheroe [1968] 1 WLR 519; Clarence 
House Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc [2010] 1 WLR 1216, [43] Ward LJ (if the 
relationship between the parties had constituted a bare trust, fiduciary obligations would have 
been owed by T to B).  Also: M. Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty (Hart Publishing 2010) 198-200; 
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Nevertheless, it seems correct to say that T’s knowledge is sufficient to trigger 
a duty to preserve the property pending its return to B.    Arguably, this duty 
arises whether we treat presumed resulting trusts as responding to B’s 
presumed intention to create a trust for herself or the presumed absence of any 
intention on her part to benefit T.  On either analysis, T needs to know the facts 
that indicate that the property she received from B is not property B intended 
her to enjoy for her own benefit.   If T has this knowledge, it seems reasonable 
to oblige her to return the property in specie and take care of it149 pending its 
return to B.  If, despite her knowledge that someone else is entitled to it, she 
disposes of it in the meantime, it seems reasonable to require her personally to 
make good the loss.150  
 
As in the case of express trusts, it is more difficult to say that T’s knowledge 
that she has property belonging to someone else makes it reasonable to oblige 
her to manage or invest the property.   For it to be reasonable to subject her to 
these more onerous obligations, we might well require evidence of something 
more, for example that T held herself out as being prepared to undertake such 
duties.  The same may be said of fiduciary obligations.  There is a wide 
diversity of views as to what precisely justifies a fiduciary obligation.151   It is 
said that fiduciary duties ‘arise because a person has come under an obligation 
to act in the interests of another.  They are not the source of a positive 
obligation to act in the interests of another and no breach arises per se from a 
                                                
149 As Webb and Akkouh, Trusts Law (n 103) 267 suggests. 
150 Whether this means T is subject to the full extent of custodial duties owed by an express 
trustee is a question beyond the scope of this thesis. 
151 L. Sealy, ‘Fiduciary Relationships’ [1962] CLJ 69, 75-6 (suggests that a fiduciary 
relationship arises where T has control of property which equity views as belonging to B); E. 
Weinrib, ‘The Fiduciary Obligation’ (1975) 25 UTLJ 1, 7, 15 (focuses on the fact that one 
party is ‘at the mercy of the other’s discretion’); J. Shepherd, ‘Towards a Unified Concept of 
Fiduciary Relationships’ (1981) 97 LQR 51, 75 (they are based on receipt of a power subject 
to a duty to use it in the best interests of another); L. Wedderburn, ‘Trust, Corporation and the 
Worker’ (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 203, 221 (their purpose is social); P. Finn, ‘The 
Fiduciary Principle’ in T. Youdan (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Carswell 1989) 46-47 
(fiduciary loyalty is characterized by the idea that one party is entitled to expect that the other 
will act in her interests); S. Worthington, ‘Fiduciaries: When is Self-Denial Obligatory?’ 
(1999) 58 CLJ 500 505 (they should only be imposed when the function of one party within 
the relationship demands self-denial); P. Birks, ‘The Content of Fiduciary Obligation’ (2002) 
16 TLI 34, 41-44 (they are based on altruism); Conaglen (n 148) 245 (they are based on one 
party’s legitimate expectation that the other party will act in her interest). 
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failure to act in the interests of another.’152  The question is what gives rise to 
that obligation.  It is said that equity will require a person to act in another’s 
interests if she has put herself in a position that requires her to act for or on 
behalf of another.153  Thus it is said that ‘[A] fiduciary is someone who has 
undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a particular matter in 
circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence.’154  
This is not to say that equity will only recognise fiduciary obligations where 
they arise by consent; it will impose them where necessary.   However, it 
would seem reasonable to do so only where T either intentionally assumes a 
responsibility to act in B’s best interests155 or holds herself out as doing so. 
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the language of conscience does not tell us 
how much the legal owner must know in order to be subject to the obligations 
of a trustee.  This question did not arise on the facts of Westdeutsche because 
the contract only became void as a result a change in the law, about which 
neither of the parties had reason to know.  However, in view of Lord Browne-
Wilkinson’s approach, it is possible that he would say there is nothing 
unreasonable in subjecting an individual to an obligation on the basis of 
constructive notice because if she had acquired the factual knowledge she 
ought to have acquired, she would have been in a position to discern and 
comply with the obligation.  Against this, it could be argued that if an 
individual is being asked to take positive steps to comply with a moral 
standard, then it is only fair to require her to do so when she has actual 
knowledge of the relevant facts.156   In the chapters that follow it will be seen 
that where the courts are concerned to give effect to obligations, they do tend 
to require actual knowledge.  Either way, this question is a moral one for the 
courts, the answer to which cannot depend on the idea of conscience per se.  
                                                
152 P. Parkinson, Principles of Equity (P. Parkinson ed, 2nd edn, Lawbook Co. 2003) 347. 
153 Wedderburn (n 151); Conaglen (n 148), 61, 62, 75-76. 
154 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1, 18 (Millett LJ). 
155 P. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (The Law Book Co. Ltd 1977) 9;  J. Edelman, ‘When do 
Fiduciary Duties Arise?’ (2010) 126 LQR 302, 316; L. Hoyano, ‘The Flight to the Fiduciary 
Haven’ in P. Birks (ed), Privacy and Loyalty (Oxford University Press 1997); Millett, 
‘Proprietary Restitution’ (n 95) 309, 310. 
156  In accordance with the first three categories of knowledge outlined in Baden v Société 
Générale Pour Favouriser Le Développement Du Commerce Et De L'Industrie En France S.A. 
[1993] 1 WLR 509 (Ch). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s invocation of conscience in Westdeutsche has been 
widely criticised.  To the extent he claims that the idea of conscience underpins 
the proprietary aspects of trusts, these criticisms are justified.  The law on 
express and resulting trusts clearly indicates that B may acquire equitable title 
to property of which T is the legal owner, irrespective of whether T’s 
conscience is affected by knowledge.  To insist that equitable title can only 
arise from the date of knowledge is wrong as a matter of principle and likely to 
lead to uncertainty as to the incidence of property rights in practice.  B can 
acquire title under an express or resulting trust even where T is unaware of the 
relevant facts, because B’s title to the property need not depend on T coming 
under any obligations towards her in respect of it.  If B does acquire title in 
circumstances where T is unaware of the facts, she acquires an immediate 
claim to the return of the property but arguably at this stage T is merely under 
a liability to return the property to B if called upon to do so.   
 
By contrast, the language of conscience does tell us something about T’s 
obligations as a trustee.  It reminds us that when T comes under an obligation 
she is being required to comply with certain moral standards.  Lord Browne-
Wilkinson tells us it is unreasonable to expect T to comply with these 
standards unless she has knowledge of the relevant facts, i.e. that she is in 
possession of property to which someone else is entitled.  The acquisition of 
factual knowledge is a prerequisite to the process of moral reasoning, whereby 
she applies her innate understanding of the relevant moral principles to her 
knowledge of the facts.  Without it she is unable to identify and comply with 
what she ought (morally) to do with the property in the circumstances and it 
would be inappropriate to treat her as subject to any obligation in respect of it.  
Once she has this knowledge, she is in a position to discern that she ought to 
return the property to B or hold it for her benefit.  At this stage (and not before) 
equity underwrites her moral obligations with the force of law and will grant 
relief if T fails to comply with what the objective standard of morality requires 
of her in the circumstances. 
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However, beyond this, the language of conscience tells us precious little.  Of 
itself, it cannot help us to identify what moral principles underpin trust 
obligations.  Similarly, it cannot tell us what type of obligations affect T, or the 
content or extent of her knowledge.   These are all important questions, which 
require direct argument as to the principles the law does or should embody in 
this area and how they are to be applied.  Unfortunately, as Lord Browne-
Wilkinson’s judgment demonstrates, to invoke the language of conscience 
without paying due attention to the limits of its explanatory power can cause 
real confusion.  For this reason, it is important to be very clear as to what 
conscience means and what, if any, function it plays within trusts doctrine.  
Otherwise, the use of the language of conscience may well distract us from the 
rigorous analysis demanded by the questions it cannot answer.  
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CHAPTER 3: CONSCIENCE AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter considers the meaning and function of conscience in the context 
of constructive trusts.   In particular, the chapter considers five non-express 
trusts, which have been described as constructive trusts and may arise in a 
commercial context: trusts over mistaken payments, trusts that arise upon 
rescission, trusts that arise in response to theft, the Pallant v Morgan equity 
and trusts over unauthorised fiduciary profits.  The chapter makes two 
arguments.  First, it argues that the use of the language of conscience to 
describe how constructive trusts work generally tells us nothing more than that 
they arise because moral reason requires it.  Secondly, it argues that the idea of 
conscience plays the same role in the trusts considered in this chapter as it does 
in the context of express and resulting trusts.  It reminds us that trust 
obligations are moral obligations and it is unreasonable to treat T as bound by 
them before she has knowledge of the relevant facts because it is only then that 
she is in a position to discern and comply with what morality requires her to do 
with the property.   However, it never explains why B acquires equitable title 
to the property or T comes under an obligation in respect of it in the first place, 
nor can it help us identify the content or scope of T’s obligations. 
CONSCIENCE AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS - MEANING 
 
The language of conscience is often used at a very general level to describe the 
purpose of constructive trusts.  Where it is used in this way, it bears its 
ordinary meaning: it tells us that these trusts arise for moral reasons.  For 
example, it has been remarked that ‘the constructive trust is the formula 
through which the conscience of equity finds expression.’1  All this can mean 
is that when equity recognises a constructive trust, it does so because moral 
reason requires it.  Similarly, constructive trusts have been said to arise when 
                                                
1 Beatty v Guggenheim Exploration Co (1919) 225 NY 380, 386 (Cardozo J). 
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under the circumstances it would be ‘inequitable’2 or ‘unconscionable for the 
owner of the legal title to assert his own beneficial interest and deny the 
beneficial interest of another.’3 This means simply that a constructive trust 
arises when it would be morally unacceptable to allow the legal owner of the 
property to ignore someone else’s equitable claim to it.  Again, putting it 
slightly differently, ‘[A] constructive trust cannot be imposed unless the 
defendant’s conduct is considered unconscionable and so, in this respect, 
unconscionability appears to be a pre-condition of the imposition of the trust.’4 
This tells us nothing more than that a constructive trust cannot be imposed 
unless the defendant has behaved in a morally unacceptable manner.  
 
In Westdeutsche5 itself, Lord Browne-Wilkinson held that constructive trusts 
do not arise before T has knowledge ‘of the factors alleged to affect his 
conscience’.6   When T acquires this knowledge, she must ‘carry out the 
purposes … which the law imposes on [her] by reason of [her] unconscionable 
conduct’.7   If we deconstruct this, all it means is that the trust does not arise 
before T has knowledge of the facts, which enables her to work out, through 
the process of moral understanding, what she ought to do with the property 
(i.e. deliver it in specie to B, or hold it for her benefit).  When T obtains this 
knowledge, she must do what the law tells her to do because she has behaved 
in a morally unacceptable manner (presumably by not doing what she ought to 
have done, i.e. deliver the property to B).   At best, this tells us that when 
equity imposes a constructive trust, it is underwriting T’s moral obligation to 
give the property to B or hold it for her benefit.  As before, however, the 
language of conscience tells us nothing about why T is so obliged, or what or 
how much she must know before she comes under such an obligation.  
Moreover, Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s comments tell us even less about the 
proprietary aspects of constructive trusts.  All we know is that in his view B 
                                                
2 Gissing v Gissing [1971] AC 886 (HL), 905 (Lord Diplock). 
3 P. Millett, ‘Restitution and Constructive Trusts’ (1998) 114 LQR 399, 400. 
4 N. Hopkins, ‘How Should We Respond to Unconscionability?’ in G. Griffiths and M. Dixon 
(eds), Contemporary Perspectives on Equity, Property and Trusts Law (Oxford University 
Press 2007) 9. 
5 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 
(HL). 
6 Ibid 705 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
7 Ibid. 
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does not acquire equitable title before T’s conscience is affected by knowledge 
of the relevant facts so as to bring her under the relevant obligation.  
 
Finally, the tendency to characterise constructive trusts as trusts that are 
particularly closely associated with the idea of conscience is problematic for 
the following reasons.  First, as the last chapter showed, the idea of conscience 
is relevant to all trusts.  Indeed, Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s argument in 
Westdeutsche was that no resulting trust could arise in the circumstances 
because T’s conscience was unaffected by knowledge at a time while it still 
held the money.  To suggest that constructive trusts are uniquely linked to or 
based on the idea of conscience is therefore misleading.  Secondly, it follows 
that the idea of conscience does not provide a basis for differentiating between 
types of trusts.  If we wish to do this, we must do it by reference to the 
principles that support them.  Thirdly, general appeals to conscience fail 
adequately to distinguish between the personal and proprietary aspects of 
trusts.  The idea of conscience points to the moral nature of T’s obligations as 
trustee and reminds us T’s knowledge of the relevant facts is a precondition to 
that obligation arising.  However, the rationale for the recognition of both B’s 
equitable title and T’s obligations is always some moral principle towards 
which T’s faculty for moral reasoning should point her.  The remainder of this 
chapter considers the role of conscience in the five non-express trusts referred 
to at the outset.  
CONSCIENCE AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS ARISING IN RESPONSE 
TO MISTAKEN PAYMENTS 
 
According to Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche, B may have an 
equitable proprietary claim to money paid by mistake to T under a constructive 
trust once T has knowledge of the mistake.8    In principle, however, there are 
good reasons for saying that the fact that B does intend T to benefit from the 
payment is sufficient to give her equitable title to the property and the ability to 
recall it in specie from T on the ground that otherwise T would be unjustly 
                                                
8 Ibid 714-5. 
81 
 
enriched.  On this analysis, B would acquire equitable title to the money at the 
date of payment irrespective of the state of T’s conscience.   The language of 
conscience would have a limited explanatory role in relation to T’s obligations 
in respect of the money.  It would remind us that it is unreasonable to treat T as 
coming under any obligations in respect of the money before the date on which 
she learns of B’s mistake because only at that point could T determine, through 
the process of moral reasoning, what she ought to do with the money, i.e. 
return it to B.  
Conscience and the Personal Claim to Recover a Mistaken Payment 
 
Where B mistakenly pays T, e.g. in respect of a non-existent debt,9 the law of 
unjust enrichment allows B to recover the amount of the enrichment as money 
had and received.  There may be no contract involved at all, or as in the case of 
Westdeutsche B may believe that the contract pursuant to which she makes the 
payment is valid, when in fact it is void.  During the nineteenth century, some 
of the cases on money had and received used the language of conscience to 
describe the fact that it would be unjust for T to retain the benefit of the 
payment.10  For example, in Kelly v Solari11 Rolfe B held that ‘wherever 
[money] is paid under a mistake of fact, and the party would not have paid it if 
the fact had been known to him, it cannot be otherwise than unconscientious to 
retain it.’12  Kremer has argued that the cases support a more general principle 
of unconscientious receipt.13  However, his definition of this principle as 
‘informed by the interests equity is seeking to protect’ and operating ‘by 
reference to substantive principles’ which ‘form the substantive body of 
equitable jurisprudence’14 is so general as to be meaningless.  By contrast, 
Birks suggests that the use of the language of conscience here has the potential 
to confuse insofar as it might be thought to suggest ‘bad behaviour at the time 
                                                
9 Birks refers to this as the core example of unjust enrichment: P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment 
(2nd edn, Clarendon Press 2005) 3. 
10 Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005; 97 ER 676. 
11 Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M & W 54; 152 ER 24. 
12 Ibid [59]/26 (Rolfe B).   
13 B. Kremer, ‘Restitution and Unconscientiousness: Another View’ (2003) 119 LQR 188. 
14 Ibid 191. 
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of receipt’15 or that T’s knowledge of the mistake formed a necessary 
precondition to B’s cause of action.  The action for money had and received 
was never fault-based16 and the language of conscience is used in a conclusory 
sense only, i.e. to describe ‘the prior determination that other facts require 
restitution to be made’.17  In other words, in Kelly v Solari Rolfe B was simply 
emphasising that it would be morally unacceptable if a recipient of a mistaken 
payment were to be permitted to retain it, i.e. because ultimately she is morally 
obliged to repay it. 
 
The language of conscience does not tell us why T ultimately comes under a 
moral obligation to return a mistaken payment.  We can certainly say that 
morality requires T to give up that which is not hers to keep.  But we need to 
go further and ask why it is not hers to keep and in mistake cases, the reason is 
that B did not consent or intend T to have it.18  It follows that from the date on 
which B makes the mistaken payment she has a claim to recover it and T 
becomes liable to return it to her.  However, it is difficult to see how any moral 
obligation to return the money arises before T knows the facts which enables 
her to determine that she ought to return it to B.19  In mistaken payment cases 
there is therefore a tension: B becomes immediately entitled to the money 
because she never intended T to have it, yet it cannot be reasonable to subject 
T to an obligation to return it before she is aware of the mistake.  The common 
law deals with this tension by treating B as entitled to recover the mistaken 
payment from the date on which it was made – thus, it is said that T is strictly 
liable to return it – but allowing T to rely on the defence of change of position20 
to the extent that she uses the money for her own benefit before learning of the 
                                                
15 Birks (n 9) 5. 
16 Sir William Evans, ‘An Essay on the Action for Money Had and Received (1802)’ (1998) 6 
RLR 3.  
17 Birks (n 9) 6. 
18 R. Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Clarendon Press 1997) 125-132; P. Birks, An Introduction to 
the Law of Restitution (revised edn, 1989) 140, 147; A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution 
(Oxford University Press 2010) 203-4. Cf. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 9) 101-160, who 
suggests the true basis for all unjust enrichment claims is an absence of basis for the 
transaction. 
19 Cf. S. Smith, ‘A Duty to Make Restitution’ (2013) 26 Canadian Law and Jurisprudence 157, 
173. 
20 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 (HL), 579. 
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mistake.  Even if, as some argue,21 T comes under no positive obligation at all 
in respect of the money before judgment, the extent of her ultimate obligation 
is nevertheless limited by reference to the date on which her conscience was 
affected by knowledge that the money was not hers to keep. 
Conscience and the Proprietary Response to Mistaken Payments  
 
Arguably, there are good reasons why we should accept that the principle 
against unjust enrichment gives B equitable title to the money from the date of 
a mistaken payment.  As Webb explains, ownership interests ‘provide 
exclusive use privileges and control powers’, which means that others may 
benefit from an asset only where the owner consents.  Consent is important 
because the owner is exclusively entitled to decide how the asset should be 
used.  If T obtains money from B without T’s consent, she obtains something 
to which she is not entitled and to which B is entitled.  In Webb’s view, ‘[T]his 
justifies, where possible, the return of what [T] has obtained.  Restitutionary 
claims arising out of defective transfers rest on and give effect to [B]’s 
exclusive interest in what [T] received or obtained.’22  Therefore, where B does 
not intend to benefit T, there is no obvious reason why B should not be able to 
bring a claim ‘asserting that very interest.’23   Mistakes are significant because 
they mark out ‘contingencies to which [B]’s intentions do not extend’.24  What 
justifies recovery ‘is not that [B] was mistaken but the fact that he had no 
applicable intention to transfer the asset to [T].  Establishing a mistake is just a 
means to that end.’25  For these reasons, in principle a proprietary response to 
mistake from the date of payment seems justifiable.   In the last chapter, we 
saw that resulting trusts can arise to give B equitable title irrespective of the 
state of T’s conscience and there is judicial support for the view that they may 
                                                
21 Smith (n 19), 173-6. 
22 C. Webb, ‘Property, Unjust Enrichment and Defective Transfers’ in R. Chambers, C. 
Mitchell and R. Penner (eds), The Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment 
(Oxford University Press 2009) 352-3; S. Worthington, Equity (2nd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2006) 292. 
23 Webb (n 22) 369. 
24 C. Webb, ‘Intention, Mistakes and Resulting Trusts’ in C. Mitchell (ed), Constructive and 
Resulting Trusts (Hart Publishing 2010) 325.  Alternatively, the reason T’s enrichment is 
unjust is because any basis that might have justified it failed from the start: Birks, Unjust 
Enrichment (n 9) 116, 125, 126, 131. 
25 Webb, ‘Intention, Mistakes and Resulting Trusts’ (n 24) 327.  
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arise in response to an absence of intention to benefit T, i.e. to reverse unjust 
enrichment.26  Therefore, the most obviously appropriate vehicle for the 
proprietary response to mistaken payments would seem to be the resulting 
trust. 
 
Originally, authority27 seemed to support the idea that B’s lack of consent to 
the transfer was sufficient not only to generate a right to reverse T’s 
enrichment but also a right to recover the money itself from T.28  In 
Westdeutsche, however, Lord Browne-Wilkinson rejected this idea, so the 
authority is now of doubtful effect.29  In accordance with Lord Browne-
Wilkinson’s view that conscience necessarily underpins both the personal and 
the proprietary aspects of trusts, he held that B could not have acquired 
equitable title on the date of payment because at that stage T was unaware of 
the mistake.  Nevertheless, he held that ‘[A]lthough the mere receipt of 
moneys, in ignorance of the mistake, gives rise to no trust, the retention of 
moneys after [T] learned of the mistake may well have given rise to a 
constructive trust.’30  This finding has been applied subsequently31 and 
represents current law.   This approach makes proof by B that T’s conscience 
has been affected by knowledge of the mistake a necessary precondition to the 
proprietary claim.   For the reasons given above, however, there is no reason in 
principle why the proprietary claim should work in this way.   
                                                
26 Air Jamaica Ltd v Charlton [1999] 1 WLR 1399 (CA). 
27 Sinclair v Brougham [1914] AC 398 (HL) (from which the House of Lords departed in 
Westdeutsche); Chase Manhattan NA v Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd [1981] Ch 105 
(mistake); Nesté Oy v Lloyds Bank plc [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep 658 (absence of consideration). 
28 D. Hayton, ‘Constructive Trusts: Is the Remedying of Unjust Enrichment a Satisfactory 
Approach?’ in T. Youdan (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (Carswell 1989) 214. 
29 Millett (n 3) 412-3 agrees with this conclusion for the same reason he agreed with the 
outcome in Westdeutsche.  In his view, the plaintiff in Chase Manhattan ‘had intentionally 
though mistakenly parted with all beneficial interest in the money’ and this was ‘inconsistent 
with the existence of a resulting trust’. 
30 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (n 5) 715 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
31 Friends Provident Life Office v Hillier Parker May & Rowden [1997] QB 85, 106 (Auld LJ) 
(mistake); Nesté Oy v Lloyds Bank plc (n 27) (failure of consideration); Bank of America v 
Arnell [1999] Lloyd's Rep Bank 399, 404-5 (Aikens J); Papamichael v National Westminster 
Bank Plc [2003] EWHC 164 (Comm), [2003] 1 Lloyd's Rep 341, [220] (HHJ Chambers QC); 
Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft v IMB Morgan Plc [2005] 1 Lloyd's Rep 298, 304, [38] 
(Lawrence Collins J); Re Farepak Food and Gifts Ltd (in administration) [2006] EWHC 3272 
(Ch), [2008] BCC 22, 35, [40] (Mann J); approved by Warren J in Re Farepak Food and Gifts 
Ltd (No. 2) [2009] EWHC 2580 (Ch), [2010] BCC 735, 741, [25] (mistake). 
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Insofar as Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s conscience-based approach may have 
been motivated by concerns to prevent T from unwittingly owing any 
obligations in respect of the property, requiring proof of T’s knowledge as a 
precondition to establishing B’s equitable title is unnecessary to achieve this. 
We know that if B’s claim is personal, T becomes liable to make restitution 
from the date of payment, while the change of position defence limits the 
extent of her obligation by reference to the date on which she acquired 
knowledge of the mistake.  In accordance with the arguments made in the last 
chapter, B’s equitable proprietary claim would work in a similar fashion as 
against T.  B would acquire equitable title to the money under a resulting trust 
at the date of the mistaken payment, which would enable her to recall the 
money from T in specie.  However, because at this stage T would know 
nothing that would tell her the money was not hers to keep, it would be 
unreasonable to treat her as being under a moral obligation to take active steps 
to return it.  Therefore, if T disposed of any of it before learning of B’s claim, 
B could not recover that portion from T.  However, once T’s conscience 
became affected by knowledge of the mistake, so that she could determine 
(through the process of moral reasoning) that she ought to return the property, 
it would be reasonable to treat her as bound by an obligation to preserve and 
return to B whatever she had left of the money and/or its traceable proceeds.   
However, for the reasons given in Chapter 2, T’s knowledge would not 
necessarily be sufficient to generate management or fiduciary obligations. 
 
In rejecting the idea that B could acquire equitable title from the date of 
payment, Lord Browne-Wilkinson was also clearly influenced by concerns that 
it would be inappropriate for B to enjoy the proprietary advantages associated 
with equitable title from the date of payment, such as the ability to avail of 
equity’s tracing rules, claim the property from third parties and enjoy priority 
in T’s insolvency.   He could see ‘no moral or legal justification’ for B being 
granted these advantages before T’s conscience was affected by knowledge of 
the mistake.32  These concerns derive from the fact that in Westdeutsche the 
apparent existence of the contract, combined with the invisibility of B’s 
                                                
32 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (n 5) 704. 
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equitable title,33 suggested to the rest of the world that there was in fact a valid 
reason for the payment from B to T, so as to give T absolute title to the money.  
 
However, Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s concerns may be overstated or, at least, 
could be addressed in a different way.  As far as his concerns about tracing are 
concerned, two points can be made.  First, if, as seems to be the case, it is right 
that B can acquire equitable title to property without T knowing about it, so as 
to give B a right to recall it in specie, then as a matter of principle this ought to 
be sufficient to entitle B to avail of equity’s identification rules, so that she can 
locate what is after all her property.34  Secondly, to the extent that B’s 
entitlement to claim a proportionate share of any traceable substitutes held by 
third parties35 might be thought to be unfair,36 the problem could be addressed 
by limiting B’s claim against third parties to a lien over the substitute to the 
value of the original trust property.37  Moreover, as Worthington also points 
out, ‘proprietary rights generated by unjust enrichment claims will only prevail 
against volunteers or third party purchasers who have notice of the claimant’s 
interests.’38  As far as the reluctance to afford B priority in T’s insolvency is 
concerned, Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s analysis seems to suggest that if T is 
under no moral duty to give the property up to B or hold it for her benefit, then 
there is no reason why she should be expected to ring-fence it from her 
creditors so as to take it out of her estate for insolvency purposes. The 
difficulty of course is that priority in insolvency is an attribute of legal or 
equitable ownership of property,39 i.e. it is referable to B’s entitlement to the 
property rather than any obligations T may owe her in respect of it.    
 
                                                
33 On the difficulties associated with the invisibility of equitable title, see L. Smith, ‘Unjust 
Enrichment, Property and the Structure of Trusts’ (2000) 116 LQR 412, 430-441. 
34 J. McGhee QC (ed) Snell's Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014) 787, [30-054] 
suggests that a fiduciary relationship or a distinct equitable title will suffice, citing Re Diplock 
[1948] Ch 465 (CA), 520. 
35 Foskett v McKeown [2000] UKHL 29, [2001] 1 AC 102. 
36 Chapter 4, p 114, text to n 5. 
37 S. Worthington, ‘Justifying Claims to Secondary Profits’ in E. Schrage (ed), Unjust 
Enrichment and the Law of Contract (Kluwer 2001).   
38 Worthington, Equity (n 22) 292. P. Birks, ‘The End of the Remedial Constructive Trust’ 
[1998] TLI 202, 214 suggests they could also avail of the change of position defence. 
39 C. Webb and T. Akkouh, Trusts Law (3rd edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 22. 
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The effect of Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s conscience-based limitation is 
therefore to reinforce a ‘commitment to fault-based restitution’40 in 
circumstances where it may not be necessary or justified.  Arguably, it also 
distorts our proper understanding of how conscience works in the context of 
trusts.  Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s approach is confusing, as it may well lead us 
to think that T’s knowledge is the reason why the trust arises and B gets 
equitable title to the property, when in fact it is merely a condition for T’s 
obligations to arise. 
CONSCIENCE AND THE PROPRIETARY RESPONSE TO OTHER 
DEFECTIVE TRANSFERS 
 
The language of conscience is not often used in the context of non-express 
trusts that arise on rescission.  In any event, it tells us nothing about why the 
trust arises and B gets equitable title to the property; it merely reminds us that 
T’s knowledge is a precondition to the recognition of trust obligations.  B may 
transfer, or enter into a contract to transfer a benefit to T in circumstances 
where her intention to do so is impaired by other factors, such as undue 
influence, the fact that she suffers from a special disadvantage of which T is 
aware (unconscionable bargains), misrepresentation or duress.  If the 
transaction is contractual, it is voidable at common law (for fraud and duress 
only) or in equity and B may choose to set it aside.  Until B chooses to rescind, 
B has a personal claim to recover title to it when rescission occurs.41  This is a 
mere equity, i.e. something less than a full-blown equitable interest under a 
trust.42  At the date of election, equitable title to the property re-vests in B 
retrospectively43 under a non-express trust, so as to give her a full equitable 
                                                
40 P. Birks, ‘Trusts Raised to Reverse Unjust Enrichment: The Westdeutsche Case’ (1996) 4 
RLR 3, 21-22, 26; P. Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26 
UWAL Rev 1, 71. 
41 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1, 11-12 (Millett LJ); S. Worthington, 
‘The Proprietary Consequences of Rescission’ (2002) 10 RLR 28, 38-40; D. O'Sullivan, S. 
Elliott and R. Zakrzewski, The Law of Rescission (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 
330, [16.12]; 
42 Worthington, ‘The Proprietary Consequences of Rescission’ (n 41) 38, 39, 40. 
43 Shalson v Russo [2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch), [2005] Ch 281. 
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interest under a non-express trust,44 and enable her to trace in equity.45 B’s 
election may take the form of direct communication with T or it may be 
implied from her conduct46 and in exceptional cases, where T is guilty of 
fraudulent misrepresentation, it may be sufficient if T hears about B’s election 
from a third party.47  Once B elects to rescind, T comes under the obligation to 
preserve and return the property in specie to B.   
 
To understand why B gets equitable title to the property, we have to ask what 
moral principle justifies setting the contract aside.   The role of conscience in 
rescission for misrepresentation, undue influence, lawful act duress and 
unconscionable bargains is considered in Chapters 5-7.  There it is argued that 
in all these doctrines, as a matter of principle, the reason why B is entitled to 
rescind is that her intention to transfer the benefit to T (and thus her consent to 
the transaction) was impaired and distorted.  It is true that for relief to be 
granted, T must have either caused the problem with B’s consent (e.g. innocent 
misrepresentation) or know about it (e.g. unconscionable bargains), but this 
additional factor simply tells us that in the circumstances it would not be unfair 
to displace T’s interest in security of receipt.  It does not tell us why B is 
entitled to rescind in the first place.  In some cases, e.g. where T makes a 
fraudulent misrepresentation or puts pressure on B by threatening to do 
something unlawful, there may be a second reason why B is entitled to set 
aside the transaction, i.e. because otherwise T would benefit from her wrongful 
conduct.  In such cases, T will know or intend that B’s consent will be 
impaired.  However, this does not detract from the fact that, independent of T’s 
wrongful conduct or fault, we can say that T should not be entitled to retain the 
benefit because B never properly intended her to have it and thus T would be 
unjustly enriched.   In light of the above, it follows that even if T’s knowledge 
is present it is not a ground of B’s claim.  Therefore, it is unnecessary for T’s 
                                                
44 Latec Investments v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (1965) 113 CLR 265 (HCA), 290-291 (Menzies 
J); Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 371, 387-390 (Brennan J). 
45 Lonrho v Fayed (No. 2) [1992] 1 WLR 1, 11-12 (Millett J); El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings 
plc [1993] 3 All ER 717 (Ch), 713 (Millett J); Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew (n 
41) 23 (Millett LJ). 
46 O'Sullivan, Elliott and Zakrzewski (n 41), 235, [11.04]; Shalson v Russo  (n 43), [120], [127] 
(Rimer J). 
47 Car and Universal Finance Co Ltd v Caldwell [1965] 1 QB 525 (CA); O'Sullivan, Elliott 
and Zakrzewski (n 41) 242, [41.33]. 
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conscience to be affected by knowledge in order for B to acquire equitable title 
to the property. 
 
Unjust enrichment scholars argue that the impairment of B’s consent48 at the 
date of the transfer immediately entitles her to equitable title under a non-
express trust (which they would say is a resulting trust) and that such a trust 
should not be postponed to the date of election.49  Applying what we know 
about conscience to this analysis, we can say that the acquisition of equitable 
title by B at the date of the contract would mean that T would be subject to an 
immediate liability to return the property to her if required.  However, that 
would not necessarily translate into an immediate obligation on T’s part to 
deliver the property in specie to B or hold it for her benefit, as it would not be 
reasonable to treat T as subject to such a (moral) obligation before she had 
knowledge of the relevant facts, i.e. that B’s consent to the transaction was 
impaired.  Of course, in circumstances where B’s consent was impaired as a 
result of, e.g. fraud or duress or because the bargain was unconscionable, T 
would know this at the date of the contract and therefore she would become 
subject to trustee obligations at the same date B acquired equitable title.   
However, this would be a coincidence of timing and nothing more. 
 
There may be at least two reasons why, as the law stands, the non-express trust 
does not arise before the date B elects to rescind the contract.  First, the 
contract gives T legal title to the property and provides an independent reason 
for her to retain any benefits received under it.  Therefore, B cannot at the 
same time leave the contract on foot and argue that the retention by T of any 
benefits is unjust.50  In other words, as long as the contract exists, it is difficult 
to say that B has been unjustly enriched.  Secondly, the requirement of election 
protects third parties who deal with T on the basis that she has good title to the 
benefits she received under the contract.   Before election, B’s mere equity 
ranks behind interests acquired by bona fide purchasers for value of the legal 
                                                
48 Chambers (n 18) 125-139.   
49 Ibid (n 18) 171-4, 182-3; Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 9) 192. 
50 Daly v Sydney Stock Exchange Ltd (n 44); E. Bant, ‘Reconsidering the Role of Election in 
Rescission’ (2012) 32 OJLS 467, 476. 
90 
 
or equitable estate.51  Rescission does not undo any transactions between T and 
third parties that take place before the date of election.52  Therefore, a third 
party who acquires the property from T before election takes it free and clear 
to the extent that her interest in it takes priority over B’s mere equity.  By 
contrast, if B were to acquire a proprietary interest at the date of the contract, 
this would trump the interests of bona fide purchasers, who, in reliance on the 
appearance of T’s good title to the property received under the contract, 
subsequently took equitable security over it, e.g. in the form of an equitable 
charge or mortgage. 
 
In some cases, e.g. of innocent misrepresentation or undue influence, T may 
not know that there was any problem with B’s consent to the transaction until 
B notifies her of her intention to rescind the contract through the process of 
election.  Therefore, it might be said that the requirement of election also 
protects T against any unwitting trustee obligations.  In Bristol and West 
Building Society v Mothew53 the question arose as to whether T, who had made 
an innocent misrepresentation to B which allowed her to rescind the contract, 
could be held personally liable for disposing of money received by her in 
accordance with the contract before B elected to rescind. Millett LJ held that T 
could not be held liable in this way.  In his view, ‘on rescission the equitable 
title does not revest retrospectively so as to cause an application of trust money 
which was properly authorised when made to be afterwards treated as a breach 
of trust.’54  On the facts, before the date of election T was unaware that he had 
misled B and therefore until B elected to rescind, T had no idea that he had no 
authority to deal with the money he had received from B.   T ‘could not be 
bound to repay the money to [B] so long as he was ignorant of the facts which 
had brought his authority to an end, for those are the facts which are alleged to 
                                                
51 Phillips v Phillips (1861) 4 De G F & J 208, 218 (Lord Westbury LC); Latec Investments v 
Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (n 44) 277 (Kitto J), 291 (Menzies J); Bristol & West Building Society v 
Mothew (n 41) 22-23 (Millett LJ); Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [1999] All ER (D) 433 (CA), [99] 
(Potter LJ). 
52 Shalson v Russo  (n 43) 323, [126] (Rimer J). B. Hacker, ‘Rescission and Third Party 
Rights’ (1996) 14 RLR 21, 31, 35 suggests that in practice B will be left to pursue any 
potential claims for damages or disgorgement of profits against T, who has parted with the 
property. 
53 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew (n 41). 
54 Ibid 23 (Millett LJ).  
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affect his conscience and subject him to an obligation to return the money to 
[B]’.55    
 
However, T would be equally well protected against unwitting obligations 
were the trust to arise immediately at the date of transfer.   In accordance with 
the arguments in the last chapter, although B would acquire equitable title 
immediately (so as to subject T to a liability to return the property), it would 
not be reasonable to treat T as coming under any obligation to preserve and 
return the property before her conscience was affected by knowledge of the 
problem with consent.  Therefore, she would not come under any obligations at 
all in respect of the property before she acquired knowledge of the facts upon 
which B’s entitlement to relief was based, i.e. that her consent had been 
impaired.   
 
Moreover, the fact that B does not acquire equitable title – and thus T comes 
under no equitable obligations – before the date of election can operate harshly 
as between B and T.  In some cases, such as fraudulent misrepresentation, T 
may be fully aware from the date of the transaction that B did not properly 
consent to the transaction.  As a matter of principle it seems reasonable to treat 
her as subject to a moral obligation to preserve and return the property from 
that date.  However, as the law stands, she comes under no such obligation 
until B elects to rescind and thereby acquires equitable title to the property. 56  
As between B and T, this seems difficult to justify.57  There are signs that at 
least in some cases of fraud the courts agree.  We know that B will be taken to 
have elected to rescind even if T learns about her decision from a third party,58 
and a trust has been found to arise immediately where the contract itself is the 
instrument of fraud.59   Ultimately, however, it may be that the prejudice 
caused to third parties by the recognition of an immediate equitable interest 
                                                
55 Ibid. 
56 Lonrho v Fayed (No. 2) (n 45) 11-12 (Millett J); Collings v Lee [2001] 2 All ER 332 (CA), 
337 (Nourse LJ); Shalson v Russo (n 43) [108], [119] (Rimer J). 
57 B. McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law (Hart Publishing 2008) 302. 
58 Text to n 47. 
59 Halley v The Law Society [2003] EWCA Civ 97, [47] (Carnwath LJ); T. Wu, ‘Proprietary 
Relief Without Rescission’ (2004) 63 CLJ 30. 
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justifies the delay in the recognition and enforcement of T’s moral obligation 
to B.     
 
In light of the above, we can say that in the case of non-express trusts arising 
in response to defective transfers, the idea of conscience is really only relevant 
for the purpose of reminding us that T’s obligation to preserve or return the 
property to B is a moral one, to which it is not reasonable to subject T unless 
she has the factual knowledge that will enable her to identify and comply with 
such an obligation.  Beyond this, as elsewhere, the language of conscience 
adds little to our understanding of what is going on.  It tells us nothing about 
why B acquires equitable title to the property: this depends on the principle 
against unjust enrichment.  It does not help us to identify the type of trust that 
arises, which has been referred to variously as a constructive trust60 and a 
resulting trust.61  On balance, as the trust responds to unjust enrichment, the 
resulting trust classification is probably better.  Moreover, the language of 
conscience does not help us to identify the content or extent of T’s obligations.  
Millett LJ has held that when B elects to rescind, T’s ‘fiduciary’ obligations do 
not extend beyond those to which a vendor is subject as a constructive trustee 
when she sells property.62  These obligations require her to preserve and care 
for the property as a prudent owner would.63  This means that she is personally 
responsible for depredations to or loss of the property pending its return to B.64  
Furthermore, if the property is of the sort that needs managing, such as land, 
she must manage it appropriately in B’s interests pending its transfer to B.65   
For the reasons given in Chapter 2, the obligation to preserve and care for the 
property and make good any depredations or loss is better viewed as a 
custodial, rather than a fiduciary obligation.   Moreover, it seems questionable 
whether, absent any assumption of responsibility or acceptance by T, she 
should be subject to any active management obligations in respect of the 
                                                
60  Lonrho v Fayed (No. 2) (n 45) 11-12 (Millett J); Millett (n 3) 416; Worthington, ‘The 
Proprietary Consequences of Rescission’ (n 41) 38. 
61 El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc (n 45) 714 (Millett J). 
62 Lonrho v Fayed (No. 2) (n 45) 12 (Millett LJ).   
63 Phillips v Silvester (1872-73) LR 8 Ch App 173 (CA), 177 (Lord Selborne LC). 
64 Raffety v Schofield [1897] 1 Ch 937 (Ch), 944-5 (Romer J). 
65 Abdulla v Shah [1959] AC 124 (PC), 131, 132 (Lord Somervell); Earl of Egmont v Smith 
(1877) 6 Ch D 468, 475-6 (Lord Jessel MR). 
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property.  Finally, the language of conscience cannot help us to answer the 
difficult question of whether the proprietary response to all defective transfers 
(i.e. those which render a contract void, such as mistake, and those which 
render a contract voidable, as discussed here) should be the same and if so, 
what approach the law should adopt.  To answer all these questions, we need 
direct argument as to what principles the law does or should embody in this 
context. 
CONSCIENCE, CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS AND THEFT 
 
According to Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche,66 if T steals or 
fraudulently takes B’s money,67 T immediately becomes a trustee of the money 
under a constructive trust.  Australian authority also supports this view.68  
Here, as elsewhere, the idea of conscience tells us something about the 
circumstances in which T comes under a positive obligation to return the 
property to B (i.e. when she acquires knowledge of the facts), but it does not 
explain why B gets equitable title to the property in the first place.   
 
The first reason we might say that a trust arises is that T commits a wrong and 
equity should offer a proprietary response to that wrong. When T steals B’s 
property, B retains legal title to it and this entitles her to recover the property in 
a common law action for conversion.  However, if left to a common law 
remedy, B might well find it difficult to recover her property, particularly if it 
were money, as the common law tracing rules would not permit her to trace or 
follow the money through mixed funds or into and out of bank accounts.  
Therefore, we might say that a trust is justified in order to allow B to avail of 
equity’s more favourable tracing rules.69  We can therefore justify equity’s 
intervention on the basis that it supplements the common law’s inadequate 
                                                
66 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (n 5) 716 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Collings v Lee (n 56). 
67 As distinct from inducing her to enter into a contract by fraudulent misrepresentation, where 
the trust arises only at the date B elects to rescind. Cf. Halley v The Law Society (n 59). 
68 Black v Freedman (1910) HCA 58, (1910) 12 CLR 105; Australian Postal Corporation v 
Lutak (1991) 21 NSWLR 584; Creak v James Moore & Sons Pty Ltd (1912) HCA 67, (1912) 
15 CLR 426; Zobory v Commissioner of Taxation [1995] FCA 1226; Robb Evans of Robb 
Evans & Associates v European Bank Ltd (2004) 61 NSWLR 75. 
69 D. Waters, The Constructive Trust (The Athlone Press 1964) 66. 
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protection of B’s rights.  On this analysis, B acquires equitable title because T 
should not be entitled to profit from her wrongdoing and equitable intervention 
is required to ensure this does not happen.  B’s equitable title allows her to 
trace the property in equity into substitutes in T’s hands and/or follow it into 
the hands of third parties (except bona fide purchasers for value) where 
necessary.  Here, as elsewhere, the idea of conscience is relevant to the 
imposition of personal obligations on T.  However, apart from reminding us at 
the most general level that T has breached the universal moral duty not to steal, 
the idea of conscience does not really contribute to our understanding of why 
B acquires equitable title.   It does not tell us what the nature and extent of T’s 
obligations should be.  Arguably, her knowledge is sufficient to subject her to 
the basic custodial duty to preserve and return the property to B and, as a 
wrongdoer, she would also be liable to account for profits.  Whether it is also 
necessary or appropriate to treat her as a fiduciary70 is a difficult question and 
not one that the idea of conscience can help us answer. 
 
The second reason we might say equity should offer proprietary relief is that in 
cases of theft B does not know of, let alone consent to T taking her property 
and therefore T is unjustly enriched at her expense.71  Therefore, as in the case 
of mistake or other defective transfers, a resulting trust should arise in her 
favour to give her equitable title and make T liable to return the property in 
specie (or restore its value).  On this analysis, the idea of conscience does not 
explain why B’s equitable title arises: the fact that the property is not T’s to 
keep entitles B to recover.  Again, the idea of conscience is relevant only to 
T’s obligations and, as before, its explanatory force is limited.  
 
Whichever analysis applies, there is a potential problem with Lord Browne-
Wilkinson’s suggestion that a trust arises at the date of the theft.  First, the 
                                                
70 Other than for the purposes of facilitating an entitlement to trace insofar as that might be 
necessary (as to which cf. n 34). 
71 P. Birks, ‘Trusts Raised to Reverse Unjust Enrichment’ [1996] RLR 3, 16; Chambers (n 18) 
117-118; R. Chambers, ‘Trust and Theft’ in E. Bant and M. Harding (eds), Exploring Private 
Law (Cambridge University Press 2010); Robb Evans of Robb Evans & Associates v European 
Bank Ltd (n 68) 100, [112]-[113]  (Spiegelman CJ). 
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authorities72 relied on by Lord Browne-Wilkinson do not offer direct support 
for the recognition that a trust arises.73  Secondly, because a thief does not 
acquire legal title to stolen property, T cannot hold the legal title on trust for B 
(as B retains it).74  In response, it has been argued that although B retains legal 
title to the stolen money, T is unjustly enriched by the acquisition of 
possessory title,75 which constitutes a property interest and can therefore be 
held on trust for B. 76   On the other hand, it might be said that not only does B 
have legal and beneficial title but also already the better possessory title to the 
money.  The true position may therefore be that the trust arises only when B 
loses legal title to T, e.g. where money is stolen and used as currency or 
transferred into T’s bank account.77   
 
If it is correct that the trust can only arise at the date B loses legal title to the 
property, it means that at the date of the theft T is clearly aware that the 
property is not hers to take from B, let alone keep, which surely makes it 
reasonable to treat her as bound by an immediate moral obligation to preserve 
and return the property.  However, even though the common law’s means of 
enforcing T’s moral obligation seems inadequate, equity cannot step in and 
supplement it until the date on which B loses legal title.   This would appear to 
be unfortunate.  It is therefore unsurprising that the courts are prepared to 
recognise an immediate trust78 for the purpose of facilitating the recovery of 
stolen funds, especially in fraud cases.79  This is likely to continue until such 
time as the equitable tracing rules are given universal application.80 
                                                
72 McCormick v Grogan (1869) LR 4 HL 82, 97-98; Bankers Trust v Shapira [1980] 1 WLR 
1274; Stocks v Wilson [1913] 2 KB 235; R. Leslie Ltd v Sheill [1914] 3 KB 687. 
73 Halifax Building Society v Thomas [1996] Ch 217, 228 (Peter Gibson J); Shalson v Russo  (n 
43) 317-318, [111] (Rimer J). 
74 Shalson v Russo  (n 43) 317, [110] (Rimer J); S. Barkehall-Thomas, ‘Thieves as Trustees: 
The Enduring Legacy of Black v S Freedman & Co Ltd’ (2009) 3 Journal of Equity 52, 58; B. 
McFarlane, ‘Trusts and Knowledge: Lessons from Australia’ in J. Glister and P. Ridge (eds), 
Fault Lines in Equity (Hart Publishing 2012) 174-175. 
75 Burrows (n 18) 196-7. 
76 J. Tarrant, ‘Property Rights to Stolen Money’ (2005) 32 UWAL Rev 234; J. Tarrant, 
‘Thieves as Trustees: In Defence of the Theft Principle’ (2009) 3 Journal of Equity 170, 173, 
178-179; D. Fox, Property Rights in Money (Oxford University Press 2008) 142-143.  
77 Chambers, ‘Trust and Theft’ (n 71). 
78 E.g. Re Holmes [2005] 1 ALL ER 490, [21]-[22] (Stanley Burnton J). 
79 E.g. Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC 10 (Ch) [125]-[129] 
(Stephen Morris QC). 
80 As suggested by Lord Millett in Foskett v McKeown (n 35) 128. 
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CONSCIENCE AND THE PALLANT V MORGAN EQUITY 
 
Where two parties, B and T, enter into an informal agreement or arrangement 
to acquire property jointly and T goes on to acquire the property, in certain 
circumstances the courts will treat T as a constructive trustee of the property 
for B.  The trust that arises in such circumstances is known as the Pallant v 
Morgan equity.81  The courts regularly use the language of conscience in their 
descriptions of why the trust arises. For example, it is said that B ‘alleges that 
the circumstances in which the defendant obtained control [of the property] 
make it unconscionable for him thereafter to assert a beneficial interest in the 
property’;82 and ‘[T]he trust is imposed on [T] by operation of law since it 
would be unconscionable for him to repudiate the agreement by claiming the 
entire benefit of the property for himself.’83  However, this is merely to say that 
the circumstances in which T obtained the property make it morally 
unacceptable for her subsequently to deny B an interest in it; it does not tell us 
why this is the case.  For this we need direct argument as to the relevant moral 
principles that justify the acquisition of equitable title by B and the imposition 
of obligations on T.  The best explanation of why B gets equitable title to the 
property is that the parties agreed she would have a share in the property84 and 
T undertakes to acquire it for and on behalf of B, i.e. qua fiduciary.  Implicitly, 
therefore, from the date of the undertaking, T’s conscience is affected by 
knowledge of the facts (i.e. that she has consented to acquire the property for 
B) and this enables her to determine what she ought (morally) to do, i.e. share 
it with B once she acquires it.  Therefore, once she acquires it she comes under 
an immediate moral obligation to preserve and transfer B’s share in specie to 
her, which equity will underwrite.   However, as elsewhere, beyond this the 
idea of conscience tells us nothing. 
 
                                                
81 Pallant v Morgan [1953] Ch 43 (Ch). 
82 Paragon Finance Plc v D.B. Thakerar & Co (A Firm) [1998] EWCA Civ 1249, [1999] 1 All 
ER 400 (CA), 408 (Millett LJ). 
83 McGhee QC, Snell’s Equity (n 34) 668, [24-040]. 
84 C. Rickett, ‘The Classification of Trusts’ (1999) 18 NZULR 305, 327. 
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The Pallant v Morgan doctrine has developed in two stages.  First, in Pallant v 
Morgan itself85 B and T were neighbouring domestic landowners, who reached 
an informal agreement that T only would acquire the property and then sell 
part of it to B.  Harman J held that a trust arose because the evidence showed 
that T’s agent ‘was bidding for [B and T] on an agreement that there should be 
an agreement between the parties on the division of the lot if he were 
successful.’86  He therefore declared that T held the land on trust for himself 
and B and, if they could not reach agreement, it would be sold and the 
proceeds divided equally subject to the making of an adjustment for the 
purchase price in T’s favour.  Harman J relied on only one authority, Chattock 
v Muller,87 which involved almost identical facts.  In that case Mallins V-C 
held that T ‘attended the auction partly on his own account and partly as [B]’s 
agent’.  This meant that when he purchased the property he held it on trust for 
B and the failure to sell part of it to B as agreed ‘was a flagrant breach of duty, 
which in this Court has always been considered as a fraud’.88  Thus, the 
original rationale for such a trust was based on a finding that on the evidence 
the relationship between B and T vis-à-vis the acquisition of the property was a 
fiduciary one.  This meant that T was not entitled to keep for herself property 
she should have acquired for herself and B, so in accordance with the 
principles of fiduciary law a constructive trust arose to prevent her from doing 
so.   In Pallant v Morgan itself, B gave T an advantage in relation to the 
acquisition of the first parcel of land by standing back and allowing him to bid, 
but T had no such advantage in bidding for the second parcel and was entitled 
to hold that parcel for himself.89   
 
The second stage in the development of the doctrine is marked by the 
judgment of Chadwick LJ in Banner Homes Group Plc v Luff Developments 
Ltd,90 which has been interpreted as authority for the proposition that the 
                                                
85 Pallant v Morgan  (n 81). 
86 Ibid 50 (Harman J). 
87 Chattock v Muller (1878) 8 Ch D 177. 
88 Ibid 181 (Mallins V-C), citing Lees v Nuttall (1856) 1 Russ & M 53; 39 ER 21; Heard v 
Pilley (1869-69) LR 4 Ch App 548 (CA) (both cases of express agency). 
89 McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law (n 57) 271.   
90 Banner Homes Group plc v Luff Developments Ltd [2000] Ch 372 (CA). 
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rationale for the trust is in fact common intention.91   This represents a 
departure from the original formulation of the rule.  On the facts of Banner 
Homes B and T were negotiating a commercial joint venture to acquire and 
develop a site and were going to use a joint venture company to purchase the 
property.  Towards the end of the negotiations, at a stage when most matters 
had been agreed in principle but the shareholders’ agreement for the new 
company had not been signed, T got cold feet.  It knew that if it told B it was 
pulling out, B might bid independently for the site, so it purchased the site 
through the joint venture company, which it had incorporated and wholly 
owned.  Chadwick LJ held that for a constructive trust to arise: (i) the parties 
needed to have entered into a pre-acquisition arrangement or understanding 
that T would take steps to acquire the property and if it did so, B would obtain 
some interest in it; and (ii) B needed to have taken some steps in reliance on 
the arrangement or understanding, giving rise to detriment to it or an advantage 
to T in relation to the acquisition of the property.92  Both factors were present 
in the case: there was an agreement in principle and although B had suffered 
no detriment, it might have bid for the property itself if it had known T did not 
wish to go ahead with the joint venture and so T could be said to have acquired 
an advantage.  T therefore held the property on trust for itself and B in equal 
shares.  
 
Chadwick LJ clearly saw conscience as playing a role in the recognition of B’s 
equitable interest under the trust.  He held: 
 
‘It is the existence of the advantage to the one, or detriment to the 
other, gained or suffered as a consequence of the arrangement or 
understanding, which leads to the conclusion that it would be 
inequitable or unconscionable to allow the acquiring party to retain the 
property for himself, in a manner inconsistent with the arrangement or 
understanding which enabled him to acquire it … What is essential is 
that the circumstances make it inequitable for the acquiring party to 
retain the property for himself in a manner inconsistent with the 
                                                
91 Kilcarne Holdings Ltd v Targetfellow (Birmingham) Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1355; Crossco 
No. 4 Unlimited v Jolan Limited [2011] EWCA Civ 1619, [2012] 1 P & CR 16, [122] 
(McFarlane J) and [129]-[130] (Arden LJ). 
92 Banner Homes Group plc v Luff Developments Ltd (n 90), 397-398 (Chadwick LJ). 
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arrangement or understanding on which the non-acquiring party has 
acted.’93 
 
Here, the language of unconscionability simply tells us that if the parties have 
reached an informal arrangement that T would acquire the property for both of 
them, it would be morally unacceptable for T to retain the property for herself 
if B has conferred an advantage on her or acted to her detriment in some way, 
e.g. by foregoing the opportunity to obtain the property herself.94    However, 
this analysis seems inadequate to explain why B should get equitable title to 
the property, particularly in a commercial context.   Subsequently, it was 
suggested that the constructive trust arose in order to keep T to an undertaking, 
subject to which she acquired the property.95  This may be true but again, it 
does not really tell us why the trust is necessary.  It was also argued that the 
trust responded to B’s detrimental reliance, as she had foregone the 
opportunity to secure a binding joint venture agreement with T or someone 
else.96  The difficulty with this argument is that it can be raised in respect of 
every joint venture negotiation that falls short of a contract.  
 
The concerns about the inadequacy of the Banner Homes explanation may be 
reflected in the courts’ subsequent reluctance to allow B to rely on the doctrine 
to assert equitable title to property that was to be acquired in the course of a 
joint venture that failed to materialise, particularly where the negotiations were 
subject to contract.  Thus, it has been held that ‘[I]n general, it is not 
unconscionable for a party to negotiations, which are expressly stated to be 
“subject to contract”, to exercise a reserved right to withdraw from the 
negotiations before a final agreement has been concluded.’97  This suggests that 
where it is clear the negotiations are not binding, it will not be morally 
                                                
93 Ibid 398, 399 (Chadwick LJ); Baynes Clarke v Corless [2010] EWCA Civ 338, [40], [41] 
(Patten LJ).  
94 E.g. Island Holdings v Birchington Engineering Ltd 7 July 1981 (Ch) (Goff J). 
95 B. McFarlane, ‘Constructive Trusts Arising on a Receipt of Property Sub Conditione’ (2004) 
120 LQR 667; cf McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law (n 57) 267, 271. 
96 S. Gardner, ‘Reliance-Based Constructive Trusts’ in C. Mitchell (ed), Constructive and 
Resulting Trusts (Hart Publishing 2010) 72-4. 
97 London and Regional Investments Ltd v TBI Plc [2002] EWCA Civ 355.  In Button v Phelps 
[2006] EWHC 53 (Ch), [79] (Robert Englehart QC) there was no arrangement or 
understanding that T would not participate in a rival bid and so no trust arose.  
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unacceptable for one of the parties to withdraw.  In Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row98 
Lord Scott put it another way.  He held that where the parties are dealing with 
each other in a commercial context and negotiating towards the joint 
acquisition of property, it may be ‘unconscionable’, i.e. morally unacceptable 
for T to take the property for herself, but this alone will not suffice to give B 
an interest in the property when B knows the agreement is binding in honour 
only.99  In other words, although it may be ‘discreditable’ or morally dubious 
for one party to withdraw at the last minute,100 where commercial parties know 
the risks they are running if a contract fails to materialise, equity does not treat 
T as coming under a positive moral obligation to acquire the property for B.   
 
In Crossco No. 4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd Etherton LJ held that Banner Homes 
should be reinterpreted on the basis that the Pallant v Morgan equity will only 
arise if fiduciary duties can be inferred from the nature of the relationship 
between B and T.101  In his view, the cases in which the equity is said to arise 
‘can all be explained and, in my judgment, ought to be explained in wholly 
conventional terms by the existence and breach of fiduciary duties.’102  In 
Etherton LJ’s view, it made sense in terms of policy for the Pallant v Morgan 
line of cases to be explained as and confined to cases of breach of fiduciary 
duty because, ‘by contrast with the common intention constructive trust, such a 
policy recognises the need for certainty in commercial transactions’.103  On this 
analysis, the Pallant v Morgan cases ‘[C]an be seen as cases in which the 
Court is, pursuant to the constructive trust, depriving the defendant of the 
advantage obtained in breach of trust.  The irrelevance of lack of complete 
agreement, whether documented or not, is then easily explained, as is the 
latitude with which the Court devises the best way to deprive the defendant of 
the unconscionable advantage …’104  Although Arden LJ agreed with Etherton 
                                                
98 Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 WLR 1752. 
99 Ibid [37] (Lord Scott). 
100 Benedetti v Sawiris [2009] EWHC 1330 (Ch), [514], [515] (Patten J). 
101 Crossco No. 4 Unlimited v Jolan Limited (n 91), [88]-[96] (Etherton LJ).  
102 Ibid [88]. 
103 Ibid [94]. 
104 Ibid [95]. 
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LJ’s approach,105 the majority in Crossco held that it was not possible to depart 
from Banner Homes in this way, so it remains good law.106 
 
There is academic support for the fiduciary rationale107 and arguably, it makes 
good sense.108  Where T and B agree informally that T will acquire the property 
on behalf of them both and B will stand back and not compete to acquire it, as 
in cases such as Chattock v Muller109 and Pallant v Morgan110 itself, T may be 
taken to have consented to acquire the property for and on behalf of B, i.e. qua 
fiduciary.  The question is whether the evidence suggests that T is negotiating 
for B as a direct purchaser of the property, rather than merely negotiating for 
herself with the intention afterwards to offer to sell some of the property to 
B.111  In other words, T will be treated as a fiduciary if it is clear that she put 
herself under an obligation to share the property with B.112  In the case of a 
commercial joint venture, T is unlikely to be treated as having assumed such a 
positive obligation towards B before the negotiations have culminated in an 
enforceable agreement.  However, each case would turn on its own facts. 
 
In light of the above, we can say that where the evidence suggests that T has 
expressly or implicitly agreed to purchase part of the property for and on 
behalf of B, when she enters into the transaction to purchase the property she 
does so qua fiduciary for B, as well as for herself.  Once acquired, the property 
falls within the scope of the obligation she assumed towards B.  On this 
                                                
105 Ibid [128] (Arden LJ). 
106 It was recently applied in Achom v Lalic [2014] EWHC 1888 (Ch), [81]-[89] (Newey J). 
107 P. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (The Law Book Co. Ltd 1977) 201-2; P. Millett, ‘Remedies: 
The Error in Lister v Stubbs’ in P. Birks (ed), Frontiers of Liability, vol 1 (Oxford University 
Press 1994) 53-54; S. Nield, ‘Constructive Trusts and Estoppel’ (2003) 23 LS 311, 315; T. 
Etherton, ‘Constructive Trusts: a new Model for Equity and Unjust Enrichment’ (2008) 67 
CLJ 265, 285-6; T. Etherton, ‘Constructive Trusts and Proprietary Estoppel: The Search for 
Clarity and Principle’ [2009] Conv 104, 122-3. Cf. M. Yip, ‘The Pallant v Morgan Equity 
Reconsidered’ (2013) 33 LS 549, 571. 
108 Cf. G. Allan, ‘Once A Fraud, Forever a Fraud: The Time-Honoured Doctrine of Parol 
Agreement Trusts’ (2014) 34 LS 419, 428, in which it is argued that that the trust arises 
because it would constitute a fraud for T to take the benefit of the property, knowing that B 
had relied on their agreement.  
109 Chattock v Muller (n 87). 
110 Banner Homes Group plc v Luff Developments Ltd (n 90). 
111 Walden Properties Ltd v Beaver Properties Pty Ltd [1973] 2 NSWLR 815, 832-3 (Hope 
JA). 
112 Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Television Corporation Ltd [1969] 2 NSWLR 
257, 262 (Walshe JA). 
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analysis, we would say that the reason B acquires equitable title is that T 
consented to acquire the property in part on her behalf.  Before T acquires the 
property, her conscience is affected by knowledge of the relevant facts (i.e. 
that she has undertaken to act for B in relation to the purchase of the property), 
which enable her to identify what she ought morally to do when she acquires 
it, i.e. share it with B.  Therefore, at the moment T acquires legal title to the 
property she comes under an immediate, enforceable obligation to preserve 
and transfer the relevant part of the property in specie to B.  If the parties 
cannot agree how the property is to be divided, the courts will direct T to sell it 
and transfer the relevant share of the proceeds of sale to B.113  Importantly, 
because T is a fiduciary, she will also come under an obligation to account in 
specie to B for any profits she makes from the property.  
CONSCIENCE AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS OVER PROFITS MADE 
IN BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
 
In recent years, the courts have had to grapple with the controversial question 
whether, assuming B and T are in a fiduciary relationship and T makes profits 
for herself, B may claim equitable title to them under a constructive trust. 
There is little doubt that any property, which T already administers as a 
fiduciary for B, is trust property, so that if in breach of fiduciary duty, T uses 
the trust property for her own ends114 or exchanges it for substitute property115 
and thereby makes a profit, B has an equitable proprietary claim to the gain.   
However, until recently it was unclear whether B was also entitled to assert 
equitable title to profits made by T as a result of a conflict of interest and duty, 
such as a bribe, or profits made by T simply because of her position (and not 
necessarily involving a conflict of interest).  Since the decision of the Supreme 
                                                
113 Pallant v Morgan (n 81) 50 (Harman J); Holiday Inns Inc v Broadhead (1974) 232 EG 951 
(Ch).  Cf. Thames Cruises Ltd v George Wheeler Launches Ltd [2003] EWHC 3093, [122], 
[123] (Peter Smith J). 
114 Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd (in administrative 
receivership) [2011] EWCA Civ 347, [88] (Lord Neuberger MR). 
115 Trustee of the Property of FC Jones & Sons (A Firm) v Jones [1997] Ch 159 (CA); Foskett 
v McKeown (n 35).  Cf. Worthington, ‘Justifying Claims to Secondary Profits’ (n 37). 
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Court in FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC,116 it is 
now clear that B does get title to all three different types117 of profits under a 
constructive trust.   The language of conscience has occasionally been invoked 
in support of the conclusion that B should get equitable title to the profits.  
However, it cannot tell us why this should be the case.  At best, as elsewhere, 
the language of conscience reminds us that whatever obligations T is subject to 
qua fiduciary are moral obligations, which cannot arise absent her knowledge.  
However, it cannot tell us what T’s obligations are or whether they should 
extend to delivering up in specie to B all profits made by virtue of her position 
as fiduciary. 
 
The discussion of this issue has centred around whether B can claim equitable 
title under a constructive trust to a bribe received by T in breach of fiduciary 
duty.  There was no difficulty in recognising B’s equitable title where the bribe 
represented a deduction from the purchase price that would otherwise have 
been payable to T.118  However, where the bribe was simply paid directly by a 
third party to T and did not constitute property that was already the subject 
matter of the fiduciary relationship between B and T, the question was more 
difficult.  Originally, the courts took the view that T was only liable to account 
to B for the value of the bribe.119  The reason given was that B could only claim 
equitable title to property or profits made from property that was already the 
subject matter of the fiduciary relationship between B and T, and a bribe did 
not fall within this category.  This approach120 – or variations of it121  – had 
                                                
116 FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45, [2015] AC 
250. 
117 On the distinction between the three types: S. Worthington, ‘Fiduciary Duties and 
Proprietary Remedies: Addressing the Failure of Equitable Formulae’ (2013) 72 CLJ 720, 751. 
118 In Re Canadian Oil Works Corporation (Hay's Case) (1874-75) LR 10 Ch App 593 (CA); 
Re Caerphilly Colliery Company (Pearson's Case) (1877) 5 Ch D 336 (CA); Daraydan 
Holdings Ltd v Solland International Ltd [2004] EWHC 622 (Ch). 
119 Boston Deep Sea Fishing & Ice Co v Ansell (1889) 39 Ch D 339; Metropolitan Bank v 
Heiron (1879-80) LR 5 Ex D 319; Lister v Stubbs (1890) 45 Ch D 1. 
120 Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (n 18) 387-9; R. Goode, ‘Property and 
Unjust Enrichment’ in A. Burrows (ed), Essays on the Law of Restitution (Clarendon Press 
1991).  
121 G. Jones, ‘Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty’ (1968) 84 LQR 472, 478 
(constructive trust only where T acted in bad faith); T. Youdan, ‘The Fiduciary Principle:  The 
Applicability of Proprietary Remedies’ in T. Youdan (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts 
(Carswell 1989) (constructive trust only where T acquired bribe at B’s expense); J. Edelman, 
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academic support.   In particular, the concern was that it would be unfair to 
give B priority in T’s insolvency in circumstances where she had not given 
value for the bribe and T’s unsecured creditors, who had given value, would 
suffer a loss.122  Therefore, the view was that B should be limited to a personal 
claim against T for the value of the bribe. 
 
Subsequently, however, in AG for Hong Kong v Reid123 the Privy Council held 
that B did get equitable title to the bribe under a constructive trust and Lord 
Templeman invoked the language of unconscionability in an effort to explain 
why this should be the case.  The city of Hong Kong (B) successfully asserted 
equitable title to the profits arising out of a bribe, which T had accepted in 
breach of his fiduciary duty of loyalty.  Lord Templeman described bribery as 
‘an evil practice which threatens the foundations of any civilized society’.124  
He went on to say that although legal title to the bribe vests in T: 
 
Equity, however, which acts in personam, insists that it is unconscionable 
for a fiduciary to obtain and retain a benefit in breach of duty.  The 
provider of the bribe cannot recover it because he committed a criminal 
offence when he paid the bribe.  The false fiduciary who received the 
bribe in breach of duty must pay and account for the bribe to the person to 
whom that duty is owed.125 
 
Lord Templeman’s use of the language of unconscionability tells us that he 
saw it as morally unacceptable for T to receive and keep a benefit arising from 
a breach of fiduciary duty owed to B.  It also suggests that T comes under a 
moral obligation towards B in respect of the bribe.  Crucially, however, it fails 
to tell us why T comes under such a moral obligation or why the obligation is 
to deliver it in specie to B, rather than simply to pay its value to B.  In other 
words, the language of unconscionability may tell that morally, T ought not to 
keep the bribe (because bribery is regarded as a social evil) but it tells us 
nothing about why B should receive the bribe itself.   Rather, he seemed to take 
                                                
Gain-Based Damages (Hart 2002) 262-264 (constructive trust only where personal liability to 
account insufficient to deter fiduciaries from misconduct). 
122 G. Virgo, ‘Profits Obtained in Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Personal or Proprietary Claim?’ 
(2011) 70 CLJ 502, 503.  Also Goode (n 120). 
123 Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC).  
124 Ibid 330-331 (Lord Templeman). 
125 Ibid 331 (Lord Templeman). 
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it as read that T is under an obligation to deliver the bribe in specie to B126 and 
continued: 
 
‘As soon as the bribe was received it should have been paid or transferred 
instanter to the person who suffered from the breach of duty.  Equity 
considers as done that which ought to have been done.  As soon as the 
bribe was received, whether in cash or in kind, the false fiduciary held the 
bribe on a constructive trust for the person injured.’127 
 
Lord Millett has been a strong supporter of the decision in Reid.  Writing 
extra-judicially, he argues that the reason T must give up the bribe and any 
consequent profits to B is that T must account to B in specie for all benefits 
acquired as a result of T’s fiduciary position.  He suggests this is because 
equity disables defaulting fiduciaries from preferring their own interests to 
those of their principals.  Why might this be so?  In Lord Millett’s view T is 
not entitled ‘to obtain a benefit by holding himself out as acting for another, 
and keep it by insisting, however truthfully, that he was acting for himself.’128 
Therefore, on the analysis that T was never entitled to keep the gain in the first 
place, it is not unfair to T’s creditors to exclude it from T’s estate on 
insolvency,129 especially if the gains made by T were secret and therefore not 
visible to her other creditors so as to mislead them.130     
 
Although the decision in Reid was subsequently applied here131 and a similar 
approach was adopted in Australia,132 the Court of Appeal declined to follow it 
in Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd (in 
administrative receivership),133 and so the pendulum swung back towards the 
                                                
126 Webb and Akkouh, Trusts Law (n 39) 234. 
127 Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid (n 123) (Lord Templeman), applying Keech v 
Sandford (1726) Sel Cas T King 61; 25 ER 223.  Keech is discussed in detail by A. Hicks, 
‘The Remedial Principle of Keech v Sandford Reconsidered’ (2010) 69 CLJ 287. 
128 Millett, ‘Remedies: The Error in Lister v Stubbs’ (n 107) 59. 
129 Ibid 52; Daraydan Holdings Ltd v Solland International Ltd (n 119) [86]. 
130 A. Oakley, ‘Proprietary Claims and their Priority in Insolvency’ (1995) 54 CLJ 377, 390. 
131 United Pan-Europe Communications NV v Deutsche Bank AG [2000] BCLC 461, 483, [44] 
(Morritt LJ); Tesco Stores Ltd v Pook [2003] EWHC 832 (Ch), [45] (Peter Smith J); Mainland 
Holdings Ltd v Szady [2002] NSWSC 699, [69]-[71] (Gzell J); Primlake Ltd v Matthews 
Associates [2006] EWHC 1227 (Ch), [335]-[336] (Lawrence Collins J). 
132 Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp [1984] 156 CLR 41, 108 (Gibbs CJ); 
Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6. 
133 Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd (in administrative 
receivership) (n 114); Cadogan Petroleum Plc v Tolly [2011] EWHC 2286 (Ch). 
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Lister v Stubbs analysis.  Sinclair was a case where B did not claim a 
proprietary interest in a bribe but rather profits made by T in the course of their 
relationship and as an indirect result of T’s breach of fiduciary duty.  In the 
view of Neuberger LJ, there was no obvious reason why ‘the fact that a 
fiduciary can profit as a result of the breach of his duties to a beneficiary, 
without more, [should] give the beneficiary a proprietary interest in the 
property’, not least because ‘a proprietary claim is based on property law’.134  
The need to deter defaulting fiduciaries could potentially be addressed by an 
order for equitable compensation135 and because of the impact of proprietary 
claims on other creditors, it was better not to extend such claims beyond ‘what 
is established by authority and accords with principle.’136   
 
The decision in Sinclair prompted yet more academic debate.137  Those who 
preferred the logic of Reid emphasized the disability principle referred to by 
Lord Millett as the source of T’s obligation to return the bribe or secret profit 
to B and, pending or failing that, to hold it for her benefit.  On this analysis the 
personal obligation to account for the value of the bribe is a corollary of the 
obligation to give it up in specie; it only becomes relevant when T is unable to 
give it up because she has already dissipated it.138  In other words, T’s primary 
obligation is to account in specie to B for any benefits received in the course of 
her duty, in default of which she must restore their value to B.  According to 
Lord Millett himself:  
 
The principal’s beneficial interest in the profit is thus inherent in the 
very concept of a fiduciary relationship.  It is an incident of the 
relationship that any advantage or profit which the fiduciary may obtain 
by virtue of the relationship is in the eyes of equity obtained for the 
benefit of his principal and belongs beneficially to him.139   
 
                                                
134 Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd (in administrative 
receivership) (n 114) [52] (Neuberger LJ). 
135 Ibid [53]. 
136 Ibid [54]. 
137 E.g. Virgo (n 122). 
138 D. Hayton, ‘Proprietary Liability for Secret Profits’ (2011) 127 LQR 487, 488. 
139 P. Millett, ‘Bribes And Secret Commissions Again’ (2012) 71 CLJ 583, 585. 
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Thus, in his view, the constructive trust arises ‘to frustrate the unconscionable 
intention of the fiduciary to keep the profit for himself’.140  Here again, the 
language of unconscionability tells us it is morally unacceptable for T to retain 
the profit, but it does not tell us why.  On Lord Millett’s analysis, there are two 
steps to the recognition of the constructive trust.  First, we have to accept the 
disability principle i.e. that ‘a fiduciary who places himself in a position where 
his interest conflicts with his duty will be treated as having acted in accordance 
with his duty’.141  Then it follows that at the moment T receives the money, she 
comes under an obligation to return it to B.142 Lord Millett argued further that 
the constructive trust is ‘not based on property law’ and was ‘never confined to 
the vindication of property rights’, but rather extended to ‘a wide variety of 
cases where equity, acting on the defendant’s conscience, enforces a personal 
obligation in relation to property’.143   Here, the language of conscience merely 
tells us that equity is underwriting moral obligations in respect of property.  
Ultimately, Lord Millett’s approach tells us it would be morally unacceptable 
for T, as a fiduciary, to retain for herself any advantage or profit obtained by 
virtue of her position because she is morally obliged to account in specie to B 
for all benefits received in the course of her duties.  Consequently, whenever 
she receives a bribe, she comes under an immediate moral obligation to 
transfer it in specie to B or, failing or pending that, to hold it for B’s benefit, 
which equity will underwrite. 
 
The disability principle has been criticised as a fiction and it has been argued 
that the better view is that when T receives a bribe in breach of duty she 
commits a wrong and therefore is liable to pay its value to B.  However, it is  
incorrect to say that she comes under a positive obligation in respect of it 
before judgment.144   Nevertheless, in FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar 
Capital Partners LLC145 the Supreme Court chose to follow Reid.  Cedar acted 
                                                
140 Ibid 589.   
141 Ibid 591. 
142 Ibid 592. 
143 Ibid 599-600. 
144 W. Swadling, ‘Constructive Trusts and Breach of Fiduciary Duty’ (2012) 18 Trusts and 
Trustees 985; J. Penner, ‘The Difficult Doctrinal Basis for the Fiduciary's Proprietary Liability 
to Account for Bribes’ (2012) 18 Trusts and Trustees 1000. 
145 FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC (n 116). 
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as B’s agent in negotiating the purchase of a hotel through a joint venture 
agreement.  It entered into an agreement with the vendor of the hotel for a 
€10m fee (a secret commission) payable upon completion.  B sought to recover 
the sum from Cedar and the question was whether Cedar held it on 
constructive trust for B.  The Court of Appeal held itself bound to apply 
Sinclair and rejected the constructive trust argument.146  The Supreme Court 
held that for a number of reasons of principle and practicality Cedar did hold 
the bribe on trust for B.  First, as a matter of principle, B was entitled to 
Cedar’s undivided loyalty as agent and therefore to the entire benefit of its acts 
in the course of its agency.  According to Lord Neuberger JSC:  
 
The agent’s duty is accordingly to deliver up to the principal the benefit 
which he has obtained, and not simply to pay compensation for having 
obtained it in excess of his authority.  The only way that legal effect 
can be given to an obligation to deliver up specific property to the 
principal is by treating the principal as specifically entitled to it.147   
 
Cedar argued that a constructive trust could only arise where it had made a 
secret profit on a transaction acting for its principal or effected as a result of 
some knowledge or opportunity arising in the course of its agency.  Lord 
Neuberger rejected this argument on the basis that the constructive trust 
approach was simpler148 and it reconciled the circumstances in which B could 
get proprietary and personal relief.149   In his view: 
 
If equity considers that in all cases where an agent acquires a benefit in 
breach of his fiduciary duty to his principal, he must account for that 
benefit to his principal, it could be said to be somewhat inconsistent for 
equity also to hold that only in some such cases could the principal 
claim the benefit as his own property.150 
 
                                                
146 Discussed by R. Chambers, ‘Constructive Trusts and Breach of Fiduciary Duty’ [2013] 
Conv 241, 249; P. Buckle, ‘Ariadne's Skein Again: Secret Profits in Sinclair v Versailles and 
FHR v Mankarious’ (2014) 20 Trusts and Trustees 768. 
147 FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC (n 116) [33] (Lord Neuberger 
JSC). 
148 Ibid [35]. 
149 Ibid [36]. 
150 Ibid. 
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The argument that the rule should not apply to the bribe because legally it 
could not have been received by or on behalf of B, was unattractive because it 
put Cedar in a position of conflict of interest and there was a real risk of 
disadvantage to B.151  It would also lead to an inconsistent approach to shares 
and money.152  As a matter of authority153 and policy154 the constructive trust 
remedy was justifiable.  Finally, Lord Neuberger concluded that concerns 
regarding prejudice to unsecured creditors were overstated; they could be in no 
better position than their principal.155   
 
The FHR analysis assumes that all gains which arise as a result of T’s role as a 
fiduciary are within the scope of her fiduciary relationship with B and 
therefore properly the subject matter of her moral obligations to B, so as to be 
caught by the constructive trust.  Why should this be the case?  There is 
certainly authority that supports this view. 156  Arguably, the FHR approach 
derives from a strict application of the no profits rule as a separate stand-alone 
principle from the no conflicts rule.157  On this analysis, there is one no profit 
rule, which is activated not by T’s wrongdoing but as ‘a direct implication of 
the fact that a fiduciary acts, within a sphere of activity, for and on behalf of 
the principal’, so that everything that can be extracted from that sphere of 
activity is attributed, as between B and T, to B.158  However, there may be good 
reasons to argue that the no profit rule is better treated as an aspect of the no 
conflict rule.159   On this analysis, only profits arising from the use of B’s 
property and profits which involve a conflict of duty and interest may be 
treated as falling within the scope of T’s positive obligations towards B, so that 
                                                
151 Ibid [37]. 
152 Ibid [38]. 
153 Ibid [40], [46]. 
154 Ibid [42]. 
155 Ibid [43]. 
156 E.g. Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134; Guinness plc v Saunders [1988] 1 
WLR 863; and more recently, O'Donnell v Shanahan [2009] EWCA Civ 751. 
157 Millett, ‘Bribes And Secret Commissions Again’ (n 139) 589. 
158 L. Smith, ‘Constructive Trusts and the No-Profit Rule’ (2013) 72 CLJ 260 
159 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver (n 156) 123 (Lord Upjohn, dissenting); D. Kershaw, ‘How 
the Law Thinks About Corporate Opportunities’ (2005) 25 Legal Studies 533. 
110 
 
B can say T ought to have acquired them for her160 and therefore she should 
have equitable title to them under a constructive trust.161  
 
Ultimately, as a result of Reid and FHR, it seems clear that B obtains equitable 
title to any benefits or gains made by T in the course of their fiduciary 
relationship because T is already under an obligation to deliver in specie to B 
all benefits and gains acquired in the course of his fiduciary activities for B.   
Although the language of conscience has been invoked to support this 
conclusion, it cannot explain it.  As elsewhere, it can remind us that T’s 
obligations are moral obligations, which cannot arise unless T has knowledge 
of the relevant facts so as to identify, through the process of moral reasoning, 
what morality requires her to do in the circumstances.  However, of itself, the 
language of conscience cannot help us to identify the nature of T’s obligations 
nor to what property they extend.  This requires direct argument as to the 
principles that the no profit and no conflict rule embody and the relationship 
between them. 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the idea of conscience plays the 
very same role in constructive trusts as it does in express and resulting trusts.  
It cannot tell us why B acquires equitable title to the property or T comes 
under obligations in respect of it: for this we must engage in direct argument as 
to the principles the law does or should embody in the relevant context.  
However, the idea of conscience is relevant to all trusts in that it reminds us 
that in recognising trust obligations, equity is underwriting moral obligations.  
It also helps us to understand why T must have knowledge of the relevant facts 
before she will be subject to the obligations of a trustee.  This is because it is 
not reasonable to require her to take positive steps to abide by moral standards 
unless she is first in a position to identify, through the operation of her 
conscience and the process of moral reasoning, what those standards are and 
                                                
160 Worthington, ‘Fiduciary Duties and Proprietary Remedies: Addressing the Failure of 
Equitable Formulae’ (n 117) 745. 
161 Ibid 751-2. 
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what she needs to do in order to comply with them.  Only then can she be 
taken to have reason to know about the relevant obligation and only then can 
we expect her to comply with it.  Beyond this, however, the idea of conscience 
tells us nothing.  In particular, it does not help us to identify the nature and 
scope of T’s obligations as trustee.    
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CHAPTER 4: CONSCIENCE, TRUSTS AND THIRD PARTIES 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter considers the meaning and function of conscience as it arises in or 
may be relevant to the equitable proprietary claim and the doctrines of 
knowing receipt and dishonest assistance.  Once a trust has arisen, these 
doctrines enable a beneficiary (B) to protect her equitable title to the trust 
property and her relationship with the trustee (T) from interference by a third 
party (X).  Consider the situation where, once B has acquired equitable title to 
the property and T is obliged to her as a trustee, T without authority takes B’s 
property1 and transfers it by sale or gift to X.  B’s equitable title survives the 
transfer, unless X can demonstrate that she bought the property from T in good 
faith in circumstances where an honest and reasonable person would not have 
discovered B’s interest in it.  If X can do this, she gets good title to it and B’s 
title is extinguished.  If X no longer has the property when B makes her claim, 
equity may still compel her personally to restore its value and account for 
profits through the doctrine of knowing receipt.    
 
The chapter argues that the idea of conscience has little if any role to play in 
helping us to understand why B’s equitable title survives the transfer to T, but 
it does tell us something about X’s obligations to B.  If, while X has the 
property, she learns that B has an interest in it and T had transferred it to her 
without B’s authority, arguably she comes under an immediate moral 
obligation to return the property to B in specie or hold it for B’s benefit.  If, 
despite her knowledge of B’s interest, she disposes of the property, morality 
also requires that she make good its value to B.  The idea of conscience 
reminds us that it is unreasonable to treat X as subject to any such obligations 
unless she has reason to know about them, and this will only be the case if she 
knows the facts, so as to be able to identify what morality requires of her in the 
                                                
1 For the purposes of this chapter, the phrase, ‘equitable property’ includes property in which B 
has an equitable interest under a trust or because someone such as a company director (see, e.g. 
Russell v Wakefield Waterworks Company (1875) LR 20 Eq 474 (CA)) owes her fiduciary 
duties in respect of the property. 
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circumstances.  In other words, the language of conscience points to the fact 
that X’s obligations are moral obligations, which equity underwrites and 
enforces.  However, beyond this, the language of conscience leaves a range of 
important questions unanswered.  It does not help us to identify the moral 
principles underpinning X’s obligations, nor the content of them, nor what or 
how much X must know before she will become subject to them. 
 
If, instead of or as well as receiving trust property from T, X assists T in a 
breach of trust, X may be liable to compensate for losses and/or account for 
any profits she makes through the doctrine of dishonest assistance.  
Historically, the language of conscience was also used to explain this doctrine, 
although recently the courts have eschewed it in favour of the language of 
dishonesty.  The chapter argues that the language of dishonesty in fact suffers 
from some of the same explanatory limitations as unconscionability.   
Moreover, the test for establishing dishonesty for the purposes of the 
assistance claim and knowing receipt appear to be very similar, so that the 
labels may be interchangeable.   Finally, the language of conscience may have 
some explanatory force in the context of dishonest assistance, to the extent that 
relief is predicated on the breach of a pre-existing (moral) duty about which X 
had reason to know.  
CONSCIENCE AND THE EQUITABLE PROPRIETARY CLAIM 
 
If T transfers trust property or its traceable substitutes2 without authority to X, 
B may assert her equitable title against X in order to exclude X from 
                                                
2 Foskett v McKeown [2000] UKHL 29, [2001] 1 AC 102, 108-9, 110 (Lord Browne-
Wilkinson), 115 (Lord Hoffmann) and 129 (Lord Millett) (equitable property).  This view has 
some academic support: P. Millett, ‘Proprietary Restitution’ in S. Degeling and J. Edelman 
(eds), Equity in Commercial Law (Thomson 2005) 315-316; R. Calnan, ‘Proprietary Remedies 
for Unjust Enrichment’ in A. Burrows and E. Peel (eds), Commercial Remedies: Current 
Issues and Problems (Oxford University Press 2003); J. Penner, ‘Value, Property and Unjust 
Enrichment: Trusts of Traceable Proceeds’ in R. Chambers, C. Mitchell and J. Penner (eds), 
Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford Scholarship Online 
2009) 325-327; L. Tucker, N. Le Poidevin and J. Brightwell, Lewin on Trusts (15th edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell 2015) 1997-99, [41-057]. 
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interfering with or enjoying the benefits of the property,3 on the basis that X’s 
ownership of it is limited by her equitable title in the same way that T’s 
ownership was limited.4   The view that B’s equitable title automatically 
inheres in traceable substitutes is controversial,5 but it represents current law.  
For this reason, any references to the trust property hereinafter should be taken 
to include its traceable substitutes, as appropriate.  B’s equitable interest in the 
trust property binds X6 unless X can show7 that at the time of receipt she was a 
bona fide purchaser for value of the legal estate without notice8 of B’s interest 
in the property, in which case she takes good title to it.9  If X is not a bona fide 
purchaser, she will be obliged to return the property in specie to B if she still 
has it when B asserts her claim.10   
 
Up until fairly recently the language of conscience was still used to describe 
the operation of notice in the bona fide purchase defence.  However, given that 
                                                
3 Lionel Smith, ‘Transfers’ in P. Birks and A. Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart 2003) 136; R. 
Nolan, ‘Equitable Property’ (2006) 122 LQR 232, 236-238; J. McGhee QC (ed) Snell's Equity 
(33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014) 22, [2-005]. 
4 Penner (n 2) 325-6. 
5 Some suggest B’s equitable title arises as a new right to prevent X’s unjust enrichment: P. 
Birks, ‘Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths’ [1997] NZL Rev 623, 661; A. 
Burrows, ‘Proprietary Restitution: Unmasking Unjust Enrichment’ (2001) 117 LQR 412; P. 
Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 2005) 35; A. Burrows, ‘The Relationship 
Between Unjust Enrichment and Property: Some Unresolved Issues’ in S. Degeling and J. 
Edelman (eds), Unjust Enrichment in Commercial Law (Thomson 2008) 338-9; R. Chambers 
and J. Penner, ‘Ignorance’ in S. Degeling and J. Edelman (eds), Unjust Enrichment in 
Commercial Law (Thomson 2008) 266-7.  Cf. S. Worthington, ‘Reconsidering Disgorgement 
for Wrongs’ (1999) 62 MLR 218; S. Worthington, ‘Justifying Claims to Secondary Profits’ in 
E. Schrage (ed), Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Contract (Kluwer 2001) 452, 462, 466-71 
who argues that B should only get equitable title to the substitute if X owed her a pre-existing 
obligation, e.g. qua fiduciary. 
6 Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465 (CA), 522 (Lord Greene MR) (accepted without argument by both 
parties); affirmed, sub nom Ministry of Health v Simpson [1951] 1 AC 251 (HL); Boscawen v 
Bajwa [1996] 1 WLR 328 (CA), 334 (Millett LJ); Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v 
Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 (HL), 705 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
7 Re Nisbet and Potts Contract [1906] 1 Ch 386 (CA), 406 (Collins MR), 409 (Romer LJ) and 
410 (Cozens-Hardy LJ); Re Loftus [2005] EWHC 406 (Ch) [169] (Lawrence Collins J). 
8  X must demonstrate absence of notice and good faith: Pilcher v Rawlins LR 7 Ch 259 (CA) 
269 (James LJ); Midland Bank Trust Company Limited v Green [1981] AC 513 (CA) 528 
(Lord Wilberforce). 
9 Re Diplock (n 6) 539 (Lord Greene MR); Foskett v McKeown (n 2) 129 (Lord Millett).  
However, if X subsequently sets aside the transaction by which she gave value, she may not 
avail of the defence: Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd [2012] EWCA 
Civ 195, [91] (Lloyd LJ).  
10 Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1990] 1 Ch 265 (Ch), 290 (Millett J); Clark v Cutland [2003] 
EWCA Civ 810, [2004] 1 WLR 783, [28]-[31] (Arden LJ); NABB Brothers Limited v Lloyds 
Bank International (Guernsey) Ltd [2005] EWHC 405 (Ch) [72] (Lawrence Collins J); P. 
Millett, ‘Restitution and Constructive Trusts’ (1998) 114 LQR 399, 402. 
115 
 
today notice may not be sufficient to subject X to a positive obligation to 
return the property, there is no sense in which equity is requiring the defendant 
to take steps to comply with a particular moral standard and therefore the 
language of conscience adds nothing to our understanding of the bona fide 
purchase defence.  
Conscience and Volunteers 
 
The language of conscience tells us nothing about the survival of B’s equitable 
title against X, where X is a volunteer who has received the trust property by 
way of gift or inheritance from T.  B’s equitable title survives the transfer to X 
even if at the date of receipt X had no knowledge or notice of B’s interest in 
the property.11  It takes priority over X’s legal title and thus, B has an 
immediate right to demand the return of the property in specie from X. 
Therefore, we might say that at the date of receipt X comes under a liability 
towards B in respect of the property, but this liability extends only to the very 
property itself.  If X disposes of the property before she acquires knowledge of 
B’s claim that is B’s tough luck  She must now follow the property into the 
hands of the next recipient and assert her equitable title against that person.   
The language of conscience tells us nothing about X’s liability to B, as the 
liability arises irrespective of knowledge. 
 
Although X may be under a liability to B from the date of receipt, it is 
unreasonable to treat her as owing her any positive moral obligation to take 
steps to return the property before she acquires knowledge of B’s claim.  When 
X comes to know of B’s interest in the property, either because B asserts her 
equitable title against X or X learns about B’s interest from some other source, 
then she comes under an obligation to return the property in specie to B or, 
pending or failing that, hold it for her benefit.   As Lloyd LJ recently explained 
as regards an innocent volunteer, ‘[X] would have been under no relevant duty 
as regards the money until she had notice of the interest of the beneficiaries.  
Once she had such notice, she would be under a duty not to part with the 
                                                
11 Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts [1987] 1 Ch 264 (Ch), 277 (Megarry VC). 
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remaining funds (and the traceable proceeds in her hands of any which had 
already gone) otherwise than by restoring them to or for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries’.12  As will be seen in the section on knowing receipt, the better 
view is that actual knowledge (rather than notice, as Lloyd LJ suggests) is 
required to subject X to the duty to return the property to B and/or hold it for 
her benefit.  In any event, the language of conscience has some limited 
relevance here in that it reminds us that X’s obligations in respect of the 
property are essentially moral obligations, to which X will not be subject 
unless she has (moral) reason to know about them.  
 
The courts have also used the language of conscience to explain how they 
balance the interests of B and X, where X holds a mixed fund containing some 
of her own money and some of the original trust money, which she received 
from T.  As the law stands, the general rule is that where T wrongfully uses 
trust money to provide part of the cost of acquiring an asset, B may claim 
equitable title to a proportionate share of the asset or enforce a lien over it to 
secure the value of the trust money contribution.  If T gives the new asset to X, 
the general rule is that B’s claim to a proportionate share or a lien is still good 
against X because X received the asset gratuitously and can be in no better 
position than T.13 However, where X herself has contributed to the acquisition 
of the asset, B’s claim to a lien is limited by reference to the state of X’s 
conscience.  If, when X received the trust money and mixed it with her own, 
she had no knowledge of B’s interest in the property, B and X are said to be 
‘competing contributors who are innocent of any wrongdoing’ and equity 
treats them equally.14  Thus, it is said that X is ‘not in conscience bound to give 
precedence’ to B15 and thus she ‘cannot be said to act unconscionably if  [she] 
claims equal treatment for herself’.16   This is consistent with our ordinary 
understanding of conscience: absent knowledge, it would be unreasonable to 
treat X as having come under any moral obligation towards B in respect of the 
trust money before she did the mixing.  Therefore, X is entitled to recover from 
                                                
12 Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd (n 9) [76], [81] (Lloyd LJ). 
13 Foskett v McKeown (n 2) 132 (Lord Millett). 
14 Ibid. 
15 Re Diplock (n 6) 524 (Lord Greene MR). 
16 Ibid 539. 
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the mixture what she put into it and B’s claim is limited to what is left.  
Conversely, if X did know about B’s interest in the money before she did the 
mixing, it is reasonable to treat her as coming under a moral obligation towards 
B in respect of it, so that if by the time B makes her claim the mixture is 
inadequate to satisfy both it and X’s claim, B should get her lien.      
Conscience and Purchasers 
 
Similarly, the language of conscience has no real explanatory force in relation 
to the circumstances in which B’s equitable title survives a purchase of the 
property by X.  If at the date of purchase X has no notice that B is asserting a 
proprietary interest in the property,17 B’s equitable title is extinguished.  This 
means X takes good title to the property and, as a result, is exempt from any 
liability or obligation towards B in respect of it, even if she subsequently 
learns of B’s interest.  The effect of the bona fide purchase exemption is to 
favour the interests of good faith purchasers in security of receipt over the 
equitable property interests of trust beneficiaries.  The reason may be that if X 
has paid for something in good faith only to be liable to return it, she is thereby 
unfairly prejudiced.18  
 
Historically, the courts used the language of conscience to describe the effect 
of notice on X as a purchaser.  In Midland Bank Trust Company Ltd v Green19 
Lord Wilberforce stated, ‘In order to affect a purchaser for value of a legal 
estate with some equity or equitable interest, equity fastened upon his 
conscience’20 and the phrase, bona fide purchaser for value without notice ‘was 
used to epitomise the circumstances in which equity would or rather would not 
do so.’21  If X could show that at the time of purchase her conscience was 
unaffected by notice of B’s claim, her title was unimpeachable22 and B’s 
                                                
17 Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd (in administrative 
receivership) [2011] EWCA Civ 347, [109] (Neuberger LJ). 
18 K. Barker, ‘After Change of Position: Good Faith Exchange in the Modern Law of 
Restitution’ in P. Birks (ed), Laundering and Tracing (Oxford University Press 1995)196-7. 
19 Midland Bank Trust Company Limited v Green (n 8). 
20 Ibid 528 (Lord Wilberforce). 
21 Ibid. 
22 R. Eastwood, Strahan's Digest of Equity (6th edn, Butterworth & Co. Ltd 1939); Pilcher v 
Rawlins (n 8) 269 (James LJ). 
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beneficial interest was extinguished.23  Thus, according to Strahan, ‘[I]f the 
legal owner obtains his title in such a way that his conscience is not affected by 
the equitable interest, he is in no way bound by it.’24 It has also been said that 
equity takes away from a purchaser without notice ‘nothing which he has 
honestly acquired.’25  Here, the language of conscience simply tells us that if X 
had applied her moral reasoning to the facts, there would have been nothing to 
suggest to her that anyone else was entitled to the property.  Therefore, there 
was no reason to displace X’s interest in security of receipt as legal owner of 
the property and so B’s title was extinguished.   
 
If X did have notice of B’s equitable interest, the position was different. Here 
the language of conscience was used to emphasise that X had behaved in a 
morally unacceptable manner by accepting a conveyance of property, when 
she had notice of the fact that someone else had an interest in it.  According to 
Maitland, ‘[I]t is unconscientious – “against conscience” – to buy what you 
know to be held on trust for another’.26  If X bought the property with actual 
notice of B’s interest or deliberately refrained from making enquiries, she was 
‘considered to be guilty of fraud or, if one prefers to call it so, unconscionable 
behaviour.’27  Originally, the test for establishing constructive notice turned on 
whether X had wilfully abstained from enquiry so as to avoid finding out about 
B’s interest.28 Although the language of gross or wilful negligence was also in 
use,29 the key question seemed to be whether X was trying to avoid knowledge 
of the true state of the title.30  If so, it was said to be unconscionable for her to 
                                                
23 W. Cornish, An Essay on Uses (J. Butterworth & Son 1826) 17-18; W. Hayes, An 
Introduction to Conveyancing, vol 1 (5th edn, S. Sweet 1840) 42-3. 
24 Eastwood (n 22) 29.  Also J. Strahan and G. Kerrick, A Digest of Equity (London 1905) 21. 
25 Bailey v Barnes [1894] 1 Ch 25 (CA), 34 (Lindley LJ); Taylor v London and County 
Banking Company [1901] 2 Ch 231 (CA), 256 (Stirling LJ). 
26 J. Brunyate, F. Maitland, Equity, a Course of Lectures, (A. Chaytor and W. Whittaker eds, 
Cambridge University Press 1936), 113-114.  See also Story, Commentaries on Equity 
Jurisprudence (W. Grigsby ed, 2nd edn, Stevens & Haynes 1892) 257. 
27 R. Griggs Group Ltd v Evans [2005] Ch 153 (Ch), 166, [47], [48]. 
28 Espin v Pemberton (1859) 3 De G & J 547; 44 ER 1380, [554]/1383 (Lord Chelmsford LC); 
Jones v Smith (1841) 1 Hare 43; 66 ER 943, [55-6]/948-9 (Wigram VC). 
29 Hewitt v Loosemore (1851) 9 Hare 449; 68 ER 586, [458]/590 (Turner VC). 
30 Hunt v Elmes (1860) 2 DF & J 578; 45 ER 75, [586-7]/748 (Turner LJ); Ratcliffe v Barnard 
(1871) LR 6 Ch App 652 (CA), 654 (James LJ); The Agra Bank Ltd v Barry (1874) LR 7 HL 
135 (HL), 157 (Lord Selborne); Bailey v Barnes (n 25) 35 (Lindley LJ). 
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take the property.31  The language of conscience tells us that because X knew 
or deliberately avoided acquiring notice of B’s interest in the property, it was 
not unfair to displace her interest in security of receipt.  Therefore, B’s title 
survived the transfer and took priority over X’s legal title, and from the date of 
purchase, X became liable (in the same way as a volunteer) to return the 
property to B if called upon to do so. 
 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the law changed so that negligence 
would suffice to fix X with constructive notice.32   Since then, the frequency 
with which the language of conscience was used to describe the effect of 
notice has gradually declined.  Despite some initial concerns about the 
appropriateness of importing strict standards of notice that apply in the context 
of property transfers into a commercial context,33 it is now accepted that ‘the 
doctrine of notice lies at the heart of equity.’34  The standard is that of the 
honest and reasonable person.35  The court will ask what X actually knew and 
what further enquiries an honest and reasonable person would have made in 
the circumstances.36  The key is what constitutes commercially acceptable 
conduct in the relevant context.37  If in any particular case, an honest and 
reasonable person would not enquire as to whether T has good title, X is not 
fixed with constructive notice for failing to make such an enquiry and there is 
nothing unconscionable about her receipt of the property.38  Although good 
                                                
31 Kettlewell v Watson (1882) 21 Ch D 685 (Ch), 704-7 (Fry J). 
32 Oliver v Hinton [1899] 2 Ch 264 (CA), 273-4 (Lindley MR); Hudston v Viney [1921] 1 Ch 
98 (Ch), 104 (Eve J); Cf. Section 3 of the Conveyancing Act 1882; Bailey v Barnes (n 25) 
Lindley LJ. 
33 Manchester Trust v Furness [1895] 2 QB 539 (CA), 545 (Lindley LJ); Eagle Trust Plc v 
S.B.C. Securities Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 484 (Ch), 507 (Vinelott J); and Polly Peck International 
Plc v Nadir [1993] BCLC 187 (CA). 
34 Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 (HL), 195-6 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).  
Applied: Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd [1995] AC 74 1014 (Millett J); Sinclair Investments (UK) 
Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd (in administrative receivership) (n 17). 
35 Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (n 34) 1014 (Millett J). 
36 Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd (in administrative 
receivership) (n 17) [100] (Neuberger LJ). 
37 Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC 10 (Ch), [122] (Stephen 
Morris QC). 
38 Such as the sale and purchase of classic cars: Gray v Smith [2013] EWHC 4136 (Comm), 
[139] (Cooke J).  Cf. land transfer, where stricter standards apply: S. Gardner, ‘Knowing 
Assistance and Knowing Receipt: Taking Stock’ (1996) 112 LQR 56, 63. 
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faith is a separate requirement,39 given that X can only establish the absence of 
notice by showing that she had no reason to know about B’s interest because 
an honest and reasonable person would not have discovered it, any distinction 
between lack of notice and good faith has collapsed.40   
 
These days the courts rarely invoke the language of conscience to describe the 
effect of notice on X for the purposes of the bona fide purchaser defence.  
There may be a number of reasons for this.  First, the courts may be reluctant 
to equate a failure to exercise reasonable care with morally unacceptable 
conduct, and thus in their view such behaviour does not attract the epithet 
‘unconscionable’.  Secondly, the language of negligence may simply be more 
apt to describe X’s lack of care when she fails to make the enquiries that she 
ought to have made.  There may also be a third reason.  We know that during 
the nineteenth century the test for constructive notice for the purposes of the 
defence did not extend to a negligent failure to make enquiries: X must have 
deliberately or recklessly avoided learning about B’s interest.   At the same 
time, it seems that the threshold for liability in knowing receipt was notice, 
although if X acquired the property in the ordinary course of business proof of 
fraud or collusion was required.41  Therefore, if X had notice for the purposes 
of the bona fide purchase defence, not only was she unable to claim immunity 
from liability, but she may also have come under an immediate positive 
obligation to return the property in specie to B or hold it for her benefit.  In 
other words, the conditions for liability and obligation may have coincided.  In 
those circumstances, the language of conscience was not out of place, as it 
                                                
39 Midland Bank Trust Company Limited v Green (n 8); Grindal v Hooper 6 December 1999 
(Ch) (J. Jarvis QC);  Re Loftus (n 7). 
40 Midland Bank Trust Company Limited v Green (n 8) 528 (Lord Wilberforce); Sinclair 
Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd (in administrative receivership) (n 17) 
[100] (Neuberger LJ); Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd (n 37) [121] 
(Stephen Morris QC). 
41 Bodenham v Hoskyns (1852) 2 De G M & G 903; 42 ER 1125; Mayor, etc. of Berwick-upon-
Tweed v Murray (1856-1857) 7 De G M & G 496; 44 ER 194; Ernest v Croysdill (1860) 2 De 
GF & J 175; 45 ER 589;  Gray v Lewis (1869) LR 8 Eq 526; Russell v Wakefield Waterworks 
Company (n 1); Blundell v Blundell (1888) 40 Ch D 370 (Ch); Thomson v Clydesdale Bank 
[1893] AC 282 (HL), 290 (Lord Watson);  Bank of New South Wales v Goulburn Valley Butter 
Company Proprietary Ltd [1902] AC 543 (HL).  The cases are discussed in detail by C. 
Harpum, ‘The Stranger as Constructive Trustee’ (1986) 102 LQR 112 , 273, 276, 278, 281-2, 
290; P. Birks, ‘Misdirected Funds: Restitution from the Recipient’ [1989] LMCLQ 296, 318, 
320. 
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pointed to the moral basis of X’s obligation towards B.  By contrast, nowadays 
notice for the purposes of the bona fide purchase defence includes a negligent 
failure to make enquiries, while, as will be seen below, the test for knowing 
receipt probably turns on actual knowledge.  It follows that a purchaser with 
notice may be liable to B in respect of the property from the date of receipt but 
not come under any obligation to return it in specie or hold it for her benefit.   
In other words, as in the case of a volunteer recipient, the threshold conditions 
for liability and obligation are now detached.  On this analysis, the presence or 
absence of notice goes only to the issue of whether X is immune from liability 
in respect of the property.  Here, the only question is whether it is fair to 
displace X’s interest in security of receipt.  We are not concerned about 
whether she must take active steps to comply with certain moral standards.  
For this reason, the language of conscience does not have the same explanatory 
force that it has in relation to X’s obligations. 
 
Finally, it remains to mention that consistently with his view that no trust 
arises unless the recipient of the property is subject to fiduciary obligations in 
respect of it, Lord Browne-Wilkinson42 would characterise B’s right to assert 
her equitable title against X under the equitable proprietary claim as a 
specifically enforceable equitable right only.  Others would describe X as 
holding the property on trust for B from the date she receives it, either under 
the terms of the original express trust or on a resulting trust,43 or alternatively, 
as a constructive trustee.44  In light of the arguments in Chapter 2 and above, 
arguably there is nothing wrong with stating that B holds equitable title under a 
trust, as long as it is accepted that at this stage X is under no obligations at all 
in respect of the property.45    She is merely under a liability to return the 
                                                
42 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (n 6) 707 
(Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Foskett v McKeown (n 2) 108 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
43 Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (n 35) 988-9 (Millett J); Tucker, Le Poidevin and Brightwell, 
Lewin on Trusts (n 2) 1680, [41-50]. 
44 T. Lewin, The Law of Trusts and Trustees (1st edn, A. Maxwell 1837) 611; F. Maitland, 
Equity, also the Forms of Action at Common Law (A. Chaytor and W. Whittaker eds, 
Cambridge University Press 1909) 83-84; Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock and 
Others (No. 3) [1968] 1 WLR 1555 (Ch), 1582-3 (Ungoed-Thomas J); Boscawen v Bajwa (n 
6) 334-5 (Millett J); Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd (n 9) [80], [84] 
(Lloyd LJ). 
45 Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd (n 9) [81]-[84] (Lloyd LJ). 
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property to B when called upon to do so.   Ultimately, the language of 
conscience plays no necessary explanatory role in relation to X’s liability as 
volunteer or purchaser.  However, as will be seen below it does have a positive 
(albeit) limited explanatory role to play in the context of X’s obligations to B. 
CONSCIENCE AND KNOWING RECEIPT 
 
If, by the time B discovers that T has transferred trust property to X in breach 
of trust and calls upon X to return it, X has already used the property for her 
own benefit, spent it or transferred it to someone else, she is clearly unable to 
comply with B’s demand.  Nevertheless, if B can prove that X took the 
property with sufficient knowledge that it was traceable to a breach of trust46 
(or subsequently acquired that knowledge while the property was in her 
hands)47 and then disposed of it on her own account, X may be compelled to 
restore the value of the trust property out of her own pocket.   Arguably, here 
the language of conscience has a positive explanatory role to play.   It reminds 
us that relief for knowing receipt is based on X’s breach of a pre-existing 
moral obligation.  It will only be reasonable to treat her as having been subject 
to such an obligation if she was in a position, through the application of her 
moral reasoning (which requires both moral understanding and factual 
knowledge), to identify and comply with what morality required of her in the 
circumstances.  However, as elsewhere, beyond this, the language of 
conscience tells us little.  Of itself, it cannot identify the moral principles 
underpinning the doctrine or the content of the obligation to which X is 
subject, nor does it tell us what or how much she must know in order for it to 
be reasonable to treat her as bound by that obligation.  
Conscience and the Test for Liability 
 
It is said that in cases of knowing receipt ‘equity is concerned with [X]’s 
knowledge of equitable interests because it is concerned with fastening upon 
                                                
46 El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Plc [1994] 1 BCLC 464 (CA), 478 (Hoffmann LJ). 
47 Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson (n 10) 291 (Millett J). 
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the conscience of the person with that knowledge’.48 X is said to be a 
constructive trustee and thus, the fundamental question for the purposes of 
establishing liability is said to be ‘whether the conscience of the recipient is 
bound in such a way as to justify equity in imposing a trust on him’49 or 
whether ‘his conscience became … sufficiently affected for it to be right to 
treat him as bound by obligations in equity giving rise to an in personam claim 
against him as recipient to account for the money which came into his hands’.50  
 
The modern statement of the test for liability is that stated by Nourse LJ in 
BCCI v Akindele,51 i.e. whether X’s state of knowledge is ‘such as to make it 
unconscionable for him to retain the benefit of the receipt’ of the trust 
property.52  Despite having been criticised as too vague and uncertain to be 
helpful,53 the Akindele test has been widely applied.54  It tells us that equity will 
treat X as being under an obligation to restore the value of the property to B if 
her conscience is affected by such knowledge as makes it unconscionable for 
her to retain the benefit of the property.  However, the language of 
unconscionability does not tell us what or how much X must know before she 
will be subject to such an obligation.  Moreover, to say that it is 
unconscionable for X to retain the benefit of the receipt means nothing more 
than that it would be contrary to what good conscience - i.e., moral reason - 
requires for X to retain the benefit of receipt.  The language of 
                                                
48 Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock and Others (No. 3) (n 44) 1583, 1615 
(Ungoed-Thomas J). 
49 Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts (n 11) 277 (Megarry VC). 
50 Relfo v Varsani [2012] EWHC 2168 (Ch), [78] (Sales J). 
51 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele [1991] 1 Ch 437 
(CA). 
52 Ibid 455 (Nourse LJ).   
53 P. Birks, ‘Receipt’ in P. Birks and A. Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart 2002) 226.  Cf. S. 
Barkehall-Thomas, ‘Goodbye Knowing Receipt: Hello Unconscientious Receipt’ (2001) 21 
OJLS 239, who suggests economic analysis can add certainty; R. Walker, ‘Dishonesty and 
Unconscionable Conduct in Commercial Life - Some Reflections on Accessory Liability and 
Knowing Receipt’ [2005] Syd LR 187; R. Walker, ‘Fraud, Fault and Fiduciary Duty’ (2006) 
10 JGL Rev 139. 
54 Papamichael v National Westminster Bank Plc [2003] EWHC 164 (Comm), [2003] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 341; Ali v Al-Basri [2004] EWHC 2608 (QB); Charter plc v City Index Ltd [2007] 
EWCA Civ 1382, [2008] Ch 313; Uzinterimpex J.S.C. v Standard Bank Plc [2008] EWCA Civ 
819, [2008] Bus LR 1762; The Law Society of England and Wales v Habitable Concepts Ltd 
[2010] EWHC 1449 (Ch); Relfo v Varsani (n 50); Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington 
Networks Ltd (n 37); Arthur v Attorney General of Turks and Caicos [2012] UKPC 30, [33] 
(Etherton LJ). 
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unconscionability does not help us to identify any particular moral principle or 
basis for liability for knowing receipt.  All it says is that there is such a basis. 
Conscience and What X Must Know 
 
What must X know in order to come under an obligation to restore the value of 
the property to B?  The idea of conscience itself tells us nothing about this.  It 
seems that she must know ‘that the assets [s]he received are traceable to a 
breach of fiduciary duty’55 or that she knows the property ‘was trust property’56 
or ‘was transferred in breach of trust’.57  This test will be satisfied where, e.g.: 
X receives money from T and knows the money represents the proceeds of 
fraud;58 the court finds it highly probable that T explained to X that T was 
using money ‘diverted without legitimate reason’ from B to pay X;59 X knows 
that the source of funds used by her husband, T to buy property for her was 
money ‘entrusted by [B] to [T] and not lent to him’;60 or X did not have actual 
knowledge of the fraud or that the property was stolen but was ‘actually aware 
that there was a possibility that [T] did not have title to, or authority to sell’ the 
property.61   Conversely, it will not be satisfied where: X was not ‘at any time 
conscious of the fact that he was not entitled to receive the [trust assets] and 
deal with them as beneficial owner’;62 nor where X received a payment from 
BCCI in respect of the sale of shares at a time when ‘no one outside BCCI had 
reason to doubt the integrity of its management’ and X ‘had no knowledge of 
the underlying frauds within the BCCI group’ but saw the payment simply ‘as 
an arm’s length business transaction’.63   
 
All the examples referred to above suggest that the key to X’s personal liability 
is knowledge that, at the time T transferred the property to her, someone other 
                                                
55 El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Plc (n 46) 478 (Hoffmann LJ); applied by Nourse LJ in 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele (n 51) 448. 
56 Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts (n 11) 276 (Megarry VC). 
57 Arthur v Attorney General of Turks and Caicos (n 54) [31] (Etherton LJ). 
58 El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Plc (n 46) 472 (Nourse LJ). 
59 Relfo v Varsani (n 50) [81], [82] (Sales J). 
60 Ali v Al-Basri (n 54) [194] (Tugendhat J). 
61 Armstrong DLW GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd (n 37) [278] (Stephen Norris QC). 
62 Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts (n 11) 275 (Megarry VC). 
63 Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele (n 51) 456-7 (Nourse 
LJ). 
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than T was entitled to enjoy the benefit of it and the transfer was made without 
that other person’s authority.  This tells us something about the reason or 
ground for X’s obligation to make good the value of the property to B.  It 
suggests that X should not retain for her own benefit property to which 
someone else is entitled.  However, there may be different reasons why X 
should not retain the property and these are explored in a little more detail 
below. 
Conscience and the Moral Principles Underpinning Knowing Receipt  
 
The language of unconscionability tells us that it would be morally 
unacceptable for X to keep the property but it does not tell us why.  The fact 
that X must know that someone other than T (i.e. B) was entitled to enjoy the 
benefit of the property and the transfer was made without B’s authority 
suggests she ought not to retain property to which she knows B is entitled, but 
there may be different reasons for this.    We might say the fact that B did not 
consent to its transfer to T means that it would be morally unacceptable for T 
to keep it. Equally, we might say that T ought not to interfere with other 
people’s property rights and if she does, it is morally unacceptable for her to 
keep the property.  Finally, we might say that it is morally unacceptable for X 
to keep the property because once she receives it with knowledge that someone 
else has an interest in it, she comes under an immediate obligation to return it 
in specie to B and preserve it pending its return.    
 
These three possibilities are reflected in the arguments about the true rationale 
of the doctrine of knowing receipt.64  At one point it was suggested that X’s 
personal obligation arose to reverse B’s unjust enrichment and therefore the 
need for B to prove fault should be abolished, leaving X to rely on the change 
of position defence65 (‘the unjust enrichment rationale’).  Subsequently, this 
                                                
64 R. Havelock, ‘The Transformation of Knowing Receipt’ (2014) 22 RLR 1, 2-4. 
65 Birks, ‘Misdirected Funds: Restitution from the Recipient’ (n 41); P. Birks, ‘Persistent 
Problems in Misdirected Money: a Quintet’ [1993] LMCLQ 218, 225; Millett, ‘Proprietary 
Restitution’ (n 2) 311-2; El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc [1993] 3 All ER 717 (Ch), 716 
(Millett J); Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, [2002] 2 AC 164, 194, [105] (Lord 
Millett); Criterion Properties plc v Stratford UK Properties LLC [2004] UKHL 28, [2004] 1 
WLR 1846, 1848, [4] (Lord Nicholls, Lord Walker concurring). 
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argument changed and it was contended that B should be entitled to assert a 
strict liability unjust enrichment claim against X in addition to the claim in 
knowing receipt, which should be subsumed within the wrong-based 
participatory liability of knowing assistance.66  The suggestion that it is time 
for such a change has not been universally accepted.67   There are at least two 
good reasons for this.  First, equitable rights are less extensive than and derive 
from legal property rights; their scope corresponds to the extent to which B is 
owed management obligations by T.68  Second, equitable property interests are 
often less visible than legal property interests, such that it would be harsh to 
hold X strictly liable to give up the property or make good its loss in every 
case.69  
 
It has also been suggested that once X acquires knowledge of B’s entitlement 
to the property, equity treats X as subject to obligations which mirror the core 
obligations of T70 (‘the trustee rationale’).  Indeed, it is argued that X really is a 
trustee because at the date of knowledge she comes under a trustee’s custodial 
obligation to account for the property in specie.  This means she must return it 
if she still has it (and preserve it pending restoration71), failing which she must 
restore its value to the trust.72  In other words, X’s ‘authority to deal with the 
property is made subject to the same limits as [T’s] authority’ and X really is 
                                                
66 Birks, ‘Receipt’ (n 53) 223-225; Birks, Unjust Enrichment (n 5) 156-8; D. Nicholls, 
‘Knowing Receipt: the Need for a New Landmark’ in W. Cornish (ed), Restitution: Past, 
Present and Future (1998) 245; Walker, ‘Fraud, Fault and Fiduciary Duty’ (n 53); T. Akkouh 
and S.  Worthington, ‘Re Diplock’ in C. Mitchell and P. Mitchell (eds), Landmark Cases in the 
Law of Restitution (Hart 2006) 297-301; J. Edelman, ‘Marsh v Keating (1834)’ in C. Mitchell 
and P. Mitchell (eds), Landmark Cases in the Law of  Restitution (Hart 2006) 119; D. Hayton, 
P. Matthews and C. Mitchell, Underhill & Hayton, Law of Trusts and Trustees (17th edn, 
LexisNexis Butterworths 2006) 1198-9; J. Dietrich and P. Ridge, ‘'The Receipt of What?': 
Questions Concerning Third Party Recipient Liability in Equity and Unjust Enrichment’ 
(2007) 31 MULR 47, 85-86; A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press 
2010) 424-431. 
67 D. Sheehan, ‘Disentangling Equitable Personal Liability’ (2008) 16 RLR 41; K. Low, 
‘Recipient Liability in Equity: Resisting the Siren's Lure’ (2008) 16 RLR 96; C. Mitchell and 
S. Watterson, ‘Remedies for Knowing Receipt’ in C. Mitchell (ed), Constructive and Resulting 
Trusts (Hart Publishing 2010) 136-7.   
68 S. Worthington, Equity (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2006) 186. 
69 L. Smith, ‘Unjust Enrichment, Property and the Structure of Trusts’ (2000) 116 LQR 412, 
430-441. 
70 Harpum (n 41), 267; M. Bryan, ‘The Liability of the Recipient: Restitution at Common Law 
or Wrongdoing in Equity?’ in S. Degeling and J. Edelman (eds), Equity in Commercial Law 
(Thomson 2005) 330-333. 
71 Robb Evans of Robb Evans & Associates v European Bank Ltd (2004) 61 NSWLR 75. 
72 Mitchell and Watterson (n 67) 135-6, 138-140. 
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subject to the custodial duties of a trustee.73  This analysis has judicial 
support.74  In Arthur v Attorney General of the Turks and Caicos Islands75 the 
Privy Council accepted the argument that X’s personal liability as a knowing 
recipient ‘means the recipient is subject to custodial duties which are the same 
as those voluntarily assumed by express trustees … The recipient’s core duty is 
to restore the misapplied trust property.’76 
 
A third view is that knowing receipt is a species of equitable wrongdoing77 and 
it has been described as ‘equity’s analogue to the common law’s claim in 
conversion’78 (‘the wrongdoing rationale’).  This analysis seems to have found 
favour with the Supreme Court in the recent case of Williams v Central Bank 
of Nigeria.79  The question arose whether a claim for knowing receipt was 
subject to the usual six-year limitation period or - on the basis that a knowing 
recipient was in fact a constructive trustee who had been a privy to fraud - no 
limitation period at all.  The Supreme Court rejected the argument that a 
knowing recipient is in fact a trustee and held that the six-year limitation 
period applied.  According to Lord Sumption JSC, X never holds property as a 
trustee as she only becomes accountable for it when she parts with it.80  
Furthermore, in his view: 
 
The essence of a liability to account on the footing of knowing receipt 
is that the defendant has accepted trust assets knowing that they were 
transferred to him in breach of trust and that he had no right to receive 
                                                
73 C. Mitchell, ‘Stewardship of Property and Liability to Account’ [2014] Conv 215, 221. 
74 Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd (n 9) [82] (Patten LJ). 
75 Arthur v Attorney General of Turks and Caicos (n 54). 
76 Ibid [37] (Etherton LJ), citing Mitchell and Watterson, ‘Remedies for Knowing Receipt’ (n 
67). 
77 M. Dixon, ‘Knowing Receipt,  Constructive Trusts and Registered Title’ [2012] Conv 439, 
442-443; N. Hopkins, ‘Recipient Liability in the Privy Council: Arthur v Attorney General of 
the Turks and Caicos Islands’ [2013] Conv 61, 67.  Cf. M. Conaglen and A. Goymour, 
‘Knowing Receipt and Registered Land’ in C. Mitchell (ed), Constructive and Resulting Trusts 
(Hart Publishing 2010) 174, 177 (who argue that the knowing receipt claim involves 
wrongdoing but is ‘parasitic’ upon the equitable proprietary claim); P. Finn, ‘The Liability of 
Third Parties for Knowing Receipt or Assistance’ in D. Waters (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and 
Trusts (Carswell 1993) (arguing that knowing receipt and assistance should be unified under a 
doctrine of participation in a breach of trust); and W. Swadling, ‘The Fiction of the 
Constructive Trust’ (2011) 64 CLP 399 (arguing that all constructive trusts are fictional). 
78 L. Smith, ‘W(h)ither Knowing Receipt?’ (1998) 114 LQR 394. 
79 Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10, [2014] AC 1189. 
80 Ibid 1206, [26] (Lord Sumption JSC), citing Paragon Finance Plc v D.B. Thakerar & Co (A 
Firm) [1998] EWCA Civ 1249, [1999] 1 All ER 400 (CA), 412 (Millett LJ). 
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them.  His possession is therefore at all times wrongful and adverse to 
the rights of both the true trustees and the beneficiaries.  No trust has 
been reposed in him.  He does not have the powers or duties of a 
trustee, for example with regard to investment or management.  His 
sole obligation of any practical significance is to restore the assets 
immediately.81 
 
Lord Sumption accepted that a knowing recipient may be accountable for 
profits made82 or losses avoided had the property remained with the original 
trustee, and a proprietary claim might be available in some circumstances, but 
in his view this was ‘simply the measure of the remedy’ and did not make the 
defendant a trustee.83  
 
For a number of reasons, it seems preferable to conclude X is in fact a 
constructive trustee if she receives property to which B has equitable title and 
while she has it, acquires knowledge that someone other than T (i.e. B) was 
entitled to enjoy the benefit of it and the transfer was made without that other 
person’s authority.   First, the arguments in Chapter 2 suggest that in these 
circumstances X comes under an immediate moral obligation to return the 
property to B or hold it for her benefit, which equity will underwrite.  This 
does not mean she is subject to the managerial and fiduciary84 obligations of a 
trustee, but it is difficult to resist the conclusion that she is subject to the 
custodial obligations,85 at least to the extent necessary to make sure the 
property – or its value if X disposes of it while she has knowledge – is returned 
intact to B.  This approach is consistent with Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s 
                                                
81 Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria (n 79) 1208, [31] (Lord Sumption JSC); 1217, [90] 
(Lord Neuberger JSC). 
82 Crown Dilmun v Sutton [2004] EWHC 52, [2004] 1 BCLC 468; Bank of China v Kwong Wa 
Po [2005] HKCFI 422; Charter plc v City Index Ltd (n 54); A. Goymour, ‘A Contribution to 
Knowing Receipt Liability’ (2008) 16 RLR 113. 
83 Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria (n 79) 1208, [31] (Lord Sumption JSC). 
84 Views are divided as to whether a knowing recipient is a fiduciary: see Bank of China v 
Kwong Wa Po (n 82) [1587], [1588]; and Walker, ‘Dishonesty and Unconscionable Conduct in 
Commercial Life - Some Reflections on Accessory Liability and Knowing Receipt’ (n 53) 202 
(suggesting knowing recipients may well owe fiduciary duties).  Cf.  S. Worthington, ‘The 
Proprietary Consequences of Rescission’ (2002) 10 RLR 28, 62 (argues it is merely a personal 
duty to compensate).  The better view may be that X’s duties are primarily custodial: C. Webb 
and T. Akkouh, Trusts Law (3rd edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 267; Mitchell, ‘Stewardship 
of Property and Liability to Account’ (n 73) 221; also Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk [2014] 
EWCA Civ 908, [2015] 2 WLR 526, 547, [68] (Longmore LJ). 
85 S. Watterson, ‘Limitation of Actions, Dishonest Assistance and Knowing Receipt’ (2014) 73 
CLJ 253, 256. 
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approach in Westdeutsche.86  The implication from his judgment is that if the 
local authority had had knowledge of the fact that the contract was void at a 
time when it still had the bank’s money, a non-express trust would have 
arisen.87  Secondly, Lord Sumption’s suggestion that T may only be subject to 
trust obligations if trust has been reposed in her or she is subject to investment 
and management obligations tends to suggest that T may only be a trustee 
where there is an express trust.  This cannot be right.  As Watterson suggests, 
its effect would be to undermine ‘the well-established categorisations of many 
trusts that are imposed by operation of law.’88  Thirdly, the Supreme Court’s 
analysis fails entirely to address the fact that X’s liability is contingent on the 
extent to which she is already susceptible to B’s equitable proprietary claim: 
the knowing receipt claim cannot arise if X received the property as a bona 
fide purchaser for value.89   In any case, for the reasons given above, the 
language of unconscionability does not help us choose between the rationales 
and can be used consistently with all of them. 
Conscience and the Standard of Knowledge 
 
The idea of conscience itself does not dictate the standard of knowledge 
required before X will be obliged to restore the value of the property to B; 
however, it does remind us that in essence this is a moral question.    As argued 
in Chapter 2, on Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s analysis we might say that if the 
only reason X does not know what she ought (morally) to do with the property 
(i.e. give it back to B or hold it for her benefit) is that she carelessly failed to 
acquire knowledge which she ought to have acquired, it is not unreasonable to 
treat her as bound by that obligation.  On the other hand, we might say that 
because these are onerous obligations, X must actually know the facts (or at 
least not deliberately or recklessly fail to discover them).  For this reason it is 
                                                
86 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (n 6); also  
Conyngham v Conyngham (1750) 1 Ves Sen 522; 27 ER 1181 (express trust). 
87 B. McFarlane, ‘Trusts and Knowledge: Lessons from Australia’ in J. Glister and P. Ridge 
(eds), Fault Lines in Equity (Hart Publishing 2012) 173. 
88 Watterson (n 85). 
89 McGhee QC, Snell’s Equity (n 3) 795, [30-071]. 
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not right to say, as has been suggested,90 that the language of conscience 
mandates a standard of actual knowledge.  
 
Originally, the courts were prepared to accept that X could be personally liable 
for knowing receipt if B could prove that her state of mind came within any of 
the five Baden91 categories of knowledge.  In Selangor v Cradock92 Ungoed-
Thomas J concluded that the knowledge required to hold a stranger liable as a 
constructive trustee93 was ‘knowledge of circumstances which would indicate 
to an honest, reasonable man that such a design was being committed or would 
put him on inquiry, which the stranger failed to make, whether it was being 
committed’.94  A number of subsequent cases adopted the same approach.95  
Thus, it was held that where X receives the trust property ‘with knowledge 
(actual or constructive) of the breach, he cannot conscientiously retain those 
funds against [B] unless he has some better equity.  He becomes a constructive 
trustee for [B] of the misapplied funds.’96  Broadly, the same approach is taken 
throughout the Commonwealth,97 although in Australia it seems that liability 
turns on the first four Baden categories only.98  On this analysis, X’s 
                                                
90 E.g. Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd (1975) 132 CLR 373 (HCA), 410-
11 (Stephen J); Baden v Société Générale Pour Favouriser Le Développement Du Commerce 
Et De L'Industrie En France S.A. [1993] 1 WLR 509 (Ch), 576 (Peter Gibson J); Re Montagu's 
Settlement Trusts (n 11) 285 (Megarry VC); Havelock (n 64) 15. 
91 Baden v Société Générale Pour Favouriser Le Développement Du Commerce Et De 
L'Industrie En France S.A. (n 90) 575-6 (Peter Gibson J). 
92 Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock and Others (No. 3) (n 44); applied, Karak 
Rubber Co. Ltd v Burden (No. 2) [1972] 1 WLR 602 (Ch), 633 (Brightman J). 
93 The case concerned allegations of knowing assistance and knowing receipt but at the time 
there was a unified test of liability for both claims. 
94 Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock and Others (No. 3) (n 44) 1590 (Ungoed-
Thomas J). 
95 Baden v Société Générale Pour Favouriser Le Développement Du Commerce Et De 
L'Industrie En France S.A. (n 90) 582 (Peter Gibson J); International Sales & Agencies Ltd v 
Marcus [1982] 3 All ER 551 (QB) 558 (Lawson J); Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd v 
British Steel Corporation [1986] Ch 246 (CA), 298 (Slade LJ), 307 (Browne-Wilkinson LJ); 
Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1991] Ch 547 (CA), 567 (Fox LJ); Eagle Trust Plc v S.B.C. 
Securities Ltd (n 33) (Vinelott J) (probably Baden categories (i)-(iv) only); El Ajou v Dollar 
Land Holdings plc (n 65) 739 (Millett J). 
96 Belmont Finance Corporation v Williams Furniture Limited (No. 2) [1979] Ch 250 (CA), 
405 (Buckley LJ). 
97 Citadel General Assurance Co v Lloyds Bank Canada [1997] 3 SCR 805 (SCC), [48] (La 
Forest J); Gold v Rosenberg [1997] 3 SCR 767 (SCC), [46] (Iacobucci J); Westpac Banking 
Corporation v Savin [1985] 2 NZLR 41, 52-3 (Richardson J); Equiticorp Industries Group Ltd 
v Hawkins [1991] 3 NZLR 700 (NZHC); Marshall Futures Ltd v Marshall [1992] 1 NZLR 
317 (NZHC), 324-6 (Tipping J) (obiter); Springfield Acres Ltd (In Liquidation) v Abacus 
(Hong Kong) Ltd [1994] 3 NZLR 502 (NZHC), 510 (Henry J).  
98 Dietrich and Ridge (n 66) 61.  
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conscience may be affected if she knows or has reason to know that the 
property was traceable to a breach of trust.  This test seems similar to the test 
for notice for the purposes of the bona fide purchase defence.99  
 
Recent authority supports the view that all five Baden categories can render the 
receipt of trust property unconscionable,100 but the preponderance of higher-
level authority101 now seems to favour a test based on the first three categories 
only.  In Arthur v Attorney General of Turks and Caicos102 Etherton LJ 
emphasised the difference between notice of equitable interests and knowledge 
for the purposes of knowing receipt because it ‘reflects the difference between 
a proprietary remedy and the imposition of personal duties as a constructive 
trustee.’103  He held that knowing receipt is ‘not merely absence of notice but 
unconscionable conduct amounting to equitable fraud.  It is a classical example 
of lack of bona fides’.104  In his view it constituted equitable fraud, ‘that is to 
say somewhere between mere notice (including constructive and imputed 
notice), on the one hand, and dishonesty, on the other hand.’105 In light of the 
above, we can say that in the eyes of equity, X’s conscience will be affected 
for the purposes of knowing receipt if she is consciously aware that someone 
                                                
99 It has been argued that category 5 is not the same as constructive notice: Agip (Africa) Ltd v 
Jackson (n 10) 293 (Millett J); Cowan de Groot Properties Ltd v Eagle Trust plc [1991] BCLC 
1045 (Ch), 1112 (Knox J); Eagle Trust Plc v S.B.C. Securities Ltd (n 33), 492 (Vinelott J); 
Gardner (n 38) 57-58; R. Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (Oxford University Press 2003) 
253; P. Creighton and E. Bant, ‘Recipient Liability in Western Australia’ (2000) 29 UWAL 
Rev 205, 208.  This interpretation reflects a perceived difference between inferred and imputed 
knowledge, as described by J. Chan, ‘Dishonesty and Knowledge’ (2001) 31 HKLJ 283, 288, 
289.  However, the two seem very similar: Baden v Société Générale Pour Favouriser Le 
Développement Du Commerce Et De L'Industrie En France S.A. (n 90) 582-3, 587 (Peter 
Gibson J). In El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc (n 65) 717 Millett J acknowledged that there 
was room for a doctrine analogous to constructive notice in the strict conveyancing sense to 
operate ‘in a situation in which any honest and reasonable man would have made inquiry.’ 
100 The Law Society of England and Wales v Habitable Concepts Ltd (n 54); Armstrong DLW 
GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd (n 37).  The remarks of Lloyd LJ in Independent Trustee 
Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd (n 9) [76], [81] also tend to support this view. 
101 AG v Corporation of Leicester (1844) 7 Beav 176; 49 ER 1031 (actual knowledge on the 
facts and boundaries of knowing receipt and assistance blurred); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert 
Smith & Co [1969] 1 Ch 276 (CA); Competitive Insurance Co. Ltd v Davies Investments 
[1975] 1 WLR 1240 (Ch); Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts (n 11); Cowan de Groot Properties 
Ltd v Eagle Trust plc (n 99); Polly Peck International Plc v Nadir (n 33); Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd v Akindele (n 51) 452, 455 (Nourse LJ); Ali v Al-Basri 
(n 54); Crown Dilmun v Sutton (n 82); Dyson Technology Ltd v Curtis [2010] EWHC 3289 
(Ch). 
102 Arthur v Attorney General of Turks and Caicos (n 54). 
103 Ibid [36] (Etherton LJ). 
104 Ibid [40]. 
105 Ibid [41]. 
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other than T was entitled to the property at the time it was transferred to her 
and it was transferred to her without that person’s authority, or she has 
deliberately or recklessly avoided acquiring that knowledge.   
Conscience – Doctrinal Function 
 
The explanatory force of conscience within the doctrine of knowing receipt 
depends upon the doctrine’s rationale.  On the unjust enrichment rationale, B’s 
lack of consent or intention to benefit X is the reason for relief.  Any 
unconscionability arises ex post.106 It tells us nothing about why relief is 
granted and has no explanatory force at all.   The position is different in 
relation to the wrongdoing and the trustee rationales:  here, arguably, the 
language of conscience does have some limited explanatory force.  On the 
wrongdoing rationale, relief depends on the breach by X of a pre-existing 
obligation not to interfere with B’s equitable proprietary rights.  On the trustee 
rationale, relief depends on X being subject to the core custodial obligation of 
a trustee to account for the property in specie, which requires her to restore its 
value if she cannot restore the property itself.   In both cases the language of 
conscience can remind us that in granting relief equity is underwriting and 
enforcing moral obligations.  We know it is unreasonable to treat X as subject 
to the relevant obligation unless she has knowledge of the relevant facts 
because only then will she be able to determine, through the process of moral 
reasoning, what she ought to do in the circumstances.  Therefore, the language 
of conscience tells us that X’s factual knowledge is relevant not simply for its 
own sake but because it facilitates the process of moral reasoning, absent 
which the obligation will not be recognised or enforced.   
 
In light of the above, it seems right that the knowledge threshold for knowing 
receipt should be higher than the standard of notice applied in the equitable 
proprietary claim, irrespective of whether the wrongdoing or the trustee 
rationale applies.  If B’s equitable title survives the transfer, X comes under a 
liability to return the property to her if required.   This liability does not depend 
                                                
106 P. Birks and N. Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in J. Beatson and D. Friedmann 
(eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Oxford University Press 1995) 60. 
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on a pre-existing moral obligation owed by X to B, so there is no sense in 
which X is being required to take steps to comply with certain moral standards.  
The position is very different in the case of knowing receipt.  By ordering X to 
put her hand in her pocket to make good the value of the property, equity is 
compelling X to comply with a pre-existing moral obligation.  Therefore, a 
standard of actual knowledge seems justified.107  Ultimately, however, the 
language of conscience plays a very limited function in knowing receipt.  
Beyond reminding us that equity is underwriting moral obligations (and hence 
why X’s knowledge is important), it tells us nothing at all. 
CONSCIENCE AND DISHONEST ASSISTANCE 
 
The courts use the language of dishonesty rather than unconscionability to 
explain X’s liability for assisting in a breach of trust.   However, as a label, 
dishonesty seems to face the same problems as unconscionability.  In addition, 
the requisite mental element for the purposes of dishonesty seems to be the 
same as that which renders the retention of the property ‘unconscionable’ for 
the purposes of knowing receipt, so the labels appear to be interchangeable.108  
Moreover, it cannot be said that the idea of conscience is irrelevant to 
dishonest assistance.  To the extent that dishonest assistance constitutes an 
equitable wrong, equity may be said to be underwriting a pre-existing moral 
obligation to which X is subject, i.e. not to interfere with a fiduciary 
relationship.109   The language of conscience reminds us that it is unreasonable 
to expect X to comply with such an obligation in the absence of factual 
knowledge because only then can X, through the process of moral reasoning, 
determine what she ought or ought not to do in the circumstances.  
 
 
  
                                                
107 Cf. Havelock (n 64) 15. 
108 Cf. Lord Neuberger JSC’s reference to ‘dishonest’ receipt in Williams v Central Bank of 
Nigeria (n 79) 1215, [64]. 
109 P. Ridge, ‘Justifying the Remedies for Dishonest Assistance ’ (2008) 124 LQR 445, 450. 
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Dishonesty and the Test for Liability 
 
If X assists T in committing a breach of trust, she is liable to account for any 
loss caused to the trust fund110 and must disgorge any profits which she herself 
has made as a result of her participation in the breach of duty.111  For the 
purposes of establishing assistance, all that is required is that X’s actions or 
omissions must have been of more than minimal importance to T and must not 
have hampered T in the breach of her duty.112  X may be found to have assisted 
T (and may be liable to account for profits she makes from the breach113) even 
if she does not receive any misapplied trust property.114  Therefore, the subject 
matter of T’s breach of duty is irrelevant115 and the measure of X’s liability 
need not duplicate that of T.116    
 
Originally, X’s liability for (what was then) knowing assistance depended on 
whether she knew or had reason to know (in the sense of Baden categories 1-5) 
that she was assisting in a breach of trust.117  If X knew all the circumstances 
‘from which the honest and reasonable man would have knowledge of the 
facts’ then it was ‘little short of common sense’ that she should be treated as 
                                                
110 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v Tan [1994] UKPC 4, [1995] 2 AC 378 (PC); Twinsectra 
Ltd v Yardley (n 65); Abou-Rahmah v Abacha [2006] EWCA Civ 1492, [2007] Bus LR 220. 
111 Fyffes Group Ltd v Templeman [2000] 2 Lloyd's Rep 643, 672 (Toulson J); Bank of China v 
Kwong Wa Po (n 82) [1589]-[1601] (Lewison J); OJSC Oil Company Yugraneft v Abramovic 
[2008] EWHC 2613 (Comm), [382] (Christopher Clarke J);  Fiona Trust & Holding 
Corporation v Privalov [2010] EWHC 3199 (Comm), [62]-[67] (Andrew Smith J); Novoship 
(UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk  (n 84), [87]-[93] (Longmore LJ). 
112 Baden v Société Générale Pour Favouriser Le Développement Du Commerce Et De 
L'Industrie En France S.A. (n 90) 574-5 (Peter Gibson J); C. Mitchell, ‘Assistance’ in P. Birks 
and A. Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart Publishing 2002) 172. 
113 Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk (n 84). 
114 Eaves v Hickson (1861) 30 Beav 136; 54 ER 840; Barnes v Addy (1874) LR Ch App 244 
(CA); Midgley v Midgley [1893] 3 Ch 282 (CA); Warman v Dwyer [1995] HCA 18, (1995) 
182 CLR 544; Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v Tan (n 110), 382 (Lord Nicholls); Houghton 
v Fayers [2000] 1 BCLC 511 (CA), 517 (Nourse LJ); Goose v Wilson & Sandford (a Firm) 
[2000] EWCA Civ 73, [86]-[88] (Morritt LJ). Also: Harpum (n 41) 142; S. Elliott and C. 
Mitchell, ‘Remedies for Dishonest Assistance’ (2004) 67 MLR 16, 21. 
115 Fyffes Group Ltd v Templeman (n 111); JD Wetherspoon PLC v Van de Berg [2009] 
EWHC 239 (Ch), [511]-[520] (Peter Smith J); Starglade Properties Ltd v Nash [2010] EWCA 
Civ 1314, [2011] 1 P & CR DG17; Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov (n 111) 
[61] (Andrew Smith J); Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk (n 84). 
116 Ridge (n 109).  Cf. Elliott and Mitchell (n 114).  Different rules of causation apply to profits 
made by X from those applicable to T: Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk (n 84).  It also seems 
unlikely that X should be liable for T’s profits, although she is liable to compensate B for all 
losses: Bank of China v Kwong Wa Po (n 82) [1598]-[1600] (Lewison J). 
117 Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock and Others (No. 3) (n 44); Karak Rubber 
Co. Ltd v Burden (No. 2) (n 92). 
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having knowledge of the facts.118  Occasionally, the courts used the language of 
conscience in assistance cases, e.g. to describe the fact that ‘equity is 
concerned with [X]’s knowledge of equitable interests because it is concerned 
with fastening upon the conscience of the person with that knowledge’119 or 
that X’s conduct in assisting a breach of trust was ‘unconscionable’.120  Thus, it 
was held that a constructive trust was imposed for knowing assistance on a 
stranger who becomes ‘bound in good faith and in conscience by the trust in 
consequence of his conduct and behaviour’.121  Subsequently, the courts 
increased the knowledge threshold to conscious, deliberately or recklessly 
avoided knowledge (Baden categories 1-3) on the basis that dishonesty or lack 
of probity was key.122 
 
In Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd v Tan,123 Lord Nicholls expressly chose 
dishonesty124 as the touchstone for X’s liability and re-named the doctrine 
‘dishonest assistance’.  He held that B was entitled to expect ‘that third parties 
                                                
118 Baden v Société Générale Pour Favouriser Le Développement Du Commerce Et De 
L'Industrie En France S.A. (n 90) 582 (Peter Gibson J). 
119 Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock and Others (No. 3) (n 44) 1583 (Ungoed-
Thomas J). 
120 Karak Rubber Co. Ltd v Burden (No. 2) (n 92) 633 (Brightman J).  Also Powell v 
Thompson [1991] NZLR 597 (NZHC), 613 (Thomas J), noted K. McDonald, ‘Case Note, 
Powell v Thompson’ (1988-1991) [6] Auckland U L Rev 615; Nimmo v Westpac Banking 
Corporation [1993] 3 NZLR 218. 
121 Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd (n 90) 409 (Stephen J). 
122 Belmont Finance Corporation v Williams Furniture Limited (No. 2) (n 96) 405-406 
(Buckley LJ), 407 (Goff LJ); Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson (n 10) 292 (Millett J).  The Court of 
Appeal in Agip (n 95) 567 (Fox LJ), held that all five Baden categories of knowledge were 
relevant in principle to liability for knowing assistance.  However, Millett J’s approach was 
adopted in Cowan de Groot Properties Ltd v Eagle Trust plc (n 99) 1103 (Vinelott J); Eagle 
Trust Plc v S.B.C. Securities Ltd (n 33) 496 (Vinelott J); Polly Peck International Plc v Nadir 
(n 33) 203-204 (Scott LJ).   The Commonwealth authorities also broadly support this view:  
see e.g. Gold v Rosenberg (n 97) [33] (Iacobucci J); Citadel General Assurance Co v Lloyds 
Bank Canada (n 97), [21]-[22], (La Forest J); Consul Development Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty 
Ltd (n 90), [33] (Stephen J).  The law in New Zealand on this point has been described as 
unsettled: Springfield Acres Ltd (In Liquidation) v Abacus (Hong Kong) Ltd (n 97) 510 (Henry 
J). 
123 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v Tan (n 110). 
124 The dishonesty test has been subsequently applied at all levels: HR v JAPT [1997] EWHC 
Ch 371, [1997] OPLR 123; Jyske Bank (Gibraltar) Ltd v Spjeldnaes [1999] EWCA Civ 2018, 
[1999] Lloyd's Rep Bank 511; Al-Sabah v Grupo Torras SA [2000] EWCA Civ 273, [2001] 
CLC 221; Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley (n 65); Bank of China v Kwong Wa Po (n 82); Barlow 
Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust Ltd [2005] UKPC 37, [2006] 1 WLR 1476; Abou-
Rahmah v Abacha (n 110); AG Zambia v Meer Care & Desai (a firm) [2007] EWHC 952 (Ch). 
On the need for a high standard for liability: W. Blair, ‘Secondary Liability of Financial 
Institutions for the Fraud of Third Parties’ (2000) 30 HKLJ 74, 84; and P. Birks, ‘The Burden 
on the Bank’ in F. Rose (ed), Restitution and Banking Law (Mansfield Press 1998) 90. 
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will refrain from intentionally intruding in the trustee-beneficiary 
relationship’.125  He concluded that if X were strictly liable for unknowingly 
interfering, everyday business would be impossible.  He jettisoned the term 
‘knowing assistance’ because in his view determining fault by reference to the 
Baden categories of knowledge was difficult.126  He also expressly rejected 
unconscionability as too uncertain a standard for liability: 
 
It must be recognised … that unconscionable is not a word in everyday use by 
non-lawyers.  If it is to be used in this context, and if it is to be the touchstone 
for liability as an accessory, it is essential to be clear on what, in this context, 
unconscionable means.  If unconscionable means no more than dishonesty, 
then dishonesty is the preferable label.  If unconscionable means something 
different, it must be said that it is not clear what that something different is.  
Either way, therefore, the term is better avoided in this context.127 
 
According to Lord Nicholls, dishonest conduct (like unconscionable conduct) 
has ‘a strong subjective element in that it is a description of a type of conduct 
assessed in the light of what a person actually knew at the time, as distinct 
from what a reasonable person would have known or appreciated.’128 His 
Lordship went on to emphasise that dishonesty ‘is an objective standard … 
The standard of what constitutes honest conduct is not subjective.  Honesty is 
not an optional scale, with higher or lower values according to the moral 
standards of each individual … The individual is expected to attain the 
standard, which would be observed by an honest person placed in those 
circumstances’.129  
Unconscionability and Dishonesty Compared 
 
The explanatory force of dishonesty seems to be limited in the same way that 
the explanatory force of unconscionability is limited.  Of itself, it does not tell 
us what X must know in order to be liable for dishonest assistance nor does it 
tell us what moral principles underpin the doctrine.  The authorities suggest 
that X need not know specifically that she is assisting in a breach of trust or 
                                                
125 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v Tan (n 110) 387 (Lord Nicholls). 
126 Ibid 391. 
127 Ibid 392. 
128 Ibid 389. 
129 Ibid 389, 390. 
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even what a trust is.  Rather, X needs to know that T does not have the right to 
do what she is doing.  For example, if T misappropriates trust property and 
invests it for herself, X need only know that T did not have the authority to do 
so.130   In other words, she must know that the assets are not at T’s free disposal 
and that she is helping T to deal with the assets in an unauthorised fashion.131  
Similarly, it is dishonest for X to continue to enter into transactions with T in 
circumstances where X knew she was the beneficiary of the corrupt payment 
of bribes by T in breach of T’s duty to her principal.132  This suggests more 
broadly that X must know that she is helping T to breach some sort of duty or 
obligation, which T owes to another.   
 
The fact that T must know that she is helping T to breach some duty or 
obligation owed to another suggests that the relevant moral principle is that we 
should respect and not interfere with obligations owed by others to others.  It 
has been argued that the rationale for the doctrine is based on the need to deter 
third parties from helping trustees and fiduciaries to exploit the vulnerability of 
B133 and compensating B for any harm done,134 thus limiting fiduciaries’ ability 
to do wrong135 and safeguarding the trust relationship.136  However, arguably 
the broader moral principle at stake is that referred to above.  This view finds 
support in judicial assertions that X’s liability in dishonest assistance is the 
equitable counterpart of the economic tort of inducing breach of contract.137  In 
order to be liable for inducing breach of contract, X would have to know138 that 
she was inducing T to breach her contract with B and nevertheless intend to 
                                                
130 Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust Ltd (n 124) 1483-1484, [28] (Lord 
Hoffmann). 
131 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley (n 65) 202, [135]-[137] (Lord Millett). 
132 Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk (n 84) 544-5, [57]-[59] (Longmore LJ). 
133 The vulnerability of the principal in a fiduciary relationship is emphasized by H. Dagan, 
‘Restitution and Relationships’ Tel Aviv University Law Faculty Papers, 2011, Working Paper 
127, 3. 
134 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v Tan (n 110), 386-387 (Lord Nicholls). 
135 Ridge (n 109) 446, 467. 
136 M. Clapton, ‘Gain-Based Remedies for Knowing Assistance: Ensuring Assistants do not 
Profit from their Wrongs’ (2008) 45 Alta L Rev 989. 
137 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v Tan (n 110) 387 (Lord Nicholls); Twinsectra Ltd v 
Yardley (n 65) 200-1, [127], [131] (Lord Millett). 
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Industrial Plastics v Ferguson [1940] 1 All ER 479 (HL); Emerald Construction Co Ltd v 
Lowthian [1966] 1 WLR 701 (CA), 701 (Lord Denning MR); Meretz Investments NV v ACP 
Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1303, [2008] Ch 244, 275, [114] (Arden LJ). 
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bring about the breach.139  Even though the remedies and defences differ140 and 
the economic tort focuses on ‘procurement and targeted harm’, whereas ‘the 
keys to liability [in dishonest assistance] are facilitation and dishonesty’,141 the 
aim of both doctrines is to prevent X from interfering in the relationship 
between B and T142 and making herself party to a breach of duty owed by T to 
B.143  Therefore, it seems right to say that X ‘has committed an equitable 
wrong’144 by breaching a pre-existing obligation or duty not to interfere in the 
relationship between T and B.     
 
Furthermore, the language of dishonesty has caused some confusion as to 
whether X must simply have factual knowledge in order to be liable as a 
dishonest assistant or whether she must also understand that by reference to the 
objective standard of morality, her conduct is dishonest.  According to Lord 
Nicholls, actual knowledge of the relevant facts is required.145  However, in 
Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley146 the majority seemed to require proof that X also 
understood her behaviour was dishonest.  X, a solicitor had released money to 
his client, T knowing that: (i) T had allowed another solicitor acting on his 
behalf to give an undertaking to B that the money be used only for a specific 
purpose; and (ii) that T was going to use it for another purpose.  The majority 
held that T’s agreement with B that the money be used only for a specific 
purpose gave rise to a Quistclose trust, so that the use of the money for another 
purpose constituted a breach of trust by T.  However, despite X’s knowledge 
                                                
139 Glamorgan Coal Company Ltd v South West Miners' Federation [1903] 2 KB 556 (CA); 
OBG Limited v Allan, Douglas v Hello! Limited [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1, 20, [8], 30, 
[43] (Lord Hoffmann). 
140 R. Stevens, Torts and Rights (OUP 2007) 275-77 and N. McBride and R. Bagshaw, Tort 
Law (3rd edn, Pearson Education Ltd 2008) 418-9. 
141 H. Carty, An Analysis of the Economic Torts (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2010) 317; 
P. Ridge, ‘Participatory Liability for Breach of Trust or Fiduciary Duty’ in J. Glister and P. 
Ridge (eds), Fault Lines in Equity (Hart Publishing 2012) (on the need to distinguish between 
inducement and participation for the purposes of dishonest assistance). 
142 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v Tan (n 110) 387 (Lord Nicholls). 
143 P. Sales, ‘The Tort of Conspiracy and Civil Secondary Liability’ (1990) 49 CLJ 491, 503-4, 
513; L. Hoffmann, ‘The Redundancy of Knowing Assistance’ in P. Birks (ed), The Frontiers 
of Liability, vol 1 (Oxford University Press 1994) 28; D. Stilitz and P. Sales, ‘Intentional 
Infliction of Harm by Unlawful Means’ (1999) 115 LQR 411, 433; H. Carty, ‘Joint 
Tortfeasance and Assistance Liability’ (1999) 19 LS 489, 514;  P. Davies, ‘Accessory Liability 
for Assisting Torts’ (2011) 70 CLJ 353, 369.  
144 Novoship (UK) Ltd v Mikhaylyuk (n 84) 558, [107] (Longmore LJ).   
145 Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v Tan (n 110) 389 (Lord Nicholls). 
146 Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley (n 65). 
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of the facts, he was not held liable for dishonest assistance.  Lord Hoffmann 
held that the idea of dishonesty outlined by Lord Nicholls in Tan required ‘a 
dishonest state of mind, that is to say, consciousness that one is transgressing 
ordinary standards of honest behaviour.’147   According to Lord Hutton, in 
order to find X dishonest, ‘it must be established that [his] conduct was 
dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and dishonest people and 
that he himself realised that by those standards his conduct was dishonest.’148  
Therefore, on the analysis of the majority, the idea of dishonesty required X to 
know that T was breaching the undertaking and understand that ordinary 
people would view her conduct in assisting T to do this as dishonest.  Lord 
Millett dissented on the basis that it was dishonest for X consciously to release 
the money to T in the knowledge that it would be used inconsistently with the 
undertaking without there being any need for him to appreciate that he was 
thereby acting dishonestly.  He held that to introduce a requirement of 
‘subjective’ dishonesty would introduce an unnecessary and unjustified 
distinction between dishonest assistance and inducing breach of contract.149 
 
In Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust Ltd150 the Privy Council 
reinterpreted the majority decision in Twinsectra as imposing an objective 
standard of dishonesty.  X had strongly suspected that monies going through 
his hands into T’s personal accounts were monies received from T’s clients 
who thought they were giving him money to invest on their behalf in a gilt-
edged securities investment scheme.  Lord Hoffmann, giving the judgment of 
the court, held that X consciously decided not to make enquiries because he 
preferred not to run the risk of discovering the truth and found that by ordinary 
standards such a state of mind was dishonest.  It did not matter that A saw 
nothing wrong in what he was doing because he held an exaggerated notion of 
the need to provide dutiful service to his clients, nor would it have mattered if 
A was unaware that by ordinary standards his conduct would be regarded as 
dishonest.  
                                                
147 Ibid 170, [20] (Lord Hoffmann). 
148 Ibid 171-2, [27]-[28], 173, [31], 174, [34]-[35], 175, [36] (Lord Hutton). 
149 Ibid 200-1, [126]-[132] ( Lord Millett). 
150 Barlow Clowes International Ltd v Eurotrust Ltd (n 124). 
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Lord Hoffmann re-characterised Lord Hutton’s judgment in Twinsectra as 
meaning ‘only that [X]’s knowledge of the transaction had to be such as to 
render his participation contrary to normally acceptable standards of honest 
conduct.  It did not require that he should have had reflections about what 
those normally acceptable standards were’.151  Of his own judgment in 
Twinsectra, he held that it was intended to require only ‘consciousness of those 
elements in the transaction which make participation transgress ordinary 
standards of honest behaviour.  It did not also require [X] to have thought 
about what those standards were.’152 Despite Lord Hoffmann’s avowedly 
objective approach to dishonesty the language in his judgment indicated a 
readiness to infer moral understanding from factual knowledge.  For example 
he adopted the trial judge’s finding that a dishonest state of mind on the part of 
X ‘may consist in knowledge that the transaction is one in which he cannot 
honestly participate (for example, a misappropriation of other people’s 
money), or it may consist in suspicion combined with a conscious decision not 
to make inquiries which might result in knowledge.’153  This has the potential 
to cause confusion insofar as it might suggest that moral understanding must 
be proved in addition to factual knowledge.   
 
Although Barlow Clowes has been interpreted as mandating an objective test 
for dishonesty,154 there still seems to be a residue of doubt as to the relevance 
of X’s moral understanding.  For example, in Abou-Rahmah v Abacha155 Pill 
LJ held that the question whether subjective dishonesty was necessary had no 
bearing on the outcome of the appeal but went on to remark that if viewed 
objectively, X’s conduct fell below normally acceptable standards ‘it can 
readily be inferred that he knew it did, so that his conduct would have 
                                                
151 Ibid 1481, [16] (Lord Hoffmann). 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid 1480-1, [10]. 
154 Abou-Rahmah v Abacha (n 110) 237-8 (Arden LJ), noted, N. Kiri, ‘Dishonest Assistance: 
The Latest Perspective from the Court of Appeal’ (2007) 22 JIBLR 305; AG Zambia v Meer 
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amounted to dishonest assistance.’156  Rix LJ analysed the elements of 
dishonest assistance as requiring proof of knowledge on X’s part, the fact that 
given that knowledge, X breaches generally acceptable standards of honest 
conduct and ‘possibly, that [X] must in some sense be dishonest himself (a 
subjective test of dishonesty which might, on analysis, add little or nothing to 
knowledge of the facts which, objectively, would make his conduct 
dishonest).’157   
 
Subsequently in Starglade Properties Ltd v Nash158 the Court of Appeal 
referred to the fact that X’s conduct in removing assets from an insolvent 
company of which he was a director to frustrate the claim of a particular 
creditor was at variance with the ordinary standards of commercial behaviour 
and a person in X’s position could not have thought otherwise.159   In light of 
the above, it may be better to take up Lord Millett’s suggestion that we re-
adopt the label of ‘knowing’ assistance, assuming that, in accordance with 
Barlow Clowes, only factual knowledge is required.160   In any event, as the 
law stands, the mental element required to prove dishonesty seems to be very 
similar to that required to establish knowing receipt  (actual knowledge in the 
sense required in Baden categories 1-3), which suggests that the labels of 
dishonesty and unconscionbability are interchangeable.  Moreover, for the 
reasons given above, they are of equally limited explanatory value.   
 
Finally, if it is right to say that dishonest assistance is an equitable wrong, then 
the language of conscience does in fact have a limited role to play in the 
context of dishonest assistance.  It reminds us that relief turns on the breach of 
a pre-existing moral obligation by X.  In order for it to be reasonable to require 
X not to interfere with the fiduciary relationship between T and B, X must 
know that T’s authority to do what she is doing is in some way limited by 
reference to a relationship with another.  If she knows this, then through the 
                                                
156 Ibid 247, [90] (Pill LJ). 
157 Ibid 224, [16] (Rix LJ). 
158 Starglade Properties Ltd v Nash (n 115). 
159 Ibid [39] (Morritt C), [44] (Leveson LJ). 
160 Cf. Webb and Akkouh (n 84) 364, who suggest that if it is thought necessary to excuse 
from liability those who assist a trustee in a justifiable breach of trust, then the test for liability 
could be reframed in terms of intention. 
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operation of her conscience, she can determine what she ought to do, i.e. not 
take steps to assist T to exceed the limits of that authority. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The language of conscience tells us little if anything about why B’s equitable 
title survives the transfer of the property to X.  If X is a volunteer, from the 
date she receives the property she is liable to return it in specie if B demands it, 
but she comes under no obligations in respect of it absent knowledge.  If X is a 
purchaser, she is in the same position unless she can prove that she received 
the property without notice of B’s interest.  Notice is relevant not because it 
triggers an immediate moral obligation on X’s part to return the property to B 
but rather because it makes it fair to displace X’s interest as a purchaser in 
security of receipt and subject her to the same liability as a volunteer.   Again, 
it is only when X acquires knowledge of B’s entitlement that she becomes 
obliged to restore the property in specie or, failing that, account to B for its 
value.  By contrast, the language of conscience does tell us something about 
X’s obligations towards B, whether they relate to the property itself or the 
relationship between B and T.  However, even then, its function is very 
limited.  It simply reminds us that it is unreasonable to treat X as subject to any 
obligation before she acquires knowledge of the relevant facts.  This is because 
equitable obligations are rooted in moral obligations and X can only identify 
and comply with what morality requires of her through the process of moral 
reasoning; for this she requires factual knowledge.  Beyond this, it tells us 
nothing. 
 
The invocation of unconscionability as a standard in knowing receipt, without 
due regard to the explanatory limits of the language of conscience, is 
problematic.  It cannot help us to identify the doctrine’s rationale and in fact 
may be used consistently with several different rationales.  Similarly, it may 
point to the moral nature of the obligations owed by the defendant, but it 
cannot give content to them.  It may help us to understand why the defendant’s 
knowledge is relevant but it cannot tell us what or how much she must know.  
Worse still, not only does it fail to help us answer these important questions, it 
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can often obscure the fact that they need answering in the first place.  
Arguably, the invocation of dishonesty as the standard for relief for assisting a 
breach of trust faces similar problems.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONSCIENCE, MISTAKE AND 
MISREPRESENTATION 
INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter analyses the meaning and function of conscience in the 
contractual doctrines of common and unilateral mistake1 and 
misrepresentation. Historically, claims for relief for mistake were first heard in 
equity and it was said to be ‘against conscience for a man to take advantage of 
the plain mistake of another, or, at least, that a court of Equity will not assist 
him in doing so.’2   The courts were concerned with the ‘morality of founding 
an agreement upon mistake’.3  Over time, a parallel doctrine of mistake 
developed at common law,4 which was based on the idea of consensus rather 
than conscience and this is now dominant: if the mistake was sufficient to 
destroy consensus, the contract is void.5   Nevertheless, the courts continued to 
use the language of conscience and unconscionability when explaining why 
equity would rescind a contract for common mistake or rescind or rectify a 
contract for unilateral mistake.  Recently, in The Great Peace,6 the Court of 
Appeal held that there was no room for overlapping doctrines of contractual 
mistake at common law and in equity.  This has been taken to mean that 
                                                
1 Mistake as to identity is not considered, as the leading judicial explanations of this doctrine 
do not make reference to conscience: Cundy v Lindsay (1878) 3 App Cas 459 (HL); Shogun 
Finance Limited v Hudson [2003] UKHL 62, [2004] 1 AC 919; C. Macmillan, ‘Rogues, 
Swindlers and Cheats: The Development of Mistake of Identity in English Contract Law’ 
(2005) 64 CLJ 711.  Similarly, the refusal of specific performance for unilateral mistake is not 
considered because although there are early examples of the use of the language of 
unconscionability (e.g. Manser v Back (1848) 6 Hare 443; 67 ER 1239, [448]/1241 (Wigram 
VC); Burrow v Scammell (1881) 19 Ch D 175, 182 (Bacon VC), it was superseded by the 
language of hardship and unreasonableness: Tamplin v James (1880) 15 Ch D 215, 221 (James 
LJ); Preston v Luck (1884) 27 Ch D 497, 506 (Cotton LJ); Stewart v Kennedy (1890) 15 App 
Cas 75, 105 (Lord Macnaghten). 
2 Manser v Back (n 1) [448]/1241(Wigram VC); C. Macmillan, Mistakes in Contract Law 
(Hart 2010) 38. 
3 Macmillan, Mistakes in Contract Law (n 2) 45. 
4 Ibid 133, 179. 
5 Smith v Hughes (1870-71) LR 6 QB 597, 607 (Blackburn J); Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd [1932] 
AC 161 (HL), 217 (Lord Atkin); C. Macmillan, ‘How Temptation Led to Mistake: An 
Explanation of Bell v Lever Bros Ltd’ (2003) 119 LQR 625; Associated Japanese Bank 
(International) Ltd v Crédit du Nord SA [1989] 1 WLR 255, 264, 268 (Steyn J). 
6 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1407, 
[2003] QB 679. 
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equitable rescission for common and unilateral mistake is no longer available 
in equity.7  Nevertheless, these doctrines are considered here for two reasons.  
First, the use of the language of conscience within them tells us something 
about its role in rescission more generally.  Secondly, The Great Peace has 
been the subject of academic criticism and, although it seems likely that the 
common law and equitable doctrines cover the same ground so as to render the 
equitable doctrine superfluous, the Supreme Court has not yet had the 
opportunity to consider and rule on the question definitively. 
 
The chapter argues that where the language of conscience and 
unconscionability has been used in the context of mistake, it bears its ordinary 
meaning: the courts are making judgments about whether the defendant’s 
behaviour or particular outcomes are or would be morally acceptable. The 
chapter argues further that although the language of conscience and 
unconscionability alerts us to the fact that the principle underpinning rescission 
or rectification is a moral one, of itself the idea of conscience cannot identify 
that principle.  Moreover, in principle, the language of conscience and 
unconscionability has no real explanatory role where the claimant seeks to 
rescind a contract for mistake.  In such cases, the defendant’s knowledge of the 
mistake is relevant but, crucially, only for the purpose of telling us whether it 
is fair to disable her from enforcing the contract.  This does not depend on the 
breach of a pre-existing moral obligation8 and therefore the language of 
conscience does not add anything to our understanding of why the contract 
may be rescinded.   By contrast, where the claimant seeks to rectify the 
contract, the language of conscience does have an explanatory function.  As in 
the case of trustee obligations and knowing receipt, it reminds us that it is 
unreasonable to treat the defendant as coming under an obligation (to abide by 
the claimant’s interpretation of the contract) unless she knows that she has a 
(moral) reason to do so.  Finally, the chapter explains that there are good 
reasons why the language of conscience is largely absent from the doctrine of 
misrepresentation.  
                                                
7 E.g. J. McGhee QC (ed) Snell's Equity (33rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014), 407, [15-006]. 
8 Cf. S. Smith, ‘A Duty to Make Restitution’ (2013) 26 Canadian Law and Jurisprudence 157, 
179. 
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CONSCIENCE AND COMMON MISTAKE  
 
The courts have used the language of unconscientiousness to describe the fact 
that in the eyes of equity it is morally unacceptable for one party to seek to 
enforce a contract based on a common (i.e. shared) mistake, once that mistake 
has come to light.  However, beyond this, the idea of conscience has no 
explanatory function in equitable rescission for common mistake.  
Conscience - Meaning 
 
In Solle v Butcher9 Denning LJ invoked the language of conscience to explain 
the basis on which a contract would be rescinded in equity for common 
mistake.  The defendant landlord sought to resist a claim for overpaid rent and 
counterclaimed to rescind a lease entered into under a common mistake that 
the rent control legislation did not apply to it.  Both parties had mistakenly 
believed that ‘the rent [the landlord] could charge was not tied down to a 
controlled rent’.10  The Court of Appeal therefore rejected the claim for the 
overpaid rent but was prepared to grant rescission on terms that the claimant 
was allowed to continue in occupation of the property at the controlled rent.  
Denning LJ cited authority to the effect that the court ‘had power to set aside 
the contract whenever it was of opinion that it was “unconscientious” for the 
other party to avail himself of the legal advantage which he had obtained: 
Torrance v Bolton per James LJ.’11  In his view, rescission was available for 
common mistake ‘if the parties were under a common misapprehension either 
as to facts or as to their respective or relative rights, provided that the 
misapprehension was fundamental and the party seeking to set it aside was not 
himself at fault’.12   
 
Because common mistake depends on both parties being mistaken, the 
language of unconscientiousness cannot be taken to refer to any shabby 
conduct by the defendant at the time the contract was formed.  Thus, in Solle, 
                                                
9 Solle v Butcher [1950] 1 KB 671 (CA).   
10 Ibid 691-2 (Denning LJ) 
11 Ibid 692. 
12 Ibid 693.  
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although Denning LJ referred to the fact that the tenant had been responsible 
for the mistake, the Court held there was no misrepresentation on the facts13 
and Denning LJ found it unnecessary to decide the point14 because the shared 
mistake was enough.  Spooner v British Telecommunications plc15 also 
supports this view.  BT and the members of its pension scheme both 
mistakenly assumed that the offer by BT of new pension benefits to the 
members would improve their pension rights.  On the basis of this mistaken 
assumption the members elected to move to the new scheme.   Jonathan Parker 
J held that there was no impropriety or bad faith on the part of BT or the 
trustees of the pension scheme.  However, the circumstances were such ‘as to 
render it unconscionable for BT or the trustees to insist that the elections in 
question should stand’.16  The members were therefore entitled to rescind their 
elections and continue to participate in the original scheme.  Therefore, in 
common mistake cases the language of unconscientiousness only really points 
to the fact that the court considers it (morally) unacceptable for the defendant 
to enforce and retain the benefit of the contract17 once the mistake has come to 
light. 
Conscience – Function 
 
The idea of conscience plays no explanatory role in the doctrine of common 
mistake.  Here, it is useful to distinguish between the ideas of 
unconscientiousness ex ante or ‘unconscientiousness in acquisition’18 and 
‘unconscientiousness ex post’.19  The idea of unconscientiousness ex ante 
points to unconscionable conduct by the defendant at the time the contract was 
entered into and therefore may potentially tell us something about the cause of 
action.  The idea of unconscientiousness ex post captures references to it being 
                                                
13 Ibid 687 (Bucknill LJ), 703 (Jenkins LJ).   
14 Ibid 695 (Denning LJ). 
15 Spooner v British Telecommunications Plc 1999 WL 1953275 (ChD). 
16 Ibid [9.3.10] (Parker J). 
17 Torrance v Bolton (1872) LR 8 Ch 118, 124 (James LJ); Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] 
AC 932 (HL), 955 (Viscount Haldane LC). 
18 N. Chin, ‘Relieving against Forfeiture: Windfalls and Conscience’ (1995) 25 Western 
Australia Law Review 110, 111. 
19 P. Birks and N. Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in J. Beatson and D. Friedmann 
(eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Oxford University Press 1995) 60. 
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unconscionable for the defendant to enforce the contract once the cause of 
action has been established; it is ‘no more than an inference from the plaintiff’s 
right to recover’.20  It is clear from cases such as Solle and Spooner that any 
unconscientiousness in common mistake cases arises ex post and has no 
explanatory force beyond indicating that the court regards it as morally 
unacceptable for the defendant to enforce the contract. 
 
Of themselves, the ideas of conscience and unconscientiousness cannot tell us 
why it would be morally unacceptable for the defendant to enforce the contract: 
to understand this, we need to interrogate the principles that underpin relief for 
common mistake, and the key seems to be a lack of consensus or the fact that 
the consensus the parties have reached does not cover the facts as they are.  In 
Solle itself the Court of Appeal focused on the seriousness of the mistake.  Had 
the lease been upheld, the landlord would have had to let the flat at a 
substantial undervalue for the remaining four years of a seven year term, 
something he would never have agreed to do had he not been mistaken.  Later 
authorities also focused on the fundamentality of the mistake.21  It has therefore 
been suggested that any perceived unconscientiousness in Solle was ‘rooted 
only in the consequences of the bargain’,22 i.e. because it would have had a 
harsh impact on the landlord. ‘[O]nce the other party knows of the mistake and 
its effect, for him to seek to enforce the bargain with its resulting disparity of 
values would be unconscionable.’23  Arguably, the seriousness of the mistake 
and its impact on the claimant provide evidence which goes to the issue of 
consensus: the graver the mistake, the easier it is to infer that the parties’ 
agreement did not factor in this eventuality.  Thus, for example, in Magee v 
Pennine Insurance Co Ltd24 Lord Denning MR that held an agreement to settle 
an insurance claim ought to be set aside because it would not be fair to hold the 
insurance company to an agreement ‘they would not have dreamt of making if 
                                                
20 Ibid. 
21 William Sindall Plc v Cambridgeshire County Council [1994] 1 WLR 1016 (CA) 1042 
(Evans LJ); West Sussex Properties Ltd v Chichester District Council [2000] All ER (D) 887 
(CA). 
22 J. Cartwright, ‘Solle v Butcher and the Doctrine of Mistake in Contract’ (1987) 103 LQR 
594, 621. 
23 H. Fuller, ‘Mistake and Error in the Law of Contracts’ (1984) 33 Emory LJ 41, 78.  
24 Magee v Pennine Insurance Co. Ltd [1969] 2 QB 507 (CA). 
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they had not been under a mistake’ that Mr Magee had a valid insurance 
policy.25  
 
The authorities on rectification for common mistake26 also support the view 
that consensus is the key issue: the contract will be rectified where the 
contractual instrument does not accurately reflect the parties’ true agreement.27  
The origins of the remedy of rectification are said to ‘lie in conscience and fair 
dealing’28 but all the idea of conscience signifies is that it is wrong for the 
defendant to seek to uphold the contract despite the absence of true agreement.  
Thus, it has been held that ‘the type of unconscientiousness that is prevented 
by the availability of the equity to rectify a written contract is that which would 
occur if a party to the contract sought the benefit of those legal rights he would 
have if the document contained the agreement that the parties had made, when 
the doctrine does not accurately state the common intention that the parties 
had’.29   A common mistake renders a contract void at common law for the 
same reason.30  On this analysis, the objective standard requires both parties to 
honour their agreement, as long as it is the product of consensus.  However, if 
both parties are so badly mistaken that their consensus does not cover the facts 
as they are, then the law will not enforce those obligations.  The idea of 
conscience adds nothing to this conclusion other than to remind us that it 
                                                
25 Ibid 515 (Lord Denning MR), 518 (Fenton-Atkinson LJ). 
26 Originally rectification was granted only for common mistake: Bradford v Romney (1862) 
30 Beav 431; 54 ER 956, [438]/ 959; Sells v Sells (1860) 1 Dr & Sm 42; 62 ER 294, [45-46]/ 
295 (Kindersley VC); Fowler v Fowler (1859) 4 De G & J 250; 45 ER 97. 
27 Joscelyne v Nissen [1970] 2 QB 86 (CA); Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] 1 
AC 1101, noted, D. McLauchlan, ‘Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd - Commonsense 
Principles of Interpretation and Rectification’ (2010) 126 LQR 8; applied, Daventry District 
Council v Daventry & District Housing Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1153.  On the debate as to 
whether the test should be based on the parties’ intentions, subjectively or objectively 
interpreted: M. Smith, ‘Rectification of Contracts for Common Mistake, Joscelyne v Nissen, 
and Subjective States of Mind’ (2007) 123 LQR 116 (arguing for the objective approach).  Cf. 
D. McLauchlan, ‘The 'Drastic' Remedy of Rectification for Unilateral Mistake’ (2008) 124 
LQR 608; McGhee QC, Snell’s Equity (n 7) 425-6, [16-015]; P. Davies, ‘Rectifying the 
Course of Rectification’ (2012) 75 MLR 412, 420-1; C. Nugee QC, ‘Rectification after 
Chartbrook v Persimmon: Where Are We Now?’ (2012) 26 TLI 76 (preferring the subjective 
approach). 
28 Daventry District Council v Daventry & District Housing Ltd (n 27) 1380, [194] (Lord 
Neuberger MR). 
29 Ryledar Pty Ltd v Euphoric Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 65, [310] (Campbell JA); McLauchlan, 
‘The 'Drastic' Remedy of Rectification for Unilateral Mistake’ (n 27) 609; Nugee QC (n 27) 
79. 
30 Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd (n 5) 217 (Lord Atkin); Associated Japanese Bank (International) 
Ltd v Crédit du Nord SA (n 5) 264, 268 (Steyn J). 
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would be morally unacceptable if the defendant were to be allowed to enforce 
the contract31 despite the problem with the consensus.   
 
In any case, appeals to conscience for the purposes of common mistake are 
likely to be much rarer after The Great Peace.32 The Court of Appeal held that 
Solle was inconsistent with earlier authority,33 which established that a 
sufficiently serious common mistake destroys the parties’ consensus so as to 
render a contract void at common law34 rather than voidable.  Relief at 
common law and in equity depended on the seriousness of the mistake, so the 
doctrines overlapped completely and the fact that the contract was void at 
common law meant that the equitable doctrine was otiose.35  According to Lord 
Phillips MR, ‘it is axiomatic that there is no room for rescission in equity of a 
contract which is void.’36 
 
The decision in The Great Peace has been criticised for taking a very 
restrictive view of the circumstances in which the mistake will be serious 
enough to render the contract void, and instead Capper has argued for a new 
test for common mistake based on the idea of unconscionability.  According to 
the Court of Appeal it is only where the parties’ mistaken common assumption 
is so fundamental that ‘performance of the contractual adventure’ is 
impossible37 and the basis for their consensus is effectively destroyed, so as to 
render the contract void.  This reflects the view that the common law prefers to 
hold parties to what they have agreed if they have agreed terms and the 
                                                
31  If the contract is void, the claimant may recover any benefits received by the defendant 
through the law of unjust enrichment: A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution (Oxford University 
Press 2010) 387-8. 
32 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd (n 6) 725, [157], 726, 
[160] (Lord Phillips MR). Noted, J. Cartwright, ‘Common Mistake in Common Law and 
Equity’ (2002) 118 LQR 196. 
33 Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd (n 5) 218 (Lord Atkin); applied, Associated Japanese Bank 
(International) Ltd v Crédit du Nord SA (n 5), 268 (Steyn J). 
34 As had been suggested by P. Atiyah and F. Bennison, ‘Mistake in the Construction of 
Contracts’ (1961) 24 MLR 241, 442. 
35 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd (n 6) 709, [96] (Lord 
Phillips MR). 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid 703, [76]. 
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bargaining process itself has been fair.38   However, this test has been widely 
criticised,39 particularly because of its remedial inflexibility.40  Capper argues 
that a common mistake may undermine the parties’ shared assumption of 
mutual gain under the contract in such a serious way that ‘it would be 
unconscionable to uphold the contract’.41  He suggests that ‘[T]o this extent 
unconscionability can be seen as the grounding principle of relief against all 
contracts vitiated at inception.’42  ‘The way forward … is to focus less on the 
fundamentality of the mistake and more on the unconscionability of the 
advantage gained by the party seeking to uphold the contract and on the 
allocation of risk between the parties.’43  According to Capper’s test, a contract 
would be voidable rather than void for common mistake.  Relief would depend 
on whether the risk of the mistake had been allocated by the contract,44 the 
mistake was ‘fundamental or really serious’45 and ‘enforcing the contract 
would be unconscionable, and in this regard the inequality of the exchange is 
particularly important’.46  
 
The suitability of the idea of unconscionability as the basis of an alternative 
test for common mistake is doubtful.  The idea of unconscionability is neither 
                                                
38 Bell v Lever Brothers Ltd (n 5), 226 (Lord Atkin); cited with approval in Great Peace 
Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd 2001 WL 1251948; High Court of Justice 
Queens Bench Division, 9 November 2001, [115], [122] (Toulson J); S. Worthington, Equity 
(2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2006) 207; M. Eisenberg, ‘The Role of Fault in Contract 
Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake and 
Nonperformance’ (2009) 107 MichLRev 1412, 1415-1416. 
39 S. Midwinter, ‘The Great Peace and Precedent’ (2003) 119 LQR 180 questions the 
correctness of the departure from Solle as a matter of precedent.  As to the doubtful weight of 
Bell v Lever Bros as authority for the doctrine of common mistake: Macmillan, ‘How 
Temptation Led to Mistake: An Explanation of Bell v Lever Bros Ltd’ (n 5) 658; Macmillan, 
Mistakes in Contract Law (n 2) 259-378, 315.   
40 A. Phang, ‘Controversy in Common Mistake’ [2003] Conv 247, 252, 253; A. Chandler, J. 
Devenney and J. Poole, ‘Common Mistake, Theoretical Justification and Remedial 
Inflexibility’ [2004] JBL 34, 35, 56, 57.    Cf. C. Hare, ‘Inequitable Mistake’ (2003) 62 CLJ 
29, in which it is argued that greater remedial flexibility could be provided through legislative 
reform.  As to the flexibility of the equitable doctrine: C. Grunfeld, ‘A Study in the 
Relationship Between Common Law and Equity in Contractual Mistake’ (1952) 15 MLR 296, 
319; R. Blackburn, ‘The Equitable Approach to Mistake in Contract’ (1955) 7 Res Jud 43, 50-
51; A. Phang, ‘Common Mistake in English Law: The Proposed Merger of Common Law and 
Equity’ (1989) 9 LS 291, 303; D. Capper, ‘Reconfiguring Mistakes in Contract Formation’ in 
M. Bryan (ed), Private Law in Theory and Practice (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 129. 
41 Capper (n 40) 120. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid 136. 
44 Ibid 143. 
45 Ibid 142. 
46 Ibid 143. 
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a principle nor a standard in its own right.  All it can do is denote the fact that 
in the eyes of equity it would be contrary to the objective standard of morality 
were the defendant to be allowed to enforce the contract; of itself, it cannot tell 
us why or, as importantly, when this is the case.  Therefore, it cannot help us to 
choose between the approach of the Court of Appeal in The Great Peace and 
Capper’s alternative; it is capable of describing either approach as an 
embodiment of the objective standard.   If the courts are to be persuaded to 
adopt a different approach from that set out in The Great Peace, then direct 
argument is required as to what principles the law on common mistake should 
embody.  The idea of unconscionability itself cannot provide answers to these 
questions and an appeal to it is no substitute for the hard analysis required. 
CONSCIENCE AND UNILATERAL MISTAKE  
 
The courts use the language of conscience and unconscionability in unilateral 
mistake in two ways.  First, they use it to describe the fact that if at the time 
the contract is being formed the defendant knows the claimant is mistaken, she 
ought not accept her consent to the contract.  Secondly, they use it to indicate 
that in light of the claimant’s mistaken consent, the defendant ought not seek 
to enforce the contract against her at a later stage.  The language of conscience 
does not add anything to our understanding of the reasons why a contract may 
be rescinded for unilateral mistake.  By contrast, in the case of rectification the 
language of conscience has a positive (albeit limited) explanatory function in 
that it reminds us that the defendant comes under an obligation to adhere to the 
claimant’s interpretation of the contract if she knows she has moral reason to 
do so.  
Conscience – Meaning 
Rescission 
 
Equity will not rescind a contract for unilateral mistake simply because the 
claimant was mistaken.  Even though the claimant’s consent may have been 
impaired by the mistake, the defendant will only be disabled from enforcing 
the contract if at the time it was formed she had knowledge of the mistake.  
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The courts sometimes couch this requirement in the language of conscience.  
In Riverlate Properties Ltd v Paul47 a landlord mistakenly believed that a term 
had been included in the lease that would have made the tenant liable for half 
the costs of repairs.  He sought to rectify the lease for unilateral mistake, 
alternatively an order that the tenant should elect between rectification or 
rescission.  The Court of Appeal refused to rectify the lease or rescind it on 
terms.  Russell LJ considered whether the lease could be rescinded on the mere 
ground of a serious mistake when the tenant neither shared the mistake, nor 
knew that the lease did not give effect to the landlord’s intention and had not 
caused the mistake.  He held that rescission was unavailable in those 
circumstances.  He went on to explain his conclusion in terms of conscience 
and expressly linked the idea of conscience to the objective standard of 
morality, as interpreted and applied by equity.  
 
If reference be made to principles of equity, it operates on conscience.  
If conscience is clear at the time of the transaction, why should equity 
disrupt the transaction?  If a man may be said to have been fortunate in 
obtaining a property at a bargain price, or on terms that make it a good 
bargain, because the other party unknown to him has made a 
miscalculation or some other mistake, some high-minded men might 
consider it appropriate that he should agree to a fresh bargain to cure 
the miscalculation or other mistake, abandoning his good fortune.  But 
if equity were to enforce the views of those high-minded men, we have 
no doubt that it would run counter to the attitudes of much the greater 
part of ordinary mankind (not least the world of commerce), and would 
be venturing upon the field of moral philosophy in which it would soon 
be in difficulties.’48   
 
In OT Africa Line Ltd v Vickers plc49 the parties were negotiating a litigation 
settlement and the claimant made a mistake as to the currency in which the 
settlement offer was made.  Mance J held that ‘rescission may be available 
where it is simply inequitable for one party to seek to hold the other to a 
bargain objectively made’.50  Rescission was refused because the defendant 
was ‘not aware of, or in a position where they shut their eyes to, or responsible 
                                                
47 Riverlate Properties Ltd v Paul [1975] Ch 133 (CA). 
48 Ibid 141 (Russell LJ). 
49 OT Africa Line Ltd v Vickers plc [1996] CLC 722. 
50 Ibid 727 (Mance J). 
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for or at fault in respect of any mistake.’51   Subsequently, it has been held that 
implicit in Mance J’s remarks was the idea that had the defendant known or 
had reason to know of the mistake, it would have been under ‘a duty to speak 
rather than remain silent’.52   When such a duty to speak will arise depends 
very much on the context.  As a matter of English law, it will arise very rarely 
in the context of litigation settlement negotiations.53 
 
The language used by the courts in some cases tends to suggest that it would 
be morally unacceptable for the defendant to be allowed to enforce the contract 
in light of her knowledge of the mistake at the time the contract was formed.  
Some cases go further and suggest that the courts regard the defendant as being 
under some sort of moral duty not to allow the claimant to enter into the 
contract without first correcting the mistake.  For example, in Huyton v 
DIPASA54 Andrew Smith J had to consider whether to grant rescission, where 
the claimant’s mistake related to the facts underlying the contract rather than a 
term of the contract itself. In principle, he was prepared to recognise that 
rescission would be available for such a mistake.  For reasons later discussed, 
this conclusion seems doubtful,55 but Andrew Smith J’s judgment tells us 
something about how the language of unconscionability is used.  He held that 
one of the factors relevant to the grant of relief was whether it would be 
unconscionable for the defendant to enforce the contract ‘in light of any 
responsibility for bringing about the mistake or for allowing the other party to 
enter into the contract under a mistake.’56   He held the mistake was not ‘of 
such importance … that it would be unconscionable to enforce’ the contract.57  
Moreover, the defendants were not guilty of any misrepresentation, and they 
were neither aware of nor did they suspect the claimant was mistaken at the 
                                                
51 Ibid 728. 
52 Thames Trains Ltd v Adams [2006] EWHC 3291, [46] (Nelson J). 
53 Relief was refused in Thames Trains and in Thompson v Arnold [2007] EWHC 1875 (QB); 
[2008] PIQR P1, [104], [105] (Langstaff J).  Cf. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v 
Chamberlain (1990) 26 FCR 221 (ACT District Registry).  Also, A. Kronman, ‘Mistake, 
Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts’ (1978) 7 JLS 1. 
54 Huyton SA v DIPASA [2003] EWHC 2088 (Comm). 
55 Text to n 147 - 150. 
56 Huyton SA v DIPASA (n 54) [455] (Andrew Smith J). The issue of unilateral mistake did not 
arise for decision on appeal: Huyton SA v DIPASA [2003] EWCA Civ 1104. 
57 Huyton SA v DIPASA (n 54) [461]. 
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time the contract was formed; at most, they created the opportunity for the 
mistake.  Thus, they were not guilty ‘of the sort of unconscionable behaviour 
that should prevent them from enforcing’ the contract.58  He did not elaborate 
on what would constitute unconscionable conduct, but cited an authority on 
rectification59 that suggests that it involves a failure to alert the claimant to or 
an attempt to distract her from discovering the mistake.   
 
The High Court of Australia took a similar approach to unconscionability in 
Taylor v Johnson.60  A vendor granted the purchaser an option to purchase two 
pieces of land for $15,000.  He exercised the option and the parties entered into 
a contract for sale in those terms.  Subsequently, the vendor sought to set aside 
the contract on the basis that when she executed it she had made a mistake as 
to a term of the contract because she believed she was agreeing to a price of 
$15,000 per acre. The High Court of Australia held that ‘special circumstances 
will ordinarily need to be shown before it would be unconscientious for one 
party to a written contract to enforce it against another party who was under a 
mistake as to its terms or subject matter.’61  The court cited authority (including 
Solle and Riverlate) to the effect that such special circumstances would include 
those where the defendant caused the mistake, e.g. by misrepresentation, or 
despite her awareness of the mistake, went ahead with the contract without 
correcting it.  It granted rescission because at the time the option was exercised 
the purchaser suspected the vendor was mistaken and, rather than drawing this 
to her attention, he avoided mentioning the price and wrongly stated that he did 
not have a copy of the option agreement when asked for it.  It would have been 
‘unfair’ for the defendant to hold the claimant to the written contract, where 
she knew of the mistake or deliberately avoided acquiring such knowledge.62  
 
                                                
58 Ibid [464]. 
59 Commission for the New Towns v Cooper (Great Britain) Ltd [1995] Ch 259 (CA);  text to n 
77 – 80. 
60 Taylor v Johnson (1982-1983) 151 CLR 422 (HCA). 
61 Ibid 431. 
62 Ibid 433. 
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The Singapore Court of Appeal cited Solle, Riverlate and Taylor and took a 
similar approach in Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd.63  The 
claimants sold computer equipment online and one of their employees made a 
pricing error, so that a laser printer was advertised on the claimants’ website at 
a massive undervalue.  The defendants did not have actual knowledge of the 
claimants’ pricing error but they suspected it and acted very quickly to take 
advantage of it by placing large numbers of online orders for the printer 
without first checking with the claimants whether the price was in fact 
accurate.  The claimants subsequently sought to rescind the sales contracts, 
which had been formed at the time the orders were placed.  The court held that 
actual knowledge was required before the contracts would be void at common 
law.  However, it held that equitable rescission was available for a unilateral 
mistake as to terms when it was ‘unconscionable for the non-mistaken party to 
insist that the contract be performed.’64  In its view ‘a conscious omission to 
disabuse a mistaken party is itself sufficient to constitute unconscionable 
conduct’.65  Constructive knowledge alone would not suffice.  ‘There must be 
an additional element of impropriety.  The conduct of deliberately not bringing 
the suspicion of a possible mistake to the attention of the mistaken party could 
constitute such impropriety.’66  This was established on the facts.  
Rectification 
 
It is said that rectification for unilateral mistake was originally limited to cases 
of equitable fraud.67  Authority suggests this was not always the case,68 but by 
the early twentieth century the idea seems to have been well established,69 and 
                                                
63 Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2005] 1 SLR 502 (SCA).  Noted, T. Yeo, 
‘Unilateral Mistake: Five Degrees of Fusion of Common Law and Equity’ [2004] Sing JLS 
227; T. Yeo, ‘Great Peace: a Distant Disturbance’ (2005) 121 LQR 293; P. Lee, ‘Unilateral 
Mistake in Law and Equity - Solle v Butcher Reinstated’ (2006) 22 JCL 81. 
64 Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd (n 63) [80]. 
65 Ibid [73]. 
66 Ibid [80]. 
67 McGhee QC, Snell’s Equity (n 7) 428, [16-018]; H. Beale, Chitty on Contracts (31st edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 558, [5-122]. 
68 Rectification was granted in the absence of fraud in Simpson v Vaughan (1739) 2 Atk 31; 26 
ER 415 and Ball v Storie (1823) 1 Sim & St 210; 57 ER 84. 
69 May v Platt [1900] 1 Ch 616 (Ch); Hoblyn v Hoblyn (1889) 41 Ch D 200 (Ch), 207 
(Kekewich J);  Blay v Pollard & Morris [1930] 1 KB 628 (CA); McCausland v Young [1949] 
NI 49. 
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nowadays the remedy is said to depend, at least in part,70 on unconscionable 
conduct by the defendant at the time the contract was formed.71   In Riverlate 
Russell LJ held that rectification could be ordered if the tenant had knowledge 
of the mistake at the time the contract was executed.72  He remarked further, 
‘Basically it appears to us that it must be such as to involve the lessee in a 
degree of sharp practice.’73  In Thomas Bates & Son Ltd v Wyndham’s 
(Lingerie) Ltd74 Buckley LJ cited Riverlate but preferred to focus on ‘the 
equity of the position’ rather than the idea of sharp practice.  In his view, ‘the 
conduct of the defendant must be such as to make it inequitable that he should 
be allowed to object to the rectification of the document … [The] conduct must 
be such as to affect the conscience of the party who has suppressed the fact 
that he has recognised the presence of a mistake.’75  This would be the case 
where the non-mistaken party was aware that due to a mistake by the other 
party, the contract did not contain a term that the mistaken party thought it 
contained, and she failed to draw this to the mistaken party’s attention in 
circumstances where she stood to benefit from the mistake.  In those 
circumstances ‘the court may regard it as inequitable to allow [the non-
mistaken party] to resist rectification to give effect to [her] intention.’76   
 
In CNT v Cooper77 Stuart Smith LJ held that the court would rectify a contract 
for unilateral mistake not simply because the claimant was mistaken but ‘if 
there are “additional circumstances that render unconscionable reliance on the 
document by the party who has intended that it should have effect according to 
its terms”.’78  It would be unconscionable for the defendant to rely on the 
apparent contract if she dishonestly represented the position to the claimant, 
                                                
70 D. Hodge, Rectification (Sweet & Maxwell 2010) 386, [4.66]. 
71 A. Burrows, ‘Construction and Rectification’ in A. Burrows and E. Peel (eds), Contract 
Terms (Oxford University Press 2007) 88.   
72 Applying A. Roberts & Co. Ltd v Leicestershire County Council [1961] Ch 555, 570 
(Pennycuick J). 
73 Riverlate Properties Ltd v Paul (n 47) 140 (Russell LJ). 
74 Thomas Bates & Son Ltd v Wyndham's (Lingerie) Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 505 (CA). 
75 Ibid 515 (Buckley LJ). 
76 Ibid 516. 
77 Commission for the New Towns v Cooper (Great Britain) Ltd (n 59).  Noted, Mossop, 
‘Rectification for Unilateral Mistake’ (1996) 10 JCL 259. 
78 Commission for the New Towns v Cooper (Great Britain) Ltd (n 59) 277 (Stuart Smith LJ), 
citing Spry, Equitable Remedies, 4th ed (1990) 599. 
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had actual knowledge of the mistake or wilfully shut her eyes to the mistake or 
failed to make the enquiries an honest and reasonable person would have made 
as to whether the claimant was mistaken, i.e. knowledge of the type referred to 
in Baden categories 1-3.79  On the facts the Court of Appeal found that such 
knowledge had been established.  Alternatively, Stuart Smith LJ was prepared 
to hold that where the defendant did not know but merely suspected the 
claimant to be mistaken and, intending the claimant to make the mistake, had 
deliberately made misleading statements so as to prevent the claimant from 
discovering it but an actionable misrepresentation could not be proved, her 
conduct would be ‘unconscionable’ and she would be precluded from insisting 
on performance of the contract.   In those circumstances, he held that ‘it may 
also not be unjust or inequitable to insist that the contract be performed 
according to [the claimant’s] understanding.’80  
 
The courts often expressly characterize the defendant’s decision to proceed 
with the contract despite her knowledge of the mistake as a moral failure.  
Thus, in CNT v Cooper Evans LJ remarked that the defendant’s disingenuous 
conduct in trying to engineer the claimant’s mistaken inclusion of a put option 
in a settlement agreement went ‘beyond the boundaries of fair dealing even in 
an arm’s length commercial negotiation’.81   In Thor Navigation v Ingosstrakh 
Insurance Co Ltd82 Gloster J held that rectification could be granted where the 
defendant had actual knowledge of the mistake (in the sense identified in 
Baden categories 1-3) at the time the contract was formed.  In those 
circumstances, ‘The defendant’s knowledge of the claimant’s mistake can be 
stigmatized as dishonest.  The implication is that his decision to proceed with 
the contract when he knew of the claimant’s mistake is below generally 
accepted standards of commercial behaviour.’83   
 
                                                
79 Ibid 281 (Stuart Smith LJ), 292 (Evans LJ). 
80 Ibid 280 (Stuart Smith LJ). 
81 Ibid 292 (Evans LJ); Traditional Structures Ltd v HW Construction Ltd [2010] EWHC 1530 
(TCC) [60] (HHJ Grant). 
82Thor Navigation Inc v Ingosstrakh Insurance Co  Ltd [2005] EWHC 19 (Comm), [2005] 1 
CLC 12. 
83 Ibid 33, [57] (Gloster J), citing Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn. Bhd. v Tan [1994] UKPC 4, 
[1995] 2 AC 378 (PC), 390 (Lord Nicholls). 
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In George Wimpey UK Ltd v VI Construction Ltd,84 the claimant alleged that as 
a result of its error, a price formula in a building contract did not reflect the 
fact that the price was to take account of certain enhancements to the property 
units, and that the defendant unconscionably decided to take advantage of the 
error by failing to alert the claimant to the mistake.  The claim failed because 
the Court of Appeal found that there was no convincing evidence that the 
defendant had knowledge of the mistake in the sense described in Baden 
category 3, i.e. as a result of a wilful or reckless failure to make the enquiries 
an honest and reasonable person would have made in the circumstances.  
According to Sedley LJ: 
 
The phrase ‘honest and reasonable’ is not a term of art.  It is a judicial 
attempt to sketch a line beyond which conduct may be regarded as 
unconscionable or inequitable.  Its duality, however, is a recognition 
that honesty alone is too pure a standard for business dealings because 
it omits legitimate self-interest; while reasonableness alone is capable 
of legitimizing Machiavellian tactics. 
Mistake is a concept which sits awkwardly in this space.  Absent a 
prior accord which has simply not been carried into effect, absent also a 
dishonest inducement to contract, one is looking for a mistake on the 
claimant’s own part which the defendant was honour-bound, despite his 
own legitimate business interests, to point out to him.85 
 
Subsequently, in Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd Briggs J remarked 
that in rectification cases, ‘It is the unconscionable conduct involved in staying 
silent when aware of the claimant’s mistake that makes it just to impose a 
different contract upon him from that by which he intended to be bound.’ 86  
More recently, in another rectification case it was held that the defendant was 
‘bound in conscience’87 to alert the claimant to her mistake. 
 
 
                                                
84 George Wimpey UK Ltd v VI Construction Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 77. 
85 Ibid [60]-[61] (Sedley LJ); Witney Golf Club Ltd v Parker [2006] All ER (D) 174 (CA), [60] 
(Peter Leaver QC). 
86 Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2007] EWHC 409, [136], [137] (Briggs J).  
Reversed on appeal: Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd (n 27) but the Court of Appeal 
made no adverse finding as to Briggs J’s interpretation of unconscionability. 
87 Clayton v Candiva Enterprises Ltd County Court (Newcastle upon Tyne), 17 January 2013. 
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Conclusion 
 
In light of the above, it is clear that the courts use the language of conscience 
in unilateral mistake cases consistently with its ordinary meaning.   A finding 
that the defendant’s conscience is affected by knowledge of the mistake simply 
means that the defendant has knowledge of the mistake; it need not imply 
nothing as to what she ought to do.  The courts use the language of 
unconscionability to signal that the defendant’s behaviour in going ahead with 
the contract despite her knowledge of the mistake was morally unacceptable.  
Often the courts seem to hint that the defendant’s knowledge of the mistake 
triggers some sort of moral obligation to correct it before entering into the 
contract.   They also use the language of unconscionability to describe the fact 
that ultimately, it would be morally unacceptable for the defendant to be 
allowed to enforce the contract despite the mistake.    
Conscience and the Principle Underlying Unilateral Mistake  
 
Of itself, the idea of conscience cannot tell us why the claimant is entitled to 
rescind or rectify a contract for unilateral mistake; to answer this question we 
need to interrogate the moral principles that underpin the doctrine of unilateral 
mistake.  The key concern seems to be to protect each party’s entitlement to 
rely on the appearance of the other’s consent, as long as such reliance is 
reasonable.   We saw in Chapter 2 that the claimant’s entitlement to recover a 
mistaken payment does not depend on proof that the defendant knew of the 
mistake at the time the payment was made: the concern for the claimant’s 
autonomy embodied in the requirement that her consent be free and 
unimpaired is sufficient to justify relief.88   By contrast, where the claimant’s 
mistake is as to the terms of a contract, no relief is available unless the 
defendant was aware of the mistake at the time the contract was formed.  
Common law authority suggests that the reason for this is to do with the fact 
that English law seeks to protect the reasonable expectations of parties to 
                                                
88  Chapter 3, p 82, text to n 18. 
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contracts89 by interpreting the idea of consent in a predominantly objective 
manner.90   
 
If the parties have not reached a genuine, subjectively formed consensus as to 
terms, the question is whether a reasonable person would believe that 
consensus had been reached.91  In other words, if the claimant appears to have 
consented, the defendant is entitled to rely on the appearance of consent and 
enjoys security of receipt unless she knows that the claimant intended 
something different.92  Conversely, if the defendant does know about the 
mistake when the contract is formed, it is not open to her to say that she 
reasonably believed that the appearance of consensus embodied in the contract 
reflected the claimant’s true intentions.93  The contract is treated as void at 
common law or it may even be said ‘that there was never a contract at all’.94   
Importantly, however, the common law does not treat the contract as void 
where the mistake relates only to the subject matter of the contract or the 
underlying facts or circumstances because if there is nevertheless agreement as 
to terms, it is said that there is consensus.95  This distinction has been criticised 
as difficult to understand96 and to ‘square with morality’,97 particularly where 
the defendant knows the claimant to be mistaken about a material fact.  
Nonetheless, others suggest it is consistent with primary aim of contract law as 
                                                
89 J. Cartwright, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (3rd edn, Sweet and Maxwell 
2012) 590, [12-14], 608, [13-11]; Vorster, ‘A Comment on the Meaning of Objectivity in 
Contract’ (1987) 103 LQR 274, 282. 
90 French law adopts a subjective approach: H. Beale, Mistake and Non-Disclosure of Facts, 
Models for English Contract Law (Oxford University Press 2012), 42.  Australian law adopts a 
wholly objective approach: Taylor v Johnson (n 60) 428-429; D. McLauchlan, ‘Objectivity in 
Contract’ (2005) 24 UQLJ 479, 484; and D. McLauchlan, ‘The Contract That Neither Party 
Intends’ (2012) 29 JCL 26. 
91 Smith v Hughes (n 5) 607 (Blackburn J); Cartwright, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-
Disclosure (n 89) 602, [13-07]; McLauchlan, ‘Objectivity in Contract’ (n 90), 479; Lord 
Nicholls, ‘My Kingdom for a Horse: The Meaning of Words’ (2005) 121 LQR 577, 582. 
92 McLauchlan, ‘The 'Drastic' Remedy of Rectification for Unilateral Mistake’ (n 27) 610. 
93 Hartog v Colin & Shields [1939] 3 All ER 566, 568 (Singleton J); Smith v Hughes (n 5), 607 
(Blackburn LJ); McMaster University v Wilchar Construction Ltd [1971] 3 OR 801 (Ontario 
HCJ); Shogun Finance Limited v Hudson (n 1), 964, [123] (Lord Phillips); R. Stevens, 
‘Objectivity, Mistake and the Parol Evidence Rule’ in A. Burrows and E. Peel (eds), Contract 
Terms (Oxford University Press 2007) 104; McLauchlan, ‘The Contract That Neither Party 
Intends’ (n 90) 33; McLauchlan, ‘Objectivity in Contract’ (n 90) 484.   
94 Statoil A.S.A. v Louis Dreyfus Energy Services LP [2008] 2 Lloyd's Rep 685 (QB), [87] 
(Aikens J). 
95 Smith v Hughes (n 5); Statoil A.S.A. v Louis Dreyfus Energy Services LP (n 94). 
96 E. Peel, Treitel, The Law of Contract (12th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2011) 340, [8-044]. 
97 Beale, Mistake and Non-Disclosure of Facts, Models for English Contract Law (n 90) 30. 
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being to promote the parties’ autonomy, rather than fairness of exchange.98  If 
the contract is void, the claimant may recover any benefits transferred to the 
defendant under the contract through an unjust enrichment action based on 
mistake of fact or failure of consideration.99  
 
The fact that the defendant’s knowledge of the mistake is a necessary 
prerequisite for relief for unilateral mistake has led some to characterize the 
mischief to which the common law and equity are responding as a form of 
passive exploitation100 or unacceptable advantage-taking.101  As Posner puts it, 
‘It is one thing to say that you can exploit your superior knowledge of the 
market … It is another thing to say that you can take deliberate advantage of 
an oversight by your contract partner concerning his rights under the contract.  
Such taking advantage is not the exploitation of superior knowledge or the 
avoidance of unbargained-for expense; it is sharp dealing.’102  The use of the 
language of unconscionability tends to reinforce this perception.  Of itself, this 
is not a problem, as long as we do not allow the language of unconscionability 
to distract us from the fact that the moral principle justifying relief flows from 
the need to protect each party’s reliance on the appearance of consensus, where 
that reliance is reasonable.  Arguably, sharp practice is unnecessary because it 
adds nothing to the reliance rationale, which is sufficient to justify the need to 
avoid the contract independently of the defendant’s motives. 
Conscience and What the Defendant Must Know 
 
The language of conscience cannot explain what the defendant must know 
before the contract will be rescinded or rectified.  Because these remedies have 
different effects, there are good arguments for saying that the answer to this 
question differs according to which remedy is in issue.   
                                                
98 Ibid 77; Stevens (n 93) 104. 
99 Burrows, The Law of Restitution (n 31) 386, 387-8.  The defendant’s ability to rely on the 
change of position defence is likely to be compromised where she had knowledge of the 
mistake at the time the contract was formed. 
100 R. Bigwood, ‘Undue Influence: Impaired Consent or Wicked Exploitation’ (1996) 16 OJLS 
503, 507. 
101 Lee (n 63) 84; Eisenberg (n 38) 1425. 
102 Market Street Associates Ltd Partnership v Frey 941 F 2d 588 (7th Cir 1991), 594 (Judge 
Posner). 
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Rescission 
 
For the purposes of rescission, it seems to be sufficient if the defendant knows 
the claimant was mistaken.103   This seems right,104  as the effect of rescission is 
merely to disable105 the defendant from enforcing the contract, and knowledge 
of the problem with the claimant’s consent is all that is necessary to make it 
unreasonable for the defendant to rely on the appearance of consensus. 
Rectification 
 
By contrast with rescission, the effect of rectification is to correct the contract 
to accord with the claimant’s true intentions, on the basis that they reflect the 
basis of the consensus reached.106  In other words, the question is no longer 
merely whether the defendant is empowered to enforce (and the claimant 
obliged to perform) the contract according to his terms.  Rather, it is whether 
the defendant is obliged to perform the contract according to the claimant’s 
terms.  Because we are no longer concerned simply with a disability but with 
an obligation, the question is whether the defendant can reasonably be held to 
this obligation.   Therefore, we might well say it would only be reasonable to 
require her to comply with it if she knew not only that the claimant was 
mistaken but also what the claimant’s terms were.107  If at the time the contract 
was formed the defendant had this factual knowledge it would have enabled 
her to determine that she ought to correct the claimant’s misapprehension.  
Failing that, it would not be unreasonable to take her silence as agreement to - 
and therefore to hold her to – the claimant’s interpretation of the contract. 
 
The cases in which rectification has been granted suggest that generally, the 
defendant does have knowledge not only of the mistake but also of the 
claimant’s true intentions.  Thus, rectification has been granted where, e.g.: a 
                                                
103 Taylor v Johnson (n 60) 432. 
104 McLauchlan, ‘The 'Drastic' Remedy of Rectification for Unilateral Mistake’ (n 27) 619, 
625. 
105 Yeo, ‘Unilateral Mistake: Five Degrees of Fusion of Common Law and Equity’(n 63) 231, 
n34. 
106 McLauchlan, ‘The 'Drastic' Remedy of Rectification for Unilateral Mistake’ 609, 613. 
107 Ibid 619. 
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developer was fully aware that a builder mistakenly believed their contract 
contained an 18-month completion period and was working to that timeframe 
but failed to alert him to the fact that the period in the contract was 30 months; 
108 a tenant failed to alert a landlord to the fact that the lease as drafted 
mistakenly failed to record an agreed arbitration provision;109 it was clear that 
before both parties signed a lease they shared the common intention to make 
the defendants liable for standard business rates, but the defendants noticed 
that the lease as drafted placed the burden of the rates on the claimant and said 
nothing;110 the parties to a contract of sale had agreed that the conveyance 
would include a house but not the yard attached to it, but the purchaser 
deliberately waited until after the conveyance had been completed before 
pointing out to the vendor that the conveyance had in fact included the yard;111 
a tenant’s solicitor knew that the lease was meant to contain a clause that made 
the tenant’s right to break the lease conditional upon its observation of 
leasehold covenants (a standard boilerplate clause) and spotted that due to a 
drafting error the clause made the landlord’s right to break the lease 
conditional upon the tenant’s performance of the covenants.112 
 
However, occasionally the courts fail to appreciate the fact that it is difficult to 
justify rectification in circumstances where the defendant does not know the 
claimant’s true intentions.  For example, in Traditional Structures Ltd v HW 
Construction Ltd113 the defendant knew that a faxed version of the claimant’s 
tender document for a construction project, which it had received, omitted 
some prices relating to cladding.   The court held that its failure to alert the 
claimant to this omission was ‘unconscionable’ and ‘went beyond the 
boundaries of fair dealing’.114  It rectified the contract to include the claimant’s 
prices even though the defendant had no knowledge of what prices the 
claimant would have charged and might not have agreed to them.  This 
decision is difficult to justify.   Absent knowledge of the claimant’s true 
                                                
108 A. Roberts & Co. Ltd v Leicestershire County Council (n 72). 
109 Thomas Bates & Son Ltd v Wyndham's (Lingerie) Ltd (n 74). 
110 JJ Huber (Investments) Ltd v Private DIY Co Ltd (1995) 70 P & CR D33. 
111 Clayton v Candiva Enterprises Ltd (n 87). 
112 Littman v Aspen Oil (Broking) Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1519; [2006] 2 P & CR 2.   
113 Traditional Structures Ltd v HW Construction Ltd (n 81). 
114 Ibid [60] (HHJ Grant). 
165 
 
intentions as to price, it is difficult to see how the defendant came under a 
moral obligation to do anything other than pay a fair market price for the 
cladding work.   Traditional Structures is an example of a case where the 
unreflective invocation of unconscionability115 caused the court to omit an 
important step in its reasoning.  By focusing only on whether the defendant 
ought to have alerted the claimant to the mistake, it ignored the important 
question of what the defendant needed to know before it would be reasonable 
to hold her to the claimant’s interpretation of the contract.  
Conscience and How Much the Defendant Must Know 
 
The courts tend to associate unconscionability with the defendant’s actual 
knowledge of the mistake (in the sense described in Baden categories 1-3). 
Properly understood the idea of unconscionability does not mandate any 
particular level of knowledge as a prerequisite for rescission or rectification, 
albeit that, as indicated in earlier chapters, a high level of knowledge may be 
justified where the question is whether the defendant should be made subject 
to an obligation. 
Rescission 
 
As a matter of English law, it is not entirely clear how much the defendant 
must know for rescission to be granted for unilateral mistake.  As mentioned 
above, in OT Africa116 Mance J refused relief because the non-mistaken party 
was ‘not aware of, or in a position where they shut their eyes to, or responsible 
for or at fault in respect of any mistake.’117  Mance J’s language is ambiguous.  
His reference to the shutting of eyes suggests that actual or consciously 
avoided knowledge (Baden categories, 1-3) may be required.  Equally, 
however, the reference to fault could support the view that it would suffice if 
the defendant had reason to know of the mistake but did not take steps to 
                                                
115 Something McLauchlan deprecates: McLauchlan, ‘The 'Drastic' Remedy of Rectification 
for Unilateral Mistake’ (n 27) 621, 640. 
116 OT Africa Line Ltd v Vickers plc (n 49). 
117 Ibid 728 (Mance J). 
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correct it.   The judgment of the High Court of Australia in Taylor v Johnson118 
is also ambiguous.  The court cited with approval US and Canadian authority, 
which supported the view that enforcement of the contract would be 
unconscionable ‘when one party knows or ought to know that the other party is 
mistaken’,119 thus seemingly indicating that knowledge in the sense identified 
in Baden categories 1-5 should suffice.  However, on the facts the defendant 
had wilfully avoided acquiring knowledge of the mistake (i.e. in the sense of 
Baden category 2).  Thus, the court held that for the purposes of disposing of 
the case before it, the relevant principle was that a party under a serious 
mistake about a fundamental term of the contract could rescind the contract if 
‘the other party is aware that circumstances exist which indicate that the first 
party is entering the contract under some serious mistake or misapprehension 
about either the content or the subject matter of that term and deliberately sets 
out to ensure that the first party does not become aware of the existence of his 
mistake or misapprehension.’120 
 
In the Chwee case121 the Singapore Court of Appeal explicitly equated 
unconscionability with actual or consciously avoided knowledge.  In its view, 
‘unconscionability cannot be imputed based on what a reasonable person 
would have know …. One cannot act unconscionably if one does not know of 
the facts which could render an act so.’122 Therefore the idea of 
unconscionability could only refer to either ‘a conscious omission to disabuse 
a mistaken party’123 or constructive knowledge plus ‘an additional element of 
impropriety’, such as ‘the conduct of deliberately not bringing the suspicion of 
a possible mistake to the attention of the mistaken party’.124   In the court’s 
view constructive knowledge alone would not suffice to justify rescission for 
unilateral mistake because ‘parties to a contract do not owe a duty of care to 
                                                
118 Taylor v Johnson (n 60). 
119 Ibid 432. 
120 Ibid 432, 433; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v Chamberlain (n 53) 229 (Wilcox 
J). 
121 Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd (n 63). 
122 Ibid [78]. 
123 Ibid [73]. 
124 Ibid [80]. 
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each other’.125  On the facts, the additional element of impropriety had been 
established and rescission was granted.  The suggestion that the label of 
unconscionability is synonymous with a particular level of knowledge should 
be treated with caution.  As was argued in relation to trusts, the selection of the 
appropriate level of knowledge is itself a moral question for the courts and the 
answer should be informed by the rationale and purpose of the moral principles 
underpinning the relevant legal doctrine.  It cannot be answered simply by 
reference to the idea of conscience or unconscionability per se.   
 
The choice of a high knowledge threshold in Chwee is not inevitable.  It 
reflects the view that where the parties are dealing at arm’s length in 
contractual negotiations, their bargain should not be set aside simply because 
the defendant could have discovered the mistake.  However, it would be 
perfectly possible for the courts to take the view that it is reasonable to disable 
the defendant from enforcing the contract if at the time it was formed she knew 
or had reason to know of the mistake.  The courts take this approach at 
common law.  In OT Africa126 Mance J held that a contract may be void for 
unilateral mistake as to terms where the defendant knew or ‘ought reasonably 
to have known that there had been a mistake’.127   He added the caveat that 
where the mistake was made in the context of litigation settlement negotiations 
‘there would have, at least, to be some real reason to suppose the existence of a 
mistake before it could be incumbent on one party or solicitor in the course of 
negotiations to question whether another party or solicitor meant what he 
said’.128   
 
In Chwee the court held that only actual knowledge could displace the 
objective principle at common law, but this conclusion is doubtful. The court’s 
interpretation of Mance J’s words in OT Africa as a ‘reasoning process to 
                                                
125 Ibid [77]. 
126 OT Africa Line Ltd v Vickers plc (n 49).  
127 Ibid 726 (Mance J) citing Centrovincial Estates Plc v Merchant Investors Assurance 
Company Ltd [1983] Com LR 158 (CA); also McMaster University v Wilchar Construction 
Ltd (n 93) 9 (obiter). 
128 OT Africa Line Ltd v Vickers plc (n 49) 726 (Mance J). 
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determine actual knowledge’129 is strained.  His judgment clearly suggests that 
it will suffice if the defendant knows or ought to know about the mistake and 
the caveat was directed to litigation settlement negotiations.  Moreover, Chwee 
itself fell squarely within the classic common law rule on unilateral mistake as 
to terms, where it is enough if it is obvious that a mistake has been made and 
the defendant snaps up the offer in a way that was unacceptable.130  Therefore, 
the better view is that actual knowledge is unnecessary at common law.  This 
is consistent with the objective approach to consensus: where the defendant 
ought to have known about the mistake, a reasonable person in her position 
would not have believed that the claimant was agreeing to the terms of the 
contract as she understood them, and so she cannot bind the claimant.131 
Arguably, this logic also applies to rescission for unilateral mistake in equity: 
there is nothing unfair in granting rescission when the only reason the 
defendant did not know the claimant had not properly consented to the contract 
was because she did not bother to ask the right questions.132  
Rectification 
 
Similarly, the idea of unconscionability per se cannot tell us what the 
knowledge threshold for rectification for unilateral mistake should be.  
Originally, it was thought that the defendant had to have actual knowledge of 
the mistake or have closed her eyes to it or deliberately or recklessly failed to 
make enquiries (Baden categories, 1-3) before a contract could be rectified for 
unilateral mistake.133  Since the Court of Appeal’s decision in Commissioner 
for The New Towns v Cooper (GB) Ltd,134 it is also clear that where the 
defendant suspects the claimant to be mistaken and deliberately misleads the 
claimant so as to bring about the mistake in the apparent contract, this will also 
justify rectification.  Given that Baden categories, 4-5 relate to a failure to 
                                                
129 Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd (n 63) [52], [53]. 
130 Statoil A.S.A. v Louis Dreyfus Energy Services LP (n 94) [95] (Aikens J). 
131 Cartwright, Misrepresentation, Mistake and Non-Disclosure (n 89) 616-7, [13-21]-[13-22]; 
Stevens (n 93) 104.    
132 Eisenberg (n 38) 1426. Cf. Yeo, ‘Unilateral Mistake: Five Degrees of Fusion of Common 
Law and Equity’ (n 63) 231; Lee (n 63) 81, 84. 
133 Agip SpA v Navigazione Alta Italia SpA (The Nai Genova and Nai Superba) [1984] 1 
Lloyd's Rep 353 (CA), 361-2 (Slade LJ). 
134 Commission for the New Towns v Cooper (Great Britain) Ltd (n 59). 
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make reasonable enquiries (i.e. a negligence standard) and the conduct referred 
to in Cooper is premised on the defendant’s suspicion that the claimant is 
mistaken, arguably it falls within Baden categories 1-3 anyway.  
 
The English courts’ insistence on a high threshold of knowledge before 
rectification will be granted seems to be rooted in the concern that because 
rectification binds the defendant to the claimant’s interpretation of the contract 
in circumstances where she may never have intended to agree to it,135 the 
remedy has a ‘drastic’ effect.136   As McLauchlan points out, rectification is not 
a drastic remedy as its purpose can only ever be to ensure that the contract 
accords with the consensus reached between the parties, rather than to penalize 
the defendant for wrongdoing.137  Nevertheless, the argument in favour of a 
higher knowledge threshold for rectification than for rescission is difficult to 
refute.  Rectification has the effect of obliging the defendant to honour the 
claimant’s interpretation of the contract.   Equity treats the defendant’s silence 
in the face of her knowledge of the claimant’s true intentions not simply as 
precluding her from relying on the apparent agreement, but as precluding her 
from denying that she has agreed to the claimant’s version of events.   
Arguably, for it to be reasonable to treat the defendant’s silence as having this 
effect, she must remain silent in the face of actual knowledge, rather than mere 
suspicion, as to: (i) what the claimant’s true intentions really were; and (ii) that 
the claimant mistakenly believed they were incorporated into the contract.  If 
despite this knowledge, the defendant remains silent, then she may be taken to 
have acquiesced to the claimant’s interpretation of the contract in such a way 
as to oblige her to abide by it. 
 
McLauchlan has argued that too great a focus on the appropriate knowledge 
threshold and/or unconscionable behaviour at the time the contract is formed 
distracts unhelpfully from the core purpose of rectification, which is to ensure 
                                                
135 Fowler v Fowler (n 26) 265 (Lord Chelmsford LC). 
136 Agip SpA v Navigazione Alta Italia SpA (The Nai Genova and Nai Superba)  (n 133) 365 
(Slade LJ); Commission for the New Towns v Cooper (Great Britain) Ltd (n 59) 137-8; George 
Wimpey UK Ltd v VI Construction Ltd (n 84) [75] (Blackburne J). 
137 McLauchlan, ‘The 'Drastic' Remedy of Rectification for Unilateral Mistake’ (n 27) 609. 
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the contract reflects consensus.138  In his view, therefore, the courts should 
grant rectification only where there is evidence that the parties had a prior 
common intention that by mistake was not reflected in the draft agreement, or 
that the non-mistaken party misled the mistaken party to believe her 
interpretation was contained in the draft contract.139  Mere awareness of the 
mistake on the defendant’s part should not suffice.140  McLauchlan is right to 
suggest that it is important to ensure that the idea of unconscionability does not 
distract from the underlying principle relating to consensus.141  However, as 
Hodge points out, the cases make it clear that the test for rectification is 
knowledge-based.  In his view, rectification is available only where the 
defendant could reasonably be expected to alert the claimant to the mistake, 
and this will be the case only where the defendant knows of the mistake.142   
Rather than changing the test for rectification as McLauchlan suggests, 
arguably it would suffice if the courts were more explicit as to the explanatory 
limits of the ideas of conscience and unconscionability.  It is important to 
recognise that, contrary to Hodge’s assertion,143 unconscionability is not a 
separate, freestanding element of the cause of action for rectification for 
unilateral mistake.  Properly understood, the ideas of conscience and 
unconscionability simply emphasize that equity will not treat the defendant as 
coming under a moral obligation to abide by the claimant’s interpretation of 
the contract, absent sufficient knowledge of the relevant facts.  
Conscience and Doctrinal Function 
 
The language of conscience and unconscionability has no real explanatory role 
to play in cases of rescission for unilateral mistake for a number of reasons.   
First, although the courts’ use of the language of conscience sometimes 
                                                
138 Ibid 621, 640. 
139 Ibid 620. 
140 Ibid. 
141 For example, the outcome in Hurst Stores and Interiors Ltd v ML Europe Property Ltd 
[2004] EWCA Civ 490 is very difficult to explain in a commercial context, when there was no 
direct proof of knowledge or suspicion on the claimant’s part.  Arguably, the case should have 
been decided along the same lines as Agip SpA v Navigazione Alta Italia SpA (The Nai Genova 
and Nai Superba)  (n 133). 
142 Hodge (n 70) 341-2, [4-22]. 
143 Ibid 386, [4-66], 401, [4-79], 403, [4-81]. 
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suggests that the defendant’s knowledge of the mistake triggers a moral duty or 
obligation to correct the mistake, the better view is that there is no such duty. 
Rather, the impairment of the claimant’s consent has the effect of excusing her 
from performing her obligations under the contract, and, correspondingly, the 
defendant is disabled144 from enforcing them.  Her knowledge of the mistake is 
relevant because it makes it unreasonable for her to rely on the appearance of 
consensus and therefore fair to displace her interest in security of receipt.  
There is no need to extrapolate from the knowledge requirement a moral 
obligation to speak, the breach of which constitutes unconscionable behaviour 
at the time the contract is formed.  Therefore, we can explain rescission for 
unilateral mistake without reference to the language of conscience at all.  
Secondly, even if there is such a duty, the language of conscience has no real 
explanatory force beyond reminding us that it may be morally dubious for the 
defendant not to point out the mistake.   There is no sense in which equity 
requires the defendant to take steps to comply with a particular moral standard.   
Thus, the language of conscience does not have the same explanatory force 
that it has in cases where the defendant’s knowledge is a precondition to the 
enforcement of a moral obligation.  In such cases the reference to conscience 
makes clear that it is reasonable to treat the defendant as subject to such an 
obligation only when she knows the facts, so as to be able – through moral 
reasoning – to discern and comply with what is required of her in the particular 
circumstances.  Thirdly, any references to it being unconscionable for the 
contract to be enforced despite the defendant’s knowledge of the mistake are 
simply examples of unconscientiousness ex post.  As in the case of common 
mistake, this tells us nothing about why the claimant should be excused from 
performing her obligations.  All it tells us is that in light of the mistake and the 
defendant’s knowledge of it, it would be morally unacceptable to allow her to 
enforce it.  
 
                                                
144 Yeo, ‘Unilateral Mistake: Five Degrees of Fusion of Common Law and Equity’ (n 63) 321, 
n 34. 
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In any case, in light of Lord Phillips MR’s remarks in The Great Peace,145 if 
and insofar as the equitable doctrine of unilateral mistake overlaps with the 
common law doctrine, it is likely to be otiose.  There appears to be a complete 
overlap in relation to mistakes as to terms unless, as the Singapore Court of 
Appeal suggested in Chwee, it is right that the knowledge thresholds at 
common law and in equity are different.  However, for the reasons given 
above146 this seems doubtful.  Moreover, there is conflicting first instance 
authority in English law as to whether equitable rescission is available for 
mistakes as to subject-matter and/or underlying facts, which would give it 
greater scope than the common law doctrine.   As previously mentioned, 
Huyton v DIPASA147 offers some support for the conclusion that equitable 
rescission is available for mistakes as to underlying facts.  However, in Statoil 
ASA v Louis Dreyfus Energy Services LP,148 Aikens J directly rejected Andrew 
Smith J’s conclusions in Huyton.149  In his view, once there is consensus as to 
terms, the contract is enforceable at law: lack of consensus as to an underlying 
fact does not affect this conclusion.150  It may therefore be said that the 
existence and scope of a doctrine of equitable rescission for mistake in English 
law is uncertain.    
 
By contrast, where a contract is rectified for unilateral mistake, the idea of 
conscience does appear to play a positive explanatory role.   Here, the question 
is whether it is reasonable to treat the defendant as coming under a positive 
obligation to abide by the claimant’s interpretation of the contract.  If at the 
time the contract is formed, the defendant knows what the claimant truly 
intends to agree to and the contract does not accurately reflect the claimant’s 
intention, then her conscience is affected in such a way as to enable her to 
discern what she ought (morally) to do, i.e. alert the claimant to the mistake or, 
failing that, accept the claimant’s interpretation of the agreement.   In other 
words, here, as in the law of trusts, equity will only treat the defendant as 
                                                
145 Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd (n 6) 709, [96] (Lord 
Phillips MR). 
146 Text to n 129 - 132. 
147 Huyton SA v DIPASA (n 54). 
148 Statoil A.S.A. v Louis Dreyfus Energy Services LP (n 94). 
149 Ibid [98]-[105] (Aikens J). 
150 Ibid [87], [88]; S. Smith, Contract Theory (OUP 2004) 369. 
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coming under an enforceable obligation if she knows she has reason to comply 
with it, and for these purposes, moral understanding and factual knowledge are 
required.   At least in this setting (unlike elsewhere) the reference to 
conscience is an application of the notion of conscience as a director of what 
one ought to do (and hence it depends on knowledge of one’s circumstances).  
More generally, however, it is worth noting that the importance of the remedy 
of rectification may recede, as the courts take a more relaxed approach to the 
admission of evidence of pre-contractual intention when interpreting 
contracts.151 
CONSCIENCE AND MISREPRESENTATION 
 
We saw in the previous section that the courts frequently use the language of 
conscience in the doctrine of mistake. By contrast, the courts rarely, if ever, 
use the language of conscience to explain the basis on which relief is granted 
for misrepresentation.  The reasons for this are considered below.  
Conscience and Non-Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
 
Historically, the courts used the ideas of conscience and constructive fraud to 
describe the basis on which they would grant rescission for non-fraudulent 
misrepresentation.  A claimant may rescind a contract for non-fraudulent 
misrepresentation152 where one party makes a representation of fact that is 
untrue and induces the other party to enter into the contract (or another 
transaction) in reliance upon it.153  If these requirements are met, then subject 
to the court’s discretion to order damages in lieu of rescission,154 the 
representee may rescind the contract in equity and, if the misrepresentation 
was negligent, she may recover damages at common law.155   The fact that 
                                                
151 Burrows, ‘Construction and Rectification’ (n 71) 90-99. 
152 Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1; Newbigging v Adam (1887) 34 Ch D 582 (CA), 588 
(Cotton LJ); Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337 (HL), 359 (Lord Herschell). For the 
background to Derry v Peek, see M. Lobban, ‘Nineteenth Century Frauds in Company 
Formation: Derry v Peek in Context’ (1996) 112 LQR 287.  
153 Brown v Raphael [1958] Ch 636 (CA), 641 (Lord Evershed MR). 
154 Under s. 2 of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. 
155 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. A statutory right to 
damages for non-fraudulent misrepresentation was also conferred by the Misrepresentation Act 
1967. 
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rescission is available for innocent misrepresentation demonstrates clearly that 
it is unnecessary that the defendant should know at the time the contract was 
formed that the statement was untrue or that it adversely affected the 
claimant’s consent.  
 
The courts have rarely used the language of conscience in the context of 
innocent misrepresentation.  Torrance v Bolton156 is an example of such a case.  
James LJ held that a sales contract could be rescinded for misrepresentation 
without proof of dishonesty because such contracts were not ‘free from the 
ordinary jurisdiction of the Court to deal with them as it deals with any other 
instrument or any other transactions, in which the Court is of opinion that it is 
unconscientious for a person to avail himself of the legal advantage which he 
has obtained.’157  In Redgrave v Hurd158 Jessel MR used the language of 
equitable fraud rather than unconscientiousness to describe the basis of relief 
for non-fraudulent misrepresentation, and gave two alternative explanations. 
His second explanation was very similar to James LJ’s idea of 
unconscientiousness.  He held that, ‘Even assuming that moral fraud must be 
shewn in order to set aside a contract, you have it where a man, having 
obtained a beneficial contract by a statement which he now knows to be false, 
insists upon keeping that contract. To do so is a moral delinquency: no man 
ought to seek to take advantage of his own false statements.’159  Such 
explanations simply indicate that it is morally unacceptable for the defendant 
to take the benefit of the contract once she becomes aware of the falsity of her 
statement.160  This is an example of unconscientiousness ex post.   It tells us 
nothing about why the claimant is entitled to set the contract aside or why the 
defendant is disabled from enforcing it.  All it tells us is that once the cause of 
action has been established, it would be unacceptable to allow the defendant to 
rely on the legal rights she acquired under the contract.161  Moreover, as will be 
                                                
156 Torrance v Bolton (n 17). 
157 Ibid 124 (James LJ). 
158 Redgrave v Hurd (n 152). 
159 Ibid 12-13 (Jessel MR).  
160 The courts adopted a similar approach in Mair v Rio Grande Rubber Estates Ltd [1913] AC 
853, 870 (Lord Shaw); and Nocton v Lord Ashburton (n 17) 955 (Viscount Haldane LC). 
161 Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 315 (HCA), 325 (Gleeson CJ, 
McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). 
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seen below the fact that the defendant made the statement and therefore was 
responsible for the problem with the claimant’s consent is sufficient to disable 
her from enforcing the contract; there is no additional requirement of 
knowledge.  To the extent that the use of the language of conscience in the 
manner described above suggests otherwise, it is misleading.  
 
The basis on which the defendant is disabled from enforcing the contract is 
better described by reference to Jessel MR’s first explanation.   He held, ‘A 
man is not to be allowed to get a benefit from a statement which he now admits 
to be false.  He is not to be allowed to say, for the purpose of civil jurisdiction, 
that when he made it he did not know it to be false; he ought to have found that 
out before he made it.’162  This explanation rests on the idea that when the 
defendant makes a representation to the claimant, she assumes responsibility 
for the truth of it, so that it if it turns out to be untrue she cannot rely on her 
ignorance.163   In other words, the defendant is disabled from enforcing the 
contract because she was directly responsible for causing a problem with the 
claimant’s consent and it is therefore unreasonable for her to rely on the 
appearance of that consent.  This makes it fair to displace her interest in 
security of receipt and disable her from enforcing the contract.  Therefore, the 
idea of conscience plays no explanatory role in rescission for 
misrepresentation.   
Conscience and Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
 
If a misrepresentation is made fraudulently, the common law and equity 
exercise concurrent jurisdiction,164 so the representee can recover damages for 
the tort of deceit165 at common law and/or rescind the contract at law166 or in 
                                                
162 Redgrave v Hurd (n 152) 12-13 (Jessel MR). 
163 The courts adopted a similar approach in Reese Silver River Mining Co v Smith (1869-70) 
LR 4 HL 64, 79-80 (Lord Cairns); and Hart v Swaine (1877) 7 Ch D 42, 46 (Fry J). 
164 Newbigging v Adam (n 152) 592 (Bowen LJ); Nocton v Lord Ashburton (n 17) 951 
(Viscount Haldane LC). 
165 Because the law regards dishonesty as immoral, damages for deceit are not limited by 
reference to foreseeability:  Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 158 (CA), 167 (Lord 
Denning MR); Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA [1997] AC 254 (HL), 280 (Lord 
Steyn). 
166 Kennedy v The Panama, etc., Royal Mail Company Ltd (1866-67) LR 2 QB 580 (CA). 
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equity167 for what is known as actual fraud, or fraud ‘in the more invidious 
sense’.168  In order to establish actual fraud it must be proved that the 
representor169 made a false statement of fact170 to the representee,171 without an 
honest belief in its truth,172 intending it would be relied upon,173 and the 
representee in fact relied upon it174 by entering into the contract or taking some 
other step to her detriment. As far as the representor’s state of mind is 
concerned, what is necessary is that ‘a false representation has been made (1) 
knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether 
it be true or false.’175  The only thing that will save the statement from being 
fraudulent is  ‘an honest belief in its truth.’176  
 
Despite the fact that actual fraud is sometimes referred to as an example of 
procedural unconscionability affecting the defendant’s conscience,177 there are 
good reasons why the language of conscience is hardly ever used in an attempt 
to explain fraudulent misrepresentation.178  We know from unilateral mistake 
and non-fraudulent misrepresentation that for the defendant to be disabled 
from enforcing the contract, all that is necessary is that either she knew the 
claimant’s consent was impaired or she was responsible for causing the 
problem with consent.  We also know that in neither case does the idea of 
conscience play a necessary explanatory role.  In cases of fraudulent 
misrepresentation, the defendant causes the problem with the claimant’s 
                                                
167 Newbigging v Adam (n 152) 592 (Bowen LJ). 
168 Reese Silver River Mining Co v Smith (n 163) 79-80 (Lord Cairns). 
169 Karberg's Case [1892] 3 Ch 1 (CA), 13 (Lindley LJ). 
170 Bisset v Wilkinson [1927] AC 177 (HL), 182 (Lord Merrivale). 
171 Andrews v  Mockford [1896] 1 QB 372. 
172 Derry v Peek (n 152) 374 (Lord Herschell).   
173 Peek v Gurney (1873) LR 6 HL 377 (HL) (deliberate concealment of facts from the public). 
174 This is true of all types of misrepresentation: Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top 
Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 AC 501, 542 (Lord Mustill). 
175 Derry v Peek (n 152) 374 (Lord Herschell).  See also Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan 
National Shipping Corp (No. 2) [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep 685 (QB), 704 (Cresswell J); approved, 
Niru Battery Manufacturing Company v Milestone Trading Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1446, 
[2004] QB 985. 
176 Derry v Peek (n 152) 374 (Lord Herschell). 
177 E.g. Hart v O'Connor [1985] AC 1000 (PC), 1024 (Lord Brightman); A. Leff, 
‘Unconscionability and the Code - the Emperor's New Clause’ (1967) 115 U Phil L Rev 485, 
487;  D. Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford University 
Press 1999) 252. 
178 Mair v Rio Grande Rubber Estates Ltd (n 160) 873 (Lord Moulton) is a rare example, 
where it was held to be ‘contrary to good conscience’ to allow a company to hold a 
shareholder to a bargain induced by fraudulent misrepresentation. 
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consent and in principle this is sufficient for the purposes of rescission.  In 
other words, the fact that the defendant was guilty of actual fraud at the time 
the contract was formed is irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether 
rescission should be granted.  
 
The idea of conscience may have greater (albeit limited) explanatory force 
where the claimant seeks damage, in that it reminds us that relief depends on 
the defendant’s breach of a pre-existing moral obligation of which she had 
reason to know.179  However, the courts prefer to use the language of 
dishonesty in this context.  Why might this be so?  We saw in Chapter 1 that 
insofar as the idea of unconscionability denotes a breach of the objective 
standard of morality, it is wider than but includes dishonesty.  In other words, 
unconscionability describes some breach of a moral standard but it does not 
enlighten us as to the type of breach or the level of moral fault required.  The 
language of dishonesty may enable us to answer that question more precisely.  
Therefore, the language of dishonesty, rather than unconscionability, is more 
appropriate where the question is whether the defendant has lied or 
deliberately misled the claimant.  This is all the more so given that if the 
defendant honestly believed her statement was true she will not be liable for 
fraudulent misrepresentation, even if her belief is unreasonable by reference to 
the standards of honest, reasonable people.180   In other words, the defendant’s 
behaviour may be unconscionable in the sense that it breaches the objective 
standard of morality but unless she herself did not believe in the truth of what 
she was saying, she will not be liable for damages.  Moreover, equity has long 
recognised a distinction between passive suppression of the truth and active 
distortion of the truth.181  The former is usually described in terms of 
unconscionability (e.g. knowing receipt and mistake), whereas the latter tends 
to be described in terms of dishonesty (e.g. dishonest assistance and 
misrepresentation).  The difference in terminology may simply reflect an 
                                                
179 Cf. Smith, ‘A Duty to Make Restitution’ (n 8) 174. 
180 Angus v Clifford [1891] 2 Ch 449, 472 (Bowen LJ); Baron Uno Carl Samuel Akerhielm v 
Rolf De Mare [1959] AC 789 (PC), 805 (Lord Jenkins); Wee v Ng [2013] SGCA 36, [37] 
(Leong JA). 
181 Peek v Gurney (1871) LR 13 Eq 79, 113 (Lord Romilly MR).   
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intuitive sense that active dishonesty is more morally reprehensible than a 
passive failure to point out the truth.   
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that where the courts use the language of 
conscience in the context of mistake, they are concerned with moral questions 
and the ideas of conscience and unconscionability bear their ordinary 
meanings.  It has also shown that the explanatory role of conscience in cases of 
mistake and misrepresentation is very limited.  Where both parties are 
mistaken, any references to unconscientiousness arise ex post and have no 
explanatory force beyond reminding us that once the cause of action is 
established, it would be morally unacceptable or unfair for the defendant to be 
allowed to enforce the contract.  Where only the claimant is mistaken, the 
defendant’s knowledge of the mistake at the time the contract was formed is a 
necessary precondition of rescission.  Here again the idea of conscience tells us 
very little.  References to unconscionability either arise ex post or add nothing 
to our understanding of why the defendant is disabled from enforcing the 
contract.   In any event, the continued existence of an equitable doctrine of 
rescission for mistake is uncertain.  By contrast, the idea of conscience has 
more explanatory force in the context of rectification for unilateral mistake.  
Here, as in the case of trusts, it reminds us that equity is underwriting a moral 
obligation, which will not be enforced unless the defendant has reason to know 
that she ought to comply with it.  She will only have reason to know this 
through the operation of her conscience, i.e. through the application of her 
moral understanding to her knowledge of the relevant facts.  Finally, if the 
claimant wishes to rescind a contract for misrepresentation, it is sufficient if 
the defendant actively induced the claimant’s misapprehension – there is no 
need to prove that at the time the contract was formed she knew her statement 
to be untrue or that the claimant was mistaken. Any references to 
unconscientiousness in the context of rescission for misrepresentation therefore 
arise ex post and have no role in explaining why the defendant is disabled from 
enforcing the contract.  It is also unsurprising that the language of conscience 
does not tend to appear in fraudulent misrepresentation, as the concepts of 
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dishonesty and bad faith can more accurately explain the state of mind required 
to establish the cause of action. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONSCIENCE AND UNCONSCIONABLE 
BARGAINS 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter considers the meaning and function of conscience and 
unconscionability in the doctrine of unconscionable bargains.  The chapter 
argues that where the language of unconscionability appears in the doctrine of 
unconscionable bargains, it bears its ordinary meaning.  The courts are judging 
whether the defendant’s conduct and the terms of the transaction were morally 
unacceptable, i.e. ‘whether the transaction, seen as a whole, is sufficiently 
divergent from community standards of commercial morality that it should be 
rescinded.’1  The chapter argues further that the explanatory force of the 
language of unconscionability within the doctrine is limited.  Although it 
reminds us that the defendant’s conduct and/or the terms of the transaction are 
morally unacceptable, of itself it cannot identify what counts as morally 
unacceptable, nor by reference to which moral principle this is judged.   Early 
English and New Zealand authority suggests the defendant’s conduct will be 
morally unacceptable if she goes ahead with the contract despite the fact that 
she knows or has reason to know that the claimant’s consent is impaired by her 
special disadvantage.  This approach is consistent with a moral concern to 
ensure the claimant is not bound by obligations to which she did not properly 
consent.   More recent English and Australian authority indicates that morally 
unacceptable conduct requires an exploitative intention, which is consistent 
with a moral concern to prevent the defendant from benefiting from her own 
wrongdoing.  The language of unconscionability is consistent with both the 
wrongdoing and the consent rationales and does not help us choose between 
them.   
 
                                                
1 Harry v Kreutziger (1978) CanLII 393 (BCCA);  (1978) 95 DLR (3d) 231, [26] (Lambert 
JA).
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Where the only relief sought is rescission, as a matter of principle and by 
analogy with unilateral mistake, the defendant’s disability from enforcing the 
contract may be explained without reference to the language of conscience at 
all.  Where the claimant seeks relief for wrongdoing, the language of 
unconscionability reminds us that relief depends on the breach by the 
defendant of a pre-existing moral duty or obligation, but beyond that it tells us 
very little.  Nevertheless, in practice the English courts seem to insist on proof 
of exploitation even in cases where the only relief sought is rescission.   This 
chapter suggests that the reasons for this may be partly historical and partly 
policy-driven and concludes that there are better ways of addressing the courts’ 
policy concerns than through the invocation of unconscionability as a 
limitation on relief. 
CAUSE OF ACTION AND RATIONALE 
 
Three factors will make a bargain unconscionable: the claimant suffering from 
a special disadvantage that affects her judgement, the transaction being 
substantively unfair and the defendant having taken advantage of her 
weakness.2  If these factors are proved, the claimant may rescind the 
transaction (this is by far the most common remedy sought) and, it seems, 
claim equitable compensation from the defendant.3  As far as the doctrine’s 
rationale is concerned, two concerns are apparent.  The current view in English 
and Australian law is that it rests on the need to prevent the defendant from 
exploiting or victimising the claimant.4   The idea that the purpose of the 
doctrine is to prevent the defendant from engaging in the ‘morally culpable 
exploitation of a superior bargaining position’5 – or at least from failing to 
                                                
2 Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 87 (Ch), 94-5 (Peter 
Millett QC), approved Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 
173 (CA); Boustany v Pigott (1993) 69 P & CR 298; Gustav & Co Ltd v Macfield Ltd [2007] 
NZCA 305, [30]; approved, Gustav & Co Ltd v Macfield Ltd [2008] NZSC 47; [2008] 2 NZLR 
735 (NZSC), [6] (Tipping J); Harry v Kreutziger (n 1) [14] (McIntyre JA); The Commercial 
Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 (HCA), 474, 480 (Deane J). 
3 Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd [2013] HCA 25. 
4 Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd (n 2); Hart v O'Connor [1985] AC 
1000 (PC); Boustany v Pigott (n 2); Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd (n 3). 
5 M. Ogilvie, ‘Wrongfulness, Rights and Economic Duress’ (1984) 16 Ottawa L Rev 1, 11; A. 
Angelo and E. Ellinger, ‘Unconscionable Contracts:  A Comparative Study of the Approaches 
in England, France, Germany and the United States’ (1992) 14 Loy LA Int'l & Comp LJ 455; 
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protect the claimant from the foreseeable risk of transactional harm6 - has 
plenty of academic support.  However, earlier English7 and New Zealand8 
authority suggests an additional or alternative concern, namely to excuse the 
claimant from obligations to which she did not properly consent.  There is also 
some academic support for this view.9 
SPECIAL DISADVANTAGE 
 
The claimant must first prove that at the time of the contract she ‘has been at a 
serious disadvantage to the [defendant], whether through poverty or ignorance, 
or lack of advice, or otherwise, so that circumstances existed of which unfair 
advantage could be taken ….’10  The question of whether the claimant suffers 
from a special disadvantage is therefore a factual question relating to her state 
of mind, physical being or circumstances.  The effect of it is said to be ‘that the 
party is unable to judge for himself’.11  Therefore, the disadvantage must be 
‘one which seriously affects the ability of the innocent party to make a 
judgement as to his own best interests.’12  This disadvantage can take different 
forms, such as poverty, illiteracy and illness,13 severe financial difficulties 
giving rise to a risk of bankruptcy,14 drunkenness,15 advanced age and lack of 
                                                
P. Birks and N. Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in J. Beatson and D. Friedmann 
(eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Oxford University Press 1995) 59-60, 94-95; A. 
Mason, ‘The Impact of Equitable Doctrine on the Law of Contract’ (1998) 27 Anglo-AmLR 1, 
7; G Dal Pont, ‘The Varying Shades of "Unconscionable Conduct" - Same Term, Different 
Meaning’ (2000) 19 Aust Bar Rev 135, 138; R. Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (Oxford 
University Press 2003), 227-78; P. Saprai, ‘Unconscionable Enrichment?’ in R. Chambers, C. 
Mitchell and J. Penner (eds), Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment 
(Oxford University Press 2009).   
6 R. Bigwood, ‘Contracts by Unfair Advantage: from Exploitation to Transactional Neglect’ 
(2005) 25 OJLS 65; R. Bigwood, ‘Still Curbing Unconscionability: Kakavas in the High Court 
of Australia’ (2013-14) 37 MULR 463, 497 et seq.   
7 E.g. Fry v Lane (1888) 40 Ch D 312 (Ch); Cresswell v Potter [1978] 1 WLR 255. 
8 Gustav & Co Ltd v Macfield Ltd (NZCA) (n 2); Gustav & Co Ltd v Macfield Ltd (NZHC) (n 
2). 
9 C. Rickett, ‘Unconscionability and Commercial Law’ (2005) 24 UQLJ 73, 79; see also J. 
Devenney and A. Chandler, ‘Unconscionability and the Taxonomy of Undue Influence’ [2007] 
JBL 541, 544-5.   
10 Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd (n 2) 94 (Peter Millett QC). 
11 Blomley v Ryan [1956] HCA 81, (1956) 99 CLR 362, 393 (McTiernan J). 
12 The Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (n 2) 462 (Mason J); Bridgewater v Leahy 
(1998) HCA 66; (1998) 194 CLR 457, 470 (Gibbs CJ and Callinan J, dissenting); Gustav & Co 
Ltd v Macfield Ltd (n 2) [30]; approved, Gustav & Co Ltd v Macfield Ltd  (n 2) [6] (Tipping J); 
Chagos Islanders v The Attorney General [2003] EWHC 2222 (QB), [559] (Ouseley J). 
13 Clark v Malpas (1862) 4 De G F & J 401; 45 ER 1238. 
14 Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd (n 2). 
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education16 or illness,17 illness alone,18 insanity,19 an inability to speak and/or 
read English,20 extreme emotional dependence21 or a combination of such 
factors.  Generally speaking, the claimant’s commercial vulnerability22 or an 
inequality of bargaining power23 is insufficient.  The requirement of special 
disadvantage is the key requirement of the cause of action: without it the claim 
will fail.  
 
The courts interpret the relevance of special disadvantage in two ways.   Some 
authorities support the view that special disadvantage is relevant because it 
goes to the claimant’s ability to give consent.  Thus, relief has been refused 
where there has been no special disadvantage because the claimant was ‘a man 
perfectly free to enter into the contract, perfectly in possession of his faculties, 
according to the weight of the evidence, and he was dealt with perfectly fairly 
on the occasion’;24 or the claimant was  ‘fully capable of taking care of 
himself’;25 or there was nothing in the evidence ‘to suggest this could even 
arguably be a case in which the question of capacity arose’ or to support a 
finding that the claimant ‘lacked capacity because she did not understand 
either the nature of the transactions or their potential effect.’26 ‘[E]quity 
intervenes not necessarily because the complainant has been deprived of an 
independent judgement and voluntary will, but because that party has been 
unable to make an independent judgement as to what was in that party’s best 
interests.’27 It is also important to note that the claimant’s special disadvantage 
is innate or arises from her particular circumstances.  
 
                                                
15 Blomley v Ryan (n 11). 
16 Baker v Monk (1864) 4 De G J & S; 46 ER 968. 
17 Boustany v Pigott (n 2). 
18 Liddle v Cree [2011] EWHC 3294 (Ch). 
19 Hart v O'Connor (n 4). 
20 The Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (n 2); Singla v Bashir [2002] EWHC 883. 
21 Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621 (HCA). 
22 ACCC v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 62, (2002) 117 FCR 301. 
23 ACCC v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 51 (HCA).  Cf. the Canadian 
courts’ tendency to conflate inequality of bargaining power with special disadvantage: e.g. 
Dusik v Newton (1985) 62 BCLR 1 (BCCA); Smyth v Szep (1992) 63 BCLR (2d) 53 (BCCA). 
24 Harrison v Guest (1860) 8 HL Cas 481; 11 ER 517, [493]/522 (Lord Wensleydale).  
25 Webster v Cook (1866-67) LR 2 Ch App 542 (CA), 548 (Lord Chelmsford LC). 
26 Fineland Investments Ltd v Pritchard [2011] EWHC 113 (Ch), [79], [82], [83] (Alison 
Morris QC).   
27 ACCC v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd (n 23) 74 (Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
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Other authorities interpret special disadvantage as going to the claimant’s 
vulnerability to exploitation. Thus, the presence of a special disadvantage on 
the claimant’s part is sometimes said to indicate that the parties are not on 
equal terms28 and it puts the claimant ‘in the power of’29 the defendant, such 
that the defendant may unconscientiously exploit her advantage.30  It has also 
been said that the relevant question is how the claimant’s intention to contract 
has been produced.31  The question is whether ‘circumstances existed of which 
unfair advantage could be taken.’32  Although special disadvantage can be 
interpreted in this way, the risk of exploitation arises only because the special 
disadvantage has had the effect of impairing claimant’s ability to exercise her 
independent judgement in respect of the transaction in question.33  Finally, the 
claimant’s access to independent advice is relevant, irrespective of which 
rationale is in play.  Thus, it may be said to help the claimant ‘overcome the 
disadvantage arising from a want of proper understanding’ of the transaction34 
or to dispel a ‘suspicion of nefarious dealing’ by the defendant.35    
UNCONSCIONABILITY AND THE TERMS OF THE TRANSACTION 
 
As a matter of English law, if the claimant wishes to set aside a transaction as 
an unconscionable bargain she must show that there is ‘some impropriety, both 
in the conduct of the stronger party and in the terms of the transaction itself 
(though the former may often be inferred form the latter in the absence of an 
innocent explanation) which in the traditional phrase “shocks the conscience of 
the court,” and makes it against equity and good conscience of the stronger 
party to retain the benefit of a transaction he has unfairly obtained.’36  For the 
                                                
28 Baker v Monk (n 16), [390]/969-70 (Knight Bruce LJ); The Commercial Bank of Australia 
Ltd v Amadio (n 2) 474 (Deane J); Louth v Diprose (n 21) 637 (Deane J). 
29 Harry v Kreutziger (n 1) [14] (McIntyre JA). 
30 Louth v Diprose (n 21) 626 (Brennan J); Blomley v Ryan (n 11) 406 (Fullagar J). 
31 Bridgewater v Leahy (n 12) 491 (Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
32 Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd (n 2) 94-5 (Peter Millett QC). 
33 N. Chin, ‘Unconscionable Contracts in Anglo-Australian Law’ (1985-1986) 16 UWAL Rev 
162, 167 suggests that where the parties are not economic equals, the contract does not reflect 
real agreement or consent. 
34 ACCC v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd (n 22). 
35 Portman Building Society v Dusangh [2000] EWCA Civ 142; [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221, 
235 (Ward LJ). 
36 Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd (n 2) 95 (Peter Millett QC); 
Boustany v Pigott (n 2) 303 (Lord Templeman). 
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terms of the transaction to shock the conscience of the court, the claimant 
needs to show that ‘the resulting transaction has been, not merely hard or 
improvident, but overreaching and oppressive.’37   In other words, it must be 
‘oppressive and extortionate’38 or ‘at a considerable undervalue’,39 e.g. where 
the terms of the bargain involve, e.g. a loan at an interest rate of 60%40 or the 
renewal by a landlord of a lease at an undervalue.41   
 
The use of the term ‘unconscionable’ to describe the substantive unfairness of 
the transaction is entirely consistent with one of the senses in which we 
ordinarily understand that word, i.e. as meaning excessive or unreasonable. 
Although English law requires proof of both substantive unfairness and 
unconscionable conduct,42 arguably the primary role of substantive unfairness 
is evidential.43  On the one hand, it supports a finding that the claimant did not 
properly consent to the transaction: the more disadvantageous it is to her, the 
less likely it is that she properly intended it. On the other, if the defendant 
knows there is a problem with the claimant’s consent and that the bargain is 
disadvantageous to her, a decision to proceed with it in any event evinces a 
deliberate intention to do wrong, e.g. by causing harm to the claimant’s 
interests.  Therefore, insofar as the courts describe the bargain as 
unconscionable, the description is largely rhetorical.  The terminology simply 
emphasises the fact that the bargain is so excessive or unreasonable that it must 
be the product of defective consent or wrongdoing. 
 
 
                                                
37 Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd (n 2) 95 (Peter Millett QC). 
38 Earl of Aylesford v Morris (1872-73) 8 Ch App 484, 495 (Lord Selborne LC). 
39 Fry v Lane (n 7) 322 (Kay J); applied, Cresswell v Potter (n 7). 
40 Earl of Aylesford v Morris (n 38) 498 (Lord Selborne LC). 
41 Boustany v Pigott (n 2). 
42 Chagos Islanders v The Attorney General (n 12) [583] (Ouseley J); Hart v O'Connor (n 4) 
1024 (Lord Brightman). 
43 D. Capper, ‘Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ (1998) 114 LQR 
479, 486.  The Australian and New Zealand courts take this approach: Blomley v Ryan (n 11) 
406 (Fullagar J); The Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (n 2) 475 (Deane J); Gustav 
& Co Ltd v Macfield Ltd (n 2) (NZCA) [30]; Gustav & Co Ltd v Macfield Ltd (n 2) (NZHC) 
[6] (Tipping J). 
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UNCONSCIONABLE CONDUCT 
Unconscionability - Meaning 
 
Where the language of unconscionability is used to describe the defendant’s 
conduct, it bears its ordinary meaning.  It is clear that the courts are concerned 
with the moral quality of the defendant’s behaviour and whether it accords 
with what is ‘right and reasonable’,44 i.e. whether it is morally acceptable.   As 
a matter of English law, ‘it must be shown that “one of the parties to it has 
imposed the objectionable terms in a morally reprehensible manner, that is to 
say, in a way which affects his conscience”.’45  The defendant’s conduct ‘must 
be characterised by some moral culpability or impropriety’,46 which is judged 
by reference to the objective standard of morality, rather than the defendant’s 
individual sense of right and wrong.47  
Unconscionability, Morally Unacceptable Conduct and the Principles by 
Which it is Judged 
 
Of itself, the language of unconscionability does not tell us what sort of 
conduct counts as morally unacceptable or by reference to which moral 
principle this question is determined.  For this, we need direct argument about 
what principles do and/or should ground relief for unconscionable bargains.  
As will be seen below, some cases suggest the defendant’s conduct is morally 
unacceptable if she accepts the claimant’s consent in circumstances where she 
knows or has reason to know about the claimant’s special disadvantage and the 
claimant has no independent advice.  This approach is consistent with the 
courts’ concern to ensure the claimant is able to exercise independent 
judgment for the purposes of consenting freely to the transaction.  However, to 
the extent that the defendant has actual knowledge of the claimant’s special 
disadvantage, it may also be consistent with an exploitative intention.  Other 
                                                
44 ACCC v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd (n 22) [44] (judgment of the court). 
45 Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd (n 2) 94 (Peter Millett QC), citing 
Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd v Marden [1979] Ch 84 (HL), 110 (Browne-Wilkinson J). 
46 Boustany v Pigott (n 2) 303 (Lord Templeman). 
47 Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd (n 3) [16] (judgment of the court); Jones v Morgan [2001] 
EWCA Civ 995, p 9 of transcript (Chadwick LJ). 
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cases, particularly recent English and Australian authorities, seem to require 
positive proof of an exploitative intention before the defendant’s conduct will 
be treated as morally unacceptable, which is consistent with a concern to 
prevent wrongdoing. 
The Early English Authorities  
 
Initially, English authority suggested that the defendant’s behaviour could be 
described as unconscientious if she entered into the transaction despite 
knowing of the claimant’s special disadvantage, without first ensuring the 
claimant took independent advice. Even though the language of unfair 
advantage-taking appeared in these cases from time to time, it was unnecessary 
to prove an improper motive on the defendant’s part.  The focus was on the 
claimant’s capabilities and the presence or absence of independent advice.48   
This approach suggests that the primary concern was that the claimant should 
not be bound by obligations to which she did not freely consent.   
 
In Evans v Llewellin49 the claimant was poor and ignorant and sold his 
reversionary interest to the defendant at an undervalue in circumstances in 
which he had insufficient time to act with caution.  Lord Kenyon MR held that 
‘if the party is in a situation, in which he is not a free agent, and is not equal to 
protecting himself, this Court will protect him … I am of opinion, in this case, 
the party was not competent to protect himself, and therefore this Court is 
bound to afford him such protection’.50   The defendant’s solicitor had told the 
claimant what the estate was worth and what he was being offered for his share 
and suggested he take independent advice.  However, this was not enough.  
The defendant ‘ought to have gone further’ and ‘should not have permitted the 
man to make the bargain without consulting his friends …’51  Although there 
was no fraud, ‘it is something like fraud, for an undue advantage was taken of 
                                                
48 Devenney and Chandler (n 9) 544-5; I. Hardingham, ‘Unconscionable Dealing’ in P. Finn 
(ed), Essays in Equity (LawBook Co 1985) 18 points out that this is similar to the approach 
taken in some early undue influence cases. 
49 Evans v Llewellin (1787) 1 Cox 333; 29 ER 1191. 
50 Ibid [340]-[341]/1194 (Lord Kenyon MR); Gwynne v Heaton (1778) 1 Bro CC 1; 28 ER 
949, [9]/953 (Lord Thurlow LC). 
51 Evans v Llewellin (n 49) [340]/1194 (Lord Kenyon MR). 
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his situation.’52  Ultimately, Lord Kenyon MR concluded that if the claimant 
had consulted his friends, the court would not have granted rescission.53  The 
language used by Lord Kenyon MR suggests that in the court’s eyes the 
defendant ought not to have accepted the claimant’s consent without first 
ensuring she had received independent advice.     
 
The Court of Appeal expressed similar sentiments in Clark v Malpas.54  A 
poor, illiterate and ill man conveyed all his property to his neighbour at an 
undervalue and without taking security for what he was getting in return.    
Knight Bruce LJ emphasised that the claimant was poor, lacking in education 
and ‘unable of himself to judge of the precautions to be taken in selling, or of 
the mode of sale, or of the mode of securing the price which was not at once 
paid down.  He was helpless in the matter, without protection.’55  In his view, 
there was completion at an undervalue, ‘under circumstances of gross 
imprudence, on terms on which the seller ought not to have been allowed to 
complete.’56  Because of his age, the fact that he was unwell, could only write 
his name and read with difficulty, ‘such a transaction could not be enforced or 
sustained without proof that he was properly advised.’57  Turner LJ agreed.  In 
his view, ‘this deed was obtained by advantage being taken of the vendor’s 
position and circumstances, and was executed without due deliberation and 
without sufficient advice.’58 Again, the emphasis was on the claimant’s 
inability to give proper consent and what the defendant ought to have done to 
counteract that, i.e. not allow him to complete without independent advice.  
 
In Baker v Monk59 the Court of Appeal went further and characterised the need 
to ensure the claimant took independent advice in terms of a duty or obligation.  
A poor, elderly and uneducated woman sold her land to a local businessman at 
an undervalue in return for an annuity.  She subsequently succeeded in setting 
                                                
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid [341]/1194 (Kenyon MR). 
54 Clark v Malpas (n 13). 
55 Ibid [404]/1240 (Knight Bruce LJ). 
56 Ibid [404]/1240. 
57 Ibid [405]/1240. 
58 Ibid [405]/1240 (Turner LJ). 
59 Baker v Monk (n 16). 
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the transaction aside.  Turner LJ cited Lord Kenyon MR’s remarks in Evans v 
Llewellin and rested his decision on that principle.  He remarked that the 
claimant was elderly, unadvised and unassisted and ‘could know no more 
about what the pecuniary value of that annuity was than any person whom you 
might meet walking along the streets at the time.’60   He held further that the 
difference in station between the parties ‘rendered it incumbent on [the 
defendant] to throw further protection around this lady before he made the 
bargain with her.’61  Ultimately, he concluded that he did not wish to enter into 
the question of the defendant’s conduct and he was ‘content to believe that in 
this case there has been no actual moral fraud’62, but nevertheless it was the 
defendant’s ‘duty’ to say to the claimant, “You had better not sell it to me 
without consulting someone else”.’63  
 
In Earl of Aylesford v Morris64 Lord Selborne LC held that a combination of 
special disadvantage, substantive unfairness and lack of independent advice 
gave rise to a presumption of the unconscientious use of power by the 
defendant, which could only be rebutted if the defendant could show the 
transaction was ‘in point of fact fair, just and reasonable.’65  A moneylender 
charged an expectant heir interest on loans at a rate of 60% and, when the 
moneylender sued on the loans, the heir successfully argued that the interest 
rate should be reduced to 5%.   A presumption of unconscientiousness arose on 
the facts because of the heir’s special disadvantage (qua expectant heir), the 
extortionate interest rate and the fact that he had not received any independent 
advice.  The moneylender was unable to rebut the presumption because he had 
wilfully avoided acquiring knowledge of the heir’s circumstances (and hence 
the special disadvantage), knew he had no independent advice and made no 
attempt to show that the loan terms were fair.66   Therefore, although Lord 
Selborne LC spoke of fraud and exploitation, the moneylender’s 
                                                
60 Ibid [393]/970 (Turner LJ).  
61 Ibid [393]/970. 
62 Ibid [393]-[394]/971. 
63 Ibid [394]/971; O'Rorke v Bolingbroke (1877) 2 App Cas 814 (HL), 830 (Lord Hatherley, 
dissenting). 
64 Earl of Aylesford v Morris (n 38) 
65 Ibid 491 (Lord Selborne LC). 
66 Ibid 495-7. 
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unconscientiousness consisted simply in going ahead with the transaction in 
circumstances where he knew of the heir’s special disadvantage and no 
independent advice had been received.  In other words, wrongdoing was not 
required.67 
 
Aylesford was applied in two later cases, Fry v Lane68 and Cresswell v Potter,69 
both of which are consistent with the consent rationale.  In Fry, the defendant 
alleged that he had acted in good faith in purchasing a reversion from the 
claimant and Kay J accepted that ‘no moral fraud ha[d] been proved’.70  
However, the price was ‘considerably below the real value’,71 the claimants 
were poor and ignorant and the solicitor acting on the transaction ‘did not 
properly protect the vendors, but gave a great advantage to the purchasers, who 
had been former clients, and for whom he was then acting.’72  Kay J reviewed 
the earlier authorities (including those referred to above) and held that the rule 
was that ‘a poor, ignorant man, selling an interest of this kind, should have 
independent advice, and that a purchase from him at an undervalue should be 
set aside, if he has not.’73   He concluded that the transactions amounted to 
‘unfair dealing, which equity considers a fraud’.74  In Cresswell the claimant 
sold her share of the family home to her ex-husband in exchange only for a 
release from future mortgage liabilities.  She had no solicitor and neither the 
defendant nor his solicitor suggested she should take independent advice.    
Megarry J accepted that no oppression had been alleged but held that the 
defendant could not uphold what was for him a very advantageous 
conveyancing transaction without first bringing to the claimant’s attention ‘the 
true nature of the transaction and the need for advice.’75  At the very least, the 
defendant’s solicitor ought to have sent the claimant a short covering letter 
                                                
67 S. Waddams, ‘Protection of Weaker Parties in English Law’ in M. Kenny, J. Devenney and 
L. Fox O'Mahony (eds), Unconscionability in European Private Financial Transactions 
(Cambridge University Press 2010) 37-8. 
68 Fry v Lane (n 7) 321 (Kay J). 
69 Cresswell v Potter (n 7). 
70 Fry v Lane (n 7) 324 (Kay J). 
71 Ibid 322. 
72 Ibid 323. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid 324. 
75 Cresswell v Potter (n 7) 259 (Megarry J). 
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explaining that by giving up her half share in the family home to the defendant, 
she would receive nothing other than a release from him from the 
responsibility to contribute to future mortgage repayments, and suggesting that 
she ought to get independent advice.  He did not view the requirement of 
independent advice as absolute but the fact that ‘there was no attempt whatever 
to comply with the requirement’ meant the transaction could not stand.76    
 
In light of the above, the courts’ references to advantage-taking seem to have 
mean no more than that the defendant entered into and sought to enforce the 
contract despite knowing of the claimant’s disability.  It involved no further 
allegation that the defendant was guided by any bad faith or improper motive 
in doing so.  The approach of the early English cases is therefore similar to that 
of the courts to mistake in the last chapter.  We might say that it is sharp 
practice to snap up an offer one knows to be mistaken or to ‘take advantage’ of 
the claimant’s special disadvantage.  Nevertheless, the reason for not 
upholding the contract is that the claimant has not properly consented to it, and 
thus the references to the defendant’s bad behaviour are superfluous. 
 
The Later English Authorities 
 
Later English authorities suggest that it is necessary for the claimant to prove 
some sort of bad faith or improper motive on the part of the defendant before 
her conduct will be characterised as unconscionable.  In other words, the courts 
now take a much more restrictive approach to what unconscionable conduct 
entails.77  This suggests a shift in rationale, away from a concern for the 
claimant’s autonomy and towards a concern to prevent wrongdoing. For the 
defendant’s conduct to be unconscionable, it now seems that it may not always 
be enough for her to go ahead with the transaction with knowledge of the 
claimant’s special disadvantage and without ensuring she take independent 
                                                
76 Ibid 260. 
77 D. Capper, ‘Protection of the Vulnerable in Financial Transactions - What the Common Law 
Vitiating Factors can do for You’ in M. Kenny, J. Devenney and L. Fox O'Mahony (eds), 
Unconscionability in European Private Financial Transactions (Cambridge University Press 
2010) 181; D. Capper, ‘The Unconscionable Bargain in the Common Law World’ (2010) 126 
LQR 403, 408. 
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advice.  Something else may be required, possibly in the form of an improper 
motive or exploitative intention.    
 
In Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd78 Peter Millett QC 
restated the law on unconscionable bargains and held that ‘the court is 
concerned, not with the reality of the weaker party’s consent, but with the 
conduct of the stronger.’79  The claimants sought to rescind an arrangement 
whereby they had leased their garage premises to the defendant in exchange 
for a cash premium and a leaseback, the terms of which included a long petrol 
tie.  Peter Millett QC held that the claimants were under a special disadvantage 
because they were in extreme financial difficulties. It was clear that the 
defendants were well aware of this.  Nevertheless, their claim failed because 
the transaction was fair and the defendants had not behaved unconscionably.   
He held further that in order to establish unconscionable conduct, it was 
necessary to show the ‘weakness of the [claimant] has been exploited by the 
[defendant] in some morally culpable manner’, i.e. that there is some 
‘impropriety’ in the defendant’s conduct that ‘“shocks the conscience of the 
court,” and makes it against equity and good conscience’ for the defendant to 
retain the benefit of the transaction.80   It is true that ‘exploit’ does not sound 
too different from ‘taking advantage’, but the rest of Peter Millett QC’s 
judgment makes it clear that some more is required. 
 
There seem to have been three reasons for the finding that the defendant had 
not behaved unconscionably.  First, the claimants had independent legal and 
financial advisors and the defendants had no reason to think they had not taken 
advice.  Secondly, the defendants did not rush the claimants.  Thirdly, they had 
no reason to believe nor did they believe that they were getting a bargain.81  
However, he gave no indication of what would have constituted 
unconscionable conduct if the transaction had been oppressive and the 
claimant had not received independent advice.  His judgment was upheld on 
                                                
78 Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd (n 2). 
79 Ibid 94 (Peter Millett QC). 
80 Ibid 95. 
81 Ibid. 
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appeal.  Dillon LJ emphasised that the focus was on ‘extortion, or undue 
advantage [being] taken of weakness, an unconscientious use of the power 
arising out of the inequality of the parties’ circumstances’,82 but did not 
indicate precisely what that would entail. 
 
In Hart v O’Connor,83 Lord Brightman also emphasised the idea that the 
doctrine of unconscionable bargains exists to prevent constructive fraud or 
victimisation, which may comprise either ‘the active extortion of a benefit or 
the passive acceptance of a benefit in unconscionable circumstances.’84  The 
claimant, who was of unsound mind, agreed to sell his land to the defendant at 
a significant undervalue.  However, because the defendant was entirely 
unaware that the claimant suffered from a special disadvantage and he neither 
knew nor had reason to suspect that the claimant was not acting in accordance 
with the advice of his solicitor, he was not guilty of any unconscionable 
conduct.  ‘There was no equitable fraud, no victimisation, no taking advantage, 
no overreaching or other description of unconscionable doings which might 
have justified the intervention of equity’.85   The decision suggests that for the 
defendant’s conduct to be unconscionable, at a minimum he would have 
needed to know about the claimant’s special disadvantage.  However, Lord 
Brightman does not indicate this in terms, nor what level of knowledge would 
have been sufficient. 86  Therefore, the decisions in Alec Lobb and Hart do not 
identify what conduct is sufficiently ‘morally reprehensible’ (using Peter 
Millett QC’s language in Alec Lobb) to count as unconscionable conduct for 
the purposes of the doctrine.   
 
More recent English authority has failed to delineate clearly the scope and 
content of ‘morally reprehensible’ conduct for the purpose of the doctrine.   It 
seems clear that if the defendant actively induces the claimant to enter into the 
bargain in circumstances where she knows it is substantively unfair and the 
                                                
82 Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd (n 2) 182 (Dillon LJ). 
83 Hart v O'Connor (n 4). 
84 Ibid 1024 (Lord Brightman). 
85 Ibid 1028 (Lord Brightman). 
86 Some argue it supports a requirement of actual knowledge: J. Getzler, ‘Unconscionable 
Conduct and Unjust Enrichment as Grounds for Judicial Intervention’ (1990) 16 Mon LR 283, 
296; A. Duggan, ‘Till Debt Do Us Part’ (1997) 19 Syd LR 220, 228; Mason (n 5) 11.  
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claimant suffers from a special disadvantage, her conduct will be 
unconscionable.  Beyond that the position is unclear.  These authorities are 
discussed below.  A number of cases suggest that in the absence of active 
inducement, the defendant’s conduct will not be unconscionable simply 
because she accepts the claimant’s consent in the knowledge that she is 
operating under a special disadvantage.  One or two others suggest that if the 
transaction is substantively unfair, the defendant’s knowledge of this might be 
relevant to a finding of unconscionability.  The difficulty with all these cases is 
that in none of them was the transaction substantively unfair, so as to make the 
issue of unconscionable conduct determinative and force the courts to delineate 
clearly what constitutes ‘morally reprehensible’ conduct. 
 
In Portman Building Society v Dusangh87 the claimant building society sought 
possession of the defendant’s house when he fell into mortgage arrears.  The 
defendant resisted possession on the basis that the bargain was unconscionable.  
The defendant clearly suffered from a special disadvantage: he was seventy 
two years old, could neither speak English very well nor read and write in 
English at all and did not have the income to support the borrowing.  The 
transaction was improvident from his point of view: the mortgage had a 
twenty-five year term and the sum borrowed was £33,000, most of which went 
to the claimant’s son, who used it to buy a supermarket.  Although the son had 
guaranteed the mortgage and agreed with his father that he would repay it, 
there was never likely to be enough income from the business to support the 
borrowing.  The same solicitor acted for all three parties in relation to the 
transaction and the claimant was only unaware of the defendant’s true 
circumstances because of a failure of its internal procedures.   However, the 
Court of Appeal upheld the possession order.   
 
Ward LJ held that neither the son nor the building society had behaved 
unconscionably.  As far as the son was concerned, he had believed the 
supermarket business would be profitable and persuaded his father to lend it 
                                                
87 Portman Building Society v Dusangh (n 35), noted L. McMurtry, ‘Unconscionability and 
Undue Influence: An Interaction?’ [2000] Conv 573.  
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without undue influence and misrepresentation.  There was ‘nothing, 
absolutely nothing, which comes close to morally reprehensible conduct or 
impropriety.  No unconscientious advantage has been taken of the father’s 
illiteracy, his lack of business acumen or his paternal generosity … There was 
no exploitation of father by son such as would prick the conscience and tell the 
son that in all honour it was morally wrong and reprehensible.’88  As a matter 
of fact, the son would inevitably have been aware of the circumstances, which 
put his father at a special disadvantage.  However, going ahead with the 
transaction despite this knowledge was insufficient to constitute 
unconscionable conduct.  This suggests that something more in the form of an 
improper motive or exploitative intention was required.   
 
The defendant argued that the building society ought to have been aware of the 
special disadvantage and this fact, coupled with its failure to insist on 
independent advice, was enough to render its actions in proceeding with the 
mortgage unconscionable.  Ward LJ disagreed.  In his view, this approach 
missed the fact that ‘for the lending by the building society to be 
unconscionable, it must, as is implicit in the very word, be against the 
conscience of the lender – he must act with no conscience, with no sense that 
he is doing wrong.’89   Assuming with the defendant that he suffered from a 
special disadvantage, the transaction was improvident and the building society 
was perhaps even lending irresponsibly, Ward LJ considered that the foregoing 
did not ‘[get] close to establishing morally reprehensible conduct’ on the part 
of the building society.  Although the bargain was foolish from the defendant’s 
perspective, ‘the moral conscience of the court has not been shocked.’90    Two 
points arise from these conclusions.  Ward LJ’s use of the language of 
conscience tends to suggest that an individual’s behaviour can only be 
unconscionable if she understands morally that she is transgressing the 
objective standard.  In fact, as we know from Chapter 1, the term, 
‘unconscionable’ does not necessarily imply consciously immoral conduct.91  
                                                
88 Portman Building Society v Dusangh (n 35) 232 (Ward LJ). 
89 Ibid 235-6. 
90 Ibid 236. 
91 Chapter 1, pp 27-9, text to n 99-103. 
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Second, given Ward LJ’s conclusions regarding the son, it is not certain that if 
the building society had actually known about the defendant’s circumstances, a 
finding of unconscionable conduct would have followed.  
 
There are some cases in which the defendant’s knowledge of the substantive 
unfairness of the bargain appears to be relevant to a finding of 
unconscionability. 92  It is true that on the one hand, substantive unfairness may 
be relevant because it supports a finding that the claimant did not properly 
consent to the transaction.  On the other hand, if the defendant knows the 
transaction is substantively unfair, arguably this may support a finding that she 
intended to harm the claimant’s interests.93  In Mitchell v James94 Park J held 
the claimants could not show that the defendant had behaved unconscionably 
by ‘knowingly [taking] advantage of them’95 where they could not remember 
the discussions about the relevant transaction and the defendant’s evidence was 
‘that he explained everything to them, and proposed to them a transaction 
which he thought was fair.’96  In Singla v Bashir97 Park J found that in the 
absence of evidence that the claimant could have got better terms for the same 
transaction elsewhere and the defendant ‘knew that he could have done that’, 
he was not prepared to set aside the transaction as an unconscionable bargain.98  
These findings echo the approach of Millett QC in Alec Lobb.   However, in all 
three cases the transaction was substantively fair, so the issue of 
unconscionable conduct was not determinative and the courts did not have to 
address directly the relevance of this kind of knowledge.   
 
The defendant’s acts in trying to induce the claimant to enter into the contract, 
when she knew of the claimant’s vulnerability and the substantive unfairness 
of the transaction did generate a finding of unconscionable conduct in 
Boustany v Piggott.99  Miss Piggott was elderly and had been subsequently 
                                                
92 O'Rorke v Bolingbroke (n 63) 835, 836 (Lord Blackburn) is an early example. 
93 Text to and following n 42 - 43. 
94 Mitchell v James [2001] All ER (D) 116 (Jul) (Ch ). 
95 Ibid [82] (Park J). 
96 Ibid. 
97 Singla v Bashir (n 20). 
98 Ibid [29] (Park J).   
99 Boustany v Pigott (n 2). 
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diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease.  She owned and let several properties and 
the Boustanys were her tenants.  Because of her incapacity, Miss Piggott had 
appointed her cousin George to act as her agent in respect of all her properties.  
Mrs Boustany had conversations with George about a lease renewal, though 
terms were not agreed.  While George was away, Mrs Boustany flattered and 
lavished attention and hospitality on Miss Piggott.  Some days later she took 
Miss Piggott to a barrister (who had prepared the original lease for Miss 
Piggott) to execute a lease renewal at a low rent for a period of ten years, with 
an option for the Boustanys to renew the lease again for a further ten years at 
the same rent.   The Privy Council held that the lease should be set aside. 
 
Lord Templeman cited with approval the judgments of Millett QC in Alec 
Lobb and Lord Brightman in Hart on the need to demonstrate unconscionable 
conduct.  He held it was necessary to show ‘unconscientious advantage has 
been taken of [the claimant’s] disabling condition or circumstances’.100   This 
was clearly established on the facts.  The reasons Miss Piggott gave the 
barrister for renewing the lease were absurd and she was plainly under a 
misapprehension of the facts at the time.  He also found that the barrister 
‘forcibly pointed out not only to Miss Piggott but also to Mrs Boustany and her 
husband the disadvantages to Miss Piggott of the new lease but [they] gave no 
explanation and offered no concessions.  They were content to allow Miss 
Piggott ostensibly to insist on the unjustifiable terms which they must have 
already persuaded her to accept.’101  It followed that the trial judge was entitled 
to infer that the Boustanys had ‘prevailed upon Miss Piggott to agree to grant a 
lease on terms which they knew they could not extract from [her cousin] or 
anyone else.’102  When the unfairness of the lease was pointed out to them, they 
did not release Miss Piggott from the bargain.  ‘In short Mrs Boustany must 
have taken advantage of Miss Piggott before, during and after the interview 
with [the barrister] and with full knowledge before the … lease was settled that 
her conduct was unconscionable.’103    
                                                
100 Ibid 303 (Lord Templeman), citing The Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (n 2). 
101 Boustany v Pigott (n 2) 304. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
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Since Boustany the courts have taken an inconsistent approach as to what 
constitutes morally reprehensible or unconscionable conduct in the absence of 
positive acts of inducement or exploitation.  In Chagos Islanders v The 
Attorney General104 the UK government sought to strike out a claim that a 
settlement agreement it had entered into with the claimants should be set aside 
as an unconscionable bargain.  The claimants were very poor, illiterate and 
uneducated and Ouseley J held they had reasonable prospects of showing that 
the UK government knew this.  He accepted it was arguable that the UK 
government’s conduct in accepting the claimant’s signatures to the agreement 
without ensuring they understood it ‘involved the exploitation of [the 
claimants’] weaknesses in a morally culpable manner.  They were asked to 
sign a legal form without explanation at the time as to its purpose or content by 
those who knew of their weakness.’105  There was no evidence that the 
government had attempted to prevent the claimants from understanding it and 
therefore they had not engaged in any trickery; ‘it is rather that no positive 
attempt to inform them was made at the time.’106  Ultimately, the terms of the 
agreement were fair and so the claim was struck out.  Ouseley J’s judgment 
suggests that the defendant’s conduct may be unconscionable because she 
accepts the claimant’s consent with knowledge of her special disadvantage, but 
his characterisation of this conduct as exploitation suggests a concern to 
prevent the defendant benefiting from wrongdoing. 
 
Three subsequent cases indicate that even where the defendant has knowledge 
of the special disadvantage, a finding of unconscionable conduct will not 
necessarily follow.  In Humphreys v Humphreys107 Rimer J doubted whether 
the transaction was oppressive and unreasonable and held that the facts 
supporting a finding of presumed undue influence were insufficient to justify a 
finding that the defendant ‘had acted with sufficient moral culpability’ to 
establish unconscionable conduct and that he had made no other findings 
                                                
104 Chagos Islanders v The Attorney General (n 12). 
105 Ibid [580] (Ouseley J). 
106 Ibid. 
107 Humphreys v Humphreys [2004] EWHC 2201. 
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which would have justified it.108  He did not discuss what would have sufficed 
to establish unconscionable conduct.  However, in view of the fact that the 
defendant (the claimant’s son) was – or must have been - aware of the facts 
that established her special disadvantage (she was deaf and poorly educated 
and he did not rate her powers of comprehension very highly109), his decision 
to proceed with knowledge of those facts was not unconscionable.  In Liddle v 
Cree110 the claimant sought to set aside a conveyance partitioning the parties’ 
property.  Between the date on which the transaction was substantially 
completed as between the parties and the date on which the conveyance was 
registered, the claimant’s health deteriorated to the point where he could be 
said to have suffered from a special disadvantage.  It was clear the defendant 
knew the claimant was very unwell.   Briggs J found the transaction was not 
oppressive.  He also found it was impossible to describe the defendant’s 
conduct as ‘taking unfair or unconscionable advantage of [the defendant] or … 
meeting the requirement that it should have been “morally reprehensible”.’111  
In reaching this conclusion, Briggs J was clearly influenced by the fact that the 
parties had substantially completed the deal three months earlier when the 
claimant was not so unwell.  From then on, the defendant kept the claimant 
informed about progress and at no time did she ‘receive any inkling’ from him 
that he was having second thoughts about the transaction because of his 
illness.112  Thus, it seems the defendant’s knowledge of the claimant’s ill health 
was not enough to make it unconscionable for her to go ahead with the 
contract: some sort of improper motive or harmful intention would have been 
necessary. 
 
Finally, in Evans v Lloyd113 Wynne, a poor and uneducated farm worker, made 
a gift of all his property to the defendants, on whose farm he had lived and 
worked all his life.  The parties treated each other as family.  After his death, 
his heirs at law sought to set aside the gift on the grounds of undue influence 
                                                
108 Ibid [106] (Rimer J). 
109 Ibid [46]. 
110 Liddle v Cree (n 18). 
111 Ibid [92] (Briggs J). 
112 Ibid. 
113 Evans v Lloyd [2013] EWHC 1725 (Ch). 
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and unconscionable bargain.   The court accepted that Wynne was at a special 
disadvantage, the gift was improvident and he had received no independent 
advice.  The defendants’ solicitor, who dealt with the transaction, said he 
regarded Wynne as his client.  It was also clear that Wynne wanted the 
defendants to take the property because he wanted it to be used productively 
and had good reason to think that if he left it to his siblings, this would not 
happen.  As far as the undue influence claim was concerned, HHJ Keyser QC 
held Wynne had clearly exercised an independent will and the gift could be 
explained by ordinary human motives (the desire to benefit people he regarded 
as family).114  Therefore, the burden did not fall on the defendants to rebut an 
inference of undue influence.  However, even if it had, he found that Wynne 
had made the gift on his own initiative ‘without the suggestion or bidding of 
the defendants, who are decent people and made no attempt to influence or 
direct his will.’115 In his view, the unconscionable bargain claim also failed.  
He held that ‘no finding of fact that I have made could support a finding that 
the defendants acted with sufficient moral culpability to justify the grant of 
relief’.116   In his view, the failure of the undue influence claim meant that the 
claimants could not ‘conceivably’ succeed on this ground.117  He did not say 
why, nor did he identify what would have sufficed to establish unconscionable 
conduct in the circumstances.  However, it was clear that the defendants’ 
acceptance of the gift despite knowledge of the facts establishing Wynne’s 
special disadvantage and the fact that he was giving them all his property in 
circumstances where he had not received independent advice was insufficient.   
This suggests a finding of unconscionable conduct would have required proof 
that the defendants had induced or persuaded Wynne to make the gift to them 
and/or harboured an improper or exploitative motive.  Arguably, this 
conclusion may have been driven by the fact that although, technically, Wynne 
suffered from a special disadvantage, in fact his consent was not materially 
distorted by it.   In light of the above, the meaning of ‘morally reprehensible’ 
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conduct in English law remains unclear but it does appear that active 
exploitation and/or an improper motive may be required. 
New Zealand Authority 
 
The use of the language of unconscionability by the New Zealand courts 
suggests that the defendant’s conduct is morally unacceptable simply because 
she accepts the claimant’s consent where she knows or has reason to know that 
it is defective.  Their approach therefore appears to be consistent with the early 
English authorities and the focus appears to be on the quality of consent, even 
though they sometimes use the language of advantage-taking.  In Bowkett v 
Action Finance Ltd118 Tipping J held that a defendant takes advantage of a 
claimant’s special disadvantage where there are ‘circumstances which are 
either known or ought to be known to the stronger party in which he has an 
obligation to say to the weaker party: no, I cannot in all conscience accept the 
benefit of this transaction in these circumstances either at all or unless you 
have full independent advice.’119   
 
In Gustav & Co Ltd v Macfield Ltd120 the New Zealand Court of Appeal cited 
with approval Tipping J’s words in Bowkett and held that ‘an unconscionable 
victimisation’ of the claimant would occur in the circumstances identified by 
him above.121  It held further that ‘the essential question is whether it is 
unconscionable to permit the stronger party to take the benefit of the 
bargain.’122  In its view, for a finding of unconscionability to be made, the 
defendant must know of the claimant’s special disadvantage and take 
advantage of it.  Actual or constructive knowledge will suffice for these 
purposes, and the absence of independent advice or the substantive unfairness 
of the bargain may suggest the defendant ought to have known about the 
special disadvantage.  On appeal,123 Tipping J approved the findings of the 
Court of Appeal.  He held that ‘Equity will intervene when one party in 
                                                
118 Bowkett v Action Finance Ltd [1992] 1 NZLR 499. 
119 Ibid 457 (Tipping J). 
120 Gustav & Co Ltd v Macfield Ltd (n 2) [30]. 
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entering into a transaction, unconscientiously takes advantage of the other.  
That will be so when the stronger party knows or ought to be aware, that the 
weaker party is unable adequately to look after his own interests and is acting 
to his detriment.  Equity will not allow the stronger party to procure or accept a 
transaction in these circumstances.’124  In Gustav the only question was 
whether the transaction could be rescinded and the court accepted that the 
contract could be rescinded if the defendant merely had reason to know of the 
claimant’s special disadvantage: this does not suggest that wrongful conduct is 
required.  
Australian Authority 
 
Until recently the Australian courts were prepared to grant rescission not only 
in cases of active exploitation125 but also where the defendant accepted the 
claimant’s consent with actual or constructive knowledge of her special 
disadvantage.  Thus, in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio126 a bank 
accepted a mortgage from two elderly immigrants as guarantee for their son’s 
company’s debts, knowing they were not proficient in written English and had 
not received any independent advice about the transaction.  This was sufficient 
to justify setting the transaction aside.  Mason J characterised unconscionable 
bargains as concerned with the defendant’s ‘unconscientiously taking 
advantage’ of the fact that the claimant was at a special disadvantage.127   He 
held that if the defendant knows or ought to know of the claimant’s special 
disadvantage adversely affecting the claimant’s ability to judge what is in her 
own interests and ‘takes advantage of [her] superior bargaining power or 
position by entering into that transaction, [her] conduct in doing so is 
unconscionable.’128  In other words, the defendant’s conduct may be 
unconscionable simply because she enters into the transaction despite her 
knowledge of the claimant’s disability.  This is consistent with the approach of 
the early English and New Zealand authorities. 
                                                
124 Ibid [6] (Tipping J); also Nicholls v Jessup [1986] 1 NZLR 226 (NZCA), 235 (Cooke P).  
125 Louth v Diprose (n 21); Maher v Honeysett & Maher Electrical Contractors Pty Ltd [2007] 
NSWSC 12.  
126 The Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (n 2). 
127 Ibid 461 (Mason J). 
128 Ibid 467. 
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As in the early English cases, Deane J used the language of unfair advantage-
taking, but not so as to require proof of an improper motive.  In his view, the 
doctrine ‘looks to the conduct of the stronger party in attempting to enforce, or 
retain the benefit of, a dealing with a person under a special disability in 
circumstances where it is not consistent with equity or good conscience that he 
should do so.’129  He accepted that where the claimant’s special disadvantage 
‘was sufficiently evident to [the defendant] to make it prima facie unfair or 
“unconscientious” that he procure, or accept, the [claimant’s] consent to the 
impugned transaction in the circumstances in which he procured or accepted it 
… an onus is cast on the [defendant] to show that the transaction was fair, just 
and reasonable.’130   He emphasised that there was no suggestion that anyone at 
the bank was ‘guilty of dishonesty or moral obliquity’ in their dealings with 
the elderly couple.131  However, the evidence showed that it was apparent to 
the bank that Mr and Mrs Amadio required advice and assistance and it was 
therefore ‘prima facie unfair and “unconscientious” of the bank to procure 
their signature on the guarantee/mortgage’132 without having made sure they 
received such advice in circumstances where the transaction was manifestly 
unfair to them.133   
 
A concern for the quality of the claimant’s consent was also evident in ACCC v 
Samton Holdings Pty Ltd.134  The court held that ‘[C]haracterisation of 
disadvantage as “special” involves the recognition that it would be 
unconscionable knowingly to deal with the person so affected without regard 
to his or her disability.’135  Therefore ‘conscientious dealing’ may require that 
the defendant take steps (e.g. through the provision of independent advice), 
‘which will either enable [the claimant to have] a proper understanding of the 
transaction or overcome the disadvantage arising from a want of proper 
                                                
129 Ibid 474 (Deane J). 
130 Ibid 474. 
131 Ibid 478.  Also Blomley v Ryan (n 11) 429 (Kitto J, dissenting, but not on this point); Louth 
v Diprose (n 21) 637 (Deane J). 
132 The Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio  (n 2) 479 (Deane J), citing Fry v Lane (n 
7). 
133 Ibid 466 (Mason J). 
134 ACCC v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd (n 22). 
135 Ibid [100] (judgment of court). 
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understanding.’136  This is redolent of some of the early English and New 
Zealand cases and Amadio.  It suggests that the defendant behaves 
unconscientiously by failing to comply with some sort of (moral) obligation to 
encourage the claimant to take independent advice.  This duty has been 
variously characterised as a duty to ensure the claimant is in a position to make 
‘an independent and informed judgement’137 and a duty to take reasonable 
steps to protect the claimant from foreseeable transactional harm.138  
 
The recent decision of the High Court of Australia in Kakavas v Crown 
Melbourne Ltd139 marked a change in direction.  In its view, proof of a 
‘predatory’ intention on the part of the defendant is required before a finding 
of unconscionable conduct will be made, at least where the claimant seeks 
compensation rather than rescission.   The claimant was a pathological gambler 
who lost $20.5 million playing baccarat at the defendant’s casino.  He alleged 
that his gambling addiction meant that he was under a special disadvantage, 
the defendant knew about it and nevertheless actively induced him to gamble 
by offering rebates on losses and transport on its private jet.  He sought 
damages under s.82 of the Trade Practices Act 1974, further or alternatively 
equitable compensation for his losses, which he said resulted from the 
defendant’s unconscionable exploitation of his special disadvantage.140  The 
availability of equitable compensation for unconscionable conduct does not 
seem to have been questioned at any stage of the proceedings.  However, the 
claim failed.  The court accepted that the claimant suffered from a special 
disadvantage in the form of a gambling addiction, which made him susceptible 
to exploitation.  It went on to reject the argument that the defendant had 
behaved unconscionably, in circumstances where it did not have actual 
knowledge of the claimant’s special disadvantage. It reinterpreted Amadio as 
consistent with a requirement of actual knowledge, because in that case it had 
been evident that the bank had wilfully ignored the fact that the Amadios 
                                                
136 Ibid. 
137 Hardingham (n 48) 18. 
138 Bigwood, ‘Contracts by Unfair Advantage: from Exploitation to Transactional Neglect’ (n 
6). 
139 Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd (n 3). 
140 Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd [2012] VSCA 95, [10]-[11] (Mandie JA). 
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needed advice.  The court concluded that ‘equitable intervention to deprive a 
party of the benefit of its bargain on the basis that it was procured by unfair 
exploitation of the weakness of the other party requires proof of a predatory 
state of mind’.141 In its view, ‘mere inadvertence, or even indifference’ to the 
circumstances of the claimant in an arm’s length commercial transaction ‘falls 
short of the victimisation or exploitation with which the principle is 
concerned’, but proof of actual knowledge would suffice.142  The language 
used by the court suggests that it regarded proof of a predatory state of mind as 
a necessary element of unconscionable bargains generally, irrespective of the 
type of relief sought. 
 
It is clear from the authorities discussed above that the courts have two 
concerns: to ensure the claimant is in a position to consent freely and 
independently to the transaction and to prevent wrongful conduct by the 
defendant.  The authorities demonstrate that the language of unconscionability 
is consistent with both principles.   On the one hand, we can say it is morally 
unacceptable for the defendant to accept or seek to uphold a contract she 
knows to be the product of defective consent.  This suggests that 
unconscionable bargains are concerned with ensuring the claimant is not bound 
by a contract to which she did not properly consent.  As in the case of 
unilateral mistake, the defendant’s knowledge is relevant because it makes it 
unreasonable for her to rely on the appearance of consensus and thus it is not 
unfair to disable her from enforcing the contract.  On the other hand, we can 
say it is morally unacceptable for the defendant to exploit the claimant’s 
weakness.  The use of the language of unconscionability in this way suggests 
that the doctrine is principally concerned with denying the defendant a 
wrongful gain, rather than protecting the claimant’s autonomy.  Here, the 
defendant’s knowledge goes to the question of whether she is subject to a duty 
to the claimant and/or harbours an exploitative intention.  The unreflective 
invocation of the language of unconscionability in the authorities is unhelpful 
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because it tends to obscure the distinction between the two separate moral 
principles in play. 
Unconscionability – Doctrinal Function 
 
The explanatory force of the language of unconscionability within the doctrine 
of unconscionable bargains is very limited.  Where the claimant seeks only to 
rescind the contract, then although the defendant may have harboured an 
exploitative intention towards her, it should be unnecessary to prove this in 
order to obtain relief.  The claimant may be excused from performing an 
obligation to which she did not properly consent, irrespective of whether that 
obligation was also the product of a wrong committed by the defendant.   By 
analogy with unilateral mistake, where the claimant’s consent is impaired or 
distorted by her special disadvantage, this is sufficient to justify rescission, as 
long she can show that the defendant knew or ought to have known about her 
special disadvantage at the time the contract was formed.  The only relevance 
of the defendant’s knowledge is that it makes it unreasonable for her to rely on 
the appearance of consent and therefore displaces her interest in security of 
receipt,143 so that it is not unfair to disable her from enforcing the contract.  
Some of the cases seem to suggest that the defendant’s knowledge of the 
claimant’s special disadvantage may trigger some sort of moral obligation to 
ensure she has the benefit of independent advice before proceeding with the 
transaction, the breach of which might be described as unconscionable.  It is 
questionable whether such an obligation arises or if it does, whether it is a real 
obligation, as the effect of the defendant’s failure to discharge it is merely 
disabling.    In any event, even if it does arise, arguably it is unnecessary to 
justify rescission, as the defendant’s knowledge is sufficient for this purpose.  
There is no sense in which equity is requiring the defendant to take steps to 
comply with a particular moral standard.  Therefore, the language of 
conscience adds nothing to our understanding of why rescission is granted.   
 
                                                
143 Rickett (n 9) 78. 
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If the claimant seeks compensation or disgorgement of profits, such relief 
cannot be justified by reference to the claimant’s lack of consent.  Rather, she 
must show that the defendant has committed a wrong, i.e. a breach of a pre-
existing duty.144  Here again, the explanatory force of the language of 
conscience is limited.  It can remind us that it is morally unacceptable to 
breach a duty or an obligation, but it cannot tell us what the content of the 
obligation/duty is145 and thus what conduct will constitute a breach of it.  To 
answer these questions we need direct argument as to the principles that justify 
the imposition of the duty in the first place.   It is true that the language of 
conscience reminds us that the defendant will not come under any such duty 
absent knowledge of the facts.  However, by contrast with e.g., trust 
obligations, the degree of knowledge that the defendant must have in order to 
come under a duty not to exploit the claimant’s special disadvantage is very 
limited.  All she needs to know is that the claimant suffers from such 
vulnerability.   Therefore, we do not need to enquire into the state of the 
defendant’s knowledge to the same extent, and so the idea of conscience plays 
a much less prominent role.  The bigger and more important question is what 
sorts of conduct are morally unacceptable in this context and we cannot answer 
this question simply by invoking the notion of unconscionability.  
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that the role of unconscionability in 
unconscionable bargains is limited.  In principle, it plays no positive 
explanatory role where the only question is whether rescission is justified.  
Where the relief sought depends on wrongdoing, its explanatory force is 
limited to reminding us that it is morally unacceptable to breach a pre-existing 
duty, but it does not tell us anything about the content of the duty or what sort 
of behaviour will constitute a breach of it.   As English law stands, it is 
necessary to prove that the claimant’s consent was produced ‘by malign means 
of an intention to act’146 even where the only remedy in question is rescission.  
                                                
144 P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 2005) 21; Rickett (n 9) 77. 
145 Rickett (n 9) 77-8. 
146 Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 315 (HCA), 325. 
208 
 
There may be at least two reasons why this is the case.  First, it seems that the 
nineteenth century treatise writers did little to reinterpret this area of law 
consistently with will theory, so that the significance of the consent principle 
in unconscionable bargains has perhaps been underplayed.147   Secondly, the 
English courts’ approach may reflect the view that the defendant’s interest in 
security of receipt should be afforded greater protection than the principled 
approach allows.  If this concern is justified, arguably there are better ways to 
address it than through recourse to the language of unconscionability.  For 
example, the courts could refine the special disadvantage requirement to 
ensure it involves a rigorous enquiry as to whether the claimant’s consent was 
in fact impaired or distorted.  If the claimant’s consent is impaired, then in 
principle, if the defendant knows or has reason to know about it, this should 
displace her interest in security of receipt.     
 
At the moment, even in the wake of Kavakas, any classification of 
unconscionable conduct as a wrong ‘is flawed by the absence of reliable 
indicators of what constitutes a wrong for this purpose’.148  Therefore, if the 
English courts are faced with a similar issue, it is imperative they consider 
questions relating to the content of the duty and what sorts of conduct are 
legitimate in these settings.  The last question will require consideration of 
whether any such wrong is concerned only with the process of contract 
formation149 and/or harm to the claimant’s welfare interests, and whether it is 
to be of more general application in cases where the defendant knows the 
claimant’s consent has been impaired (for whatever reason).  Careful 
consideration would also need to be given to the impact the recognition of such 
a duty would have on transactions generally.150  
                                                
147 W. Swain, ‘Reshaping Contractual Unfairness in England 1670-1900’ (2014) 35 J Legal 
Hist 120, 141. 
148 M. Bryan, ‘Unconscionable Conduct as an Unjust Factor’ in S. Degeling and J. Edelman 
(eds), Unjust Enrichment in Commercial Law (Thomson 2008) 303. 
149  This form of exploitation focuses on the processes by which the contract is formed rather 
than the infringement of the claimant’s welfare rights:  Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (n 5) 
249; R. Bigwood, ‘Ill-Gotten Contracts in New Zealand:  Parting Thoughts on Duress, Undue 
Influence and Unconscionable Dealing - Kiwi-Style’ (2011) 42 Victoria U Wellington L Rev 
83, 113; Bigwood, ‘Still Curbing Unconscionability: Kakavas in the High Court of Australia’ 
(n 6) 495. 
150 Rickett (n 9) 78. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONSCIENCE, LAWFUL ACT DURESS AND 
UNDUE INFLUENCE  
INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter considers the meaning and function of conscience in the common 
law doctrine of lawful act duress and the equitable doctrine of undue influence, 
which offer relief where the claimant confers a benefit or enters into a contract 
as a result of pressure or influence applied by the defendant.  Pressure takes 
many forms: for example, the defendant may threaten to harm the claimant 
physically unless she agrees to her demand1 or she may simply threaten to 
harm the claimant’s economic interests.  In the latter case, the pressure is 
referred to as economic duress and this category of pressure is further sub-
divided into threats to do something unlawful and threats to do something 
lawful (lawful act duress), such as a refusal by a shareholder to consent to a 
transfer of shares.2  In a case of lawful act duress, relief will not be granted 
unless the court ‘the pressure involved in the defendant’s threatening to do that 
which it is clearly entitled to do, was in all the circumstances unconscionable’.3  
Influence may also be exercised in different ways: the defendant may actively 
dominate the claimant4 (actual undue influence) or the influence may arise by 
virtue of their relationship, e.g. where the claimant relies entirely on the 
defendant to manage her financial affairs5 (presumed undue influence).  The 
courts frequently use the language of conscience and unconscionability in their 
efforts to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable influence.  Thus, it 
is said that ‘[i]t is only when [influence] becomes unconscionable that the 
court can and should interfere.’6   
                                                
1 Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104. 
2 Borrelli v Ting [2010] UKPC 21, [2010] Bus LR 1718. 
3 Alf Vaughan & Co Ltd (In Receivership) v Royscot Trust Plc [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 856 
(Ch), 863 (Judge Rich QC). 
4 Bank of Credit and Commerce International v Aboody [1990] 1 QB 923 (CA). 
5 Pesticcio v Huet [2004] EWCA Civ 372, noted N. Enonchong, ‘Presumed Undue Influence: 
Continuing Misconceptions’ (2005) 121 LQR 29. 
6 Meredith v Lackschewitz-Martin [2002] All ER (D) 20 (Jun) (Ch), [32] (David Mackie QC). 
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Where the courts use the language of conscience and unconscionability, it 
bears its ordinary meaning: they are making judgments about the moral quality 
of the defendant’s behaviour and/or outcomes.   Although the language of 
conscience reminds us that moral principles underpin both doctrines, beyond 
this its function is very limited.  The language of unconscionability plays no 
necessary explanatory role in lawful act duress as a matter of principle.  
However, the courts invoke it in order to limit the circumstances in which 
coercive pressure will entitle the claimant to escape her obligations in a 
commercial context.  As far as undue influence is concerned, the explanatory 
force of the language of conscience depends on the type of relief sought.  
Where the claimant seeks to rescind the transaction, the language of 
conscience adds nothing to our understanding of why relief is granted.  
However, if and insofar as the courts are prepared to treat undue influence as 
an equitable wrong, the language of conscience plays a discernible but limited 
explanatory role.   It reminds us that relief depends on the defendant’s breach 
of a pre-existing moral obligation of which she had reason to know through the 
operation of her conscience, i.e. as a result of the application of her innate 
moral understanding to her knowledge of the relevant facts.  
CONSCIENCE AND LAWFUL ACT DURESS  
Cause of Action and Rationale 
 
Smith suggests there are two distinct, ‘even if often factually overlapping’7 
moral principles that may explain relief where the defendant extracts a 
payment or a bargain through the exercise of pressure.  He gives the example 
of a contract signed at gunpoint and argues that one reason for not enforcing it 
may be that ‘the person seeking enforcement … is seeking to enforce an 
obligation obtained by his or her own wrongdoing.  A second reason for not 
enforcing the agreement is that the person denying the contract’s validity … 
did not consent to the contract.’8   Consistently with this suggestion, duress 
may give rise to two distinct types of relief.  First, the claimant may seek 
                                                
7 S. Smith, ‘Contracting Under Pressure: A Theory of Duress’ (1997) 56 CLJ 343, 344. 
8 Ibid. 
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restitution of a benefit conferred or to rescind a contract entered into as a result 
of duress.  Secondly, she may have a right to recover damages if the 
defendant’s conduct also constitutes a legal wrong, such as the tort of 
intimidation.9  
 
As the law stands, the test for establishing economic duress is the same, 
irrespective of the nature of the threat and the type of relief sought by the 
claimant.  It involves two questions: did the pressure exercised by the 
defendant have a coercive effect on the claimant and was it pressure of a kind 
that the law regards as illegitimate?10   The first question is whether the 
pressure distorted her consent in such a way that it should not be treated as 
voluntary.  Here ‘voluntarily’ does not simply mean ‘willingly’.11  Rather, the 
claimant’s consent is involuntary if it was the product of ‘unwarrantedly 
constrained or deflected volition’.12  For the purposes of duress to the person, 
the courts ask only whether the pressure was a cause of the claimant’s decision 
to enter into the contract.13  The courts seem to lean towards a tougher 
causation test in cases of economic duress, asking whether the pressure was a 
significant or dominant cause.14   Although the validity of the stricter test has 
been doubted,15 it is clear that when working out whether lawful economic 
pressure is coercive, the courts usually have regard to whether its effect on the 
claimant in the context of her relationship with the defendant was to cut off her 
options in such a way that she had no practical alternative but to consent.16   
                                                
9 E. McKendrick, ‘The Further Travails of Duress’ in A. Burrows and A. Rodger (eds), 
Mapping the Law: Essays in Memory of Peter Birks (Oxford University Press 2006) 196; 
Kolmar Group AG v Traxpo Enterprises Pvt Ltd [2010] EWHC 113, [2010] 1 CLC 256, 281, 
[119]-[120] (Christopher Clarke J).  Cf. H. Carty, An Analysis of the Economic Torts (2nd edn, 
Oxford University Press 2010) 119-20. 
10 Universe Tankships of Monrovia Inc v ITWF [1983] AC 366 (HL), 400 (Lord Scarman); R v 
Attorney General of England and Wales [2003] UKPC 22, [15] (Lord Hoffmann). 
11 Mason v New South Wales (1959) HCA 5, [4] (Kitto J), [12] (Windeyer J). 
12 R. Bigwood, ‘Coercion in Contract: The Theoretical Constructs of Duress’ (1996) 46 UTLJ 
172, 207. 
13 Barton v Armstrong (n 1), 120 (Lord Cross), 121 (Lords Wilberforce and Simon).  
14 Dimskal Shipping Co SA v ITWF [1992] 2 AC 152 (HL), 166-7 (Lord Goff); Huyton SA v 
Peter Cremer GmbH & Co [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep 620; [1999] CLC 230 (QB), 250 (Mance J). 
15 P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (revised edn, 1989), 180-1, 183; 
McKendrick (n 9) 186-7; A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press 2010) 
270. 
16 Universe Tankships of Monrovia Inc v ITWF (n 10) 400; Dimskal Shipping Co SA v ITWF (n 
14) 166 (Lord Goff); DSND Subsea Ltd (formerly DSND Oceantech Ltd) v Petroleum Geo 
Services ASA [2000] BLR 530 (QB (TCC)), [131] (Dyson J); Carillion Construction Ltd v 
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The illegitimacy of the pressure is established by reference to the quality of the 
defendant’s conduct at the time of the transaction.  For the purposes of duress 
generally, where the defendant threatens to do something unlawful, i.e. commit 
a legal wrong in the form of a tort or a crime, the unlawfulness of the threat is 
usually sufficient to render the pressure illegitimate.17  However, the courts 
treat economic pressure differently.  Even though a threat to break a contract is 
a threat to do something unlawful,18 the courts take the view that it does not 
automatically constitute illegitimate pressure. Broadly speaking, it seems to be 
accepted that the illegitimacy of the pressure is determined by reference to 
whether the threat was made because the defendant ‘intended to exploit the 
plaintiff’s weakness rather than to solve financial or other problems of the 
defendant.’19  The pressure is not illegitimate if she acts in good faith in order 
to further her legitimate business interests.20  For the pressure to be illegitimate, 
it seems that at the very least the defendant must know that ‘it would be in 
breach of contract if the threat were implemented’21 and in many of the cases 
where relief has been granted, the threat was made in bad faith.22   This view 
seems to be based on the idea that parties should be free to exert commercial 
pressure to renegotiate bargains where necessary,23 although the 
                                                
Felix (UK) Ltd [2000] BLR 1 (QB (TCC)), [24] (Dyson J); Kolmar Group AG v Traxpo 
Enterprises Pvt Ltd (n 9) 275, [92] (Christopher Clarke J); Borrelli v Ting (n 2), 1727-8 [31] 
(Lord Saville); Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd v Tube City IMS LLC [2012] EWHC 273 (Comm), 
[40] (Cooke J). 
17 Universe Tankships of Monrovia Inc v ITWF (n 10) 401 (Lord Scarman); R v Attorney 
General of England and Wales (n 10) [16] (Lord Hoffmann). 
18 Burrows (n 15) 277. 
19 Birks (n 15) 183; Burrows (n 15) 273-5.  Similar explanations are put forward by M. 
Ogilvie, ‘Economic Duress, Inequality of Bargaining Power and Threatened Breach of 
Contract’ (1981) 26 McGill LJ 289; R. Halson, ‘Opportunism, Economic Duress and 
Contractual Modifications’ (1991) 107 LQR 649; Bigwood (n 12) 245; R. Bigwood, 
Exploitative Contracts (Oxford University Press 2003) 334-5. 
20 DSND Subsea Ltd (formerly DSND Oceantech Ltd) v Petroleum Geo Services ASA (n 16), 
[65]-[66] (Dyson J). 
21 Kolmar Group AG v Traxpo Enterprises Pvt Ltd (n 9) 275, [92] (Christopher Clarke J).   
Arguably, North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Hyundai Construction Ltd [1979] 1 QB 705 may be 
justified on this ground.  It was clear the defendant knew there was no justification for its 
demand that the claimant pay more than the contractually agreed price: ibid 708. 
22 D & C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 QB 617, 625 (Lord Denning MR), 626 (Danckwerts 
LJ); B&S Contracts and Design Ltd v Victor Green Publications Ltd [1984] ICR 419 (CA), 
426 (Griffiths LJ); Carillion Construction Ltd v Felix (UK) Ltd (n 16) [37], [39] (Dyson J); 
Burrows (n 15) 273-5. 
23 Burrows (n 15) 275. 
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appropriateness of the bad faith requirement has been doubted.24   By 
definition, a threat to do something lawful is not a threat to commit a legal 
wrong and it does not automatically constitute illegitimate pressure either.  
When the courts are determining whether a threat to do something lawful is 
illegitimate, they apply a similar test to that adopted where the threat is to 
break a contract, but they use the language of unconscionability to describe it.    
Unconscionability – Meaning 
 
When the courts use the language of unconscionability in lawful act duress, it 
bears its ordinary meaning: the courts are judging the moral quality of the 
defendant’s behaviour.  Because the illegitimacy of the pressure does not 
depend on its legality, it has been held that ‘the critical inquiry is not whether 
the conduct is lawful but whether it is morally or socially unacceptable’25 and 
‘as the law stands it is essential that the threat must, if not tortious in itself, at 
least be immoral or unconscionable’ before it would be characterised as 
illegitimate pressure.26   In other words, it is accepted that the courts are 
applying ‘a standard of impropriety’.27  
Unconscionability, Morally Unacceptable Conduct and the Principles by 
Which it is Judged 
 
Of itself, the language of unconscionability does not tell us what sort of 
conduct counts as morally unacceptable or the moral principle by which this is 
judged.  Enonchong has argued that the legitimacy of the pressure in lawful act 
duress cases depends on four factors: whether the threat constitutes an abuse of 
the legal process, whether the demand is made in bad faith and is 
unreasonable, and whether the threat is ‘considered unconscionable in light of 
                                                
24 Bigwood, ‘Coercion in Contract: The Theoretical Constructs of Duress’ (n 12) 251; 
Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (n 19) 340 (on the basis that it suggest that contractual rights 
are less important than other rights); McKendrick (n 9) 188-9 (on the basis that we do not 
distinguish between good and bad faith breaches of contract). 
25 CTN Cash & Carry Ltd v Gallaher Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 714 (CA), 719 (Steyn LJ). 
26 Alf Vaughan & Co Ltd (In Receivership) v Royscot Trust Plc (n 3 ) 863 (Judge Rich QC). 
27 Birks (n 15) 177. 
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all the circumstances.’28  He accepts that these requirements can overlap but 
treats them separately for the purposes of analysis.29  The position taken here is 
that unconscionability is not a separate requirement: unconscionable is simply 
a synonym for morally unacceptable. The cases suggest that the defendant’s 
motive is crucial to a finding as to whether her conduct in exerting the pressure 
was unconscionable.30  For example, if she makes the threat in good faith and 
in support of a reasonable demand, a finding of unconscionable conduct is 
highly unlikely.  Conversely, if the defendant deliberately manoeuvres the 
claimant into a position where she has no option but to agree to a demand, 
which the defendant knows to be inimical to her interests,31 her conduct is 
much more likely to be described as morally unacceptable.   
 
Where the defendant threatens to do something lawful in support of a demand, 
which is reasonable within the context of the parties’ relationship,32 her 
conduct is not usually treated as morally unacceptable.33  CTN Cash and Carry 
Ltd v Gallaher Ltd34 also establishes that there will be no finding that the 
defendant’s conduct is morally unacceptable even if the demand is 
unreasonable, as long as she acts in good faith, i.e. genuinely believing it to be 
reasonable.  The defendants mistakenly but genuinely believed the claimants 
bore the risk of theft of a consignment of cigarettes and threatened to withdraw 
discretionary credit facilities unless the claimants reimbursed them for the 
                                                
28 N. Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionability (Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 
25-6, [3-022]. 
29 Ibid 26. 
30 Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co (n 14) 251 (Mance J), emphasising the importance 
of good or bad faith. 
31 E.g. Re Blythe (1881) 17 Ch D 480 (CA), 488 (James LJ), 490 (Brett LJ), 492 (Cotton LJ); 
and Duke de Cadaval v Collins (1836) 4 Ad & E 858; 111 ER 1006.  These cases are often 
referred to as resting on the defendant’s abuse of the legal process: N. Enonchong, Duress, 
Undue Influence and Unconscionability (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 47-9, [3-028]-[3-
029]. 
32 Alf Vaughan & Co Ltd (In Receivership) v Royscot Trust Plc (n 3). Enonchong, Duress, 
Undue Influence and Unconscionability (n 31) 53, [3-033] explains the outcome of this case 
on this basis.  Arguably it is also explicable on the basis that in reality the claimant did have a 
realistic alternative to submitting to the demand because it could and should have commenced 
a timely application for relief against forfeiture.  
33 Parras Holdings Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1999] FCA 391 (demand 
made in order to protect the defendant’s legitimate interest in obtaining sufficient security for 
loans granted to the claimants; R v Attorney General of England and Wales (n 10) (demand 
made in order to protect the defendant’s legitimate interest in preserving operational security). 
34 CTN Cash & Carry Ltd v Gallaher Ltd  (n 25). 
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value of the consignment after it had been stolen.   The court held that the 
circumstances in which lawful act duress would arise would be rare, the 
relevant question was whether the defendant’s conduct was ‘morally or 
socially unacceptable’ and ‘it might be particularly difficult to establish duress 
if the defendant bona fide considered that his demand was valid’.35  The critical 
factor militating against a finding of lawful act duress seems to have been that 
‘the defendants bona fide thought that the goods were at the risk of the 
plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs owed the defendants the sum in question … 
The defendants’ motive in threatening withdrawal of credit facilities was 
commercial self-interest in obtaining a sum that they considered due to them’.36  
 
Three recent cases in which lawful act duress claims succeeded support the 
view that the defendant’s conduct is morally unacceptable if she acts with an 
improper motive, i.e. by deliberately putting the claimant in a position where 
she has no realistic option but to agree to a bargain, which the defendant 
knows is inimical to the claimant’s interests.  The first case is Tam Tak Chuen 
v Khairul bin Abdul Rahman.37  The parties were partners in a medical 
practice.  Their relationship broke down because the defendant suspected the 
claimant of having an affair with a member of staff; the claimant denied it but 
the defendant obtained video footage which confirmed his suspicions.  He 
threatened to use the footage as evidence in support of a petition for the 
compulsory winding up of the business unless the claimant agreed to sell him 
his shares at an undervalue.   The claimant succeeded in setting aside the sale 
agreement on the basis of lawful act duress.  The court accepted that the effect 
of the threat was to distort the claimant’s consent.38  The court held that three 
separate factors were relevant to whether the pressure was illegitimate: the 
reasonableness of the demand, whether it was made bona fide and whether the 
threat was unconscionable in all the circumstances.39  The court found the 
demand was clearly unreasonable as it required sale of the claimant’s shares at 
                                                
35 Ibid 719 (Steyn LJ). 
36 Ibid.  
37 Tam Tak Chuen v Khairul bin Abdul Rahman [2009] 2 SLR 240 (SCA) . 
38 Ibid [71] (Prakash J). 
39 Ibid [50], citing Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionability (n 28) 26, [3-
022].  
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an undervalue.  It held further that the defendant was ‘acting with a collateral 
motive and the presence of that motive made the threat illegitimate’.40  The 
demand was unreasonable because it was at an undervalue.  The circumstances 
in which the demand was made were ‘unconscionable’ because the defendant 
sprang it on the claimant without any notice at a meeting late at night, which 
appeared to have been called for a different, anodyne purpose, ‘in a way that 
was calculated to unnerve’ him and making clear that the only option he was 
willing to accept that would not have resulted in publication of the footage was 
sale of the claimant’s shares to him at an undervalue.41   The defendant’s 
conduct was described as unconscionable because he clearly acted with an 
improper motive.  The invocation of unconscionability as a separate 
requirement distracts from the fact that it is merely a synonym for morally 
unacceptable conduct and is therefore unhelpful.   The case supports the view 
that the defendant’s conduct will be morally unacceptable if she acts with an 
improper motive, i.e. not to protect her own legitimate business interests but to 
extract a bargain, which she knows is inimical to the claimant’s interests.  
 
In Borrelli v Ting42 Ting had been the CEO of A Ltd, which had collapsed with 
net liabilities of over HK $1 billion.  The liquidators had been unable to 
investigate A Ltd’s affairs properly because of a lack of funds and Ting’s 
obstructive behaviour.  They sought to transfer A Ltd’s shares to another 
company in order to raise funds to continue the liquidation and sought the 
consent of A Ltd’s shareholders, who included Ting and B Ltd and C Ltd (two 
companies which he controlled), for this purpose. Ting arranged for the 
relevant board resolutions to be forged, so that B Ltd and C Ltd opposed the 
scheme.  He also got an employee to swear an affidavit to the effect that the 
signatures were genuine.  The liquidators applied to the court to disallow the 
votes but opposition to the proceedings by Ting, B Ltd and C Ltd meant the 
liquidators’ application would not be heard before the deadline for the 
scheme’s approval.  Ting, B Ltd and C Ltd then offered to discontinue their 
opposition to the scheme as long as the liquidators dropped all claims against 
                                                
40 Tam Tak Chuen v Khairul bin Abdul Rahman (n 37) [57] (Prakash J). 
41 Ibid [59]. 
42 Borrelli v Ting (n 2). 
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him.  The liquidators agreed and entered into the relevant settlement agreement 
but subsequently discovered evidence that suggested that Ting had 
misappropriated substantial funds from A Ltd.   
 
The Privy Council held the settlement agreement was voidable for economic 
duress.  Lord Saville found that Ting had the liquidators ‘over a barrel’ in that 
he had left them with no reasonable or practical alternative but to offer him the 
release because their only other option was to give up the scheme, which 
represented the only real prospect of obtaining something for the creditors of A 
Ltd.43  He also held that the pressure exerted by Ting was illegitimate.  
Relevant to this finding was the fact that Ting’s (lawful) opposition to the 
scheme was not made in good faith, but for an improper motive’44 and ‘for 
purely personal and selfish reasons’.45  His ‘failure to provide any assistance to 
the liquidators; his opposition to the scheme; and his resort to forgery and false 
evidence in order to further that opposition amount to unconscionable conduct 
on his part.’46  Thus, the term ‘unconscionable’ applied to unlawful conduct 
and lawful conduct (the opposition to the scheme was not per se unlawful).  
When Ting agreed to withdraw opposition to the scheme, he did ‘no more than 
he should have done from the outset, had he acted in good faith rather than in 
an attempt to avoid responsibility for his conduct of the affairs of [A Ltd].’  
For these reasons Lord Saville concluded that ‘it would offend justice’ to allow 
Ting to rely on the settlement agreement in order to defeat the liquidators’ 
claims.47  Here again, the key seems to have been the defendant’s motives: he 
was not acting in order to protect his legitimate business interests, but rather to 
escape liability for his own misconduct.  Therefore, he was deliberately 
manoeuvring the claimants into a position where they had no option but to 
consent to a demand, which he knew to be unreasonable and inimical to their 
interests. 
 
                                                
43 Ibid 1727-1728, [31]. 
44 Ibid 1727, [28]. 
45 Ibid 1728, [32], [35]. 
46 Ibid 1728, [32]. 
47 Ibid 1728, [33]. 
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Finally, in Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd v Tube City IMS48 the owners of a ship 
chartered it to the respondents to carry a cargo of scrap metal to China.  In 
breach of the charter, the owners chartered the ship to a third party and told the 
respondents they would provide a substitute vessel and compensate them for 
any losses flowing from their failure to provide the contracted vessel on time. 
The respondents relied on these assurances, did not look for another vessel and 
renegotiated their delivery date, which required them to discount the price 
payable by the Chinese recipients of the scrap by $8 per ton.  They sought to 
pass the discount onto the owners.  The owners responded by threatening not 
to provide a substitute vessel unless the respondents agreed to drop all claims 
against them arising out of the breach of contract and accept compensation of 
$2 per ton in respect of the discount on the scrap metal price. The respondents 
entered into a compromise agreement on those terms, which they subsequently 
succeeded in rescinding at arbitration on the ground of economic duress.   
 
On appeal, Cooke J rejected the owner’s argument that if a threat to do 
something lawful were to constitute illegitimate pressure, this should only be 
the case where the threat ‘provoked such a sense of moral outrage and 
appeared so unconscionable or so manifestly beyond the norms of ordinary 
commercial practice that it could be considered on a par with conduct that the 
law does expressly recognise as illegal or criminal.’49  In his view, each case 
would turn on its facts, but ‘the more serious the impropriety and the greater 
the moral obloquy which attaches to the conduct, the more likely the pressure 
is to be seen as illegitimate.’50 He held the threat not to provide a substitute 
vessel did constitute illegitimate pressure.  The previous breach of contract by 
the owners was ‘the root cause of the problem’51 and ‘their continuing conduct 
after that was designed to put the Charterers in a position where they had no 
option but to settlement the agreement … and avoid further huge losses on the 
sale contract to the Chinese receivers.’52  Although the arbitrators made no 
                                                
48 Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd v Tube City IMS LLC (n 16); noted, R. Ahdar, ‘Contract 
Doctrine, Predictability and the Nebulous Exception’ (2014) 73 CLJ 39. 
49 Progress Bulk Carriers Ltd v Tube City IMS LLC (n 16) [22] (Cooke J). 
50 Ibid [43]. 
51 Ibid [39]. 
52 Ibid [39]. 
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express finding of bad faith, it was clear they held the view that the owners 
‘had manoeuvred the Charterers into the position they were in, following the 
breach, in order to drive a hard bargain.’53   In light of these cases, it seems that 
the defendant’s conduct will be unconscionable if she makes the threat in order 
to coerce the claimant into agreeing to a demand, which she knows to be 
substantively unfair or unreasonable.  In other words, an improper motive or an 
intention to do harm seems to be required.  The use of the language of 
unconscionability in this way suggests a concern to prevent wrongdoing rather 
than merely to ensure the claimant’s consent is not distorted by pressure.   
Unconscionability – Doctrinal Function   
 
Arguably, in principle the language of unconscionability plays no necessary 
explanatory role in lawful act duress.   Because no legal wrong has been 
committed, relief for wrongdoing is unavailable.  Therefore, the only question 
is whether the claimant may rescind the transaction.  The doctrines of mistake 
and misrepresentation demonstrate that the claimant may rescind a contract on 
the basis of defective consent, as long as the defendant either knew about or 
caused the problem with the claimant’s consent, respectively.  By analogy with 
misrepresentation, the fact that the threat caused the distortion or impairment 
of the claimant’s consent is sufficient to make it unreasonable for the 
defendant to rely on the appearance of consensus.  Therefore, it is not unfair to 
disable her from enforcing the contract.   Although the defendant may also be 
acting in bad faith, strictly speaking this is unnecessary to justify relief: the 
consent principle alone can do the justificatory work.54   Therefore, we do not 
need to have recourse to the language of unconscionability to explain 
rescission for lawful act duress.  Nevertheless, the courts require proof of an 
improper motive before they will grant relief.  The expectation seems to be that 
commercial actors must sometimes expect their consent to transactions to be 
‘legitimately’ impaired.55 Therefore, the invocation of the language of 
unconscionability reflects a policy choice to limit relief for lawful pressure by 
                                                
53 Ibid [40]. 
54 Smith (n 7) 352-3, 362. 
55 Barton v Armstrong (n 1) 121 (Lords Wilberforce and Simon). 
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reference to the manner in which it was exercised rather than its impact on the 
claimant.  
 
It remains to be seen whether the courts will ever treat the conduct required to 
establish lawful act duress as a wrong so as to give rise to claims for 
compensation or disgorgement.  If so, the language of unconscionability would 
have a limited explanatory role to play insofar as it would remind us that – as 
in the case of trustee obligations and rectification for unilateral mistake - relief 
depends on a pre-existing moral obligation or duty,56 about which the 
defendant has reason to know as a result of the operation of her conscience, 
e.g. through the application of her moral understanding to the facts as she 
knows them to be.  The cases in which lawful act duress claims have been 
successful tend to suggest that the wrong would comprise the deliberate 
distortion of the claimant’s consent in order to extract a bargain or benefit, 
which the defendant knew to be substantively unfair or unreasonable.  It 
remains to note that the content of morally unacceptable conduct for the 
purposes of lawful act duress is very similar to that required for 
unconscionable bargains under English law.  The Australian High Court has 
recently suggested that lawful act duress be merged into the unconscionable 
bargains doctrine57 and, as we saw in the last chapter, seems to be prepared to 
treat such conduct as giving rise to a right to compensation.58  As yet, the 
English courts show no signs of following this approach.   
 
 
                                                
56 Cf. S. Smith, ‘A Duty to Make Restitution’ (2013) 26 Canadian Law and Jurisprudence 157, 
175. 
57 ANZ Banking Group Ltd v Karam [2005] NSWCA 344, [61], [66] (judgment of the court).   
This is controversial: compare K. Mason, ‘Economic Duress’ in S. Degeling and J. Edelman 
(eds), Unjust Enrichment in Commercial Law (Thomson 2008) 288 (welcomes the move) and 
R. Bigwood, ‘Throwing the Baby out with the Bathwater?  Four Questions on the Demise of 
Lawful-Act Duress in New South Wales’ (2008) 27 UQLJ 41, 82-84 (prefers to retain a 
separate category of duress to deal with cases of coercion and would deal with cases of 
necessity under the unconscionable bargains doctrine).  
58 Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd [2013] HCA 25. 
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CONSCIENCE AND UNDUE INFLUENCE  
Cause of Action and Rationale 
 
A claimant may rescind a gift or contract for undue influence if she can show 
her intention to make the gift or to transact was a product of the defendant’s 
influence over her, rather than her own independent and unfettered powers of 
decision.59  On occasion, compensation has also been awarded in response to 
undue influence.60   The cause of action may be established in one of two ways.  
If the claimant can point to a relationship of trust and confidence and show that 
the transaction is one that calls for explanation, e.g. because it is not obviously 
explained by ordinary motives, such as friendship,61 the burden shifts to the 
defendant to show that the transaction was unimpeachable, i.e. that the 
claimant entered into it free of her influence.62  To this end, the defendant 
needs to show that the transaction ‘was the spontaneous act of the donor acting 
under circumstances which enabled him to exercise an independent will.’63  
She may do this by demonstrating the claimant was not under her influence at 
the time of the transaction64 or, if she was, by liberating the claimant from her 
influence,65 e.g. by insisting she take independent advice.66    
 
Alternatively, the claimant may prove actual undue influence without the aid 
of the presumption if she can show that the defendant actively exercised 
influence over her, e.g. in the form of pressure67 or dominance.68  For these 
purposes she must show that the defendant had the capacity to influence her, 
                                                
59 Huguenin v Baseley (1807) 14 Ves 273; 33 ER 526. 
60 Jennings v Cairns [2003] EWCA Civ 1935. 
61 Allcard v Skinner (1887) 35 Ch D 145 (CA), 185 (Lindley LJ); Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v 
Etridge (No. 2) [2001] UKHL 44, [2002] 2 AC 773, 796, [13] (Lord Nicholls).  
62 Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 AC 180 (HL), 190 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
63 Allcard v Skinner (n 61) 171 (Cotton LJ); Enonchong, Duress, Undue Influence and 
Unconscionability (n 31) 287, [12-003]. 
64 Davies v Dobson 7 July 2000 (Chancery Division 7 July 2000 (Geoffrey Vos QC)). 
65 Powell v Powell [1900] 1 Ch 243, 245, 246 (Farwell J); Inche Noriah v Shaik Allie Bin 
Omar [1929] AC 127 (PC), 134; Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) (n 61) 798, [20] 
(Lord Nicholls). 
66 Inche Noriah v Shaik Allie Bin Omar (n 65) 134, 135 (Lord Hailsham LC) or because there 
was a break in the chain of causation: Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (n 19) 462-5. 
67 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) (n 61) 795, [8] (Lord Nicholls). 
68 Dunbar Bank Plc v Nadeem [1998] 3 All ER 876 (CA), 883 (Millett LJ). 
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exercised that influence, the influence was undue and its exercise brought 
about the transaction.69 Sometimes, where the parties are in a relationship of 
trust and confidence and the defendant actively wields influence over the 
claimant,70 actual and presumed undue influence may be pleaded as 
alternatives.71  Where the parties are not in a relationship of trust and 
confidence, but the defendant actively exercises influence through acts of 
pressure or coercion,72 there is an obvious overlap between actual undue 
influence and duress.73  
 
There is a debate as to whether the doctrine of undue influence responds to the 
need to protect the claimant’s autonomy, prevent the defendant’s wrongdoing 
or both.74  Broadly speaking, there are two lines of authority.  The first 
suggests that the purpose of granting relief for undue influence (actual or 
presumed) is to prevent the defendant’s wrongdoing.75  Thus, it has been said 
                                                
69 Bank of Credit and Commerce International v Aboody (n 4) 967 (Slade LJ). 
70 These cases are relational and therefore rightly form part of the law on undue influence: P. 
Birks and N. Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ in J. Beatson and D. Friedmann (eds), 
Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Oxford University Press 1995) 77, 95; M. Chen-
Wishart, ‘Undue Influence: Beyond Impaired Consent and Wrongdoing Towards a Relational 
Analysis’ in A. Burrows and A. Rodger (eds), Mapping the Law (Oxford University Press 
2006) 217. 
71 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) (n 61) 853-4, [219], 864-5, [281], 872, [315] 
(Lord Scott). Cf. earlier authority, which suggested they were antithetical: Bank of Scotland v 
Bennett (1999) 77 P & CR 447 (CA), 465 (Chadwick LJ); R v Attorney General of England 
and Wales (n 10) [24] (Lord Hoffmann). 
72 Williams v Bayley (1866) LR 1 HL 200 (HL), 211 (Lord Cranworth LC); Mutual Finance 
Co Ltd v Wetton & Sons Ltd [1937] 2 KB 389 (KB), 396 (Porter J); and In Re Craig, Decd 
[1971] 1 Ch 95 (ChD); W. Winder, ‘Undue Influence and Coercion’ (1939) 3 MLR 97; Royal 
Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) (n 61) 872, [312] (Lord Scott) (blackmail). 
73 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) (n 61) 795, [8] (Lord Nicholls) (overlap in 
cases where the defendant exerts pressure).   As to whether or not the pressure cases should be 
dealt with as part of the doctrine of duress, cf. Birks and Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue 
Influence’ (n 70) 63, 64; Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (n 19) 384-5; Chen-Wishart (n 70) 
216, 217; M. Chen-Wishart, ‘Undue Influence: Vindicating Relationships of Influence’ [2006] 
CLP 231 262-3. 
74 Chen-Wishart, ‘Undue Influence: Beyond Impaired Consent and Wrongdoing Towards a 
Relational Analysis’ (n 70); Chen-Wishart, ‘Undue Influence: Vindicating Relationships of 
Influence’ (n 73) argues for a relational analysis incorporating both concerns and the need to 
prevent substantive unfairness. 
75 Allcard v Skinner (n 61) 183 (Lindley LJ); Lancashire Loans Ltd v Black [1934] 1 KB 380 
(CA), 401-4 (Scrutton LJ); Re Brocklehurst's Estate [1978] Ch 14, 40 (Bridge LJ); National 
Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] AC 686 (HL), 705 (Lord Scarman); Barclays Bank 
Plc v O'Brien (n 62) 189-90 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); Cheese v Thomas [1994] 1 WLR 129 
(CA), 138 (Nicholls VC); Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All ER 144 
(CA), 153-4 (Millett LJ); Dunbar Bank Plc v Nadeem (n 68) 883 (Millett LJ); Royal Bank of 
Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) (n 61) 795, [8]-[9], 800, [32]-[33] (Lord Nicholls); National 
223 
 
that in cases of undue influence ‘the court is concerned with the conscience or 
behaviour of the party deriving the benefit rather than with any lack of consent 
on the part of the loser’,76 and equity ‘sets aside transactions obtained by the 
exercise of undue influence because such conduct is unconscionable’.77  In RBS 
plc v Etridge78 the House of Lords endorsed the wrongdoing rationale. Lord 
Nicholls held that undue influence consisted of ‘two forms of unacceptable 
conduct’.79  In his view, actual undue influence ‘comprises overt acts of 
improper pressure or coercion such as unlawful threats.’80  Lord Hobhouse held 
it was ‘an equitable wrong committed by the dominant party against the other 
which makes it unconscionable for the dominant party to enforce his legal 
rights against the other.’81   Lord Nicholls held further that presumed undue 
influence involves the defendant taking ‘unfair advantage’ of her relationship 
with the claimant by preferring her own interests.82   There is academic support 
for the wrongdoing rationale on the basis that undue influence involves either 
the defendant’s exploitation of her relationship with the claimant83 or, at the 
very least, her failure to take reasonable steps to protect the claimant from 
transactional harm.84  
 
According to a second line of authority, whilst actual undue influence may 
involve wrongdoing, the courts intervene in cases of presumed undue influence 
on the grounds of public policy in order to protect those subject to influence in 
relationships of trust and confidence, and thus no proof of misconduct is 
                                                
Commercial Bank (Jamaica) Ltd v Hew's Executors [2003] UKPC 51, [28] (Lord Millett); R v 
Attorney General of England and Wales (n 10) [21]-[23] (Lord Hoffmann). 
76 Dickinson v Lowery Unreported, Auld J, 23 March 1990 (QB), p20 of transcript. 
77 Dunbar Bank Plc v Nadeem (n 68), 883 (Millett LJ); Rosenfeld v Ransley [2004] EWHC 
2962 (Ch), [90] (Ferris J); Hughes v Hughes [2005] EWHC 469 (Ch), [93] (Ferris J); Royal 
Bank of Scotland Plc v Chandra [2011] EWCA Civ 192, [26] (Patten LJ). 
78 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) (n 61). 
79 Ibid 795, [8] (Lord Nicholls). 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid 820, [103] (Lord Hobhouse); Davies v AIB Group (UK) Plc [2012] EWHC 2178 (Ch); 
[2012] 2 P & CR 19, [10] (Norris J). 
82 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) (n 61) 795, [8]-[9] (Lord Nicholls). 
83 Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (n 19) 420; R. Bigwood, ‘Undue Influence: Impaired 
Consent or Wicked Exploitation’ (1996) 16 OJLS 503, 512;  R. Bigwood, ‘Undue Influence in 
the House of Lords: Principles and Proof’ (2002) 65 MLR 435, 440. 
84 R. Bigwood, ‘Contracts by Unfair Advantage: from Exploitation to Transactional Neglect’ 
(2005) 25 OJLS 65. 
224 
 
required.85    Here, the focus is on the quality of the claimant’s consent.  Thus, 
the question is whether the transaction is ‘the result of a free exercise of the 
[claimant’s] will’86 or ‘the product of full free and independent volition or, 
which comes to the same thing … the free exercise of his independent will’.87  
The transaction may be rescinded if ‘it was not the spontaneous act of the 
plaintiff acting in the requisite circumstances’.88   There is also academic 
support for the view that the consent rationale underpins both types of undue 
influence.89  On this analysis, relief is given ‘because of the impairment of the 
integrity of the plaintiff’s decision to transfer the benefit in question’90 and it 
should be possible for a claimant to rescind a contract on the ground of undue 
influence, albeit that such influence might have been innocently acquired and 
exercised.91   
 
The courts use the language of conscience and unconscionability in a number 
of different ways within the doctrine of undue influence, i.e. to describe the 
moral quality of the defendant’s conduct and/or the terms of the transaction 
itself and to explain the circumstances in which a transaction may be set aside 
against a third party creditor for undue influence.   Each of these three different 
usages is discussed below.  
Conscience, Unconscionability and the Defendant’s Conduct - Meaning 
 
The courts use the language of conscience and unconscionability in undue 
influence to suggest that where the parties are in a relationship of trust and 
                                                
85 Allcard v Skinner (n 61) 171 (Cotton LJ), 189-90 (Bowen LJ); Morley v Loughnan [1893] 1 
Ch 736 (Ch), 756 (Wright J); Powell v Powell (n 65) 247 (Farwell J); Lancashire Loans Ltd v 
Black (n 75) 412 (Lawrence LJ); Goldsworthy v Brickell [1987] Ch 378 (CA), 402 (Nourse 
LJ); Hammond v Osborn [2002] EWCA Civ 885; [2002] WTLR 1125, [32] (Nourse LJ); R v 
Attorney General of England and Wales (n 10) [40]-[41] (Lord Scott); Pesticcio v Huet (n 5) 
[20] (Mummery LJ); Macklin v Dowsett [2004] EWCA Civ 904, [10] (Auld LJ); Turkey v 
Awadh [2005] EWCA Civ 382, [19] (Buxton LJ). 
86 Allcard v Skinner (n 61) 171 (Cotton LJ). 
87 Hammond v Osborn (n 85) [60] (Ward LJ). 
88 Goldsworthy v Brickell (n 85) 402 (Nourse LJ). 
89 Birks and Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ (n 70); A. Mason, ‘The Impact of 
Equitable Doctrine on the Law of Contract’ (1998) 27 Anglo-AmLR 1, 7; C. Smith, ‘Allcard v 
Skinner’ in C. Mitchell and P. Mitchell (eds), Landmark Cases in the Law of Restitution (Hart 
2006). 
90 Birks and Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ (n 70) 61.  
91 P. Birks, ‘Undue Influence as Wrongful Exploitation’ (2004) 120 LQR 34, 36. 
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confidence for the purposes of presumed undue influence, the defendant is 
subject to moral obligations of some kind, and to express moral disapprobation 
for the defendant’s behaviour.  The cases are discussed in detail in the next 
section.  Where the issue is one of obligation, it is clear the courts are 
concerned with whether the defendant is subject to a ‘conscientious’92 or moral 
obligation.  Where the issue relates to the defendant’s conduct, although the 
courts do not expressly use the language of morality, it is clear from their 
references to exploitation and unfair advantage-taking that they are concerned 
with the moral quality of the defendant’s behaviour.   
Conscience, Unconscionability and the Defendant’s Conduct and the 
Principles by Which it is Judged 
 
Of itself, the language of conscience cannot help us to identify the obligations 
to which the defendant is subject or what counts as morally unacceptable 
conduct, nor by reference to which principles these determinations are made.  
The cases demonstrate that in cases of presumed undue influence the courts 
sometimes characterise the parties’ relationship as giving rise to an obligation 
to ensure the claimant is in a position to consent freely to the transaction or 
possibly even to act in her best interests in some way.   They also suggest that 
the defendant’s conduct may be unconscionable simply because she fails to 
ensure the claimant takes independent advice or because she engages in some 
sort of wrongful or exploitative conduct towards the claimant. Thus, the 
language of conscience and unconscionability can be interpreted consistently 
with both the consent and the wrongdoing rationales. 
Conscience and a Moral ‘Obligation’ to Enable the Claimant to Consent 
Freely to the Transaction 
 
In the context of presumed undue influence the courts have used the language 
of conscience to signify that the defendant comes under some sort of moral 
‘obligation’ to enable the claimant to consent freely to the transaction, 
                                                
92 Liddle v Cree [2011] EWHC 3294 (Ch). 
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independently of her influence.  For example, in Allcard v Skinner93 the 
claimant joined an order of nuns, subject to the rules of which she owed 
absolute obedience to her mother superior and was obliged to give up all her 
property to her relatives or the poor or the order itself.  After she joined the 
order she made a will bequeathing her property to the mother superior and 
transferred large sums of money and shares to her.  Subsequently she left the 
sisterhood, revoked her will and sought to recover the property she had 
transferred on the basis that she had been acting under the presumed undue 
influence of the mother superior.  The Court of Appeal accepted that the 
relationship was one in which influence could be presumed and that the 
transaction called for explanation.94  The mother superior could not rebut the 
presumption of undue influence because the claimant had not received 
independent advice about the transaction. In principle, therefore, the claimant 
was entitled to rescind the transaction but the claim failed for laches. 
 
In Allcard Bowen LJ held that it was important to keep separate ‘the rights of 
the donor, and the duties of the donee and the obligations which are imposed 
on the conscience of the donee by the principles of this court.’95  He found that 
the donor was not subject to duress nor was she incompetent or incapable.  She 
was a free agent and had ‘the absolute right to deal with her property as she 
chose’.96  Nevertheless:  
 
Passing next to the duties of the donee … it is plain that equity will not 
allow a person who exercises or enjoys a dominant religious influence 
over another to benefit directly or indirectly by the gifts which the 
donor makes under or in consequence of such influence, unless it is 
shewn that the donor, at the time of making the gift, was allowed full 
and free opportunity for counsel and advice outside – the means of 
considering his or her worldly position and exercising an independent 
will about it.  This is not a limitation placed on the action of the donor; 
it is a fetter placed upon the conscience of the recipient of the gift, and 
one which arises out of public policy and fair play.97 
 
                                                
93 Allcard v Skinner (n 61). 
94 Ibid 185 (Lindley LJ). 
95 Ibid 189 (Bowen LJ). 
96 Ibid 190. 
97 Ibid; cited with approval in Morley v Loughnan (n 85) 756 (Wright J); Powell v Powell (n 
85) 247 (Farwell J); Hammond v Osborn (n 85), [60] (Ward LJ). 
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Bowen LJ’s use of the language of conscience in this way evinces concern for 
the claimant’s autonomy.  In his view, the question was whether the claimant 
was subject to ‘an all-powerful religious influence which disturb[ed] [her] 
independent judgment … and subordinat[ed] for all worldly purposes’98 her 
will to the will of the mother superior.  It has been suggested in fact the 
claimant had capacity and clearly intended to make the gift to the order, so that 
her consent was not defective or lacking in a material respect.99  However, 
arguably the better view is that the claimant’s consent was distorted by the 
mother superior’s influence over her, such that it ought not to have been taken 
as a legally valid expression of her free will and autonomy.100   On this 
analysis, if the defendant fails to take steps to ensure the claimant receives 
independent advice, her conduct may be characterised as unconscionable.101  
This is reminiscent of the approach taken some of the unconscionable bargains 
cases.  For the reasons given in the last chapter, in a case like Allcard, where 
the only remedy sought is rescission, arguably the ‘obligation’ is not a real 
obligation because the only consequence of the defendant’s failure to discharge 
it is that she is disabled from enforcing the transaction. 
 
The characterisation of the need to take steps to ensure the claimant has 
independent advice about the transaction as a moral or conscientious obligation 
finds support in later cases,102 such as Jennings v Cairns.103  The claimants 
(heirs at law under a will) argued that a gift of £171,694 made by the deceased 
was procured by her niece’s presumed undue influence.  The deceased had 
paid approximately £22,000 in cash for the purposes of meeting certain school 
fees.  She paid the remainder of the sum to the trustees of insurance policies, 
                                                
98 Allcard v Skinner  (n 61) 189 (Bowen LJ). 
99 Chen-Wishart, ‘Undue Influence: Beyond Impaired Consent and Wrongdoing Towards a 
Relational Analysis’ (n 70) 207; Chen-Wishart, ‘Undue Influence: Vindicating Relationships 
of Influence’ (n 73) 237; P. Saprai, ‘Unconscionable Enrichment?’ in R. Chambers, C. 
Mitchell and J. Penner (eds), Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment 
(Oxford University Press 2009). 
100 Cf. Birks and Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ (n 70) 57, 67. 
101 K. Scott, ‘Taking the "Undue" out of Presumed Undue Influence? Hammond v Osborn’ 
[2003] Lloyds Maritime & Commercial Law Quarterly 145, 151 recognises that the failure to 
ensure the claimant receives independent advice may be characterised as unconscionable. 
102 Re Brocklehurst's Estate (n 75), 42 (Bridge LJ); O'Sullivan v Management Agency and 
Music Ltd [1985] QB 428, 463 (Fox LJ) (the defendants accepted they owed the claimant such 
a duty). 
103 Jennings v Cairns (n 60) [17] (Arden LJ). 
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which were held on trust for the benefit of the education of her niece’s 
daughters.  Rather than seeking to set aside the transaction, the claimants 
sought compensation of the original sum.  On the facts the relationship was 
one where influence could be presumed, the gift was substantial and called for 
explanation and the niece did not ensure her aunt had full independent advice 
appropriate to her needs.104  The facts suggest no obvious reason why the gift 
to the trust could not have been set aside against the beneficiaries as third party 
volunteers.105   It is unclear whether this was argued at first instance, but the 
trial judge made an order of compensation against the niece personally.  He 
found that her ‘failure to ensure that [the gift] … was made only after full free 
and informed thought does place her under a conscientious obligation to make 
compensation’ to her aunt’s estate.  The niece appealed on the basis that the 
judge’s finding of undue influence was unsustainable but she did not challenge 
the form of relief.  The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision.  
Arden LJ held that it had not been suggested that if undue influence was 
established, the trial judge could not have ordered the niece personally to make 
compensation rather than order rescission of the transactions.  Therefore, the 
Court of Appeal did not hear argument on that point.106  Ultimately, the trial 
judge’s approach sends mixed signals.  On the one hand, the suggestion that 
the defendant is required to ensure the claimant gives free consent is consistent 
with the consent rationale.  On the other, the indication that a failure to do so 
gives rise to compensation is consistent with the wrongdoing rationale. 
 
The judgment of Briggs J in Liddle v Cree107 also supports the view that the 
relationship of trust and confidence may give rise to moral obligations.  The 
parties’ relationship had ended and in 2009 they agreed to partition their farm.  
They reached agreement in principle in 2009, the partition was substantially 
completed by March 2010 and it was registered in August 2010.  One of the 
grounds on which Mr Liddle sought to rescind the transaction was presumed 
                                                
104 Ibid [34], [35], [42]. 
105 In accordance with the rule in Bridgeman v Green (1757) Wilm 58; 97 ER 22.  For a recent 
discussion of this principle, see P. Ridge, ‘Third Party Volunteers and Undue Influence’ 
(2014) 130 LQR 112. 
106 Jennings v Cairns (n 60) [45]. 
107 Liddle v Cree (n 92). 
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undue influence but his claim failed.  He argued that as a result of his declining 
health he placed trust and confidence in Mrs Cree in relation to the transaction, 
which was ultimately disadvantageous to him.  Briggs J accepted that during 
2009 Mr Liddle had placed limited trust and confidence in Mrs Cree that she 
‘would honestly and fairly supervise the steps required to bring [the partition] 
about,’108 but she had done nothing to abuse that trust when implementing the 
partition.  He held further that he was troubled by the fact that by the time the 
partition was registered in August 2010, Mr Liddle’s health had declined to the 
point where the transaction had become a very imprudent one from his 
perspective.   He then asked himself whether during 2010 the parties’ 
relationship imposed on Mrs Cree ‘an equitable duty to re-consider the 
Partition upon which they had agreed in 2009, or at least to encourage him to 
seek independent advice about its wisdom, before it became irrevocable.’109   
He concluded that she was under no such duty.  The deal was effectively 
concluded between the parties at the end of March 2010 and from then on, it 
would have been wrong to treat Mrs Cree as under any ‘conscientious 
obligation … to assist Mr Liddle to reconsider, or withdraw from it.’110  
However, Mr Liddle’s health only began to deteriorate from late May 2010 
onwards.  Moreover, although by mid-2010 the deal was an unwise one for Mr 
Liddle, it was not unfair ‘in terms of value’.111  He added, ‘[W]hile some 
elements of an obligation to have regard to Mr Liddle’s best interests might 
have arisen or persisted if his health had failed while they were still co-
habiting’, it was difficult to see how ‘an obligation to have regard to Mr 
Liddle’s best interests’112 arose for the first time in 2010.    
 
Briggs J’s approach to presumed undue influence clearly suggests that he 
regarded the required relationship of trust and confidence as giving rise to a 
conscientious or moral obligation but he did not clarify the content, scope or 
effect of such an obligation.  It seems that at the very least it requires the 
defendant to encourage the claimant to take independent advice and possibly to 
                                                
108 Ibid [72] (Briggs J). 
109 Ibid [83]. 
110 Ibid [84]. 
111 Ibid [86]. 
112 Ibid [88]. 
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act in her best interests more generally.  Because there was no relationship of 
trust and confidence at the relevant time and, even if there had been, Mr Liddle 
sought only to rescind the transaction, Briggs J did not have to decide whether 
Mrs Cree came under a positive, enforceable moral obligation, the breach of 
which would have constituted a wrong.  
 
There is other academic and judicial support for the proposition that the 
relationship of trust and confidence between the parties does generate positive 
obligations to which the defendant is subject.  However, views differ as to the 
nature and effect of those obligations.  Thus, Chen-Wishart argues that 
rescission for presumed undue influence may be explained by the fact that the 
defendant comes under an obligation ‘to protect the claimant’s welfare interest 
… or successfully emancipate the claimant to protect her own welfare 
interest’113 and Bigwood has suggested that the defendant comes under a duty 
to take reasonable steps to protect the claimant from foreseeable transactional 
harm.114 In his view, a failure to comply with this duty is the minimum conduct 
necessary to excuse the claimant from performing the contract,115 but proof of 
exploitation might well generate a right to damages or an account of profits.  
He and others also support the view that the relationship of trust and 
confidence between the parties generates a fiduciary obligation (or something 
like it) to act in the best interests of the claimant.116  Again, this is consistent 
with the wrongdoing rationale. 
 
                                                
113 Chen-Wishart, ‘Undue Influence: Beyond Impaired Consent and Wrongdoing Towards a 
Relational Analysis’ (n 70) 220-1. 
114 Bigwood, ‘Contracts by Unfair Advantage: from Exploitation to Transactional Neglect’ (n 
84). 
115 Ibid 94. 
116 Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113 (HCA), 135 (Dixon J); Lloyd's Bank Ltd v Bundy 
[1975] QB 326, 342-3 (Sir Eric Sachs); Cheese v Thomas (n 75), 133 (Lord Nicholls) (this was 
accepted by the parties); Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) (n 61) 820, [104] (Lord 
Hobhouse).  See also 795, [9] (Lord Nicholls); Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Chandra (n 77) 
[24]-[26] (Patten LJ); L. Sealy, ‘Undue Influence and Inequality of Bargaining Power’ [1975] 
CLJ 21, 22;  P. Millett, ‘Equity's Place in the Law of Commerce’ (1998) 114 LQR 214, 219; 
Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (n 19) 406-23; Bigwood, ‘Undue Influence in the House of 
Lords: Principles and Proof’ (n 83) 441-4; P. Ridge, ‘Uncertainties Surrounding Undue 
Influence: Its Formulation, Application and Relationship to Other Doctrines’ [2003] NZL Rev 
329, 332-8. 
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Unconscionable Conduct - Exploitation 
 
The courts have also used the language of unconscionability in cases of actual 
and presumed undue influence to indicate that the defendant’s conduct is 
morally unacceptable because she consciously takes advantage of the claimant.  
Where the language of unconscionability is used in this way it suggests that the 
aim of granting relief in response to undue influence is to prevent the 
defendant from enforcing obligations resulting from her own wrongdoing 
rather than excusing the claimant from obligations to which she did not 
properly consent.  For example, in BCCI v Aboody117 Mr Aboody actively and 
deliberately exercised influence over his wife in order to get her to consent to 
transactions guaranteeing the debts of the family company of which they were 
both shareholders.  He also deliberately refrained from explaining the risks of 
the transaction to her but did not intend to cause her harm; rather he was overly 
optimistic that the fortunes of the family company would recover.  Slade LJ 
held that ‘the essence of the law of undue influence is to provide a remedy in 
cases in which, by the exercise of influence, proved by evidence or presumed, 
unfair advantage has been taken by another.’118  Mr Aboody clearly ‘intended 
and knew that without any discussion or consideration of risk [the wife] would 
sign security documents for a series of increasingly large overdrafts of the 
company’119 and he never discussed the risks with her.  The fact that he 
deliberately concealed the risks rather than actively misrepresenting them and 
did not intend to injure his wife did not ‘save his conduct from being 
unconscionable or absolve him from a charge of actual undue influence.’120  
Therefore, had the transactions been held to be manifestly disadvantageous to 
Mrs Aboody (they were not), she would have been entitled to rescind them. 
 
In Dunbar Bank plc v Nadeem121 Mr Nadeem owed the claimant bank £1.4 
million, which was repayable on demand.  He fell into arrears and in order to 
improve his position, sought to borrow more money to fund the joint purchase 
                                                
117 Bank of Credit and Commerce International v Aboody (n 4). 
118 Ibid 969 (Slade LJ). 
119 Ibid 969. 
120 Ibid 969, 970. 
121 Dunbar Bank Plc v Nadeem (n 68). 
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with his wife of a new leasehold of the family home (at the time he was sole 
lessee).  The bank agreed to lend a further £260,000 but did not deal with the 
wife or advise her to take independent advice.  The bank advanced the money, 
subject to the grant of security by an all monies charge over the family home, 
under which the wife became liable not only for her joint debts with her 
husband but also for his personal debts to the bank.  The husband used 
£210,000 to purchase the joint leasehold interest and the remainder to clear his 
personal arrears.  He later fell into arrears again and the bank sought to enforce 
the charge.  The wife argued that her consent had been procured by undue 
influence.  The judge agreed but held that, as she had received an interest in 
the property, she needed to repay the bank half the money advanced.  She 
appealed against the imposition of the condition and the bank cross-appealed 
on the basis that the transaction was not manifestly disadvantageous to her.   
 
The Court of Appeal held that the transaction was not manifestly 
disadvantageous to the wife as she had obtained an interest in the family home.  
Moreover, the husband had not taken unfair advantage of her and his conduct 
could not be described as unconscionable.  Therefore, her appeal failed and the 
bank’s cross-appeal succeeded.   As far as actual undue influence was 
concerned, Millett LJ rejected the trial judge’s finding that it required proof of 
coercion, pressure or deliberate concealment.  In his view, the exercise of 
dominance per se might well suffice and it was established on the facts.122  
However, he held he did not need to decide the point because Mr Nadeem had 
not taken unfair advantage of his wife, which in his view was an essential 
ingredient of actual and presumed undue influence.   He was not guilty of 
‘exploiting the trust reposed in him for his own benefit but seeking to turn an 
opportunity of his own, at least in part, to his wife’s advantage’123 by giving her 
an interest in the family home.   Millett LJ concluded: 
 
The court of equity is a court of conscience.  It sets aside transactions 
obtained by the exercise of undue influence because such conduct is 
unconscionable.  But however the present case is analysed, whether as 
a case of actual or presumed undue influence, the influence was not 
                                                
122 Ibid 883 (Millett LJ). 
123 Ibid. 
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undue.  It is impossible, in my judgment, to criticise Mr Nadeem’s 
conduct as unconscionable.124   
 
Millett LJ’s remarks suggest that the defendant’s conduct will be 
unconscionable for the purposes of actual and presumed undue influence only 
if she exploits the claimant, i.e. by using her influence to extract the claimant’s 
consent to a transaction which is to the claimant’s disadvantage and her own 
benefit.  This use of the language of unconscionability suggests that the courts 
are concerned to prevent the defendant from benefiting from her own wrongful 
conduct. 
 
Where actual undue influence is pleaded, the courts seem to look for proof of 
deliberate and conscious acts of exploitation at the time of the transaction. 
Thus, transactions have been rescinded where, e.g. the claimant gave most of 
his wealth to the defendant as a result of religious and personal influence, 
which the defendant had deliberately cultivated for that purpose,125 and where 
the defendant ‘mercilessly exploited’ his cognitively impaired girlfriend by 
persuading her to take out a mortgage and pay most of the funds to his 
company without explaining the transactions and without regard to her 
interests.126   More recently, in Daniel v Drew127 a nephew deliberately exerted 
pressure and repeatedly tried to persuade his elderly and vulnerable aunt to 
resign as trustee of a trust for sale over a farm, of which he, his brother and his 
cousin (her son) were beneficiaries.  Her resignation would have given him 
and his brother control as trustees and left her son’s interests unprotected.  
When the aunt asked him if her son could replace her as trustee, the nephew 
untruthfully said he could not.  Ward LJ seemed to embrace the consent 
rationale insofar as he held that ‘in all cases of undue influence the critical 
question is whether or not the persuasion or the advice, in other words the 
influence, has invaded the free volition of the donor to accept or reject the 
persuasion or advice or withstand the influence.’128  However, he then went on 
                                                
124 Ibid 884. 
125 Morley v Loughnan (n 85) 756 (Wright J). 
126 Burbank Securities Ltd v Wong [2008] EWHC 552 (Ch). 
127 Daniel v Drew [2005] EWCA Civ 507. 
128 Ibid [36] (Ward LJ). 
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to consider not just whether the nephew’s conduct impaired or distorted his 
aunt’s consent but also whether his conduct was improper in some way.  He 
held that the nephew had engaged in ‘overt acts of improper pressure or 
coercion or persuasive conduct’,129 which amounted to ‘improper or undue 
influence and the unfair procurement of her consent’.130  He had seized upon 
the opportunity to get his aunt to confirm that she had resigned, ‘knowing that 
what she had said was not true … He opportunistically exploited the advantage 
thus presented to him of having her “cornered”.  He chose not to involve her 
solicitors or [her son] in order “to take advantage of his Aunt’s naiveté in 
business matters”.’131  For all these reasons the judge was right to conclude that 
the aunt’s consent ‘“ought not fairly to be treated as an expression of her free 
will”.’132  He concluded that the nephew’s actions ‘were unconscionable’133 and 
the deed of resignation should be set aside.     
 
Lord Millett’s decision in National Commercial Bank of Jamaica v Hew’s 
Executors134 suggests that where the claimant seeks to set aside a transaction 
for presumed undue influence, a finding as to whether or not the defendant has 
been guilty of exploitation may sometimes turn on evidence as to the 
substantive (un)fairness of the transaction.  The 74-year old defendant 
borrowed money from the claimant bank to fund a housing development 
project at a place called Barrett Town.  The bank insisted the money be applied 
only in respect of the development project, the interest rate was 20% over 
prime rate and the bank took security over other land belonging to the 
claimant.  The project failed and the bank sought possession of the other land.  
The defendant alleged that he entered into the transaction under the presumed 
undue influence of the bank manager and it should be rescinded.  His claim 
succeeded at first instance and before the Jamaican Court of Appeal.  On 
appeal to the Privy Council, Lord Millett confirmed that in his view 
unconscionable conduct for the purposes of both presumed and actual undue 
                                                
129 Ibid [45]. 
130 Ibid [46]. 
131 Ibid [46]. 
132 Ibid [47]. 
133 Ibid [48]-[49], citing Allcard v Skinner (n 61) 181-2 (Lindley LJ).  
134 National Commercial Bank (Jamaica) Ltd v Hew's Executors (n 75). 
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influence requires exploitation.  He held that undue influence was ‘one of the 
grounds on which equity intervenes to give redress where there has been some 
unconscionable conduct on the part of the defendant.  It arises whenever one 
party has acted unconscionably by exploiting the influence to direct the 
conduct of another which he has obtained from the relationship between 
them.’135   In his view, there were two elements to the claim: there had to be ‘a 
relationship capable of giving rise to the necessary influence’ and ‘the 
influence … must have been abused’.136 The trial judge had found that the 
necessary relationship of trust and confidence between the claimant and the 
bank’s representative had been established to support the presumption of 
undue influence.   
 
Lord Millett concluded that there was little evidence to support the finding that 
the parties were in a relationship of special influence but this was essentially a 
matter of impression and so the court would not gainsay it.137  He then 
considered whether the influence had been abused or ‘unfairly exploited’ by 
the bank,138 and held that for these purposes it was always ‘highly relevant that 
the transaction in question was manifestly disadvantageous to the person 
seeking to set it aside; though this is not always necessary.’139 Equity would not 
intervene unless the defendant ‘has exploited his influence to obtain some 
unfair advantage from the vulnerable party.’140  The bank had derived no unfair 
advantage from the transaction ‘which it would not have sought to obtain from 
an ordinary arm’s length transaction with a commercial borrower’,141 and so 
the claim failed.  
 
The cases discussed above demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct may be 
described as unconscionable or morally unacceptable because she failed to take 
steps to ensure the claimant was able to consent to the transaction freely or 
because she behaved wrongfully by exploiting her influence to take unfair 
                                                
135 Ibid [28] (Lord Millett). 
136 Ibid [29]. 
137 Ibid [31]. 
138 Ibid [33]. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid [34]. 
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advantage of the claimant.  Therefore, as in the case of unconscionable 
bargains, the language of conscience is consistent with both the consent and 
wrongdoing rationales and makes it hard to distinguish between them.  
Moreover, what precisely constitutes exploitative conduct is unclear, but 
Dunbar and Hew’s Executors suggest it may require the defendant not to use 
her influence over the claimant deliberately to extract a benefit, which is 
against the claimant’s interests (and possibly, which she knows to be against 
the claimant’s interests).  If this is correct, it is very similar to the type of 
conduct that counts as morally unacceptable for the purposes of lawful act 
duress and possibly also unconscionable bargains in English law.  
Conscience and the Defendant’s Conduct – Doctrinal Function 
 
In principle, the explanatory force of the language of conscience and 
unconscionability in the doctrine of undue influence depends on the nature of 
the relief sought.   It is clear that the consent principle alone may justify 
rescission for undue influence: for these purposes, it is unnecessary to prove 
that the defendant engaged in wrongful or exploitative conduct at the time of 
the transaction.142   As elsewhere, the language of unconscionability plays no 
necessary explanatory role where the only relief sought is rescission.   The 
doctrines of mistake and misrepresentation demonstrate that if the claimant 
wishes to set aside a contract on the basis that she did not properly consent to 
it, she must also show that the defendant either knew or had reason to know 
about the problem with her consent (mistake) or caused it (misrepresentation).  
Either is sufficient to make it unreasonable for the defendant to rely on the 
appearance of consensus.  This makes it fair to displace the defendant’s 
interest in security of receipt, and she is disabled from enforcing the contract.      
 
                                                
142 Goldsworthy v Brickell (n 85), 401, 402 (Nourse LJ); Hammond v Osborn (n 85) [25], [30] 
(Nourse LJ), [60] (Ward LJ); Pesticcio v Huet (n 5) [20] (Mummery LJ); R v Attorney General 
of England and Wales (n 10) [45] (Lord Scott, dissenting); Macklin v Dowsett (n 85) [10] 
(Auld LJ); Turkey v Awadh (n 85) [10], [11] (Buxton LJ). Also Cheese v Thomas (n 75) 134, 
138; noted J. Mee, ‘The Remedies for Undue Influence’ [1994] LMCLQ 330, 332-3; M. Chen-
Wishart, ‘Loss Sharing, Undue Influence and Manifest Disadvantage’ (1994) 110 LQR 173, 
177. 
237 
 
The nature of influence makes it difficult to decide whether the appropriate 
analogy in undue influence cases is with mistake or misrepresentation.  As far 
as presumed undue influence is concerned, on the one hand we might say the 
defendant does not cause the problem with the claimant’s consent.  It may arise 
simply from the fact that the claimant trusts her or is in her thrall.  On this 
analysis, the correct analogy is with unilateral mistake or unconscionable 
bargains and thus, the defendant must know or have reason to know that her 
influence is causing a problem with the claimant’s consent in order to be 
disabled from setting aside the contract.143  On the other hand, we might say 
that the influence (and hence the problem with consent) arises only because of 
the claimant’s relationship with the defendant, so the latter should be treated as 
having caused it and the better analogy is therefore with misrepresentation.144  
The same choice faces us in cases of actual undue influence: the defendant 
usually causes the problem with the claimant’s consent by exerting pressure, 
but it seems possible that it may also arise simply by virtue of her position of 
dominance.145   
 
The fact that the defendant’s knowledge is not an element of the cause of 
action for either presumed or actual undue influence (even though it is usually 
implicit in the former146 and visible in the latter) suggests that the better 
analogy is with misrepresentation.   On this analysis, the fact that the defendant 
caused the problem with the claimant’s consent is enough to make it 
unreasonable for her to rely on the appearance of consensus and to displace her 
interest in security of receipt, so that it is fair to disable her from enforcing the 
contract.  Therefore, any references to unconscionability in cases of undue 
influence arise ex post147 and the language of conscience plays no explanatory 
role.  Even if the better analogy is with mistake and unconscionable bargains, 
the language of conscience still plays no or no necessary explanatory role.  As 
                                                
143 Bigwood, ‘Contracts by Unfair Advantage: from Exploitation to Transactional Neglect’ (n 
84) 66. 
144 Birks, ‘Undue Influence as Wrongful Exploitation’ (n 91) 36. 
145 Dunbar Bank Plc v Nadeem (n 68) 883 (Millett LJ). 
146 Johnson v Buttress (n 116) 135 (Dixon J); Lloyd's Bank Ltd v Bundy (n 116) 341 (Sir Eric 
Sachs); Birks and Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ (n 70) 85; Bigwood, Exploitative 
Contracts (n 19) 479. 
147 Birks and Chin, ‘On the Nature of Undue Influence’ (n 70) 60-1. 
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we saw in the case of unilateral mistake, the defendant’s knowledge is per se 
sufficient to displace her interest in security of receipt and make it fair to 
disable her from enforcing the contract.   
 
We saw earlier that some of the presumed undue influence cases suggest that 
the defendant may come under an obligation to ensure the claimant is in a 
position to consent freely to the transaction or perhaps even act in her best 
interests.  If the relationship between the parties does give rise to any such 
obligations, for the reasons given above we do not need to refer to it in order to 
understand why the claimant is entitled to rescind.148  Therefore, questions of 
rescission and breach of duty ought to be analysed separately even if they arise 
on the same set of facts.149  Furthermore, even if the claimant’s right to rescind 
does depend on the defendant’s breach of an obligation to protect her from 
foreseeable transactional harm150 or to protect her welfare interests,151 the effect 
of such an ‘obligation’ is disabling rather than obligatory.  Therefore, by 
contrast with the position where equity is underwriting true moral obligations, 
the language of conscience adds nothing by way of explanation here.   In light 
of the above, it seems right to conclude that the language of conscience plays 
no necessary explanatory role in rescission for undue influence. 152   
 
By contrast, if the defendant seeks relief in the form of compensation or 
disgorgement for wrongdoing, here the language of conscience and 
unconscionability does have a discernible but limited role to play.  It reminds 
us that relief depends on the defendant’s breach of a pre-existing moral 
obligation or duty, about which she had reason to know; and that she could 
only have had reason to know about it through the application of her moral 
                                                
148 Ibid 91-2. 
149 O'Sullivan v Management Agency and Music Ltd (n 102); Mahoney v Purnell [1996] 3 All 
ER 61; L. Ho, ‘Undue Influence and Equitable Compensation’ in F. Rose (ed), Restitution and 
Equity: Vol 1: Resulting Trusts and Equitable Compensation (Mansfield Press 2000) 197; J. 
Heydon, ‘Equitable Compensation for Undue Influence’ (1997) 113 LQR 8. 
150 Bigwood, ‘Contracts by Unfair Advantage: from Exploitation to Transactional Neglect’ (n 
84) 66. 
151 Chen-Wishart, ‘Undue Influence: Beyond Impaired Consent and Wrongdoing Towards a 
Relational Analysis’ (n 70) 220-1. 
152 Cf.  R. Bigwood, ‘Conscience and the Liberal Conception of Contract: Observing Basic 
Distinctions, Part 1’ (2000) 16 JCL 1, 17-18, who argues that it plays a ‘corrective justice’ 
function; Bigwood, Exploitative Contracts (n 19) 420, 476, 477. 
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understanding to her knowledge of the facts, i.e. through the operation of her 
conscience.  However, of itself the language of conscience does not help us to 
identify the content of that obligation, nor can it tell us what or how much the 
defendant must know before she is bound by it.  Here, we need direct moral 
and legal argument as to what the law is or ought to be trying to achieve in this 
area.  For example, we might treat the duty as essentially a negative one, i.e. 
not to exercise undue influence deliberately or negligently.153  Alternatively, as 
has been suggested, we might characterise it as a positive duty of care to 
protect the claimant from transactional harm154 or to protect her welfare 
interests or enable her to do so herself,155 or a duty not to exploit the claimant 
by deliberately compromising her consent in order to extract a bargain that is 
inimical to her interests,156 or even a fiduciary duty of loyalty.157  
Unconscionability and the Terms of the Transaction 
 
The courts have occasionally used the language of unconscionability to 
describe the morally unacceptable nature of the terms of the transaction itself. 
Thus, a transaction may be morally unacceptable or wrongful because it is 
‘immoderate or irrational’158 or ‘unconscionable’, e.g. because it constitutes a 
sale at an undervalue.159  The terms of a transaction have also been described as 
‘harsh and unconscionable’,160 so much so that the transaction ‘shocks the 
conscience of the court’.161   Here, unconscionability bears one of its ordinary 
meanings.  The transaction is unconscionable in the sense that it disadvantages 
the claimant (and benefits the defendant) in an unreasonably excessive way.   
                                                
153 Ho (n 149), esp 207. 
154 Bigwood, ‘Contracts by Unfair Advantage: from Exploitation to Transactional Neglect’ (n 
84). 
155 Chen-Wishart, ‘Undue Influence: Beyond Impaired Consent and Wrongdoing Towards a 
Relational Analysis’ (n 70) 220-1. 
156 As the judgments of Millett LJ in Dunbar Bank Plc v Nadeem (n 68) and Lord Millett in 
National Commercial Bank (Jamaica) Ltd v Hew's Executors (n 75) would seem to suggest. 
157 See the authorities at n 116. 
158 National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan (n 75) 704, 707 (Lord Scarman), citing Bank of 
Montreal v Stuart [1911] AC 120 (PC); Bank of Credit and Commerce International v Aboody 
(n 4) 961 (Slade LJ). 
159 National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan (n 75) 704, 706-7 (Lord Scarman).    
160 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch (n 75) 146 (Nourse LJ). 
161 Ibid 152 (Millett LJ). 
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In other words, here the language of conscience points to the fact that the 
transaction is substantively unfair. 
 
The function of the language of unconscionability in this context is very 
limited.   Although for a while it seemed that the claimant had to prove that the 
transaction was manifestly disadvantageous to her in all cases of undue 
influence,162 subsequently the House of Lords held that manifest disadvantage 
was not an element of the cause of action for actual undue influence163 and then 
held that the term should be abandoned altogether.164  Now, in cases of 
presumed undue influence the question is merely whether the transaction ‘calls 
for explanation’ because it ‘is not readily explicable by the relationship of the 
parties’,165 and if it does, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant.   This 
requirement really just acts as a check on the presumption that all transfers 
between parties in a relationship of trust and confidence result from undue 
influence.166  More generally, the relevance of substantive unfairness seems to 
be purely evidential in that its presence or absence may bolster other 
findings,167 e.g. as to the nature of the parties’ relationship,168 whether or not the 
claimant’s consent was distorted,169 whether the defendant was incentivized to 
exercise influence,170 and whether the defendant took unfair advantage of the 
claimant171 and/or exercised influence.172  Ultimately, the use of the language of 
unconscionability to describe substantive unfairness has declined and in any 
                                                
162 National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan (n 75) 704-8; applied, Coldunell Ltd v Gallon 
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case, has no real explanatory force.  A finding that the terms of the transaction 
were morally unacceptable merely begs the question why and this simply re-
directs us to arguments about the moral principles that underpin the doctrine. 
 Conscience and Third Parties 
 
The courts have also used the idea of conscience to explain how undue 
influence may affect third party creditors in accordance with the principles 
identified by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien.173   
Where a wife acting under the undue influence of her husband provides 
security for his borrowings, if the creditor has actual or constructive notice of 
the undue influence the wife can set aside the transaction against the creditor174 
unless the creditor has taken ‘reasonable steps to satisfy [her]self that the 
borrower understands what the transaction involves and is entering willingly 
into it.’175  Broadly speaking, it can do this by meeting privately with the wife, 
explaining the transaction to her and urging her to take independent advice.176   
Lord Browne-Wilkinson made it clear that the standard was notice and the test 
has been gradually refined to the point where ‘a bank is put on inquiry 
whenever a wife offers to stand surety for her husband’s debts.’177   It may also 
apply to other relationships of trust and confidence and then the question is 
whether the creditor has notice of ‘the circumstances from which the 
presumption of undue influence is alleged to arise’.178 
 
Although Lord Browne-Wilkinson did not use the language of conscience in 
O’Brien, the courts have since used it to characterise the way in which the 
third party creditor is affected by notice of the undue influence, e.g. through 
                                                
173 Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien (n 62). 
174 Ibid 191 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). Cf. Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649, (1939) ALR 62 
(HCA); and Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 395, (1998) 155 ALR 614 
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175 Northern Bank Ltd v McCarron [1995] NI 258 (Ch) p. 9 of transcript (Carswell LJ).  
176 Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien (n 62) 196 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson); approved, Royal Bank 
of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) (n 61), where the House of Lords further refined the detailed 
nature of these steps. 
177 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) (n 61) 804, [44] (Lord Nicholls); 823, [110] 
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‘the action of equity upon the conscience’ of the third party.179  Thus, it has 
been held that: the question is ‘whether, in all the circumstances which exist, 
the conscience of the party alleged to have constructive notice is affected;’180 
what is required of the creditor ‘comes back to the question of notice and the 
action of equity upon the conscience of the creditor;’181 ‘it is necessary to show 
that the conscience of the party who seeks to uphold the transaction was 
affected by notice, actual or constructive, of the impropriety by which it was 
obtained’;182 and, because the undue influence has been exerted by the 
husband, ‘there has to be some additional factor before the lender’s conscience 
is affected and he is to be restrained from enforcing his legal rights.’183     
 
The use of the language of conscience in the third party cases is consistent with 
our ordinary understanding of conscience in that it reminds us that the 
principle by reference to which the creditor is disabled from enforcing the 
contract is a moral principle.  However, as elsewhere, it cannot identify the 
moral principle at stake.  Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained the principle 
underlying his approach by analogy with land law.  In his view, ‘there are two 
innocent parties, each enjoying rights, the earlier right prevails against the later 
right if the acquirer of the later right knows of the earlier right (actual notice) 
or would have discovered it had he taken proper steps (constructive notice).’184  
The notice analogy may be inexact185 but nevertheless it seems right to judge 
the creditor’s ability to enforce the contract by reference to whether it knew or 
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ought to have known that it was produced by influence.  If the only question is 
whether the wife may rescind the transaction against the creditor, the answer 
arguably depends on the operation of the consent principle.  
  
By analogy with mistake and misrepresentation, the wife must be entitled to 
rescind the contract if she can show that her consent was impaired and the 
other party (the creditor) either knew or had reason to know of, or caused, the 
problem with her consent.  In third party undue influence cases, clearly the 
creditor is not actively responsible for the distortion of the claimant’s consent.  
However, if the creditor knows or ought to know that undue influence has been 
exercised, arguably this is sufficient to make it unreasonable for it to rely on 
the appearance of the claimant’s consent, unless it has taken steps to ensure 
that consent was freely given, e.g. by insisting the claimant take independent 
advice.  As in the case of unilateral mistake, the only effect of the creditor’s 
knowledge is to disable it from enforcing the contract.  The defendant’s 
knowledge is not relevant as a precondition of an enforceable moral obligation.  
Ultimately, therefore, the language of conscience has no positive explanatory 
role to play in the context of third party undue influence. 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has outlined the very limited explanatory role that the language of 
conscience and unconscionability plays in lawful act duress and undue 
influence.  Where the claimant simply seeks to rescind the transaction, the 
language of conscience adds nothing to our understanding of why relief is 
granted.  If and insofar as undue influence may be said to involve a breach of 
duty, the explanatory force of conscience is greater.  Then, the language of 
conscience reminds us that in order to be bound by such an obligation, the 
defendant must have factual knowledge, so as to enable her, through the 
process of moral reasoning, to discern and comply with it.  However, it does 
not tell us what the obligation is, by reference to which principle it arises or 
what or how much the defendant must know in order for it to be reasonable to 
treat her as bound by it.  Moreover, the use of the language of conscience in 
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both doctrines is confusing, as it is consistent with both the consent and 
wrongdoing rationales and may obscure the distinction between them.  
 
It remains to mention that some argue that the doctrines of undue influence, 
unconscionable dealing and/or duress are sufficiently similar that they should 
be merged under a general principle of unconscionability.186  There is no doubt 
that in all three doctrines the courts exhibit both a concern to ensure the 
claimant consents freely to transactions and a concern to prevent wrongdoing.  
It is also clear that insofar as the courts use the language of unconscionability 
consistently with the wrongdoing rationale, i.e. to describe positively wrongful 
conduct by the defendant at the time of the transaction, the same type of 
conduct appears to be relevant in all three doctrines.   Ultimately, however, 
unconscionability is neither a principle nor a standard by reference to which 
doctrines can be organised.   Moreover, even if the doctrines were to be 
merged, where the claimant sought only to rescind, the language of conscience 
would add nothing to our understanding of the reasons for relief.  It remains to 
be seen whether the courts will recognise a wrong based on 
unconscionable/exploitative conduct and if so, what form that wrong would 
take.   Even if such a wrong were to be recognised and it could be established 
by proof of conduct common to two or more of these doctrines, the language 
of unconscionability would still have only limited explanatory force.  It would 
remind us that relief would depend on the defendant being subject to a pre-
existing moral obligation of which she had (moral) reason to know, but beyond 
that it would tell us precious little. 
                                                
186 A. Phang, ‘Undue Influence - Methodology, Sources and Linkages’ [1995] JBL 552; A. 
Phang, ‘Vitiating Factors in Contract Law - The Interaction of Theory and Practice’ (2009) 10 
Singapore Academy of Law Journal 1, 51, 62-3; A. Phang, ‘Doctrine and Fairness in the Law 
of Contract’ (2009) 29 LS 534, 571; M. Pawlowski, ‘Unconscionability as a Unifying Concept 
in Equity’ (2001-2003) 16 Denning LJ 79; D. Capper, ‘Undue Influence and 
Unconscionability: A Rationalisation’ (1998) 114 LQR 479, 504; D. Capper, ‘The 
Unconscionable Bargain in the Common Law World’ (2010) 126 LQR 403, 419.  
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
For centuries the courts have used the language of conscience in equity.  
Although by the end of the seventeenth century, equitable principles had been 
largely systematised, so that we might expect to be able to point to a sharp 
decline in usage, the courts still regularly invoke the language of conscience 
today.  Trusts and contract law doctrine are littered with references to 
‘conscience’, ‘unconscionability’ and ‘unconscientiousness’.  This fact alone 
underlines the enduring influence of Judaeo-Christian ethics on the 
development of our legal system.   It also tells us that when the courts are 
administering equity, even now they are still concerned with underlying issues 
of morality. 
 
The choice of topic for this thesis was prompted by an evident tension between 
the fact that on the one hand, the use of the language of conscience by the 
courts is often criticised as vague or meaningless and, on the other hand, the 
fact that the courts obviously think it means something or they would not 
continue to use it so prolifically.  It is hoped that the thesis shows that an 
examination of the etymology and ordinary meaning of conscience, together 
with its development in equity, gives us a clear starting point for an 
understanding of the idea of conscience in law.  If we pay regard to its ordinary 
meaning, we understand better the synergy between external, objective moral 
standards and the internal process of moral reasoning.  This enables us to avoid 
confusing debates about whether conscience in law is objective or subjective 
and whether we are talking about the conscience of an individual litigant or 
that of the court.   In all cases where the courts invoke the language of 
conscience and unconscionability, they are concerned with whether an 
individual’s behaviour or a particular outcome accords with certain moral 
standards, to which we all have access and which we are all expected to know.     
 
Ultimately, however, the utility of the language of conscience and 
unconscionability is limited.  This thesis has demonstrated that it does play a 
useful, albeit limited, explanatory role where the question is whether the 
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defendant has come under an obligation, e.g. as a trustee, or in knowing receipt 
or dishonest assistance or to rectify a contract for unilateral mistake.  It 
reminds us that in recognising and enforcing the obligation, equity is 
underwriting a moral obligation and it will not do so unless the defendant had 
knowledge of the relevant facts.  Here, the purpose is not to identify what the 
defendant herself thought was right in the circumstances.  Rather, it is to 
ascertain whether she had sufficient knowledge of the facts so as to be in a 
position to identify what the objective standard of morality (as interpreted and 
applied by the courts through equitable doctrine) required of her in the 
circumstances.  If she did have such knowledge, the obligation will be 
recognised and enforced.   Here, the language of conscience may be said to 
perform a necessary doctrinal role.  The defendant’s knowledge is not merely 
relevant for its own sake but because it is a necessary element of the moral 
reasoning process.  It is only when the defendant has had the opportunity to 
engage in this process that equity will enforce the obligation, and the language 
of conscience helps us to understand this feature of obligations. 
 
Other than as described above, the language of conscience tells us very little.  
For example, in the law of trusts, it does not tell us why the beneficiary gets 
equitable title to the property and it cannot help us with difficult questions 
about when and why trusts arise.  Moreover, it does not help us to distinguish 
between liabilities and obligations, so its use in the context of both the bona 
fide purchase defence and knowing receipt can be confusing.  As far as trust 
obligations and the obligations of third parties go, it cannot tell us what or how 
much the trustee or third party must know before she will be subject to the 
relevant obligation.  This is particularly clear in the context of knowing receipt 
and dishonest assistance, where the courts have tied themselves up in knots 
through the use of the labels of ‘unconscionability’ and ‘dishonesty’.  
Moreover, it does not help us address the vexed question of the nature and 
extent of a trustee’s obligations under a non-express trust. 
 
The language of conscience plays an even more limited role in the contractual 
doctrines discussed in this thesis.    It can tell us that moral principles underpin 
them, but beyond this it does not elucidate.  In fact, its use in a contractual 
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context can be confusing.  For example, the use of the language of conscience 
in cases of mistake sometimes tends to suggest that rescission depends on 
whether the defendant has breached some sort of positive moral obligation to 
correct the claimant’s mistake, when this is clearly not the case.  In principle, 
all that is necessary is that the claimant’s consent was impaired and the 
defendant knew this.  Here the defendant’s knowledge is not relevant as a 
precondition to the imposition of an obligation; it simply goes to the question 
of whether it is fair to allow the claimant’s lack of consent to trump the 
defendant’s security of receipt.  Therefore, the language of conscience adds 
nothing to our understanding of why rescission is granted, beyond telling us 
that it would be morally unacceptable for the contract to be enforced.   
Furthermore, the language of conscience does not help us to identify the 
principles that justify the grant of relief, nor does it help us to choose between 
potentially competing rationales.  This is particularly clear in the case of 
unconscionable bargains and undue influence, where the cases suggest that two 
possible moral principles or rationales are at stake, i.e. a concern to protect the 
claimant’s autonomy and a concern to prevent wrongdoing.    The language of 
unconscionability is consistent with both, does not help us to choose between 
them and, to the extent that wrongful conduct is or may be required for the 
purposes of relief, does not help us to identify what conduct is wrongful for 
these purposes.  
 
The big problem with the language of conscience is that not only that it does 
not help us to answer the questions referred to above, but also that it tends to 
obscure them by eliding the different issues together, so that we are sometimes 
not sure what questions we should be asking, let alone what the answers 
should be.  This has ramifications for the coherence and transparency of 
commercial law doctrine.  In turn, any uncertainty as to the law introduces 
costs implications for litigants. It is therefore respectfully suggested that if the 
courts continue to use the language of conscience, they should pay much 
greater attention to its explanatory limitations.  In particular, they could take 
the following steps, which would assist in terms of providing greater clarity.  
First, they could and should confirm that ideas of conscience and 
unconscionability are neither principles nor standards in their own right, nor 
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should they be regarded as such.   Suggestions that doctrines should be 
combined or merged under a general principle or standard of unconscionability 
could therefore be safely ignored.  Secondly, they could acknowledge that the 
language of conscience has little, if any, explanatory power in the context of 
liabilities generally (which do not presuppose an underlying moral obligation) 
and, more specifically, in the context of rescission of contracts.  Ideally, the 
language of conscience in this context should be abandoned entirely.   In turn, 
this would allow the courts to focus more clearly on the separate question as to 
whether unconscionable bargains, undue influence and possibly even lawful 
act duress should generate relief for wrongdoing and if so, identify clearly the 
basis of any duty and what would be necessary to establish a breach.   Thirdly, 
they could expressly acknowledge the limited explanatory force of the idea of 
conscience within the context of obligations.   Retaining the language of 
conscience in this context would be unproblematic, as long as we are clear that 
its only real function is to remind us that: (i) equitable obligations are moral 
obligations; (ii) such obligations will not be imposed before the defendant has 
had the opportunity, through the process of moral reasoning, to identify what 
she ought to do in the circumstances; and (iii) factual knowledge is required 
for this purpose.   If the courts were to take this step, it would facilitate a 
sharper focus on important questions, such as which principle informs the 
relevant obligation, what its nature and scope are and/or should be and the 
scope and level of factual knowledge required in order to trigger it.   Arguably, 
it is only by adopting the suggestions made above that the courts can address 
the concerns of the critics outlined in Chapter 1 of this thesis and give some 
much needed intellectual coherence to the idea of conscience in law.  
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